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ABSTRACT 
 
The degree to which a country’s public entities observe basic principles of good corporate 
governance is an increasingly important factor for attracting investment capital, maintaining 
economic stability and encouraging growth. Zimbabwe is faced with the challenge of 
restructuring for greater efficiency and creating an investment-friendly environment, 
therefore practicing good corporate governance in public entities is crucial for success and 
economic growth. As business entities, public entities need to be managed effectively by a 
competent board, which is able to construct and implement strategies that are in the best 
interests of the entity and all stakeholders.  
 
This study focuses on the corporate governance initiatives, laws and regulations aimed at 
enhancing the effectiveness of boards of public entities in Zimbabwe. The key question 
addressed is whether or not the corporate governance initiatives and legal and regulatory 
reforms in Zimbabwe are sufficient to enable boards of public entities to effectively discharge 
their duties and meet internationally accepted corporate governance standards. A comparative 
analysis of Zimbabwe’s public entities corporate governance framework to that of South 
Africa (a developing country like Zimbabwe) and Australia (a developed country with similar 
common law heritage) is also conducted. Recommendations are made on how best to enhance 
the effectiveness of boards of public entities in order to promote good corporate governance 
practices in Zimbabwean public entities. 
 
The research established that the existing corporate governance framework has not been 
effective in improving the effectiveness of Zimbabwe public entity boards due to lack of 
commitment and consistency, political interference, weak enforcement mechanisms, 
corruption and general disregard for the rule of law. The research found that South Africa and 
Australia have performed better than Zimbabwe in terms of creating conducive environments 
for boards of public entities to effectively discharge their duties. 
 
To improve the effectiveness of public entity boards, it was found that boards should be 
properly empowered, government intervention should be minimised, board appointment 
processes should be transparent and merit-based, boards should be properly composed, board 
vi 
 
remuneration should be fair and performance related, the performance of the board should be 
regularly evaluated and effective enforcement mechanisms should be put in place.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY TERMS 
 
board composition, board effectiveness, board evaluation, board remuneration, board 
selection and appointment, corporate governance, corruption, directors’ duties, parent 
ministry, public entity boards, regulatory framework, shareholder interference, weak 
enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ENTITIES 
Corporate governance
1
 is a multi-faceted subject. It has an important theme of concurrently 
improving corporate performance and accountability of individuals involved in the 
management of an organisation
2
 with the aim of attracting financial and human resources on 
the best possible terms as well as to prevent corporate failure through pursuing objectives that 
are in the interests of the company and all stakeholders.
3
 Corporate governance has become 
an increasingly interesting subject, partly due to collapses of high profile international 
corporations,
4
 the demand for transparency and accountability in the utilisation of 
shareholders’ funds and also due to the growing awareness of the need for good corporate 
practice to attract investment capital and achieve organisational strategic goals over the long-
term. As a result, all enterprises, whether they are in the private
5
 or public
6
 sector, should 
                                                 
1 The Cadbury Report defines corporate governance “as the system by which companies are directed and controlled” thus 
referring to all aspects of the control and management of companies (Cadbury A Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (United Kingdom 1992) 14 available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf). More corporate governance definitions are referred to in Chapter 2, para 
2.2 below. 
2 Corporate governance seeks to ensure that organisations are properly directed and controlled through mechanisms that try 
to reduce or eliminate the challenges associated with synchronising the sometimes diverse interests of the principals 
(shareholders) and agents (directors or managers) (Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International 
Business (Ventus Publishing ApS 2011) 11-12). 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 
Publishing 2004) 11 available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf (accessed 
on 12 August 2013). See also Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International Business (2011) 11-12. 
4 The collapses of large corporations have had overwhelming consequences on society including the loss of jobs and 
investments. Examples of some of the corporate collapses which have resulted in wider attention being drawn towards 
company directors’ actions, skill and diligence are Enron Corporation and Worldcom in the United States of America, 
Fidentia and LeisureNet in South Africa, Rothwells Ltd and HIH Insurance Ltd in Australia and ENG Asset Management 
and Trust Bank in Zimbabwe. 
5 For private enterprises, maximisation of profit, return on investment and shareholders’ wealth are the primary objectives, 
while maximisation of productivity and sales, organisational growth, socio-economic goals, among others, are the secondary 
objectives (Bosch JK, Tait M and Venter E Business Management – An Entrepreneurial Perspective (Cape Town, Van 
Schaik 2006) 8-11). 
6 While striving to achieve more or less similar objectives to private companies, public entities have the added responsibility 
to deliver various services to the public in the most effective and efficient manner (Curristine T, Lonti Z and Joumard I 
“Improving Public Sector Efficiency: Challenges and Opportunities” (2007) 7(1) OECD Journal on Budgeting 2-3). 
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always endeavour to accomplish and uphold business success through good corporate 
governance.
7
  
 
Good corporate governance is as critical to public entities
8
 or state-owned enterprises as it is 
to private companies and non-profit organisations. It is necessary to ensure that public entities 
contribute positively to a “country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness”.9 
Ineffective corporate governance may lead to poor financial performance, lack of 
accountability and transparency in the entities with the potential of causing business failures 
and losses that, unfairly so, are eventually borne by tax payers.
10
 In trying to establish the 
main causes of failures of corporate entities, researchers have concluded that, more often than 
not, government officials, management and the board of directors
11
 are responsible and 
accountable for ineffective corporate governance structures and the poor performance of 
public entities.
12
 Thus, to achieve the desired effectiveness and business success, boards in 
                                                 
7 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11. See also Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and 
International Business (2011) 11-12. 
8 Public entities (also known as parastatals, state-owned enterprises, government-owned corporations, government business 
enterprises) are independent legal entities partially or wholly owned by a government or state and created to perform 
commercial activities on behalf of the government. They perform specific functions (for example investment promotion and 
employment creation) and operate in accordance with a particular Act. They are mostly formed to provide goods or services 
where for economic, social, political or strategic reasons; privatisation would present challenges (Arries C Comparative 
Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises 
(DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa Unpublished Thesis (Stellenbosch University 2014) 1. See 
also Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th ed (HarperCollins Publishers) available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/public ownership (accessed on 10 August 2013). Public enterprises are also defined 
as institutions or organisations which are organised by the state, or in which the state owns a majority interest (Adeyemo D 
and Salami A “A Review of Privatisation and Public Enterprise Reform in Nigeria” (2008) 4(4) Contemporary Management 
Research 401-418). The words “public entities”, “parastatals” and “state-owned enterprises” have the same meaning and are 
used interchangeably throughout the thesis. More definitions are referred to in Chapter 3, para 3.2 below. 
9 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2005) 9 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/34803211.pdf. (accessed on 13 November 2013). 
10 Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (World Bank Corporate Governance 
Department 2006) 1-3 available at http://www.rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Other/CorpGovSOEs.pdf (accessed on 1 
September 2013). 
11 A board of directors (hereinafter referred to as “the board”) is a body of elected or appointed members who jointly oversee 
the activities of a company or organisation. Generally, the board serves as a link through which shareholders exercise control 
of the company’s affairs. The board makes decisions on shareholders’ behalf through guiding long-term corporate strategy, 
putting the key agents in place to implement it and monitoring performance against the strategy set out (Azar C and 
Grimminger A Achieving Effective Boards (Global Corporate Governance Forum & OECD 2011) 1 available at 
www.oecd.org/countries/peru/48510039.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2013)). A board of directors is also viewed as a team of 
individuals with fiduciary responsibilities of leading and directing a firm, with the primary objective of protecting the firm’s 
shareholders’ interests (Abdullah SN “Board Composition, CEO Duality and Performance among Malaysian Listed 
Companies” (2004) 4 Corporate Governance 47-61). 
12 Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance 
in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 31(1) Fordham International Law Journal 34-75. 
See also OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 47. 
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public entities need to effectively discharge their duties and observe good corporate 
governance.  
 
Good corporate governance is accordingly a necessity for the modern complex and dynamic 
business environment to ensure long-term sustainability, attract investment capital, maintain 
economic stability and encourage growth.
13
 It should, as a result, be cultivated and constantly 
practiced by both private and public entities. In an economy such as Zimbabwe’s, which is 
faced with the challenge of restructuring for greater efficiency and attracting investment for 
economic growth, this is particularly important. Consequently, ways of improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness
14
 of boards of public entities should continue to be investigated 
in the context of corporate governance, to lessen the burden on taxpayers and to ensure that 
the public obtains maximum benefits from the entities.  
 
Establishing the causes of the ineffectiveness of boards and finding possible solutions to the 
existing challenges are the objectives this study seeks to achieve. The effectiveness of 
Zimbabwe’s public entity boards in discharging their duties is analysed and it is attempted to 
identify the major constraints boards encounter in seeking to effectively perform their 
mandates within the existing corporate governance framework. Thereafter, possible solutions 
are proffered to improve the effectiveness of public entity boards in promoting good 
corporate governance practices.
15
   
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The increase in corporate scandals has led to global acknowledgement of the profound impact 
of corporate governance practices on the survival of companies and indeed of public entities 
in the international economy.
16 
A number of recent studies suggest that public entities have 
                                                 
13 Atacik MC and Jarvis M Better Corporate Governance: More Value for Everyone (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 2 of 
February 2006) 1-2 available at http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/CGCSRLP/Resources/paper_02.pdf (accessed on 
12 August 2013). 
14 Board effectiveness has been defined as the degree to which a board of directors achieves the purpose of its existence. It 
refers to the proper performance of the tasks by the board as well as the ability to cohesively work together (Forbes DP and 
Milliken FJ “Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Board of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making 
Groups” (1999) 24(3) The Academy of Management Review 489-505).  
15 See Chapter 8, para 8.4 below. 
16 Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International Business (2011) 12-13. Corporate failures such as that of 
Enron and World Com were inspirational to the development of renewed interest in the role of the board of directors. 
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not used their resources efficiently and that they have imposed a burden on public finances 
due to a number of reasons, the most significant of which is a lack of good corporate 
governance.
17
 Some of the cited reasons for the poor performance by public entities are a lack 
of clarity and conflicts in their objectives; the requirements to accomplish conflicting 
economic and social objectives without adequate guidance on how to resolve this divergence; 
the use of public entities for political reasons; the absence of sufficient decision making 
powers by the board and management making it difficult to hold them accountable for the 
entity’s performance; a lack of appropriate monitoring and remuneration systems to motivate 
the board and management to effectively perform; board and management incompetence and 
corruption; failure to expeditiously adapt to technological advances and government 
interference with operational decisions.
18
 In this regard, the role and effectiveness of the 
board of directors have emerged as very important when examining the causes of poor 
corporate governance, corporate collapses and inefficiencies in public entities.
19
  
 
A number of corporate governance initiatives have been introduced to govern the operations 
of public entities and their boards. But, empowering directors to effectively discharge their 
obligations and enforcing compliance with good corporate governance practices have proved 
to be major challenges. Although substantial research has been undertaken on the 
effectiveness of boards of private enterprises, inadequate attention has been given to the 
challenges being faced by boards of public entities in effectively discharging their duties and 
promoting good corporate governance.
20
 This is so especially in developing African 
                                                 
17 Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance 
in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75.  
18 Ibid. See also Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises Unpublished Thesis 
(Massey University, New Zealand 2006) 106-107 and Swanson D and Wolde-Semait T Africa’s Public Enterprise Sector 
and Evidence of Reforms (World Bank Technical Paper Number 95, Washington, D.C 1989) 2. 
19 Many of the corporate collapses have been attributed to “self seeking” activities of too powerful directors, their apparent 
lack of personal and business ethics, lack of relevant expertise, lack of commitment and the inability of their contemporaries 
on the board to restrict them from acting improperly (Coyle B Corporate Governance (ICSA Publishing Ltd, London 2003) 
8-10). Furthermore, in public entities, state ownership and government control present inherent governance challenges that 
contribute to poor performance by boards thus resulting in poor performance by the entities (Robinett D The Challenge of 
SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 3-4). 
20 Ashe PA Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State Owned Enterprises Unpublished 
Thesis (University of Phoenix 2012) 48. See also Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – 
Executive Directors Gone to Sleep?” (2014) 17(6) IOSR Journal of Business and Management 78-86 and Maune A 
“Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” (2015) 5(1) Asian Economic and Financial Review 
167-178. 
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countries.
21
 Furthermore, there has not been much meaningful research on the effectiveness 
of boards of public entities in Zimbabwe.
22
 It is also questionable whether research results 
obtained from other regions or countries can be extended and applied without further 
investigation to Zimbabwe given the differences in the country contexts.
23
 
 
It is therefore crucial to analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of boards in promoting good 
corporate governance in public entities in Zimbabwe. These entities are of significant 
importance to the national economy for the role they play in socio-economic transformation, 
employment creation and economic growth. This research particularly focuses on the 
corporate governance initiatives, laws and regulations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of 
boards of public entities in Zimbabwe with a view to establish the nature and level of 
compliance with best practices. The key question to be addressed is whether or not boards of 
public entities have been able to effectively discharge their duties and promote good 
corporate governance. The second question is whether the corporate governance initiatives 
and legal and regulatory reforms in Zimbabwe are sufficient to enable boards of directors of 
public entities to effectively discharge their duties and meet internationally accepted 
corporate governance standards.  
 
Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework for public entities is compared to the 
frameworks of South Africa and Australia. South Africa and Australia were chosen because 
of the similarities they share with Zimbabwe. For example, all three countries’ company laws 
have historically borrowed heavily from the United Kingdom’s company law and their 
corporate governance systems consist of both mandatory and self-regulating attributes.
24
 The 
comparative analysis with South Africa aims to establish how well Zimbabwe is performing 
                                                 
21 It has been noted that corporate governance has not been studied by scholars in developing countries with the “same 
intensity as in developed countries” (Ashe PA Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State 
Owned Enterprises (2012) 48. For further confirmation of this assertion, see Maasen GF An International Comparison of 
Corporate Governance Models 3rd ed. (Spencer Stuart 2002), Moloi STM Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting 
in the Annual Reports of South African Listed Companies Unpublished Thesis (UNISA 2008) 95-97 and Shliefer A and 
Vishny RW “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 52(2) The Journal of Finance 737-783. 
22 According to Sifile et al, there is limited literature on this aspect (Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: 
Have Non – Executive Directors Gone to Sleep?” (2014) 78-86). 
23 This is based on the observation by the King Committee that companies are governed within the framework of the laws 
and regulations of the country in which they operate. Therefore, laws, regulations and practices in one country cannot be 
directly applied to another country (See “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report on Corporate Governance 
(King Committee on Corporate Governance 2009) available at www.iodsa.co.za. pdf (accessed on 11 September 2013)). 
24 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1, Chapter 5, para 5.2.1 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.1 below.    
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in comparison to neighbouring and other developing countries and what good practices it can 
emulate to improve corporate governance in its public entities.
25
 Australia was chosen for the 
main reason that it is a developed country with a shared common law heritage from which 
Zimbabwe can learn certain good corporate governance practices.
26
 Thereafter, 
recommendations are made on how best the existing initiatives and the legal and regulatory 
frameworks can be improved and how boards of public entities may be assisted to perform 
their duties diligently whilst adhering to and promoting good corporate governance practices. 
 
Within the context of corporate governance, the objectives of the research are to 
answer/determine the following questions:
27
 
1. Does a company’s performance improve by adopting good corporate governance practices? 
2. To what extent do boards of directors effectively fulfil their functions in enhancing good 
corporate governance in public entities? 
3. Are public entity boards appropriately constituted and empowered to deliver their mandate? 
4. Are public entity boards remunerated adequately to motivate them to effectively discharge 
their duties? 
5. How effective are board performance evaluation tools in assessing boards’ and individual 
directors’ performance? 
6. What practices, arrangements and/or structures should help to promote the independence and 
effectiveness of boards of public entities? 
7. Is Zimbabwe’s current legal and regulatory environment conducive to and adequate for the 
realisation and effective application of principles of good corporate governance by boards in 
public entities? 
 
 
                                                 
25 The proximity of South Africa to Zimbabwe and the social, cultural and economic similarities makes the former 
jurisdiction suitable for the comparative analysis. Moreover, Zimbabwe has significant trade relations with South Africa and 
the two countries subscribe to a number of similar institutions, for example, the African Union (AU) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  
26 In conducting the comparative analysis, it was borne in mind that the two countries’ social, cultural and economic 
conditions may be different hence the reason why their levels of corporate governance compliance may differ. However, it 
was assumed that Zimbabwe could learn from Australia’s corporate governance reforms and experiences. 
27 The questions seek to establish the general position but make specific reference to Zimbabwe. 
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1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Public entities continue to play an important role in all economies; particularly developing 
countries where there is a greater need to facilitate economic growth and sustainable 
development.
28
 For that reason, government administrators and the general public in these 
countries need to appreciate the major causes of poor corporate governance in the public 
entities. In particular, they need to understand and address why boards have not been as 
effective as they should be in promoting good corporate governance in public entities. 
Determining this was the main objective of this study.  
 
The research should be of interest to government administrators and the general public who 
have a vested interest in the assets and overall performance of public entities. The results 
from this study may influence the formulation of policies for the enhancement of efficiencies 
and corporate governance structures in public entities in Zimbabwe and in other developing 
and neighbouring countries. Exchange of good practices is beneficial amongst jurisdictions 
that are engaged in trade and other collaborative enterprises.
29
 Trade facilitation provides 
vital opportunities for countries “by increasing the benefits from open trade, and contributing 
to economic growth and poverty reduction”. 30 
 
It is hoped that the research will contribute to the debate on interventions required by 
Zimbabwe and other developing countries to accomplish the objective of enhancing the 
                                                 
28 Smith DAC and Trebilcock MJ “State Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and Alternative Reform 
Strategies” (2001) 12 European Journal of Law and Economics 217-252 available at 
link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1012817825552 (accessed on 17 August 2013). See also OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 6-7.  
29 Trade negotiations and agreements have assisted in the removal of trade barriers and contributed to the expansion of 
global trade, e.g., the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rippel B Why Trade Facilitation is 
Important for Africa (World Bank Policy Note No: 27 of 2011) available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/...html (accessed on 25 March 2014). 
30 Ibid. Africa has also benefited from exchange of information and trade facilitation arrangements between countries. 
Examples are African Trade Agreements are Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Preferential 
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
COMESA enables its members to enjoy preferential access to markets within the European Union and aims to pool its 
members’ collective resources to support the economic development efforts of its member countries. The PTA was 
established in 1981 to promote economic cooperation between member states, particularly in the areas of agriculture, 
industry, transportation, and communications. It also aims to facilitate international trade through the lowering of tariff 
barriers between states. SADC was formed in 1992 to promote economic development among southern African states (Visit 
http://africaecon.org/index.php/trade_agr/view_trade_agreement/22/0/_/5 for more information). Also see The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2013 prepared by World Economic Forum, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, available at http://www.worldbank.org/../dam/Worldbank/doc/Africa/Report/africa-
competitiveness-report-2013-main-report-web.pdf (accessed on 17 March 2015). 
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effectiveness of boards in promoting good corporate governance within public entities. In 
particular, the research may assist policymakers, legislatures, board members and other 
scholarly researchers. The policymakers would be assisted to create policies on future 
direction of corporate governance reform in public entities. The legislatures may be assisted 
to develop laws and regulations which will capacitate directors to effectively discharge their 
duties and improve the compliance of public entities with good corporate governance 
practices. The boards of public entities may benefit from the research in that they may be 
enabled to better understand and handle challenges they encounter when performing their 
duties.
31
 Lastly, other scholarly researchers may build on the findings of this research and 
expand to cover other aspects of public entities that need attention other than the inefficiency 
of boards.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
The envisaged research involves a literature study of books, electronic/internet sources, 
journal articles, theses and dissertations, case law and legislation. The research also entails 
circulation of questionnaires
32
 and conducting interviews
33
 with some key people in selected 
public entities.  
 
There are principally two research methods, a positivistic and a phenomenological 
approach.
34
 The positivistic approach is referred to as quantitative research mostly because it 
explains social phenomena by establishing a relation between variables which are 
information converted into numbers.
35
 In terms of the quantitative approach, clearly 
constructed hypotheses are formulated about the relationship between two or more 
                                                 
31 Ibid. More often than not, government initiatives have failed because the people involved in implementing them lack an 
understanding of the issues and the need to solve the issues based on empirical information. 
32 A questionnaire is defined as a data collection instrument used in survey research where people answer questions by 
recording their own answers (Zohrabi M “Mixed Method Research: Instruments, Validity, Reliability and Reporting 
Findings” (2013) 3(2) Theory and Practice in Language Studies 254-262). 
33 Cooper and Schindler describe an interview as a purposeful discussion between two or more people meant to extract 
primary data responses through direct questioning (Cooper M and Schindler P “Managers’ Innovations and the Structuration 
of Organizations” (2003) 35(3) Journal of Management Studies 263–284). 
34 Collis J and Hussey R Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students 3rd ed. (New 
York, Palgrave MacMillan 2003) 55-57. 
35 Chetty L The Influence of Leadership on the Organisational Effectiveness of Saps Precincts Unpublished Thesis (Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University 2011) 17. 
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variables.
36
 Data about these variables are collected through methods such as questionnaires, 
focus groups, interviews, case studies and experiments.
37
  A positivist approach to research is 
thus based on knowledge gained from “positive” verification of observable experience rather 
than, for example, introspection or intuition.
38
 Scientific methods or experimental testing are 
the best way of achieving this knowledge.
39
  
 
The phenomenological approach, on the other hand, pays considerable regard to the 
subjective or qualitative state of the individual, hence the reference to this approach as 
qualitative research.
40
 The qualitative research approach involves “gathering information and 
perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as interviews, discussions and 
participant observation, and representing it from the perspective of the research 
participant(s)”.41 Phenomenological methods are thus particularly effective at bringing to the 
fore the experiences and perceptions of individuals from their own perspectives, and 
therefore at challenging structural or normative assumptions.
42
 
 
The research objective of the present study is to investigate how successful the existing 
corporate governance framework has been in enabling boards of public entities to effectively 
perform their duties. The nature of the investigation dictates that the phenomenological or 
qualitative approach be used. However, this study involves a mixture of methods, dominated 
by doctrinal research methodology. Doctrinal research is concerned with “analysis of the 
legal doctrine and how it has been developed and applied”.43 It systematically examines what 
the law is on a particular issue and analyses the relationship between rules. The method 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Struwig FW and Stead GB Planning, Designing and Reporting Research (Cape Town, Pearson Education 2004) 5-10. 
38 Collis J and Hussey R Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students (2003) 55-57. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Dawson C Practical Research Methods (UBS Publishers’ Distributors, New Delhi 2002) 14-23. 
41 Lester S An Introduction to Phenomenological Research (Taunton UK, Stan Lester Developments 1999) 1-2 available at 
www.sld.demon.co.uk/resmethy.pdf, (accessed on 10 August 2013). See also Struwig FW and Stead GB Planning, 
Designing and Reporting Research (2004) 11-16.  
42 Lester S An Introduction to Phenomenological Research (1999) 1. See also Hale S and Napier J Research Methods in 
Interpreting: A Practical Resource (A & C Black 2013) 84. 
43 Razak AA “Understanding Legal Research” (2009) 4 Integration and Dissemination 19-24 available at 
econ.upm.edu.my/researchbulletin/artikel/.../19-24%20Adilah.pdf (accessed on 29 August 2015). See also Hutchinson T and 
Duncan NJ “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83-119. 
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consists of an evaluation of legal sources (primary and secondary) and “study of legal 
institutions through legal reasoning or rational deduction”.44 
 
 Specifically, data is collected through literature analysis as well as interviews conducted with 
and questionnaires circulated to participants from four public entities in Zimbabwe.
45
 The 
aim is to assess corporate governance issues and challenges facing the public entities from the 
perspectives of their respective board members, senior managers, company secretaries, chief 
executive officers and selected shareholder representatives. The data collected particularly 
seeks to establish the effectiveness of boards in promoting good corporate governance in 
these public entities in light of the prevailing regulatory and statutory frameworks. 
Furthermore, to establish the extent to which Zimbabwe has tried to harmonise its corporate 
governance framework with other international players, a comparison of its corporate 
governance reforms is made to reforms that have been carried out in South Africa and 
Australia.  
 
1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research focuses on Zimbabwean public entities in general. A sample of four entities was 
selected to assist with addressing the research issues.
46
 The four public entities are Minerals 
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ),
47
 Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation (ZMDC),
48
 National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)
49
 and Grain Marketing 
                                                 
44 Ibid. See also Van Gestel R and Micklitz H Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about Methodology? 
(European University Institute Working Papers, Law 2011/05) 26-27 available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16825/LAW_2011_05.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 18 July 2015). 
45 See Chapter 2 below for a detailed discussion on the various approaches and methodologies used in the study. 
46 Interviews are conducted with and questionnaires circulated to representatives from the selected entities. The basis for 
selecting the four entities is discussed below (para 1.6.2 and Chapter 2, para 2.3.4). 
47 MMCZ is a state owned enterprise that was established in terms of the MMCZ Act 2 of 1982 to control and regulate the 
export, sale and stockpiling of all minerals. MMCZ is a body corporate that is capable of suing and being sued and subject to 
the provisions of the Act. See http://www.mmcz.co.zw/, for more information. 
48 ZMDC is a public entity which was established in terms of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation Act 31 of 
1982. Its main functions are to, on behalf of the state, invest in the mining industry in Zimbabwe, plan, co-ordinate and 
implement mining development projects and engage in prospecting, exploration, mining and mineral beneficiation 
programmes, among other things. See http://www.zmdc.co.zw/, for more information. 
49 NRZ is a state owned enterprise that was established in terms of the Railways Act 41 of 1972 to “provide, operate and 
maintain within its area of operation, either by itself or through its agents or jointly with others” an efficient system of public 
transport of goods and passengers by rail and by road. See http://www.nrz.co.zw/, for more information. 
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Board (GMB).
50
 The thesis analyses the corporate governance reforms in Zimbabwe as 
contained in the codes of corporate governance, statutory instruments and other guidelines
51
 
and examines their effectiveness in addressing corporate governance challenges experienced 
by boards in the country’s public entities.52  
 
The study also covers the principles of good corporate governance as they have come to be 
widely accepted by making a comparative analysis of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance 
framework to those of South Africa and Australia.
53
 The comparison is on the four countries’ 
corporate governance frameworks for public entities, specifically focusing on the role of a 
board, its appointment, composition, remuneration and performance evaluation. In addition, 
the comparative analysis examines how effective the existing systems have been in enabling 
boards to effectively carry out their duties and comply with good corporate governance 
practices.  
 
Reference is also made to other internationally recognised corporate governance principles 
which are relevant to Zimbabwe, namely the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance,
54
 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) Guidelines (hereinafter 
referred to as CACG Guidelines),
55
 International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
Global Principles of Corporate Governance (hereinafter referred to as ICGN Principles),
56
 
                                                 
50 GMB was established as a wholly-owned government entity in terms of the Grain Marketing Act 20 of 1966 to regulate 
and control the prices and marketing of certain agricultural products and their derivatives. See http://www.gmbdura.co.zw/, 
for more information. 
51 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 below for details of the codes of corporate governance, statutory instruments and other 
guidelines. This thesis includes the law as at 28 February 2016. 
52 The codes of corporate governance, statutory instruments and other guidelines are discussed in para 1.5 below.  
53 See chapters 5 and 6 below for the comparative analysis. The main aim of the comparative analysis is to establish how 
well Zimbabwe performs as an international competitor with regard to observing good corporate governance practices. 
54 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were first endorsed by OECD Ministers in 1999, updated in 2004 and 
have since become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders. They have 
advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both 
OECD and non OECD countries (“Foreword” and “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004)). 
55 CACG Guidelines were initially established in 1998 “in response to the Edinburgh Declaration of the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting in 1997”. Their main objectives are to promote good standards in corporate governance and 
business practice throughout the Commonwealth and facilitate the development of appropriate institutions which will be able 
to advance, teach and disseminate such standards. The CACG Guidelines are available at 
www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cacg_final.pdf (accessed on 29 August 2013). 
56 The ICGN was founded in 1995 as an initiative by major institutional investors and it represents various stakeholders 
interested in the development of global corporate governance practices. The ICGN Principles were last revised in 2009. 
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United Nations Global Compact Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as UN Guidelines)
57
 and 
other widely referred to country specific corporate governance codes like the South African 
King Reports on Corporate Governance,
58
 Malawian Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance
59
 and the United Kingdom Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined 
Code).
60
  
 
Below is an elaboration on the main themes of corporate governance that this thesis deals 
with namely; the role, selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and 
performance evaluation of the board. 
 
1.5.1 Role of Board of Directors 
Recurring corporate failures and the general changing nature of the business environment 
have been inspirational to renewed interest in and increased scrutiny of the role of the board 
of directors.
61
 A frequent criticism of boards, and especially of non-executive directors, is 
                                                                                                                                                        
They highlight the expectations and concerns of international investors with regard to the “governance of companies in 
which they invest and also express their commitment to play their role in the governance of those companies”. The ICGN 
Principles are accessible at www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/icgn_principles.pdf (accessed on 17 October 2014). 
57 The UN Global Compact is said to be the largest corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative in the world. It consists 
of corporations and civil society organisations from more than 140 countries that are “working together to help align 
business practices with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption”. The UN Global Compact is a call to companies globally to voluntarily align their operations and strategies with 
the ten universally accepted principles and to “take actions in support of UN goals, including the Millennium Development 
Goals” The UN Guidelines are accessible at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/TheTenprinciples/index.html. 
(accessed on 7 November 2013). 
58 The King Report on Corporate Governance was spearheaded by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa and the King 
Committee on governance. The King Reports have progressively developed from King I in 1994, King II in 2002 and 
subsequently King III in 2009. Currently, efforts are under way to develop King IV Report. The Reports seek to encourage 
the highest standard of corporate governance in South Africa by recommending standards of conduct for directors and 
emphasising the need for responsible corporate conduct.The Reports are available at www.iodsa.co.za. pdf. 
59 The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance in Malawi was first developed in 2001 and revised in 2010. The 
Code is a voluntary code aimed at providing corporate governance guidelines to “directors, managers and stakeholders in 
enterprises” in Malawi. It was developed by Malawi National Corporate Governance Review Committee (NCGRC) in 
consultation with other stakeholders and is available at www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=341 (accessed on 15 
December 2014). 
60 The Combined Code was first developed in 1998 to encourage corporate governance within the United Kingdom (UK). 
The Code was a result of the amalgamation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. In 2003, following the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals in the US, the Combined Code was updated to incorporate recommendations from the Higgs Report and 
the Smith Report. The Code is accessible at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf. Recently, the UK published a 
Corporate Governance Code (the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014) that replaced the Combined Code and is available 
at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf 
(accessed on 17 November 2014). 
61 Nicholson GJ and Newton CJ “The Role of the Board of Directors: Perceptions of Managerial Elites” (2010) 16(2) 
Journal of Management and Organization 201-218. See also Adams R, Hermalin BE and Weisbach MS “The Role of 
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that they do not have adequate time to dedicate to the business of the companies they serve, 
resulting in them not having sufficient knowledge of the company’s business, the industry 
environment and their responsibilities as directors.
62
 Another line of argument has been that 
the requirement that non-executive directors should be fully independent can result in them 
not being completely informed and lacking adequate knowledge of the industry and 
business.
63
 
 
To assess if a board is performing effectively, there is a need to first understand what a board 
of directors is and what it ought to be achieving.
64
 Louden defines the board of directors as:  
a legal and accountable group responsible for all the corporation’s actions and the results of 
those actions. It is appointed by shareholders and serves as trustee for the shareholder’s 
interest. ..... This being so, the Board of directors must, accordingly, act in essence as the 
owners of the business.
65
 
 
According to Louden’s definition, the board is a legally constituted group of people whose 
role is to collectively act on behalf of the shareholders by directing the affairs of the business 
to ensure its prosperity. Cadbury summarises the board’s main functions as to define the 
company’s purpose, agree on strategies and plans for achieving that purpose, establish the 
company’s policies, appoint the chief executive officer (CEO), monitor and assess the 
performance of the executive team and to assess their own performance.
66
 In order to fulfil 
                                                                                                                                                        
Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey” (2008) 48(1) Journal of Economic 
Literature, American Economic Association 58-107 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14486 (accessed on 12 
November 2014) and Dembinski PH et al Enron and World Finance: A Case Study in Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 29-
30. 
62 Bosch H The Director at Risk: Accountability in the Boardroom (Pearson Professional, Melbourne 1995) 106.  
63 Kakabadse NK, Yang H and Sanders R “The Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors in Chinese State Owned 
Enterprises” (2010) 48(7) Management Decision 1063-1079. 
64 Experience has it that challenges have been experienced in trying to precisely define what the role of the board is given the 
diverse views on this subject (Adams R, Hermalin BE and Weisbach MS “The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate 
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey” (2008) 58-107). 
65 Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (2006) 62-63. According to Vagliasindi, 
the main responsibility of the board is to “ensure that management is acting in the interests of the shareholders, through an 
advisory and monitoring role” (Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in 
Developing Countries (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4579 of 2008) 2 available at 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4579.html (accessed on 17 October 2014)). 
66 Cadbury A Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (Oxford University Press, New York 2002) 35-
36. See also OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 24-25 for more board responsibilities. 
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this strategic role, the board needs to have an understanding of the company’s fundamental 
business, competitors and industry environment.
67
 Similarly, Thynne argues that in 
performing its role, the board is guided by specific company law requirements, the nature and 
significance of the company’s business and the degree to which the government sees the 
necessity to constantly monitor the operations of the entity.
68
 On the other hand, Carter and 
Lorsh
69
 suggest that the role that a board adopts will be dependent on the board structure,
70
 
board composition
71
 and board processes.
72
  
 
In this thesis, directors’ roles and responsibilities are initially considered from a general law 
perspective
73
 and are then discussed in a Zimbabwean public entities context.
74
 In particular, 
the investigation seeks to establish to what extent the board of directors of the selected 
entities are knowledgeable about their role, the extent to which they have managed to 
perform their duties and exercise their powers as expected of them and the challenges that 
they have experienced in effectively discharging their duties. An evaluation of how 
                                                 
67 CAAG Guidelines (1999) 8-9. See also Kennerley M and Neely A “Measuring Performance in a Changing Business 
Environment” (2003) 23(2) International Journal of Operations & Production Management 213-229 available at 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0144-3577.htm (accessed on 17 December 2014) and Boulton WR Strategic Analysis Model 
(Auburn University's Strategic Management Course Paper 1996-2001) available at 
http://www.auburn.edu/~boultwr/html/strategic_analysis_model.htm  (accessed on 17 December 2014). 
68 Wicaksono A Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Investment Holding Structure of Government-Linked 
Companies in Singapore and Malaysia and Applicability for Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises Unpublished Thesis 
(University of St. Gallen Graduate School of Business Administration, Economics, Law and Social Sciences HSG 2009) 
119. 
69 Carter CB and Lorsch JW Back to the Drawing Board: Designing Corporate Boards or a Complex World (Boston, 
Harvard Business School Press 2004) 8. 
70 Carter and Lorsch define board structure as the number of the board members, the split between executive and non-
executive directors, use of alternate directors, the number and duties of board committees, leadership arrangements and the 
flow of information between board structures. See also Ngoe AO The Effect of Board Structure on the Performance of 
Quoted Companies at the Nairobi Stock Exchange Unpublished Thesis (University of Nairobi 2011) 3-5 for a similar 
definition.  
71 Board composition is defined as the mix of experience, skills, degree of affiliation the directors have with the entity and 
other attributes of its members. See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies 
2nd ed. (LexisNexis, Durban 2009) 108, for a similar definition. 
72 Board processes are defined as including how the board gathers information, builds knowledge and makes decisions, the 
formality on board proceedings and board culture on evaluation of directors. See also McNulty T, Florackis C and Ormrod P 
Corporate Governance and Risk: A Study of Board Structure and Process (Certified Accountants Educational Trust, 
London, 2012) 4-5 available at http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/corporate-governance/rr-
129-001.pdf (accessed on 12 December 2014). 
73 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 below. 
74 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 below. 
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supportive existing policy and legislative frameworks have been in enabling boards to 
effectively discharge their duties is conducted with a view to recommending improvements. 
 
1.5.2 Selection and Appointment of Board Members 
The ability of a board to provide effective governance is dependent on the selection and 
appointment of directors who possess the necessary skills and experience to effectively carry 
out board responsibilities.
75
 This, therefore, calls for a transparent and objective way of 
selecting and appointing board directors who are experienced or appropriately skilled in order 
to obtain the best results from the board and the entity itself.
76
 In the selection and 
appointment process, consideration should first be given to the qualities of possible 
appointees which could include “the ability for critical thought, objectivity, wisdom gained 
through appropriate experience, authority and the ability to exercise judgment”.77 
Subsequently, consideration should be given to the skills that will be beneficial to the board.
78
 
For instance, considering the fact that boards are involved in the oversight of compliance 
with the law and financial management, it may be beneficial to have board members with 
legal as well as financial skills and experience.
79
  
 
The process of appointing boards in Zimbabwe’s public entities is considered to establish 
whether it is sufficiently transparent, credible and objective to enable boards to effectively 
discharge their duties and achieve the goals of the entities they represent.
80
 Existing policy 
and legislative frameworks are also evaluated to determine how effective they have been in 
                                                 
75 Part Two (VI) of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Chapter 2 of the King III Report, Principle 2 of 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CAGG) Guidelines and section B of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (Commonwealth of Australia 
2003) 98 available at  http://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/Uhrig-Report.pdf (accessed on 29 November 2013). 
78 Kiel GC and Nicholson GJ “Evaluating Boards and Directors” (2005) 13(5) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 613-631. 
79 Ibid. However, it should be noted that such skills are a secondary consideration as specialist advice can be accessed by the 
board as and when necessary. See also Dutia SG Primer for Building an Effective Board for Growing Start-up Companies 
(Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 2014) 2-4 available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports/ (accessed on 29 November 2014). 
80 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 below. 
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ensuring that appropriately experienced persons are appointed to the boards of public 
entities.
81
 
 
1.5.3 Composition of the Board 
A key principle of good corporate governance is that there should be a sufficient number of 
independent,
82
 non-executive
83
 directors on the board to create a suitable balance of power 
and prevent the dominance of the board by one individual or by a small number of 
individuals.
84
 It is also generally accepted that board diversity is important with a mix of 
different directors’ demographics, relevant skills and experience being required to enable the 
board to effectively discharge its duties.
85
 Board effectiveness is thus said to greatly depend 
                                                 
81 See Chapter 7 below. 
82 An independent non-executive director is defined in the King III Report as a non-executive director who is not a 
representative of a shareholder, has not been employed by the company/group for the preceding three financial years, is not a 
professional advisor or significant supplier or customer to the company/group, has no significant contractual relationship 
with the company/group, is free from any business or other relationship which could influence his independence, does not 
have a direct or indirect interest in the company and does not receive performance based remuneration (Principle  2.18 of the 
King III Report). A similar definition is provided in the South African Companies Act which, in the context of the 
composition of an Audit Committee, requires an independent director to meet four minimum requirements. First, the person 
should not be “involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s business or have been so involved at any time 
during the previous financial year”. Secondly, he should not be “a prescribed officer, or full-time employee, of the company” 
or a related company, or has been employed in such capacity “at any time during the previous three financial years”. Thirdly, 
the person should not be a “material supplier or customer of the company”, such that it could reasonably be concluded that 
“the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that director is compromised by that relationship”. Lastly, the person should not 
be related to any person who falls within any of the criteria set out above (Section 94(4) of Companies Act 71 of 2008). See 
also paras 114-115 of Zimbabwe’s National Code on Corporate Governance, para 2.4.3 of the ICGN Global Principles of 
Corporate Governance and section B of the UK Corporate Governance Code for similar characteristics of an independent 
director.  
83 A non-executive director is an individual not involved in the day to day management of the company and not a full time 
employee receiving a salary (Principle 2.18 of the King III Report and paras 114-115 of Zimbabwe’s National Code on 
Corporate Governance). See also Barlow J Directors’ & Officers’ Liability: The Legal Position in the United Kingdom 
(Chadbourne & Parke 2009) 2 available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/upload/DandOLiability.pdf (accessed on 17 
December 2014) and Chapter 4 of the Report for Corporate Governance for Mauritius (2004) 66 available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_code_mauritius_apr2004_en.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2014). 
84 Coyle B Corporate Governance (2003) 68-69.  
85 Board diversity is generally, described as the variation among board members with regard to educational background, 
professional experience, gender, age, race, national origin and personalities, among others (Carter D et al “The Gender and 
Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance” (2010) 18(5) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 396–414). See also Wachudi EJ and Mboya J “Effect of Board Gender Diversity on 
the Performance of Commercial Banks in Kenya” (2009) 8(7) European Scientific Journal 128-148 available at 
http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/Wachudi/view/120 (accessed on 19 December 2014), section B.1 of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, para 2.4 of the ICGN Global Principles of Corporate Governance and Principle 2.18 of the King III 
Report.  
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on experience, skill, gender and judgments of individual executive and non-executive 
directors and the ways in which they combine to shape board conduct and relationships.
86
 
 
An examination of the composition of the boards of the selected public entities is conducted 
to ascertain whether or not the existing framework allows for boards that are properly 
composed and balanced in terms of, inter alia, independence, skills and gender.
87
 The 
structures and composition of the boards of the selected public entities are further 
interrogated to establish whether they have enabled the directors to effectively discharge their 
obligations as well as to find out how significantly they have contributed to the practice of 
good corporate governance in the entities. 
 
1.5.4 Directors’ Remuneration  
The structure and level of board remuneration has also been a contentious area.
88
 Directors 
themselves believe that the level of their remuneration does not reveal the increased focus on 
their responsibilities, potential liability risks and company performance.
89
 On the other hand, 
the general public and investors have criticised some directors for being paid far more money 
than they are worth and for receiving ever-increasing benefits even when their entities are 
performing poorly.
90
 
                                                 
86 Roberts J et al “Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the 
Boardroom” (2005) Special Edition British Journal of Management 16. 
87 Although board composition entails a number of factors, the research limits the examination to board independence 
(whether director is executive or non-executive), educational background, professional experience and gender. 
88 Talha M, Sallehhuddin A and Masuod S “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Remuneration in Selected Asian 
Countries” (2009) 25(1) Journal of Applied Business Research 31-40 available at 
http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/JABR/article/viewFile/1034/1018 (accessed on 2 December 2014). See also 
Kirkpatrick G The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis (OECD Publication 2009) 12 available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf (accessed on 5 December 2014) and Ferrarini G, Moloney N and Ungureanu 
MC “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe” (2010) 10(1) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 73-118. 
89 A survey by Ernst & Young and the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) indicated that 63 % of respondents 
believed that they were underpaid (Australian Institute of Company Directors October 2003) available at 
http://www.aicd.com.au/mediareleases (accessed on 10 November 2014). Similarly, in a survey conducted by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in South Africa “respondents across the spectrum agreed that directors should be paid 
more” implying that the current remuneration is considered insufficient (PwC Non-Executive Directors’ Practices and Fees 
Trends Report of January 2014) 14 available at http://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/ned_report_january_2014.pdf (accessed 
on 27 December 2014)).  
90 The public is of the view that directors are acting contrary to the principle of good corporate governance that provides that 
remuneration should be linked to some extent to company performance, so that a director will earn more if the company does 
well, but less if it does badly (Talha M, Salim ASA and Masoud S “A study on Directors’ Remuneration and Board 
Committee in Malaysia” (2009) 5(1) USA Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing 34-35). See also McCahery J and 
Renneboog L “Managerial Remuneration: The Indirect Pay-For-Performance Relation” (2001) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
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Despite the conflicting views, it has been universally accepted that all business enterprises, 
including public entities, need to attract and retain the right caliber of board members 
required to run the organisations successfully.
91
 To achieve this, it is essential that the level of 
remuneration for members of the board should be sufficient, reasonably fair and performance 
related.
92
 At the same time, the structure of an individual’s remuneration package should take 
into account the experience and expertise of the individual director as well as the 
responsibilities and risks associated with the role.
93
  
 
The remuneration structures in Zimbabwe’s public entities are examined to establish whether 
or not directors’ remuneration is adequate and whether or not the level of remuneration has 
an impact on the directors’ commitment to their role and the effective discharge of their 
duties or responsibilities. Furthermore, international best practice concerning directors’ 
remuneration is reviewed, with a view to making recommendations that would motivate 
Zimbabwean directors to apply their best efforts in performing their duties. 
 
1.5.5 Evaluation of Board Performance  
Public entities do not only have similar problems to private entities in terms of separation of 
control and ownership
94
 but they also encounter “additional challenges that can severely 
undermine their efficiency”.95 Unlike a privately owned company, a public entity generally 
                                                                                                                                                        
Studies 317-332 and Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) Directors’ Remuneration (ICSA 2009) 
194 available at http://www.icsa.org.uk/.../n_CorpGov_6thEd_StudyText_Chapter9.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2013).  
91 Bhattacharya S, Boot AWA and Thakor AV “The Economics of Bank Regulation” (1998) 30 Journal of Money and 
Banking 745-770. See also Principle 2.25 of the King III Report, section D1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
para 5 of the ICGN Principles. 
92 Coyle B Corporate Governance (2003) 133. See also Principle 2.25 of the King III Report, section D1 of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and para 5 of the ICGN Global Principles of Corporate Governance. 
93 Section D of the UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle 8 of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council (CGC) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 3rd ed. (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council 2014) and para 5 of the ICGN Global Principles of Corporate Governance. 
94 This is referred to as the principal-agent doctrine. It arises when one person or entity (the agent) has the capacity to make 
decisions on behalf of or that impact, another person or entity (the principal). This relationship sometimes presents 
challenges where the agent decides to act in his own best interests instead of those of the principal (Dalley PJ “Theory of 
Agency Law” 2011 72(495) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 495-547). 
95 Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 23-24. See also Jensen MC and 
Meckling WH “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of 
Financial Economics 305–60. 
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cannot have its board changed through a takeover or proxy contest,
 96
 and it cannot be 
declared insolvent.
97
 The absence of external control mechanisms like potential takeovers and 
proxy contests, lack of competition and nonexistence of mechanisms to capacitate the public 
to assess the performance of directors and managers, reduce the incentives of board members 
and managers to maximise the value of the organisation.
98
 The decreased likelihood of 
insolvency can also reduce pressure to manage costs.
99
 Hence, some of the most important 
checks on underperformance are absent. The need to monitor and measure board performance 
has thus become more acute mainly because the board is increasingly held accountable for 
corporate performance and there is an increase in shareholder activism
100
 with investors 
demanding more from boards due to limited investment opportunities and potentially high 
risks of losing on investments.
101
  
 
This research considers the framework that has been put in place to promote the evaluation of 
the performance of boards of Zimbabwean public entities. It further analyses the evaluation 
methods with a view to determine whether the methods are being properly implemented, the 
results of the board evaluations are reliable and whether the evaluations have assisted the 
                                                 
96 Ibid. The shareholding or ownership structure of public entities presents significant challenges in terms of governance and 
makes takeovers or proxy contests difficult or almost impossible (OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises (2005) 20-21 and Menozzi A and Vannoni D “Political Connections in Boards of Directors” (2014) 
16(3) Network Industries Quarterly 8-10 available at http://mir.epfl.ch/../../NIQ2014-
3/Political%20connections%20in%20boards%20of%20directors.pdf (accessed on 17 January 2015)).   
97 This is because, in most jurisdictions, the legal framework, e.g., the bankruptcy law does not cover public entities hence 
creditors sometimes encounter difficulties in enforcing their contracts and in obtaining payments. Other examples are the 
competition laws of a number of countries that exclude public entities (OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 21 and Menozzi A and Vannoni D “Political Connections in Boards of Directors” (2014) 8). 
98 Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 4. See also Ashe PA Governance 
in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State Owned Enterprises (2012) 47. 
99 In addition, the absence of profit-orientation and the compensation for low revenues through government subsidies 
prevents public entities from discovering ways to improve efficiency and performance (Meyer KE et al “Overcoming 
Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt Their Foreign Entries to Institutional Pressures Abroad” (2014) 45 Journal of 
International Business Studies 1005-1028). See also Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging 
Markets (2006) 4. 
100 Madden JJ The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation of 23 December 2013) available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/23/the-evolving-direction-and-increasing-influence-of-shareholder-activism/ 
(accessed on 28 August 2015). However, research has shown that shareholders, due to their own limitations and priorities, 
have little or no influence over managerial decision-making hence they have not been as effective as they should be (Othman 
S and Borges WG “Shareholder Activism in Malaysia: Is it Effective?” (2015) 172 Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 427-434 available at at www.sciencedirect.com (accessed on 28 August 2015)). See also McCahery J and 
Renneboog L “Managerial Remuneration: The Indirect Pay-For-Performance Relation” (2001) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 317-332. 
101 Kiel GC and Nicholson GJ “Evaluating Boards and Directors” (2005) 613-631. See also Kiel GC et al Board, Director 
and CEO Evaluation (McGraw-Hill, Australia 2005) 4. 
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boards in effectively discharging their duties and promoting good corporate governance. 
Recommendations are then made on how best the evaluation of the performance of directors 
can be improved to promote board effectiveness and good corporate governance.
102
 
 
1.5.6 Zimbabwe’s Corporate Governance Framework 
There have been concerted efforts to enhance corporate governance in Zimbabwe in recent 
years.
103
 This was partly encouraged by international social and economic developments as 
well as a reaction to the increase in the number of corporate collapses within the country.
104
  
 
In the main, the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in Zimbabwe is 
determined by the Constitution,
105
 the Corporate Governance Manual,
106
 various Acts of 
Parliament governing public entities, for example, the Companies Act,
107
 Acts creating public 
entities,
108
 the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA),
109
 common law
110
 and the 
                                                 
102 See Chapter 8, para 8.4 below. 
103 This is shown by the numerous initiatives that have been undertaken to promote good corporate governance practices, 
e.g., the revision of the Constitution and the adoption of corporate governance codes like the Corporate Governance 
Framework for State Enterprises and Public Entities and the Zimbabwe National Code of Corporate Governance. 
104 Examples of corporate collapses that occurred in Zimbabwe are ENG Asset Management, Trust Bank in Zimbabwe, 
Karina Textiles and AfrAsia Bank Zimbabwe Ltd (Chitemba B Zimbabwean Business Collapsing (The Zimbabwe 
Independent of 1 November 2013) available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/11/01/zimbabwean-businesses-
collapsing/ (accessed on 22 September 2014). National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and 
Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) are examples of public entities that have failed to perform efficiently to the 
extent of almost collapsing due to poor corporate governance (Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s 
State Enterprises: Can the Situation be Rescued? (Keynote Address by The Minister of State Enterprises and Parastatals, 
Honourable Gorden Moyo (M.P) at IIA Annual Conference at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe on 13 September 2012) available 
at gordenmoyo.blogspot.com/.../the-state-of-corporate-governance-in.html (accessed on 19 October 2013)). 
105 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 1 of 20 l 3. The Constitution states that Zimbabwe is founded on 
respect for internationally accepted principles of good corporate governance (Section 3 (1) (h) and (2) (g) of the 
Constitution. 
106 Minor CA Principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best Practices (African Management Services 
Company (AMSCO) 2001) (hereinafter referred to as the Manual). 
107 Companies Act 47 of 1951. The Act was promulgated in 1951 and last amended in 2003.  
108 For example, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act 2 of 1982, Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation Act 31 of 1982 and the Grain Marketing Act 20 of 1966. 
109 Section 50 of the Public Finance Management Act 11 of 2009 requires every state enterprise or parastatal to adhere to and 
implement the principles of sound corporate governance policies, procedures and practices.   
110 Naidoo defines common law as “a law which is not legislated in the statute books of a country, but which nevertheless 
over time and through wide acceptance gains the force of a law.” (Naidoo R Essentials for Corporate Governance for South 
African Companies (Cape Town: Double Storey 2002) 11). Lewis defines common law as “the body of customary law, 
based upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of decided cases” (Lewis ADE Common Law Encyclopædia 
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Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listings Requirements.
111
 The country also launched the 
Corporate Governance Framework (CGF) for State Enterprises and Public Entities in 
November 2010. The main objective of this document is to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness and to fulfill the goals of profitability and affordable service provision in state 
enterprises and parastatals.
112
 The Zimbabwe National Code of Corporate Governance 
(hereinafter referred to as the National Code), which is unique and specific to Zimbabwe’s 
corporate needs and history, was adopted in April 2015.
113
 Furthermore, in April 2014, 
Zimbabwe came up with a draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework to govern the operations of state-owned enterprises and local authorities with 
regard to remuneration and corporate governance practices.
114
 It is also important to note that 
organisations in Zimbabwe have adopted, in addition to the above instruments, corporate 
                                                                                                                                                        
Britannica Online Article of 2013 available at  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/128386/common-law (accessed on 26 December 2014)). Common law is also 
defined as that body of law that is unwritten and is applicable and binding to the entire society and to all people regardless of 
their “inherent differences in background, level of education, custom and affiliations”. The common law in Zimbabwe is a 
combination of “Roman-Dutch Common Law and English law as well as many other legal principles including International 
Law” (Dube B “Roman-Dutch and English Common Law: The Indispensable Law in Zimbabwe” (2014) V(4) Afro Asian 
Journal of Social Sciences 1-18 available at http://www.onlineresearchjournals.com/aajoss/art/164.pdf (accessed on 25 
September 2015)). See also Madhuku L An Introduction to Zimbabwean Law (Weaver Press and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
2010) 15-17.  
111 The ZSE Listing Rules incorporate principles of the Cadbury Report and King 1 Report. The Rules compel companies to 
include a statement in their annual reports indicating the extent to which they comply to enable shareholders and potential 
investors to evaluate how the corporate governance principles have been applied. In cases where the recommended 
governance structures were not applied, the company is expected to provide an explanation for the noncompliance in the 
annual reports to shareholders (Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Rules (2002)). It is important to note that the ZSE Listing Rules 
were last officially amended in 2002 hence the lack of reference to more recent reports. However, the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange, in consultation with stakeholders, is in the process of reviewing the Listings Rules (The Newsday of 13 March 
2014 11 (available at https://www.newsday.co.zw), The Herald of 14 July 2013 B4 (available at www.herald.co.zw) and The 
Financial Gazette of 17-23 September 2015 C2 (available at www.fingaz.co.zw). Also worth noting is that currently very 
few of Zimbabwe’s public entities are listed on the Stock Exchange hence the minimal applicability of the Listings Rules.   
112 The Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals is applicable to both public entities 
established through an Act of Parliament and to state enterprises registered under the Companies Act (para 1.4.3 of the 
Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals 2010). In crafting and adopting the 
CGF, the Government took cognisance of the need to provide for a code of governance that would “foster a culture of 
observance and adherence to regional and international best practices in organisational governance”. In this regard, the 
policy makers considered the “Malawi Code, the King III Code of Governance for South Africa, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises, the 
United States Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) of 2002 and subsequent 
revisions to the Act following the global economic crisis...” (para 1.1.6 of the CGF). Although public entities are expected to 
comply with the CGF, it is not legally binding on the public entities as it is not law. 
113 The National Code is an initiative of the combined efforts of the Zimbabwe Leadership Forum (ZIMLEF), the Institute of 
Directors of Zimbabwe (IoDZ) and the Standards Association of Zimbabwe (SAZ). The initiative was motivated by the 
desire to promote sound corporate governance in Zimbabwe (“Introduction and Background” to the National Code). 
114 The Zimbabwe Mail of 16 April 2014 13 (available at www.thezimmail.co.zw) and The Herald of 16 April 2014 1. It is 
anticipated that the adopted policy framework will be promulgated into an Act of Parliament so that it can legally be 
implemented and defaulters can be punished accordingly.  
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governance principles as outlined in other internationally recognised corporate governance 
codes and guidelines to promote good corporate governance.
115
   
 
From the above, it can be concluded that Zimbabwe has put substantial efforts into 
developing a corporate governance framework that promotes good corporate governance. 
Despite having a very strong regulatory framework, Zimbabwe is still faced with challenges 
in achieving good corporate governance, especially in public entities.
116
 The research 
therefore, assesses the level of compliance with the corporate governance framework and the 
challenges encountered by the public entities in complying with the framework. Furthermore, 
the efficacy of the existing legal and regulatory frameworks in enhancing the effectiveness of 
boards of Zimbabwean public entities and in upholding good corporate governance principles 
is evaluated. Finally, possible areas of improvement are identified and specific 
recommendations made. 
 
1.5.7 Comparison of Zimbabwe’s Corporate Governance Legal and Regulatory 
Frameworks to those of South Africa and Australia  
Corporate governance initiatives continue to endeavour to keep abreast with developments in 
the world and the changing business environment.
117
 As a result, developing and emerging 
economies can derive a number of lessons in the way their developed counterparts have 
practiced corporate governance.
118 
It is thus critically important that whenever a country 
decides to put enabling legislation in place, the legislation is compatible with international 
corporate governance best practice.
119
  
                                                 
115 A significant number of Zimbabwean organisations report that they are guided by other internationally recognised 
corporate governance principles. For example, the MMCZ 2009 Annual Report states that “the Board regularly reviews the 
Corporation’s policies and procedures to ensure compliance and consistency with the principles enshrined in the King III 
Report and other reports on corporate governance” (MMCZ 2009 Annual Report) 7. See also section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing 
Rules (2002). 
116 Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s State Enterprises: Can the Situation be Rescued? (2012). 
See also Okpara JO “Corporate Governance in a Developing Economy: Barriers, Issues, and Implications for Firms” (2011) 
11 (2) Corporate Governance 184–199. 
117 “Preface” to the CAGG Guidelines, “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and “Preamble” to the 
ICGN Principles. 
118 Ho KL Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics and Regulations (ISEAS Publications 
2005) 38. 
119 “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and “Preamble” to the ICGN Principles. 
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However, as the South African King Committee on Corporate Governance and the OECD 
observed, companies are governed within the framework of the laws and regulations of the 
country in which they operate.
120
 In view of the fact that countries differ in culture, 
regulation, law and generally the way business is conducted, there can be no single generally 
applicable corporate governance model.
121
 Although it is necessary for countries to have laws 
and regulations that match their individual circumstances, there are certain international 
standards
122
 that every country is required to comply with taking into consideration the fact 
that investors invest across many countries. It is, therefore, desirable that Zimbabwe should 
harmonise its corporate governance framework with those of other jurisdictions, especially 
those of its trading partners, to reduce the cost of compliance and to increase certainty both 
for international companies and investors, and for the benefit of local companies involved in 
international trade and investment.
123
  
 
In assessing the country’s corporate governance reforms and to establish whether they are in 
harmony with reforms in other jurisdictions, Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework is 
compared to those of South Africa and Australia.
124
  A comparative analysis is undertaken of 
the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in the three 
countries with a view to recommend areas of improvement in Zimbabwe. It should be noted 
that this comparative analysis is restricted to specific corporate governance aspects which 
have a bearing on the effectiveness of boards of public entities. As mentioned before, the 
focus will be on the board’s role, selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and 
performance evaluation. It is therefore, not the purpose of this study to set out and analyse 
comprehensively all the corporate governance principles and guidelines in the three countries. 
 
                                                 
120 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report and “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
121 Ibid. 
122 International guidelines have been developed by, among others, the OECD, ICGN and CACG to guide member and non-
member countries in developing the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries 
that match their individual developmental experiences. 
123 These are the benefits of practising good corporate governance as highlighted in the “Preamble” to the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance. See also Tumuheki J Towards Good Corporate Governance: An Analysis of Corporate 
Governance Reforms in Uganda Unpublished Thesis (University of Cape Town 2008) 5-7. 
124 See para 1.2 above for the reasons why the two countries were chosen. 
24 
 
 
1.6 POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1.6.1 Points of Departure 
Public entities contribute a substantial component of revenue to the national economy
125
 and 
therefore require proper and effective management. Moreover, the fact that most public entities 
are funded from taxpayers’ funds and are expected to render essential public services 
necessitates that these entities be properly governed.
126
 Failure to do so may have adverse social 
and economic effects on the citizens of a country. If directors of those entities do not observe 
good corporate governance and do not effectively discharge their duties, public entities are not 
able to successfully carry out their mandates thus resulting in loss of revenue, poor service 
delivery and sometimes collapse of the entities.
127
  
  
1.6.2 Assumptions 
The research makes the following assumptions: 
1.6.2.1 A well composed and structured board is essential for the effective discharge of 
directors’ duties.  
1.6.2.2 Appropriately trained, empowered and adequately remunerated directors are 
motivated to effectively discharge their duties. 
1.6.2.3 Evaluating board performance has the tendency to identify non-performers, allow for 
corrective action and thus increase board effectiveness. 
1.6.2.4 Legal and regulatory mechanisms are essential to the effective and efficient running 
of public entities from the perspective of good corporate governance. 
1.6.2.5 The sample of four public entities and the selected participants is a fair representation 
of the Zimbabwean entities’ experiences considering the fact that most, if not all, 
public entities are governed by a similar corporate governance framework. 
                                                 
125 “Preamble” to the OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005) 9. In Zimbabwe, it is 
estimated that public entities have the potential to contribute approximately 40% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(“Foreword” to the CGF).  
126 Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 103-104. 
127 Corrigan T Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-owned Enterprises: Perspectives on an Evolving System (African 
Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) Country Review Report of September 2014) available at 
http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=69503&type=Document#.VKEbYoDY (accessed on 27 December 2014). 
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1.6.2.6 The participants are honest and prepared to share their true experiences rather than the 
experiences that they think the researcher may want to hear. 
 
1.6.3 Limitations  
Limitations are defined as potential weaknesses in a study.
128
 This study includes (but is not 
restricted to) a sample of four public entities from which directors, chief executive officers, 
company secretaries and senior manager representatives are interviewed or requested to 
complete structured questionnaires.   
 
Like any other research, this research may have its own limitations.
129
 The first limitation of 
the research is that the majority of empirical studies examining the effectiveness of boards of 
public entities have relied on data obtained from developed nations.
130
 It is therefore doubtful 
whether these results can be directly extended and applied to other parts of the world, 
particularly developing markets such as Zimbabwe. Secondly, the scarcity of data and the 
difficulty of verifying primary data on governance mechanisms as well as low response rates 
may limit the richness of the data to be used for analysis.
131
  
 
It is also possible to have other data limitations owing to inherent deficiencies of 
questionnaire and interview surveys.
132
 Another limitation is that it is difficult to ascertain 
“whether corporate governance codes are capable of exerting a positive influence over 
financial performance” and to determine the exact level of corporate governance compliance 
                                                 
128 Simon MK Dissertation and Scholarly Research: Recipes for Success 2nd ed. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform 2010) 277. 
129 See Chapter 2, para 2.4 below for a discussion on the limitations of the search.  
130 The challenge of relying on data obtained from developed nations when conducting studies on developing countries was 
confirmed by a number of studies. See Swartz NP and Frier S “Board Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in 
South Africa” (2005) 13(2) Meditari Accountancy Research 145–166 and Tusiime I, Nkundabanyanga SK and Nkote IN 
“Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure, Board Structure and Performance of Public Sector Entities” (2011) 3(9) 
Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research 250-260.  
131 Such challenges have been found to commonly exist by a number of researchers (McLeod SA Questionnaires (Research 
Conducted in 2014) available at http://www.simplypsychology.org/questionnaires.html (accessed on 27 December 2014)). 
See also Beiske B Research Methods: Uses and Limitations of Questionnaires, Interviews, and Case Studies (Manchester 
School of Management 2002) 3-7 available at http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/15458/research-methods (accessed on 27 
December 2014). 
132 Ibid. For a detailed discussion on the limitations of questionnaire and interview surveys, see Chapter 2, para 2.3.5 below. 
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by companies.
133
 As a result, it has been argued that research on corporate governance issues 
can determine procedural compliance but is not able to actually measure substantial 
compliance.
134
 
 
1.7 FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of the thesis is organised into chapters as outlined below. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the research methodological perspective, which includes the research 
approach, sample selection, data collection methods as well as limitations of the research. In 
essence, this chapter describes the methods used to obtain research data.
135
 This study 
involves a mixture of methods although it is predominantly extensive desktop literature 
analysis (doctrinal methodology). To assist in achieving the research objectives, information 
relating to the subject is also sourced and collected through interviews with and 
questionnaires circulated to directors and senior representatives drawn from the four selected 
public entities. The interviews and questionnaires are carried out in such a way as to allow for 
flexible discussions, issue-focusing and probing which enable the collection of multiple 
perspectives on the subject. The chapter ends with a discussion on the possible limitations of 
the research.
136
 
 
In Chapter 3, the theoretical frameworks regarding the definition and importance of corporate 
governance and international initiatives on corporate governance are discussed.
137
 An 
overview of public entities is also given.
138
 Thereafter, an analysis of literature on the role, 
selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and performance evaluation of the 
                                                 
133 MacNeil I and Li X “Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code” (2006) 
14(5) Corporate Governance, An International Review 486-497. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Chapter 2, para 2.3 below. 
136 Chapter 2, para 2.4 below. 
137 Chapter 3, paras 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
138 Chapter 3, para 3.2 below. 
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board is made.
139
 The chapter ends with an examination of the global mechanisms put in 
place to enforce compliance with good corporate governance practices.
140
 
 
Chapter 4 analyses Zimbabwe’s corporate governance legal and regulatory frameworks. In 
this chapter, a theoretical analysis and evaluation of the Zimbabwean legal and regulatory 
framework aimed at promoting the effectiveness of public entity boards is carried out.
141
 The 
analysis and evaluation focuses on the role, selection and appointment, composition, 
remuneration and performance evaluation of the board.
142
 The main objective of analysing 
the regulatory and legislative frameworks is to assess whether they provide sufficient powers 
and direction to enable directors to effectively discharge their duties and achieve good 
corporate governance. Furthermore, the enforcement mechanisms provided for in the existing 
corporate governance frameworks to enhance the effectiveness of boards of public entities 
and promote corporate governance are examined.
143
 
 
In Chapter 5, a comparative analysis between Zimbabwe and South Africa’s corporate 
governance frameworks is done with the major focus being on the five identified key aspects 
considered necessary in promoting board effectiveness.
144
 In this chapter, the main objective 
is to establish how Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework compares with other 
developing and neighbouring countries, especially South Africa. The mechanisms put in 
place by both countries to enforce compliance with good corporate governance practices are 
also analysed and compared.
145
 
  
Chapter 6 compares Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework to that of Australia.146 The 
main objective is to establish how Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework compares 
                                                 
139 Chapter 3, para 3.6 below. 
140 Chapter 3, para 3.7 below. 
141 Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 below. 
142 Chapter 4, paras 4.2.2-4.2.6 below. 
143 Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 below. 
144 Chapter 5, paras 5.2.1-5.2.6 below. 
145 Chapter 5, para 5.2.7 below. 
146 Chapter 6, paras 6.2.1-6.2.6 below. 
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with developed countries like Australia with a view to establish how their corporate 
governance systems can serve as models for enhancing corporate governance standards in 
Zimbabwe. The chapter further examines and compares the mechanisms put in place by both 
jurisdictions to enforce compliance with good corporate governance practices.
147
 
 
In chapter 7, the empirical results are presented, interpreted and summarised and implications 
are discussed.
148
 The chapter ends by comparing the results obtained in respect of public 
entities in Zimbabwe to those found by other researchers on South Africa and Australia to 
establish how well Zimbabwe’s public entities have performed in comparison to those of 
South Africa and Australia.
149
 
 
In Chapter 8, a summary and conclusion of the research is provided.
150
 Based on the findings, 
recommendations are made on how the effectiveness of public entities boards can be 
enhanced.
151
   
 
1.8 REFERENCE TECHNIQUES 
For the purpose of this research, company directors are referred to in the masculine form. 
Sources of reference are cited in full when first quoted
152
 and thereafter in abbreviated form 
in the footnotes. Full references are shown in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147 Chapter 6, para 6.2.7 below. 
148 Chapter 7, para 7.2.2-7.2.7 below. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Chapter 8, paras 8.2 to 8.3 below. 
151 Chapter 8, para 8.4 below. 
152 Where the quoted source has more than three authors, only the first author is cited in the main document and the rest are 
shown in the bibliography. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was stated above, the underlying research problem of this study is to critically analyse 
how effective boards of Zimbabwean public entities have been in discharging their duties and 
to identify the major constraints faced by the boards in effectively performing their mandates 
within the existing corporate governance framework. The main objective of the research, 
therefore, is to assess the effectiveness of the Zimbabwean corporate governance initiatives, 
laws and regulations in enhancing the effectiveness of boards of public entities and 
promoting good corporate governance practices in the entities. The research also aims to 
establish how successful Zimbabwe has been in promoting internationally accepted corporate 
governance standards in its business entities and how well it has performed in comparison to 
other countries.
1
  
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology used in the study and the rationale for the 
method adopted. The chapter discusses the research problem, research approach, sample 
selection, data collection methods and limitations of the research.  
 
2.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Although considerable research has been undertaken with regard to the effectiveness of 
boards of private enterprises, not enough attention has been given to the challenges being 
faced by boards of public entities in undertaking their responsibilities.
 2
 This is so especially 
in African developing countries where public entity boards have experienced challenges in 
                                                 
1 To enable the assessment, Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework is compared to that of South Africa and Australia 
(Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
2 See Chapter 1, para 1.3 above, Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – Executive Directors 
Gone to Sleep?” (2014) 78-86 and Maune A “Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” 
(2015) 167-178. 
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discharging their duties and promoting good corporate governance.
3
 Moreover, there has not 
been significant research on the effectiveness of boards of public entities and adequacy of the 
corporate governance framework in Zimbabwe specifically, hence the need for more research 
on this crucial subject.
4
 The research aims to find answers to the questions asked in chapter 1 
above
5
 with the major focus being on Zimbabwe. 
 
2.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
2.3.1 Research Design 
Research design refers to the overall strategy chosen and applied to answer the research 
question.
6
  It therefore, constitutes a coherent sequence of determining the research question 
and the methods to be adopted to collect relevant data to answer the research question and 
how this will be accomplished. Key aspects of research design include: research 
methodology, research method, sample collection and data collection procedures and 
instruments.
7
 
 
To answer the research questions, the research involved a literature study of books, 
electronic/internet sources, journal articles, theses/dissertations, case law, legislation, 
newspaper, annual and other reports. This stage focused on literature analysis and collection 
of preliminary data which served as sources of information to develop the questionnaires and 
interview questions. To supplement the information gathered from the above, questionnaires 
were circulated and face-to- face interviews were conducted with some key people in selected 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Chapter 1, para 1.2 above. 
6 Kelly K et al “Good Practice in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research” (2003) 15(3) International Journal for 
Quality in Health Care 261-266 available at http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/content/intqhc/15/3/261.full.pdf (accessed on 
17 December 2014). Yin defines research design as a blueprint for conducting research that seeks to address four problems, 
namely the research question as well as what data are relevant, the identification of data for collection, and what data for 
analysis (Yin RK Case Study Research: Design and Methods 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications 2008). See also 
Osano B O The Effect of Investment Strategies on Financial Performance of Investment Funds in Kenya Unpublished Thesis 
(University of Nairobi 2013) 21. 
7 Ibid. See also Punch K Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (SAGE Publications 
2005) 250 available at www.sagepublications.com/ (accessed on 20 December 2014). 
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public entities. The final stage of the research involved data analysis, presentation and 
interpretation of results.  
 
2.3.2 Research Methodology 
Research methodology is “a way to systematically solve the research problem” and has many 
dimensions of which research methods constitutes a part.
8
 Research methodology does not 
only refer to the research methods but also considers the reason behind the methods used in 
the context of the research study, explains why a particular method or technique has been 
used and clarifies why other methods have not been used so that the research results are 
capable of being assessed either by the researcher himself or by others.
9
 
 
The experiences of four public entities with regard to board effectiveness in the 
implementation of good corporate governance standards are examined. A review of the 
rationale for the selection of the research method adopted and the appropriateness of the 
research design is conducted. Also included in this chapter is a discussion on the procedures 
for data sampling and data collection. 
 
2.3.3 Research Method 
Research methods refer to the techniques employed in collecting relevant research materials 
and processing such materials into answers to the research question(s).
10
 Generally, the use of 
a particular research method depends on the researcher’s personal skills, the scope, purpose 
and target population of the study and the resources available to conduct the research.
11
 A 
number of methods can be employed in collecting the requisite research material required to 
answer the research question.  
                                                 
8 Kothari CR Research Methodology: Methods and Technique 2nd ed. (New Age International (P) Ltd Publishers 2004) 7-8. 
9 Kumar R Research Methodology (APH Publishing 2012) 5. Whilst research methods focus at finding solutions to research 
problems, research methodology concentrates more on the employment of the correct procedures to find out solutions 
(Sridhar MS Introduction to Research Methodology: Problem Selection, Formulation and Research Design (Lulu.com 2010) 
9-10 available at http://www.researchgate.net/profile/M_S_Sridhar/publication/39168208_Research_Methodology (accessed 
on 29 January 2015)). 
10 Kothari CR Research Methodology: Methods and Technique (2004) 7-9. 
11 Wilkinson D The Researcher’s Toolkit (Routledge Falmer 2000) 9-11. 
32 
 
 
As indicated above,
12
 there are two major methods of research, that is a positivistic and a 
phenomenological approach.
13
 The positivistic approach, also referred to as quantitative 
research, explains social phenomena by assigning numeric values to observed phenomena 
and counting the frequency of those phenomena with a view to deduce some conclusions 
about the characteristics of the populations.
14
 In terms of this approach, clearly constructed 
hypotheses are formulated about the relationship between two or more variables.
15
 In 
addition, the positivist position is based on the “theoretical belief that there is an objective 
reality that can be known to the researcher, if she or he uses the correct methods and applies 
those methods in a correct manner”.16  
 
To ascertain the aptness of the method, the positivistic approach is evaluated using three 
criteria namely; validity, reliability and generalisability.
17
 Validity is defined as the degree to 
which a measurement process “measures what it purports to measure” or the degree to which 
it gives the correct answer.
18
 Reliability refers to the extent to which a questionnaire, test, 
observation or any measurement procedure produces the same results on repeated trials. 
Generalisability is defined as the extent to which the findings of a study can be applied 
externally or more broadly outside of the study context or the degree to which the findings 
from the study sample can be extended to make predictions about the entire population.
19
 
 
                                                 
12 Chapter 1, para 1.4 above. 
13 Collis J and Hussey R Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students 3rd ed. 
(Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2003) 55-57. See also Wilkinson D The Researcher’s Toolkit (2000) 8-9. 
14 Ibid. See also Chetty L The Influence of Leadership on the Organisational Effectiveness of Saps Precincts Unpublished 
Thesis (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 2011) 17. 
15 The relationships between the variables are measured by means of statistical methods such as multiple regression analysis, 
structural equation analysis and the Pearson product-moment correlational analysis (Struwig FW and Stead GB Planning, 
Designing and Reporting Research (Pearson Education, Cape Town 2004) 5-10). 
16 Khakpour A “Methodology of Comparative Studies in Education” (2012) 1 Contemporary Educational Researches 
Journal 20-26. See also Thomas PY Towards Developing A Web-Based Blended Learning Environment at the University of 
Botswana Unpublished Thesis (UNISA 2010) 294 and Cohen D and Crabtree B Qualitative Research Guidelines Project of 
July 2006 available at http://www.qualres.org/ (accessed on 17 August 2014). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Miller MJ Graduate Research Methods (Western International University Lecture Notes) available at 
http://michaeljmillerphd.com/res500_lecturenotes/Reliability_and_Validity.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2014). 
 
19 Myers M “Qualitative Research and the Generalizability Question: Standing Firm with Proteus” (2000) 4(3/4) The 
Qualitative Report available at http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4-3/myers.html (accessed on 17 August 2014). 
33 
 
The positivistic approach has advantages and disadvantages. One of the main advantages of a 
quantitative approach to data collection is the relative ease, economy and speed with which 
the research can be conducted.
20
 The other advantages are wide coverage of the range of 
situations and the relevance to policy decisions when statistics are exaggerated in large 
samples.
21
 The disadvantages are that the methods tend to be too flexible and artificial, are 
not very effective in understanding processes or the significance people attach to actions, are 
not very helpful in generating theories and that it is difficult for policy makers to infer what 
future actions should take place because of its main focus on what is or what has been 
recently.
22
 
 
On the other hand, the phenomenological approach (also referred to as qualitative research) 
has been defined as “an inquiry approach which is useful to exploring and understanding the 
central phenomenon. To learn about the central phenomenon the researcher asks broad and 
general questions.”23 The approach is particularly interested in the idea that human 
experience is a valuable source of data, as opposed to the idea that true research or discovery 
lies in simply measuring the existence of physical phenomena.
24
 Qualitative research 
concerns itself with approaches such as ecological psychology,
25
 symbolic interactionism
26
 
                                                 
20 Garbarino S and Holland J Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in Impact Evaluation and Measuring Results 
(Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) Issues Paper March 2009) 11-13 available at 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/EIRS4.pdf (accessed on 7 September 2014). 
21 Lin AC “Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative Methods” (1998) 26(1) Policy Studies Journal 
162-180 available at http://faculty.washington.edu/swhiting/pols502/Lin.pdf (accessed on 5 November 2014). See also 
Zawawi D Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods in Social Sciences: Bridging the Gap (Paper prepared by University of 
Putra, Malaysia) 3-4 available at http://psasir.upm.edu.my/809/1/Quantitativeversusqualitativemethodssocialsciences.pdf 
(accessed on 5 November 2014). 
22 Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in Education 6th ed. (Routledge 2007) 17-19. 
23 Creswell J Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall 2002) 596. 
24 Dawson C Practical Research Methods (UBS Publishers’ Distributors, New Delhi 2002) 14-23. 
25 Ecological psychology is defined as the analysis of behaviour settings with a view to envisage behaviour patterns that 
occur in particular settings. The focus is on the role of social and physical elements in the setting (Psychology Dictionary 
available at http://psychologydictionary.org/ecological-psychology/ (accessed on 18 August 2014). See also Morris EK 
“Behavior Analysis and Ecological Psychology: Past, Present and Future: A Review of Harry Heft’s Ecological psychology 
in Context” (2009) 92(2) A Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour 275-304.    
26 Symbolic interactionism relies on the symbolic meaning that people develop and rely upon in the process of social 
interaction. In particular, the theory states that the meaning of objects, events, and behaviors comes from the interpretation 
people give them, and interpretations vary from one group to another (Berg BL Qualitative Research Methods for the Social 
Sciences 4th ed. (Allyn & Bacon, Pearson Education Company 2000) 7-9). 
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and postmodernism
27
 and employs statistical methods, such as participant observation, 
archival source analysis, conversations, interviews, focus groups and content analysis.
28 
Generally, when one applies the phenomenological approach he tends to focus more on the 
meaning rather than the measurement of social problems.
29
 Phenomenological methods are 
particularly effective at expressing the experiences and perceptions of individuals from their 
own personal knowledge and subjectivity.
30
  
 
The advantage of a qualitative research approach is that it enables the researcher to obtain 
elaborate and comprehensive information.
31
 Another strength of phenomenology is that the 
results of the research are derived from the data collected, “instead of being imposed by a 
structured statistical analysis”.32 The main disadvantage of phenomenological research is that 
it creates huge volumes of interview notes, tape recordings or other records all of which have 
to be analysed.
33
 Also, data analysis is not usually easy because the collected data does not 
squarely fit into orderly categories and there can be various conclusions to be made from 
different parts of discussions or observations.
34
 Other disadvantages of using phenomenology 
for research are the subjectivity of the data which leads to difficulties in establishing 
reliability and validity of approaches and information, the difficulty in detecting or 
                                                 
27 Postmodernism is defined as a “reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific, or objective, efforts to explain reality. In 
essence, it stems from a recognition that reality is not simply mirrored in human understanding of it, but rather, is 
constructed as the mind tries to understand its own particular and personal reality”. Postmodernism is said to rely on actual   
“experience over abstract principles, knowing always that the outcome of one's own experience will necessarily be fallible 
and relative, rather than certain and universal” (Sarlak MA The New Faces of Organizations in the 21st Century: A 
Management and Business Reference Book (NAISIT Publishers 2010) 30). See also Stiefel BL and Wells JC Preservation 
Education: Sharing Best Practices and Finding Common Ground (University of Press, New England 2014) 6. 
28 Arnolds CA and Venter DJL “The Strategic Importance of Motivational Rewards for Lower-Level Employees in the 
Manufacturing and Retailing Industries” 2007 33(3) SA Journal of Industrial Psychology 15-23. See also Young PV 
Scientific Social Surveys and Research: An Introduction to the Background, Content, Methods, Principles, and Analysis of 
Social Studies 3rd ed. (Prentice-Hall 2011) 29-41. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Lester S An Introduction to Phenomenological Research (Stan Lester Developments, Taunton UK 1999) 1-2 available at 
www.sld.demon.co.uk/resmethy.pdf, (accessed on 10 June 2013). 
31 Strauss A and Corbin J The Bases of Qualitative Researchers: Grounded Theories, Procedures and Techniques (Newburg 
Park, CA: Sage 2004). 
32 Kohlbacher F “The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research” (2006) 7(1) Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research 1-90 available at http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0601211 (accessed on 15 February 2015). 
33 Hoepfl MC “Choosing Qualitative Research: A Primer for Technology Education Researchers” (1997) 9(1) Journal of 
Educational Technology 47-63 available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/hoepfl.html (accessed on 13 January 
2015). 
34 Berg BL Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences 4th ed. (Allyn & Bacon, Pearson Education Company 
2000) 2-4. 
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preventing researcher induced bias and the possible difficulties of participants fully 
expressing themselves.
35
 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that both methods of research are effective but in 
different ways. What determines the type of approach that is appropriate is the nature of the 
research problems under investigation, the amount of knowledge the researcher already has in 
the research field, the target population of the study and resources available to the 
researcher.
36
 It was essential, therefore, that in order to achieve this research’s objectives, the 
right methodology had to be adopted and the right data collection techniques had to be 
selected to collect the required data within the available resources. As a result, a mixture of 
methods which included the doctrinal research method,
37
 questionnaires and interviews was 
adopted. 
 
Doctrinal research method comprises of either a straightforward research that focuses at 
finding a precise statement of the law or a more complicated and comprehensive analysis of 
legal reasoning.
38
 Doctrinal research has been found to possess aspects of both quantitative 
(positivistic) and qualitative (phenomenological) methodologies within it. This is because, 
like the quantitative methodologies, doctrinal research is “underpinned by positivism and a 
view of the world where the law is objective, neutral and fixed”.39 As a result, other 
researchers are able to imitate the research involved in locating the sources of the law without 
difficulty. On the other hand, due to the fact that many facets of the law are dependent on the 
circumstances and need to be interpreted and analysed for meaning, which brings in elements 
of subjectivity, the method also has qualitative aspects.
40
 
 
                                                 
35 Punch K Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (2005) 235-238. 
36 Gill J and Johnson P Research Methods for Managers 4th ed. (Sage Publications Ltd 2010) 6-8 available at 
http://www.sagepub.com/booksProdDesc.nav?prodId=Book232326. (accessed on 20 August 2014). 
37 This method has been considered as the most accepted methodology in the discipline of law (Hutchinson T and Duncan 
NJ “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 83-119). 
38 Ibid. See also Chynoweth P Legal Research (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 29-30. 
39 Ibid. 
40 According to Hutchinson “Synthesising the law and, where necessary, applying the law to the facts and context is a highly 
subjective process. Therefore the analytical, legal reasoning aspect of the process is necessarily a qualitative one” 
(Hutchinson T and Duncan NJ “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 83-119). 
36 
 
The doctrinal research method involves location and analysis of the various sources of law 
(e.g. statutes and decided cases) in order to establish the nature and parameters of the law.
41
 
The doctrinal research method focuses on finding out what the law is in a particular context. 
It is concerned with “analysis of the legal doctrine42 and how it has been developed and 
applied”.43 The doctrinal method is more than simply a literature review because it involves 
initial location of the sources of the law and then interpretation and analysis of the text.
44
 The 
degrees of complexity within doctrinal legal research method range from practical problem-
solving,
45
 straightforward descriptions of laws to innovative theory building.
46
  
 
Given the aforementioned qualities of the doctrinal research method, it was considered the 
most appropriate for this study. With regard to questionnaires and interviews, the researcher 
sought to understand how corporate governance is implemented and the challenges faced by 
boards in four Zimbabwean public entities from the perspectives of their respective board 
members, chief executive officers, company secretaries, senior management and shareholder 
representatives.
47
 The data collected particularly sought to establish the effectiveness of 
boards of directors in promoting good corporate governance in these public entities in light of 
the prevailing regulatory and statutory mechanisms. 
                                                 
41 Chynoweth P Legal Research (2008) 30. 
42 Doctrine has been defined as a “synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It 
explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law. Doctrines can be more or less 
abstract, binding or non-binding” (Hutchinson T and Duncan NJ “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research” (2012) 83-119). 
43 Razak AA “Understanding Legal Research” (2009) 19-24. 
44 Ibid.  
45 The problem-solving facet is directed to solving a specific legal problem and normally includes assembling relevant facts; 
identifying the legal issues; analysing the issues with a view to searching for the law; reading background material (e.g. legal 
dictionaries, textbooks, law reform and policy papers, journal articles); locating primary material (e.g. legislation, case law); 
synthesising all the issues in context and a conclusion (Hutchinson T and Duncan NJ “Defining and Describing What We 
Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 83-119). 
46 Ibid. Generally innovation has been defined as “a sequential two-part process of idea generation (i.e. exploration) and 
commercialisation (i.e. exploitation) of the most promising ideas into useful products or services (Edgell RA and Vogl R “A 
Theory of Innovation: Benefit, Harm, and Legal Regimes” (2013) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 21-53 available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=2506360 (accessed on 5 September 2015)). In the context of legal research, innovative theory building 
would entail generation of something new to the body of legal knowledge that may benefit lawmakers, other researchers and 
the general society in the globalised world where there is a rise of new laws and technological innovation (Van Gestel R, 
Micklitz H and Maduro MP Methodology in the New Legal World (European University Institute Working Papers, 
Department of Law 2012/13) 7-8 available at cadmus.eui.eu/.../LAW_2012_13_VanGestelMicklitzMaduro.pdf? (accessed 
on 29 August 2015)). 
47 It was considered that focusing on participants from a single public entity would not be a good sample for the attainment 
of a deeper understanding of how corporate governance is implemented and monitored in public entities. Similarly, focusing 
on too many cases was considered unnecessary given the similarities in how the public entities are operated and the 
framework within which they operate.  
37 
 
 
2.3.4 Sample Selection 
Zimbabwe has approximately eighty six (86) public entities, sixty three (63) of which are 
under the governance of specific legislations and twenty three (23) are government owned 
entities registered under the Companies Act.
48
 The statutes forming the public entities contain 
similar provisions and only differ in terms of the objective of establishing the entity, its 
mandate and powers.
49
 Given this scenario, a sample
50
 of four public entities was selected 
through purposive sampling to provide the possibility of understanding the corporate 
governance practices in public entities. The main reasons for sampling were the huge costs 
that would be involved in terms of time and other resources to test the entire population.
51
 
Secondly, it was impossible to test the entire population due to difficulties that were likely to 
be encountered in getting access to all public entities. The third reason for sampling was the 
generally accepted fact that testing the entire population often produces errors and may be 
destructive.
52
 
 
The purposive sampling technique (also known as judgmental, selective or subjective 
sampling) was adopted. Purposive sampling embodies a group of different non-probability 
sampling techniques which allow the researcher to purposely select a small number of cases 
which represent a broader number of cases as close as possible.
53
 The method relies on the 
                                                 
48 Para 1.4 of the CGF. Visit http://www.zim.gov.zw/index.php/parastatals for more details. 
49
 This is confirmed if, for example, one compares and contrasts the provisions of the Postal and Telecommunication Act 
(Chapter 12:05) (No. 4 of 2000), Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act (Chapter 14:30) (No. 4 of 2006) and Zimbabwe 
Mining Development Corporation Act. 
50 A sample is a segment of the population selected to represent the population as a whole. Ideally, the sample should be 
representative and allow the researcher to make accurate estimates of the thoughts and behaviour of the larger population 
(Onwuegbuzie AJ and Collins KMT “A typology of Mixed Methods Sampling Designs in Social Science Research” (2007) 
12(2) The Qualitative Report 281-316 available at http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR12-2/onwuegbuzie2.pdf (accessed on 28 
August 2014)). 
51 Barreiro PL and Albandoz JP Population and Sample; Sampling Techniques (University of Seville 2001) 2-3 available at 
http://optimierung.mathematik.uni-kl.de/mamaeusch/veroeffentlichungen/ver_texte/sampling_en.pdf (accessed on 28 August 
2014). See also Emmel N Sampling and Choosing Cases in Qualitative Research: A Realist Approach (SAGE Publications 
2013) 47-48. 
52 Emmel N Sampling and Choosing Cases in Qualitative Research: A Realist Approach (2013) 47-48. 
53 Ibid. See also Teddlie C and Yu F “Mixed Methods Sampling: A Typology with Examples” (2007) 1(1) Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research 77-100 available at http://mmr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/1/77 (accessed on 17 August 2014). 
The availability of a wide range of sampling techniques provides the researcher with the justification to make generalisations 
from the sample that is being studied. 
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researcher’s judgement when it comes to selecting the elements that are to be studied.54 
Usually, the sample being investigated is quite small, especially when compared with 
probability sampling techniques.
55
 The purposive sampling technique enables the researcher 
to focus on specific qualities of a population that are relevant in assisting him to answer 
research questions.
56
 There are a wide range of purposive sampling techniques that one can 
use but it is not within the scope of this research to discuss the techniques in detail.
57
 
 
The sample for this study was derived from board members, chief executive officers, 
company secretaries, senior management and shareholder representatives from each selected 
entity. From each of the four selected entities, the board chairman, three board members, 
chief executive officer, company secretary, four senior managers and two senior 
representatives of the parent ministry
58
 were requested to participate in the study.
59
 The main 
reason for selecting the above-named participants was their position and experience in the 
development and implementation of corporate governance principles and their significant 
involvement in the operations of the entities. It was also considered that, more often than not, 
people appointed to such high levels normally have relevant experience and a reasonable 
understanding of corporate governance hence would provide better knowledgeable and 
                                                 
54 Berg BL Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (2000) 30-32. However, this judgemental, subjective 
component of purpose sampling becomes a major shortcoming when such judgements are “ill-conceived or poorly 
considered; that is, where judgements have not been based on clear criteria, whether a theoretical framework, expert 
elicitation, or some other accepted criteria” (Mohammed AR Procurement Practices in Ghana: The Challenges Faced by 
Takoradi Polytechnic Unpublished Thesis (Ghana Telecom University College 2012) 31-33. 
55 It is generally accepted that the sample being studied may not be 100% representative of the population, but for 
researchers pursuing qualitative research designs, this is not considered to be a major weakness. In addition, there is no 
specified number of cases given the fact that the size of the sample is the decision of the researcher (Emmel N Sampling and 
Choosing Cases in Qualitative Research: A Realist Approach (2013) 47-48). See also Mohammed AR Procurement 
Practices in Ghana: The Challenges Faced by Takoradi Polytechnic (2012) 31-33. 
56 Berg BL Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (2000) 30-33. See also Punch K Introduction to Social 
Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (2005) 250-252. However, it is important to note that the subjectivity 
and non-probability based nature of sample selection in purposive sampling may sometimes make it difficult to defend the 
representativeness of the sample. 
57 Examples of some of the techniques are, maximum variation sampling, homogeneous sampling, typical case sampling, 
extreme (or deviant) case sampling, critical case sampling, total population sampling and expert sampling (Patton M 
Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1990) 169-186 available at 
legacy.oise.utoronto.ca/research/field-centres/ross/.../Patton1990.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2014). See also Teddlie C and 
Yu F “Mixed Methods Sampling: A Typology with Examples” (2007) 77-100. 
58 The terms “parent” or “shareholder” ministry will be used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the ministry that the 
public entity reports to or that oversees the operations of the entity.  
59 50 questionnaires were distributed to cater for some participants who would not respond. Of the potential interviewees, six 
were women and ten were men. Of those who were given questionnaires nine were women and twenty five were men. The 
sample was considered a fair reflection of the executive management profile in Zimbabwe. Most of the participating 
managers were males, well qualified and have been working for a long time in the public sector. 
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comprehensive answers to the research questions. Their perspectives on the issues under 
research would thus provide significant outcomes to the research results.  
 
Below are brief backgrounds of the four selected public entities. 
 
2.3.4.1 Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) 
MMCZ is a public entity that was established in terms of the MMCZ Act to control and 
regulate the export, sale and stockpiling of all minerals. MMCZ is a body corporate that is 
capable of suing and being sued and, subject to the provisions of the Act, “of performing all 
such acts as bodies corporate may by law perform”.60 Its main functions are to act as the sole 
marketing and selling agent for all minerals, investigate or cause to be investigated marketing 
conditions, locally and internationally, for minerals in general or for any particular mineral, 
purchase and acquire any minerals for its own account and to sell or dispose of such minerals, 
encourage the local beneficiation and utilisation of any minerals and advise the Minister on 
all matters connected with the marketing and selling of minerals.
61
 
 
2.3.4.1.1 MMCZ Governance Arrangements 
The public entity is controlled by a board, known as the MMCZ Board, constituted in terms 
of the Act.
62
 In terms of the Act, the Minister has to consult other key stakeholders and the 
country’s President before appointing board members.63 Furthermore, the Act obliges the 
Minister to choose one of the appointed members as chairman of the board and another as 
deputy chairman of the board.
64
 The board members have to meet certain minimum 
requirements which include professional qualifications and “knowledge and experience in the 
field of mineral production or international commodity marketing”.65 In addition, the Act 
                                                 
60 Section 3 of the MMCZ Act. 
61 Section 20 of the MMCZ Act. 
62 Section 3 of the MMCZ Act. 
63 Section 5 of the MMCZ Act. 
64 Section 3 of the MMCZ Act. 
65 Section 5 of the MMCZ Act. In addition, the appointed member should, among other requirements, be a citizen of 
Zimbabwe permanently resident in Zimbabwe, have no direct or indirect financial interest in any business which is likely to 
interfere with the impartial discharge of his duties as a member, not have been adjudged or otherwise declared insolvent or 
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limits the number of directors to not fewer than six and not more than ten non-executive 
board members including the General Manager
66
 of the public entity as part of the board.
67
 
The Act also limits the period that a director may hold office to a period not exceeding three 
years although a retiring member may be eligible for reappointment as a member.
68
  
 
To enable the board to effectively exercise its functions and powers, the Act empowers the 
board to establish one or more committees in which may be vested and on which may be 
imposed some of the functions and powers of the board.
69
 However, the establishment of the 
committees does not divest the board of such functions and powers. As such the board is 
required to stipulate terms of reference for the committees as well as amend or withdraw any 
decision of any such committee in the exercise of its functions and powers.
70
 The Act also 
provides for how the board is expected to conduct its meetings, how its remuneration is 
determined and the consequences for poor performance. The Act requires the board to cause 
minutes of all proceedings of and decisions taken at board or committee meetings to be 
recorded in books kept for this purpose.
71
 The board remuneration should be determined and 
fixed by the Minister.
72
 Where the board or an individual director does not perform duties as 
expected by the shareholder, the Minister is empowered to request the board member to leave 
his office.
73
 It is important to note that MMCZ is subjected to all legislation and regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
bankrupt and been rehabilitated or discharged in terms of a law in force in any country or been sentenced in any country to a 
term of imprisonment of or exceeding six months imposed without the option of a fine and has not been freely pardoned 
within the period of five years immediately preceding the date of his proposed appointment. 
66 In Zimbabwe, the majority of the heads of public entities (CEOs) are referred to as the ‘General Manager’ (see section 24 
of the MMCZ Act and GMB Act). 
67 Section 5 of the MMCZ Act. 
68 Section 3 of the MMCZ Act. 
69 Section 9 of the MMCZ Act. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Section 13 of the MMCZ Act. 
72 Section 13 of the MMCZ Act. 
73 Section 9 of the MMCZ Act. Some of the grounds for dismissal are improper conduct as a member; failure to comply with 
the terms and conditions of his appointment or is mentally or physically incapable of efficiently performing his duties as a 
member. 
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instruments governing the operations of public entities, for example, the PFMA, Manual, 
National Code and CGF.
74
 
 
2.3.4.2 Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) 
ZMDC is a public entity which was established in terms of the Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation Act.
75
 The main functions of ZMDC are stated in the ZMDC Act 
as; to invest in the mining industry in Zimbabwe on behalf of the State,  plan, co-ordinate and 
implement mining development projects on behalf of the State, engage in prospecting, 
exploration, mining and mineral beneficiation programmes, encourage and undertake the 
formation of mining co-operatives, render assistance to persons engaged in or about to 
engage in mining, review annually the general economic conditions and prospects of the 
mining industry and in particular investment schemes, advise the Minister of Mines and 
Minerals Development on all matters connected with corporate investments in the mining 
industry and make recommendations for the proper co-ordination of all investment 
programmes.
76
 
 
2.3.4.2.1 ZMDC Governance Arrangements 
ZMDC is directed by a board, known as the ZMDC Board, constituted in terms of the ZMDC 
Act.
77
 The board is appointed by the Minister after consulting other key stakeholders and the 
country’s President.78 The people to be appointed as board members should have the ability 
and experience in the mining industry or administration.
79
 The Act limits the number of 
directors to a minimum of six and not more than ten non-executive board members including 
                                                 
74 This is because all public entities are obliged to comply with the provisions of the PFMA (section 4) and the CGF (para 
1.4.3). However, the Manual and National Code are voluntary codes which public entities can choose to comply with or 
proffer explanations for non-compliance.    
75 Act 31 of 1982 (Chapter 21:08). 
76 Section 20 of the ZMDC Act. 
77 Section 3 of the ZMDC Act. 
78 Section 5 of the ZMDC Act. The Act obliges the Minister to choose one of the appointed members as chairman of the 
board and another as deputy chairman of the board. 
79 See section 5 of the ZMDC Act which has the same wording as that of MMCZ Act. 
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the General Manager of the public entity.
80
 The Act further limits the period that a director 
may hold office to a period not exceeding three years although a retiring member may be 
reappointed as a member.
81
  
 
The Act requires the board to establish one or more committees to perform the functions and 
powers of the board on its behalf.
82
 The board should specify terms of reference for the 
committees as well as amend or withdraw any decision of any such committee in the exercise 
of its functions and powers.
83
 The ZMDC Act requires the board to cause minutes of all 
proceedings of and decisions taken at board or committee meetings to be recorded and kept 
safely.
84
 Board remuneration should be determined and fixed by the Minister.
85
 Where the 
board or an individual director commits acts of misconduct or fails to comply with the terms 
and conditions of his appointment, the Minister is empowered to request the board member to 
leave his office.
86
 ZMDC is subjected to all legislation and regulatory instruments governing 
the operations of public entities, for example, the PFMA, Manual, National Code and CGF.
87
 
 
2.3.4.3 National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) 
NRZ is a public entity that was established in terms of the Railways Act.
88
 Its main objective 
is to provide, operate and maintain an efficient system of public transport of goods and 
passengers by rail and by road. For the better exercise of its functions, the NRZ is empowered 
to work through agents or jointly with others.
89
 The NRZ functions under the ambit of 
Ministry of Transport and Energy. 
                                                 
80 Section 5 of the ZMDC Act. The General Manager is appointed in terms of section 24 of the ZMDC Act.  
81 Section 6 of the ZMDC Act. 
82 Section 9 of the ZMDC Act. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Section 13 of the ZMDC Act. 
85 Section 13 of the ZMDC Act. 
86 Section 9 of the ZMDC Act.  
87 This is because all public entities are obliged to comply with the provisions of the PFMA (section 4) and the CGF (para 
1.4.3).  
88 Section 3 of the Railways Act.  
89 Sections 17-18 of the Railways Act. 
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2.3.4.3.1 NRZ Governance Arrangements 
The public entity is controlled by a board, known as the NRZ Board, constituted in terms of 
the Act.
90
 In terms of the Act, the board should be appointed by the Minister in consultation 
with and in accordance with any directions given by the country’s President.91 The Act also 
obliges the Minister to choose one of the appointed members as chairman of the board and 
another as deputy chairman of the board.
92
 The board should be composed of not less than six 
and not more than nine members of whom one should be the General Manager and the rest 
non-executive board members.
93
 The Act further limits the period that a director may hold 
office to a period not exceeding three years although a retiring member may qualify for 
reappointment as a member.
94
  
 
The Act also provides for how the board is expected to conduct its meetings, how its 
remuneration is determined and the consequences for poor performance. 
95
 The board is 
required to keep records of all proceedings of and decisions taken at board meetings.
96
 The 
board remuneration to meet any reasonable expenses incurred by a board member in 
connection with the business of the NRZ Board should be determined and fixed by the 
Minister, in consultation with the Minister responsible for finance.
97
 The Minister is 
empowered to request a board member to leave his office or to suspend him if he does not 
perform his duties as expected by the shareholder or commits any act of misconduct.
98
 Like 
                                                 
90 Section 5 of the Railways Act. 
91 Section 5 of the Railways Act. 
92 Section 5 of the Railways Act. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Section 6 of the Railways Act. 
95 Section 11-12 of the Railways Act. 
96 Section 13 of the Railways Act. 
97 Section 12 of the Railways Act. 
98 Section 9 of the Railways Act. The Minister may suspend an appointed member against whom criminal proceedings are 
instituted for an offence in respect of which a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine may be imposed or who 
has been sentenced by a court to imprisonment after conviction of an offence pending determination of the question whether 
he is to vacate his office and whilst that appointed member is on suspension he shall not carry out any duties or be entitled to 
any remuneration as an appointed member. 
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all other public entities, NRZ is required to comply with all legislation and regulatory 
instruments governing the operations of public entities, for example, the PFMA, Manual, 
National Code and CGF.
99
 
 
2.3.4.4 Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
GMB was established as a wholly-owned government entity in terms of the Grain Marketing 
Act to regulate and control the prices and marketing of certain agricultural products and their 
derivatives. Its main functions are to buy and sell any controlled agricultural product which is 
delivered to or acquired by it under the provisions of the Act, provide storage, handling and 
processing facilities for controlled products, to maintain stocks of controlled products as it 
may consider necessary, import or export controlled products as it may consider necessary 
and to do all things necessary and consistent with the provisions of the Act to ensure the 
orderly marketing of controlled agricultural products within any prescribed area.
100
 In 
carrying out its mandate, GMB is expected to comply with all legislation and regulatory 
instruments governing the operations of public entities, for example, the PFMA, Manual, 
National Code and CGF. 
 
2.3.4.4.1 GMB Governance Arrangements 
The public entity is directed by a board, known as the Grain Marketing Board.
101
 The board is 
appointed by the Minister, in consultation with the country’s President.102 The potential board 
members should be professionally qualified and have “ability and experience in agriculture, 
business or administration.”103 The Act limits the number of directors to not fewer than six 
and not more than nine non-executive board members.
104
 In addition, the Act also limits the 
period that a director may hold office to a period not exceeding three years although a retiring 
                                                 
99 See para 2.3.4.1 above.    
100 Section 26 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
101 Section 4 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
102 Section 5 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
103 Section 5 of the Grain Marketing Act which is similarly worded to the MMCZ and ZMDC Acts. 
104 Ibid. 
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member is eligible for reappointment as a member.
105
 Furthermore, the Act also obliges the 
Minister to choose one of the appointed members as chairman of the board and another as 
deputy chairman of the board.
106
 
 
To enable the board to effectively exercise its functions and powers, the Act empowers the 
board to establish one or more committees.
107
 However, the board is expected to guide the 
operations of the committees through provision of clear terms of reference and regular 
monitoring of the activities and decisions of any such committee.
108
 More so, the Grain 
Marketing Act requires the board to maintain minutes of all proceedings of and decisions 
taken at board or committee meetings.
109
 Like in the majority of public entities, the 
remuneration of the GMB Board is determined and fixed by the Minister.
110
 To encourage 
performance, the Grain Marketing Act provides for the removal of a director if he has been 
absent without the board’s permission from three consecutive board meetings, of which he 
has been given proper notice and if there was no just cause for the member’s absence.111 The 
other grounds for dismissal of a board member are improper conduct and failure to comply 
with the terms and conditions of his appointment.
112
 
 
2.3.5 Data Collection Methods 
The quality of the collected data determines the quality of the findings of the research.
113
 
Basically, three methods were used to collect data for the research namely; literature analysis, 
questionnaires and interviews. Since the research involved human participants, it was a 
                                                 
105 Section 6 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
106 Section 5 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
107 Section 12 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Section 13 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
110 Section 14 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
111 Section 9 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
112 Ibid. 
113 The process of data collection focuses on the skills of the investigator. It basically “includes the ability to ask questions, 
to listen actively, to adapt to unforeseen circumstances that may arise, to grasp the issues being addressed, and to identify 
personal bias” (Brown PA “A Review of the Literature on Case Study Research” (2008) 1(1) Canadian Journal for New 
Scholars in Education 1-13). 
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requirement that ethical clearance be obtained from the College of Law Research Ethics 
Committee in terms of the University of South Africa Policy on Research Ethics. Ethical 
issues involved informed consent,
114
 confidentiality and anonymity of the participants which 
was achieved through educating the participants on what is expected from them and ensuring 
that the data collected did not identify the participants by name.  
 
Furthermore, a cover letter was given to the participants informing them about the purpose of 
the study and its importance as well as assuring them of the confidentiality of their answers 
and that the information provided will be used for research purposes only. To further 
maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, data analysis and research 
results were reported in such a way that the information they contain could not be directly 
linked to anyone.   
 
2.3.5.1 Questionnaire Survey 
It is generally accepted that for a questionnaire to be effective, it should be clear, reliable and 
valid for the purpose for which it is to be used, as short and concise as possible, avoid leading 
and double-barreled questions and avoid questions with implied assumptions, among 
others.
115
 Taking note of the above observations, two questionnaires were developed, one 
targeted towards directors (Appendix C) and the other one designed for chief executive 
officers, company secretaries, senior management and shareholder representatives (Appendix 
D).  
 
The questionnaires were designed to cover nine aspects namely; personal information, 
general corporate governance knowledge, role of board, appointment of board, composition 
of the board, remuneration of the board, evaluation of the board’s performance, compliance 
enforcement and general recommendations. The questionnaires consisted of both open and 
closed ended questions. Open-ended questions were designed to allow participants to give 
                                                 
114 Informed refers to “the knowing consent of an individual voluntarily, without undue inducement or any element of force, 
fraud, duress or any other form of constraint or coercion”. It involves adequate explanations to the participants with regard to 
the type of information the researcher requires from them, the purpose for which the information is being sought, its intended 
use, how the participants are expected to contribute to the study and how it will affect them (Cherry K What is Informed 
Consent? available at http://psychology.about.com/od/iindex/g/def_informedcon.htm (accessed on 7 August 2014)). 
115 Bradburn NM, Sudman S and Wansink B Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire Design—For Market 
Research, Political Polls, and Social and Health Questionnaires Revised Edition (Jossey-Bass 2004) 3-8. See also Brancato 
G et al Handbook for Recommended Practices for Questionnaire Development and Testing in the European Statistical 
System available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/../portal/.../RPSQDET27062006.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2014).  
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adequate answers in their own words and to freely express their opinion, recommendations or 
criticism without being limited by the options available as in the case of closed questions.
116
 
On the other hand, closed ended questions included an array of all possible answers and 
participants were asked to choose the most appropriate answer.
117
 
 
In Section A of the questionnaires, the questions focus on information about the participants 
such as gender, position in the public entity and length of service. Section B focuses on 
general corporate governance knowledge and seeks to establish the level of understanding of 
the participant of what corporate governance entails and his assessment of the general level of 
corporate governance compliance of the entity. Section C focuses on the role of the board 
with a view to determine the systems and mechanisms put in place by the entity to guide the 
operations of the board, the effectiveness of the systems and mechanisms and suggestions on 
how the board can be assisted to undertake its role effectively. 
 
Section D of the questionnaires concentrates on the process of board selection and 
appointment seeking to understand the basis on which boards are appointed, by whom and 
the duration of appointment. Section E focuses on board composition and tries to find out 
whether there are any specific mandatory requirements for the compositions of the public 
entities’ boards in terms of minimum qualifications, gender, board size, maximum years of 
tenure, maximum age of directors, minimum or maximum years of experience in specific 
areas and maximum number of board membership each director may hold. This part also 
concentrates on establishing the processes involved in the establishment of board committees 
and to confirm whether or not committees have clear terms of reference setting out their 
scope of work and responsibilities to enable them to perform their functions properly. 
                                                 
116 The open-ended questions have the disadvantages that they can necessitate too much time for respondents to answer, they 
may yield a lot of unnecessary information and responses are difficult to code and interpret. As opened ended questions seek 
to establish opinions rather than numbers, fewer questionnaires needed to be distributed (Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison 
K Research Methods in Education 6th ed. (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, USA 2007) 321-330). See also Bradburn M, 
Sudman S and Wansik B Asking Questions Revised Edition (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2004) 154-155 and Sincero S M Types 
of Survey Questions (Research Paper 2012) available at https://explorable.com/types-of-survey-questions (accessed on 28 
August 2014).  
117 Closed-ended questions have the advantage that it is easier and quicker for respondents to answer, there are fewer 
irrelevant or confused answers to questions and the answers of different respondents are easier to compare. However, the 
closed-ended questions have the disadvantage that participants are required to choose a response that does not exactly reflect 
their answer; they can yield misleading assumptions and discourage disclosure of true opinions and the researcher may 
experience difficulties in exploring further the meaning of the responses (Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research 
Methods in Education (2007) 321-329). See also Cassell C and Symon G Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in 
Organizational Research (SAGE Publications 2004) 12-15. 
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Section F deals with the aspect of board remuneration with the aim of determining the 
adequacy of the remuneration, how the remuneration is determined and what the views of the 
participants are as regards the existing board remuneration system. Section G focuses on 
establishing whether the entity’s boards and individual directors’ performance are evaluated 
and, if so, how frequently, by whom and through which evaluation methods. Furthermore, 
this part explores the perspectives of the selected participants on board evaluation; its 
association with board effectiveness and performance and the participants’ views on potential 
improvements to board evaluation. Thus, this part aims to find out whether or not the board 
evaluation processes have assisted public entities in enhancing the effectiveness of boards 
and in promoting good corporate governance.  
 
Section H focuses on the issues to do with enforcement of compliance with good corporate 
governance standards by public entities. This part tries to establish the participants’ opinions 
on the sufficiency of the existing legal and regulatory framework in enhancing the 
effectiveness of public entities boards as well as the effectiness of the regulatory bodies and 
the judicial system in enforcing compliance and promoting good corporate governance in 
these entities. The last part (Section I) gives the participant the opportunity to make general 
comments and express any other views considered important to the study. 
 
Five independent people
118
 were requested to analyse the questionnaire and comment on the 
length, structure and wording (clarity) of the questionnaire highlighting any ambiguities or 
areas that needed to be reviewed. Some questions were then altered accordingly taking into 
account the people’s comments. The questionnaires were then submitted to the thesis 
supervisors for validation before distribution to participants. 
 
Copies of the questionnaires were emailed and hand delivered to selected board members, 
chief executive officers, company secretaries, senior management and ministry 
representatives.
119
 Emailing questionnaires was considered appropriate because of the 
                                                 
118 These included two lecturers from the University of Zimbabwe, one lecturer from the Midlands State University, a 
colleague who recently graduated from University of South Africa and one corporate governance expert with the Institute of 
Directors of Zimbabwe. 
119 To increase the response rate, representatives of the selected people were allowed to respond on the former’s behalf and 
more than the required number of managers were given the questionnaires in case some did not respond.  
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expediency of emails whilst hard copies were delivered to those who preferred hand writing 
to typing their responses. Further, in compliance with the Ethics Committee requirements, a 
copy of the ‘Participant’s Information Sheet’ (Appendix B) was attached to the emails or hard 
copies to convey the confidentiality of the individual data of the study to the participants. 
Completed hard copies were collected from the participants and the response rate to emailed 
documents was improved through follow-up email reminders. 
 
2.3.5.2 Interview Survey 
Interviews are one of the most common methods of data collection used in qualitative 
research. The purpose of the research interview is to explore the views, experiences, beliefs 
and/or motivations of individuals on specific matters as well as to provide a deeper 
understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from other methods, such as 
questionnaires.
120
 There are different interview methods namely; structured,
121
 semi-
structured
122
 and unstructured.
123
 To conduct this research, the semi-structured format was 
chosen to enable the researcher to probe and understand the meaning, attitudes, opinions and 
personal experiences of the participants and to enable the interviewees to freely bring up 
issues that they felt were relevant to the study. 
 
The participants were initially contacted by telephone, in person or through email. Letters of 
Introduction (Appendix A), the ‘Participant’s Information Sheet’ and the questionnaire were 
                                                 
120 Cassell C and Symon G Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research (2004) 11-16. See also Gill 
P et al “Methods of Data Collection in Qualitative Research: Interviews and Focus Groups” (2008) 204 British Dental 
Journal 291-295 available at http://www.nature.com/bdj/journal/v204/n6/full/bdj.2008.192.html (accessed on 2 September 
2014). 
121 Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in Education (2007) 351-355. Structured interviews are formally 
organised, based on prearranged and standardised questions and are relatively quick and easy to administer. The scope for 
variation of the questions and for follow-up questions to unclear responses is limited (Gill P et al “Methods of Data 
Collection in Qualitative Research: Interviews and Focus Groups” (2008) 291–295).  
122 Semi-structured interviews may entail using different questions to suit each interviewee’s circumstances without 
necessarily observing any particular order. This format gives the interviewer the freedom to ask follow up questions where 
the interviewee’s responses warrant further clarification thus making it possible for the interviewer to explore pertinent 
information that may have been omitted in the initial response (Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in 
Education (2007) 355-356). 
123 Unstructured interviews are informal (usually with no predetermined questions), time consuming and encourage 
comprehensive explorations of a topic such that they can be difficult to manage for the interviewer and may not be easy for 
the interviewee to participate due to lack of predetermined questions. These types of questions are commonly used where 
greater detail is required or where little information is known about the subject matter or a different viewpoint of a known 
subject matter is needed (Gill P et al “Methods of Data Collection in Qualitative Research: Interviews and Focus Groups” 
(2008) 291-295). See also Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in Education (2007) 355-356. 
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then sent to those people who had expressed their willingness to participate in the research. 
The participants signed the consent form prior to the interview as evidence of their 
willingness to participate in the study. The Information Sheet described what the participants 
in the study were required to do, their rights to refuse to answer questions and to withdraw 
from the study at any time as well as their freedom to seek for clarification on questions they 
did not understand. The Information Sheet also assured participants that the information 
obtained from them would be strictly used for academic purposes and kept confidential.
124
 
The confidentiality and anonymity of the information obtained during the study were further 
emphasised in the introductory remarks of the interview. 
 
The interviews involved face-to-face contacts, guided by the questionnaire, with two 
company directors, the chief executive officer, the company secretary and two senior 
managers of each of the selected public entities. Interviewees were presented with the 
questionnaire beforehand to make the interview more efficient and effective as the 
participants would be more prepared to answer the questions.
125
 The participants were 
encouraged to objectively describe how they conducted various activities related to corporate 
governance. Interviews had an additional advantage over questionnaires in that participants 
were able to elaborate their answers by providing examples and the researcher was also able 
to obtain clarity on some issues which clarity might not have been obtained through 
questionnaires.   
 
The majority of the interviews were held during and after hours at the offices of the 
participants except for two board members who opted to visit the researcher’s office. The 
time taken to conduct interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to an hour and a half. All 
interviews were conducted in English. A tape recorder was used to record the majority of the 
interviews to enable the researcher to fully concentrate on the interview at hand and to adapt 
the questions according to the responses given and to maximise on the advantages of 
recording interviews. First, recording interviews made it easier for the researcher and even 
                                                 
124 Moreover, the questions were of a general business nature, and did not delve into personal issues where the interviewee 
would feel uncomfortable. There was no reference made to disclosing confidential information which would in any way 
identify the participant or the public entity. 
125 However, the researcher also accepted the possibility of the participants not being truthful in some of their responses 
given the sufficient time given to frame answers and consult other people. Also some people had not had time to look at the 
questionnaire hence the researcher had to start the interview by explaining the content of the questionnaire. However, the 
sharing of the questions with the participants some days before the interviews assisted in creating a relaxed environment. 
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other independent persons to comprehensively analyse the results after the interview.
126
 The 
second advantage was that the recorded interviews provided a level of detail and accuracy not 
obtainable from jotting notes or recalling from memory.
127
        
 
During the interview, situations arose where the interviewees’ answers covered more than 
one aspect or where, in trying to answer one question, they ended up answering a subsequent 
question in the questionnaire. These situations called for flexibility in deciding which aspects 
to explore further without losing focus. Furthermore, the probing technique was used to seek 
further clarification, show appreciation and understanding especially where the interviewee’s 
response sounded incomplete.
128
 To help the interviewees relax and answer questions freely 
the interviews were conducted in a casual and friendly manner on one hand, but directive and 
more formal on the other.
129
 In conducting the interviews, cognisance was also taken of the 
possibility of offending interviewees with regard to certain sensitive questions. As an 
example, some board members showed dismay when asked on the capabilities of boards or 
themselves as individuals to promote good corporate governance in public entities. As a 
result of this observation, sensitive questions were asked in indirect and subtle ways so as not 
annoy the interviewees. 
 
But, it is important to note that the majority of the participants were very cooperative and 
were willing to supply data and detailed information that would have been difficult to access 
without their assistance. 
 
 
                                                 
126 This advantage has been confirmed by a number of researchers (DuFon MA “Video Recording in Ethnographic SLA 
Research: Some Issues of Validity in Data Collection” (2002) 6(1) Language Learning & Technology 40-59 available at 
http://llt.msu.edu/vol6num1/dufon/ (accessed on 12 January 2015)). See also Bill G Research Interviewing: the Range of 
Techniques: A Practical Guide (McGraw-Hill International 2005) 89-91. 
127 Ibid. See also Given LM “Mini-disc Recorders: A New Approach for Qualitative Interviewing” (2004) 3(2) International 
Journal of Qualitative Methods 1-5 available at http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/3_2/pdf/given.pdf (accessed on 12 
January 2015). 
128 For more details on the importance of probing techniques, see Cassell C and Symon G Essential Guide to Qualitative 
Methods in Organizational Research (2004) 17-18.  
129 Mathers et al emphasise the need to create a conducive environment so as to be able to obtain as much information as 
necessary for the research (Mathers N, Fox N and Hunn A Using Interviews In A Research Project? (Trent Focus Group 
1998) 9-12 available at http://web.simmons.edu/~tang2/courses/CUAcourses/lsc745/sp06/Interviews.pdf (accessed on 28 
December 2014)).  
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2.3.5.3 Documents Analysis 
As indicated above,
130
 the research information was obtained through literature study of 
books, electronic/internet sources, journal articles, theses and dissertations, case law and 
legislation. With regard to the selected public entities, publicly available information and 
company reports such as government reports, annual reports, enabling statutes and website 
reports were analysed to corroborate assertions made by interviewees and those who 
responded to questionnaires as well as to obtain additional information that may have been 
omitted by the participants.  
 
2.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODS 
This section acknowledges the fact that in every research there might be some limitations 
with regard to the methodology used in the research.
131
 First, due to practical reasons and 
data collection limitations, the survey was limited to four out of eight-six (86) public entities. 
Although the sample is small it represents the majority of the public entities in that the 
sample comprises of entities whose corporate governance framework is similar to more than 
three quarters of the public entities in Zimbabwe.
132
 The sample was also selected on the 
assumption that these four entities would have the resources to place themselves at the 
forefront of developments in corporate governance given their significant contribution to the 
growth of the economy.
133
 The aim was to engage directors, chief executive officers, 
company secretaries, senior managers and shareholder representatives who were assumed to 
have had the most exposure to corporate governance issues. The data collection was meant to 
provide insight into the role of boards, selection and appointment of boards, composition of 
                                                 
130 Para 2.3.1 above. 
131 Azarian R “Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science” (2011) 1(4) International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science 113-125. 
132 Researchers have found that it may be difficult to confirm with certainty that a sample can 100% represent the whole 
population (Cohen L, Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in Education 6th ed. (Routledge 2007) 101-103). 
133 MMCZ and ZMDC play significant catalytic roles in the mining sector which is one of the key economic sectors in 
Zimbabwe. GMB is also crucial given the key role it plays in the agricultural sector considering the fact that Zimbabwe is an 
agro-based economy. Likewise, transport networks and infrastructure are essential for economic development hence the 
importance of NRZ as an influential arm in economic growth. For more details on the importance of the mining, agriculture 
and infrastructure sectors to Zimbabwe’s economic development, see Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-
Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) Policy Document (Government of Zimbabwe 2008) 8-11 that is available at 
www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/zim-asset (accessed on 1 December 2014). 
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boards, remuneration of boards, evaluation of board performance, compliance enforcement 
and their linkages with board effectiveness in the selected entities.  
 
Secondly, using interviews as a data collection technique has inherent limitations namely, 
interviewer bias resulting from the interviewer’s own opinion and expectations.134 The 
interviewer’s bias exists when the interviewer only records the interviewee’s answers that 
conform to his expectations or inaccurately records answers to suit his requirements 
especially where the interviewee’s answers are vague.135 Another contributory factor to 
interviewer bias is the use of open ended questions that draw free answers resulting in the 
need for the interviewer to summarise the responses using his personal selectivity.
136
 To 
minimise on such bias the researcher avoided leading questions and providing personal 
opinions on questions asked and where the answers proffered were not clear, a summary of 
what the interviewer had said was given to confirm whether both parties had similar 
understanding.
137
 Given the above, interviewer bias cannot be considered as of significant 
concern for this study although it cannot be completely ruled out. 
 
Thirdly, it is possible to have other data limitations owing to inherent deficiencies of 
questionnaire surveys. The questionnaire survey limitations may present themselves in the 
form of incomplete knowledge of participants and self-reporting bias.
138
 For example, if the 
participants do not have adequate knowledge about the issues asked they may not answer the 
question or may give inaccurate answers. However, in this study the majority, if not all, 
participants selected were considered competent enough to provide complete and clear 
answers. Of the selected participants twelve were board members, four corporate secretaries, 
                                                 
134 Philliber S, Bast M and Sloss G S Research Method: Guides to a Decision-Making Process (Peacock Publishers, Inc 
1999). See also Grindsted A “Interactive Resources Used in Research Interviewing” (2004) 32 Hermes Journal of 
Linguistics 117-144 available at http://download2.hermes.asb.dk/archive/download/H32_06.pdf (accessed on 13 January 
2015). 
135 Ibid. 
136 Reis H T and Judd C M Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) 302. See also Rajendran N S Dealing with Biases in Qualitative Research (Paper presented at the “Qualitative 
Research Convention: Navigating Challenges, organised by the University of Malaya, Luala lumpur in October 2001) 5-6 
available at http://nsrajendran.tripod.com/Papers/Qualconfe2001.pdf (accessed on 27 January 2015). 
137 The ideas were obtained from Manion L and Morrison K Research Methods in Education (2007) 334-335. 
138 Harris LR and Brown GTL “Mixing Interview and Questionnaire Methods: Practical Problems in Aligning Data” (2010) 
15(1) Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation (A Peer-Reviewed Electronic Journal) 1-19 available at 
http://pareonline.net/pdf/v15n1.pdf (accessed on 27 January 2015). 
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four chief executive officers, eighteen senior managers and twelve senior shareholder 
representatives hence incomplete knowledge of the issues was not considered a major risk. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to say with certainty whether the participants reported with 
bias or not and whether they answered the questions frankly and openly. 
 
The other limitation is that the majority of empirical studies examining the effectiveness of 
boards of public entities have relied on data obtained from developed nations. It is, therefore, 
debatable whether these results can be directly extended and applied to a developing market 
such as Zimbabwe where there is inadequate capital flow, markets are less sophisticated and 
educational and professional resources are limited.
139
 
 
2.5 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter dealt with the research design and the methods that were used to find answers to 
pertinent questions sought to be addressed by this study.  It described in detail the research 
methods, sample selection, methods of data collection and possible limitations of the research 
methods. The research methods included literature analysis, circulation of questionnaires and 
carrying out interviews with chosen board members, senior managers, company secretaries, 
chief executive officers and shareholder representatives from four selected public entities.  
 
The next chapter discusses corporate governance practices in public entities from a 
theoretical perspective.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 ZEPARU and BAZ Harnessing Resources from the Informal Sector for Economic Development (Study conducted by 
Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) & Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) 2014) 5-7 
available at http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Harnessing-Resources-From-The-Informal-Sector-
for-Economic-Development.pdf (accessed on 13 January 2015). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC ENTITIES: A 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Universally, it is considered a government’s responsibility to deliver, inter alia, basic 
services such as education, health, policing, water, electricity and sanitation to their citizens.
1
 
These services are offered either directly by departments and ministries or through public 
entities or state-owned enterprises. Public entities were incorporated in most countries to 
facilitate and accelerate economic and social development.
2
 However, increasing evidence 
indicates that most public entities in developing countries do not contribute strongly to this 
development because they perform their functions ineffectively resulting in huge losses, 
budgetary burdens and poor products or services.
3
 As a result of the poor performance by 
public entities, policy makers and other interested stakeholders have engaged in continuing 
debates. The debates were aimed at establishing the extent to which public entities contribute 
to economic and social development, why so many of the entities have been unsuccessful to 
                                                 
1 Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges (OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, No. 13 (OECD Publishing 2014)) 7-8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzb5zntk5r8-en 
(accessed on 10 November 2014). See also Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises 
(2006) 103-104 and Okojie C Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Nigeria (University of Benin, Nigeria 
Strategy Support Program (NSSP) Background Paper No. NSSP 004 of 2009) 11-12 available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/nsspb04.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2014). Public entities are also 
incorporated for other purposes other than basic services, for instance airlines (e.g. South African Airways and Air 
Zimbabwe Ltd) 
2 OECD Comparative Report on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2005) 6-7 available 
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/34803211.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2014). 
Due to the fact that public entities are publicly owned, they are expected to operate in compliance with government policy 
and to be accountable to both  the government, acting as the shareholder, and the general public as the stakeholders 
(Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 122). 
3 Cottarelli C Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries (Paper prepared by International Monetary Fund - Fiscal 
Affairs Department in March 2011) 8-11 available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf (accessed on 18 
May 2014). See also Nellis J Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why State-Ownership Is No More Promising the 
Second Time Around (Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 84 of 2006) 10 available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/6352_file_WP_84.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2014) and Nellis JR Public Enterprises in Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank Discussion Paper Number 1, Washington, DC. 1986) 2-3. 
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competently deliver the services for which they were created and how their administration 
and governance can be improved.
4
  
 
In the findings, it has been established that having an effective board is one of the key 
elements to a successful public entity.
5
 According to Frederick, in order to operate 
effectively, public entities should be adequately supervised by an independent board which 
should put in place structures and procedures that ensure that the public entities operate 
effectively, efficiently, accountably, and responsively in the public interest and that they are 
contributing to national development.
6
 Despite the acknowledgement of the role played by 
boards, empirical studies have established that the boards have not been as effective as they 
should be in discharging their duties.
7
 Greater focus has thus been on establishing the causes 
of the boards’ ineffectiveness and finding ways of improving their efficiency.8  
 
In pursuance of this objective, it has been established that some of the major contributing 
factors to the poor performance by boards are: the scope and extent of government influence 
which has, in practice, been extreme;
9
 fewer qualified individuals available to serve as 
directors, appointment of people for “their political allegiance rather than business acumen” 
                                                 
4 Rondinelli DA Can Public Enterprises Contribute to Development? A Critical Assessment and Alternatives for 
Management Improvement (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York 2008) 21-22 available at 
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021619.pdf. (accessed on 28 March 2014). 
5 Hermalin BE and Weisbach MS Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the 
Economic Literature (FRBNY Economic Policy Review April 2003) 9-10 available at http://www. 
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/601herma.pdf. (accessed on 19 December 2013).  
6 Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD Corporate Governance 
Working Papers, No. 2 (OECD Publishing 2011)) 8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfg6n4wj-en (accessed on 15 
January 2014). See also OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005) 13, 17. 
7 Nellis J Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why State-Ownership Is No More Promising the Second Time 
Around (2006) 9. Researchers have generally found that the rampant corporate failures point to the fact that boards have 
“failed to fulfill their role as the top-level corporate control mechanism” and have thus “ruined reputations of companies”. 
(Fuller J and Jensen MC What’s A Director to Do? in “Best Practices: Ideas and Insights from the World’s Foremost 
Business Thinkers (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing and London, Bloomsbury Publishing 2003) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=357722  (accessed on 23 December 2014)). 
8 Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 8-9. See also Hermalin BE 
and Weisbach MS Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature 
(2003) 9-10. 
9 The roles of government include “setting objectives and performance targets, appointing directors, monitoring the 
performance of the enterprise and its Board”. The remaining authority rests with a professional board and management if 
they are to be effectively empowered. However, research has established that this has been hardly the case as the government 
has gone further down to perform the duties of the board and management. Moreover, legislators or government officials 
who are supposed to oversee the public entity managers have tended to push their own personal or political interests at the 
expense of the entity’s interests (Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in 
Developing Countries (2008) 3-4). 
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and imposition of senior government or military officials who are not competent or 
sufficiently experienced. The other factors include individual directors sitting on too many 
boards thus diluting their capacity to monitor corporate events, poor board remuneration, lack 
of transparency
10
 in the face of insufficient external scrutiny and no questioning of shortfalls 
in board performance, among others.
11
 Thus the development of properly composed, focused, 
adequately empowered, motivated and efficient public entity boards capable of greater 
responsibility remains a significant challenge to corporate governance in many countries for 
the predictable future.
12
  
 
This study attempts to establish how relevant the above findings are to Zimbabwe, and to 
identify any additional challenges experienced by boards of public entities in this jurisdiction. 
Measures taken to enhance the effectiveness of public entity boards as well as to promote 
good corporate governance in these entities are also examined. The ultimate goal is to 
recommend measures which can strengthen public entity boards’ effectiveness and promote 
good corporate governance in these entities so that they can significantly contribute to 
economic and social development. The present chapter defines corporate governance and 
highlights some of the benefits derived from good corporate governance practices. The 
chapter then gives an overview of public entities and analyses the five aspects considered 
critical in enabling a board to effectively discharge its duties. Lastly, the chapter examines 
corporate governance enforcement mechanisms and challenges from a global perspective.  
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC ENTITIES 
The term “public entity” or “state-owned enterprise” refers to “enterprises where the state has 
significant control, through full, majority, or significant minority ownership”.13 Similarly, 
                                                 
10 It has been found that the majority of public entities do not provide sufficient information on their business results or the 
information provided may be undependable. The lack of transparency may sometimes be intentional since it enables 
politicians and bureaucrats to cover up their self-interests in the business of the public entity to the detriment of the taxpayers 
who need to have a clear picture of how their interests are being taken care of (Wicaksono A Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises: Investment Holding Structure of Government-Linked Companies in Singapore and Malaysia and 
Applicability for Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (2009) 152-154). See also Wong SCY “Improving Corporate 
Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach” (2004) 7(2) Corporate Governance International 5-15. 
11 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 3-4. 
See also Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24-27. 
12 Ibid. 
13 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 11. See also section 2 of the Zimbabwe 
PFMA and section 1 of the South African Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999) for similar definitions. 
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Shirley defines public entities to include entities that are expected to earn most of their 
revenue from the sale of goods and services, have a separate legal identity, and are majority-
owned by government.
14
 Public entities provide goods and services that are not usually 
provided by the private sector and profit maximisation is not the sole basis for measuring 
their efficiency.
15
 
 
Public entities have always played a critical role in the socio-economic development of many 
countries. According to Nellis, after independence, “most African governments inherited the 
notion that extensive public sector involvement in the economy was the natural, proper order 
of affairs”.16 He argues that efficient and effective service delivery to the public is a 
fundamental role of government. Thus, through public entities, governments have played a 
leading role in the provision of essential goods and services such as water, electricity, 
transportation, education and health in the urban as well as in rural areas.
17
 The entities have 
therefore, been considered as important agencies for socio-economic transformation, creation 
of employment and as instruments for economic empowerment.  
 
However, the performance of many public entities has been below expectation. This has been 
ascribed to various reasons, mainly weak corporate governance and unethical practices.
18
 The 
governance systems in some of the public entities have been found to be “characterised with 
role ambiguity, ineffective boards, ineffective management systems and non-adherence to 
statutes”.19 The other challenge cited is that of multiple and conflicting objectives set for 
                                                 
14 Shirley M Managing State-Owned Enterprises (World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 577, Management and 
Development Series No. 4, Washington, D.C, World Bank 1983) 2. See also Kowalski P et al State-Owned Enterprises: 
Trade Effects and Policy Implications (OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 147 (OECD Publishing 2013) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en (accessed on 13 March 2014). 
15 Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance 
in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75. 
16 Nellis J The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned Enterprises to Private Participation in 
Infrastructure — and Back? (Paper commissioned by the World Bank as a Background Paper for a Conference on African 
Infrastructure, held in Cape Town, South Africa, in June, 2005) 3 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=828764 (accessed on 
17 May 2014). 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Foreword” to the Zimbabwean Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Public Entities (2010) ix. 
19 This scenario has contributed to poor performance by some of these public entities, “rendering them a drain to the fiscus.” 
(Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals (2010) ix). See also Chikuhwa JW A 
Crisis of Governance: Zimbabwe (Algora Publishing 2004) 283. 
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these entities.
20
 Whilst governments expect public entities to operate in a commercially 
efficient and profitable manner, they require them to “provide goods and services at prices 
below cost, serve as generators of employment, receive inputs from state-sanctioned suppliers 
and choose plant locations based on political rather than commercial criteria”.21 The mixing 
of non-commercial or social with commercial objectives unavoidably leads to political 
interference in the public entities’ operations to the “detriment of managerial autonomy, 
commercial performance and economic efficiency”.22 These factors, among others, have 
contributed to poor performance by some of the public entities. As a result, a number of 
organisations and countries have come up with corporate governance principles and 
guidelines aimed at inculcating a culture of accountability and transparency as well as 
efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public entities.
23
                                                                            
 
3.3 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Before one can critically evaluate whether or not good corporate governance makes a 
difference in company performance, it is essential to have a clear understanding of what 
corporate governance is. Corporate governance is defined in different ways.
24
 The 
Zimbabwean CGF defines corporate governance as “a set of processes, customs, value codes, 
policies, laws and structures governing the way a corporation is directed, controlled and held 
accountable”.25 Similarly, the Cadbury Report defines the term to mean “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”.26 Cadbury’s view is that corporate governance 
focuses almost exclusively on the internal structure and operation of the organisation’s 
                                                 
20 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 13 
and Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 4.  
21 Nellis J The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned Enterprises to Private Participation in 
Infrastructure — and Back? (2005) 7-9. Many governments have tried to achieve a balance between provision of services on 
a cost recovery and commercial basis, and services that are non-commercial and social in nature. To this end, they classify 
public entities as commercial and non-commercial or social enterprises. 
22 Ibid. 
23 For example, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005), Zimbabwean CGF (2010) 
and South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector (RSA Department of Public Enterprises 2002).  
24 However, this research refers to only a few of the definitions. 
25 Para 1.3 of the CGF. The CGF further states that “corporate governance ensures that the organization is run properly, that 
goals are being achieved and funds are being managed with high standards of propriety and probity”. 
26 Cadbury A Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 14. 
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decision-making process.
27
 Another view is that corporate governance relates to the inter-
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, customers and 
other stakeholders; provides the structure through which objectives of the company are set; 
and places a strong emphasis on the welfare of shareholders.
28
 It, therefore, encompasses 
matters such as directors’ duties, financial accounting and the protection of the interests of 
various stakeholders.
29
  
 
Scholars and practitioners of corporate governance have given the term a wider variety of 
definitions. Some economists and social scientists have defined corporate governance largely 
as “the institutions that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns”.30 
John and Senbet give a more widespread definition which states that “corporate governance 
deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over 
corporate insiders and management such that their interests are protected”.31 According to 
Salacuse, these definitions focus on the informal practices that develop in the absence of 
effective formal rules and not only on the formal rules and institutions of corporate 
governance.
32
 Also, “they encompass not only the internal structure of the corporation but 
also its external environment”.33 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Du Plessis JJ “Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report” (1994) 6 South African Mercantile Law Journal 81-82. See 
also OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11. 
29 Ibid. 
30 O’Sullivan M “Corporate Governance and Globalization” (2000) 570 Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 153-172 available at flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp1999/99-71.pdf (accessed on 12 December 
2013). 
31 John K and Senbet LW “Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness” (1998) 22 Journal of Banking and Finance 371-
403.  See also World Bank Building Institutions for Markets (World Bank Development Report 2002) 68. 
32 Salacuse JW Corporate Governance in the UNECE Region (Paper commissioned for the Economic Survey of Europe, 
2003 No. 1 by the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, Geneva, December 2002) 
6-9 available at www.unece.org/ead/misc/Salacuse.doc. (accessed on 20 January 2014). According to this view, corporate 
governance is concerned with practices and procedures for trying to ensure that a company is run in such a way that it 
achieves its objectives. 
33 Ibid. The internal structure refers to the mechanisms within the corporation that determine how it is run whilst the external 
environment includes government regulatory agencies, stock markets on which corporations list their shares and the courts 
that enforce remedies for violations of corporate governance rules (Salacuse JW Corporate Governance in the UNECE 
Region (2002) 6-9). 
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In support of the economists and social scientists’ view, the OECD34 Task Force defines 
corporate governance as follows: 
Corporate governance … involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its Board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the Board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.
35
  
 
According to the OECD, corporate governance encompasses not only internal aspects of 
corporate governance but takes into account other stakeholders and the impact of the 
company on them.
36
 It also entails that a company, and especially its directors, abide by the 
provisions of relevant statutes, societal norms, standards and codes of best practices as well 
as manage the company reliably.
37
 Similarly, in support of this view, Crowther defines 
corporate governance as:  
an environment of trust, ethics, moral values and confidence - as a synergic effort of all the 
constituent parts - that is the stakeholders, including government, the general public etc., 
professionals, service providers and the corporate sector.
38
  
 
From a slightly different perspective, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
Committee on Corporate Governance
39
 views corporate governance as ethical conduct in 
business in that it is concerned with the code of values and principles that enables a person to 
conduct a company’s business in line with the expectations of all stakeholders.40 According 
                                                 
34 See para 3.5 for more information about the OECD. 
35 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11. 
36 Ibid. The same principle was adopted by Gabrielle O’Donovan who defines corporate governance as a “system of 
structuring, operating and controlling a company with a view to achieve long term strategic goals to satisfy shareholders, 
creditors, employees, customers and suppliers, and complying with the legal and regulatory requirements, apart from 
meeting environmental and local community needs” (O’Donovan G “A Board Culture of Corporate Governance” (2003) 
6(3) Corporate Governance International Journal 22-30). See also Gopalsamy N A Guide to Corporate Governance (New 
Age International 2008) 20-21 for more similar definitions. 
37 Van der Merwe JG et al South African Corporate Business Administration (Juta & Co Ltd 2009) 15.1-15.32. 
38 Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International Business (Ventus Publishing ApS 2011) 10. 
39 Report of the SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance 2003 available at http://www.acga-
asia.org/public/files/India_MurthyCtee_Feb03.pdf (accessed on 15 March 2014). 
40 The SEBI Committee defines corporate governance as “the acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of 
shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about 
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to the committee, “corporate governance is beyond the realm of law. It stems from the culture 
and mindset of management, and cannot be regulated by legislation alone”.41 From a public 
policy perspective, corporate governance concentrates more on balancing economic and 
social goals and individual and communal goals at the same time promoting the “efficient use 
of resources, accountability in the use of power and stewardship as well as aligning interest of 
individuals, corporations and society”.42  
 
Judging from the above definitions, it is clear that the overall objective of corporate 
governance is the harmonisation of relationships and interests of key stakeholders to achieve 
organisational goals.
43 
It can also be concluded that many, if not all, of the principles of 
corporate governance apply to all organisations regardless of nature and size.
44
 Irrespective of 
the type of ownership and structure, the wider governance agenda advocates that all 
organisations should act ethically, transparently and in a socially responsible manner.
45
 A 
government organisation for instance, should be managed for the benefit of the general public 
and to achieve the aims of the government itself.
46
  
 
A charitable organisation should be managed in the interests of the charitable activity and 
with regard to the interests of and concerns of providers of the funding.
47
 Likewise, 
individuals controlling an organisation should not permit self-interest to dominate their 
                                                                                                                                                        
commitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal & corporate funds in 
the management of a company” (Report of the SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance (2003) 1). 
41 Report of the SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance (2003) 1. See also Dalei P, Tulsyan P and Maravi S Corporate 
Governance in India: A legal Analysis (Paper presented at International Conference on Humanities, Economics and 
Geography (ICHEG), Bangok, March, 2012) 17-18 available at psrcentre.org/images/extraimages/312018.pdf (accessed on 
18 January 2014). 
42 Okeahalam CC and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges 
(Paper presented for the Global Corporate Governance Forum on 15 June 2003) 3 available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Pan_Africa_2003_Review_of_CG_Okeahalam/$FILE/Charles+Okeha
lam+-+Corporate-Governance+ver+4+Jul+2003.pdf. (accessed on 25 January 2014).  
43 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11. 
44 What is important, however, is to appreciate the fact that although the general principles are widely accepted, they are not 
set in concrete but must be adjusted to reflect the specific circumstances and needs of individual organisations or countries 
(OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11-13). 
45 Coyle B Corporate Governance (2003) 5-6. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Clarke T International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach (Routledge 2007) 6-8. 
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decisions but should work for the objectives of the organisation.
48
 Thus to deter individuals, 
especially directors and managers, from pursuing their own interests at the company’s 
expense, shareholders and other stakeholders need corporate governance mechanisms that 
can discipline directors’ and managers’ conduct.49 
 
3.4 VALUE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The challenge of corporate governance is to find a way in which the interests of shareholders, 
directors and other interested parties can all be sufficiently satisfied.
50
 Thus, the majority of 
the guidelines in the codes of conduct for corporate governance and the codes of best practice 
are directed towards reducing the potential for conflict and reconciling the interests of the 
various stakeholder groups.
51
 In essence, effective corporate governance establishes a system 
that guides the relationship between owners, boards, managers and various stakeholders, 
clarifying the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs, by whom the 
decisions should be made and how they should be implemented.
52
 Corporate governance 
processes, accordingly, inject transparency into the decision-making process, which is 
valuable to shareholders, potential investors, regulators, customers, suppliers, employees and 
any other stakeholders who may be affected by a company’s actions.53  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 See “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11-12 and the “Introduction and Background” 
to the Zimbabwe National Code and Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 below. 
50 Adegbie FF and Fofah ET “Ethics, Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting in the Nigerian Banking Industry: 
Global Role of International Financial Reporting Standards” (2016) 5(1) Accounting and Finance Research 50-63. 
51 Weil G and Manges LP Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its 
Member States (Report prepared on behalf of the European Commission 2002) 28-30 available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/comparative_study_eu_i_to_v_en.pdf (accessed on 13 March 2014). Examples of 
such codes are the South African King Reports, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG Guidelines and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code.  
52 By doing so, corporate governance also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 11-13).  
See also Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International Business (2011) 13-14. 
53 Effective corporate governance means that transparency values exist, investors receive timely and relevant information, 
decision-making is not done secretly, decision-makers are held accountable for their actions, there is tightened internal 
controls and financial reporting and managers/directors act in the interest of a company and not their personal interests 
(Hontz E and Shkolnikov A Corporate Governance: The Intersection of Public and Private Reform (Center for International 
Private Enterprise 2009) 29 available at www.cipe.org/sites/default/files/publication-docs/CG_USAID.pdf (accessed on 20 
January 2014)). 
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The extent to which countries attract foreign capital is dependent on their systems of 
corporate governance and the degree to which companies are duty-bound to honour the legal 
rights of shareholders and other stakeholders.
54
 Arthur Levitt, the former United States’ 
Securities and Exchange Commissioner confirmed that: “If a country does not have a 
reputation for strong corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere”.55 Levitt’s 
view is supported by Lipman who states that, good corporate governance “enhances the 
reputation of the organisation and makes it more attractive to customers, investors, suppliers, 
and in the case of non-profit organisations, contributors”.56 This means that “individual and 
institutional investors will refrain from providing capital or will demand a higher risk 
premium for their capital from enterprises in countries without effective systems of corporate 
governance than from similar enterprises in countries having strong corporate governance 
standards”.57 International investment thus not only provides corporations with expanding 
sources of capital, but also encourages the continued integration of sound corporate 
governance practices, which may help the corporations to gain the trust of investors, reduce 
their capital costs and induce more stable financial sources.
58
  
 
Corporate governance in public entities focuses primarily on making the state an effective 
owner, by creating “clear and simple lines of political and social accountability, improving 
board selection and quality, and contributing to the development of clear corporate strategies 
that reward efficiency and professionalism”.59 Good corporate governance is important for 
public entities in that it increases their productivity and competitiveness as well as helps to 
                                                 
54 Horn RC The Legal Regulation of Corporate Governance with Reference to International Trends Unpublished Thesis 
(University of Stellenbosch 2005) 15-16. See also Cornelius P “Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: 
What do Country Rankings Tell Us?” (2005) 6(3) German Law Journal 583-604 available at 
https://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol06No03/PDF_583-604_Articles_Cornelius.pdf (accessed on 22 April 2015). 
55 “Introduction and Background” to the King II Report. From Levitt’s comments, the degree to which corporations observe 
basic principles of good corporate governance is an important factor for investment decisions and in ensuring long term 
sustainability. See also Demaki GO “Proliferation of Codes of Corporate Governance in Nigeria and Economic 
Development” (2013) 3(3) Business and Management Review 37–42. 
56 Lipman FD and Lipman LK Corporate Governance Best Practices: Strategies for Public, Private, and Not-for-Profit 
Organizations (John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey 2006) 3. 
57 Salacuse JW “Corporate Governance in the New Century” (2004) 25(3) The Company Lawyer 69-83. See also Tura HA 
“Overview of Corporate Governance in Ethiopia: The Role, Composition and Remuneration of Boards of Directors in Share 
Companies” (2012) 6(1) Mizan Law Review - African Journals Online (AJOL) 45-76 available at 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/mlr (accessed on 12 December 2014). 
58 Vaughn M and Verstegen Ryan L “Corporate Governance in South Africa: a Bellwether for the Continent?” (2006) 14(5) 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 504-512. 
59 Hontz E and Shkolnikov A Corporate Governance: The Intersection of Public and Private Reform (2009) 27-29.  
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ensure that public funds invested in these entities are not mismanaged and are spent 
effectively.
60
 Improving the governance of public entities thus brings substantial benefits in 
the form of increased productivity and profitability, improved financial position for the 
government, better protection and utilisation of public assets, reduced corruption,
61
 greater 
attractiveness to investors resulting in increased state income and efficient service delivery to 
the public.
62
 In addition, good corporate governance helps to increase efficiency and 
transparency as well as to prevent public entity failures, thus minimising adverse social 
effects.
63
 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that countries and business entities that genuinely 
observe and embrace the principles of good corporate governance will derive vast benefits. 
Good corporate governance enables an organisation to attract investment, maximise the 
opportunities available to it, increase transparency and accountability, manage its risks better, 
boost its chances of succeeding in the market and to achieve sustainable long term growth. 
Every country or business entity should therefore strive to practice good corporate 
governance for sustainable long term growth and success.   
 
Despite the acknowledged vast benefits of corporate governance, it has been found that, in 
some instances, corporate governance has not really added as much value due to the fact that 
in many instances directors just “box-tick”64 without substantially complying with the 
corporate governance principles.
65
 This means that, whilst good corporate governance 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Corruption negatively affects efficiency in service delivery and creates problems beyond legal repercussions and ethical 
issues by increasing the cost of doing business. As a corruption-fighting tool, corporate governance minimises the chances 
for directors and corporate employees to engage in self-dealing and/or corrupt practices (Sullivan JD Corruption, Economic 
Development, and Governance: Private Sector Perspectives from Developing Countries (Global Corporate Governance 
Forum Issue 2 of 2006) 3-5 available at www.unglobalcompact.org (accessed on 12 February 2014)).  
62 Hontz E and Shkolnikov A Corporate Governance: The Intersection of Public and Private Reform (2009) 27-29. Better 
corporate governance can increase productivity and contribute to overall economic performance both directly and by 
reallocating resources within the state sector and across the economy as a whole. In addition, improved governance in the 
public sector can create a model for and increase pressure on the private sector to improve its own governance. 
63 Blume D Policy Framework for Investment: A Review of Good Practices (OECD Publishing 2006) 137-140 available at 
www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/40287385.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2014). See also “Foreword” and 
“Preamble” to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 3, 9. 
64 Box-ticking refers to the situation where corporate governance boxes are ticked, indicating that there was compliance with 
a specific aspect. 
65 According to King, even with the “comply or explain” regime directors just “box-tick” to avoid having to go through the 
cumbersome process of explaining non-compliance (King M Governance for All Entities, ((The Corporate Citizen, 
Johannesburg 2006) 12).  
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frameworks may be valuable, they are not adequate on their own as directors may just 
comply with the form of corporate governance at the expense of substantive compliance. As 
an example, it has been found that the failure of Enron had little to do with insufficient 
corporate governance standards and procedures, but everything to do with the culture, 
environment and conduct of the people at Enron.
66
 Unquestionably, Enron was considered as 
having one of the best boards in America before its collapse and was rated highly for its 
commitment to corporate governance practices.
67
 However, its collapse may be an indication 
that directors just chose to box-tick without necessarily complying with good corporate 
governance standards.  
 
In another study conducted in South Africa, it was shown that whilst most listed companies in 
South Africa view corporate governance as an important matter, full compliance with the 
King Corporate Governance Code is still rare and a substantial number of companies comply 
only with the letter and not the spirit of the Code.
68
 For example, many companies were 
found not to provide adequate information about their companies’ internal operations, such as 
how directors are evaluated or how much each director is remunerated.
69
 It therefore, follows 
that investors and other stakeholders must recognise that although corporate governance 
standards might be essential they are not sufficient on their own to compel directors to act in 
a manner that achieves good corporate governance.
70
 For corporate governance to actually 
add value, directors have to substantively comply with the principles and not just box-tick. 
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3.5 INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Globally, it has become well established that, to strengthen companies, be they private or 
public entities, there must be continuous investment of capital and human resources as well 
as customer satisfaction and public confidence in the entities.
71
 To be able to attain these 
objectives, companies need to do more than just create a track record of producing goods and 
services and having a reasonable market share, but must have good and effective 
management and be perceived to be properly governed.
72
 Proper corporate governance is 
globally considered as a very important tool to achieve these aims.    
 
The realisation of the importance of corporate governance for the socio-economic 
development of countries has motivated a number of initiatives, at national and at 
international levels, aimed at responding to the corporate governance challenges worldwide. 
At national level, a number of countries have come up with reforms to prevent the occurrence 
of further corporate collapses and improve corporate governance practices.
73
 Internationally, 
these initiatives are being spearheaded by multilateral organisations including the World 
Bank,
74
 OECD,
75
 CACG,
76
 UN
77
 and ICGN,
78
 among others.
79
 The World Bank regards 
                                                 
71 Cronin P et al Corporate Governance for Main Market and AIM Companies (Paper prepared by White Page Ltd in 
association with London Stock Exchange Plc 2012) 3 available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/aim/publications/documents/corpgov.pdf (accessed on 5 November 2014). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Examples of national codes are the UK’s Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1994), Hampel (1998), Turnbull (1999), Combined 
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War II. The Bank was launched alongside the International Monetary Fund by the governments of the United States of 
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services (Mason ES and Asher RE The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Brookings Institution Press 1973) 1-3). The Bank 
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Standards and Codes (ROSC), identifies weaknesses that may contribute to a country‘s economic and financial vulnerability 
and makes appropriate recommendations. Visit http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_egy.pdf for more information. 
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corporate governance as an essential tool in supporting international financial structures, 
creating a conducive investment environment for developing countries to have access to 
capital and eliminating corruption in both the private and public sectors.
80
 In furthering 
efforts to promote good corporate governance practices, the World Bank partnered with the 
OECD to put together a far-reaching international co-operation framework.
81
 The co-
operation between the World Bank and the OECD is structured along two major initiatives: a 
Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF)
82
 and a series of Regional Policy Dialogue 
Round Tables.
83
 
                                                                                                                                                        
76 The CACG published the first set of corporate governance guidelines in 1999 to promote good standards in corporate 
governance and business practice throughout the Commonwealth (CAGG Guidelines (1999) 1). 
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The principles formulated by the OECD, CACG, UN and ICGN have provided a broad 
framework for a large number of countries to develop their own specific principles of 
corporate governance.
84 
The broad membership of the OECD, CACG, UN and ICGN suggest 
that these principles reflect the views of a large number of countries with respect to the 
correct approach for addressing the challenge of corporate governance. The principles 
recommended by the OECD, CACG, UN and ICGN are minimum benchmarks against which 
member countries can compare their systems and carry out country-specific initiatives.
85
  
 
To complement the efforts of international organisations like the OECD, CACG, UN and 
ICGN, African leaders and policy makers have also come up with initiatives to, among other 
things; promote good corporate governance practices in the continent. Examples of the 
initiatives are the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),86 African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM),
87
 Africa Governance Forum (AGF),
88
 Africa Governance 
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Inventory (AGI).
89
 In the same spirit, a number of organisations have spearheaded the 
promotion and facilitation of high standards of corporate governance, business ethics and 
social responsibility for the economic development and social transformation of Africa. 
Examples are the African Development Bank (AfDB)
90
 and Centre for Corporate Governance 
(CCG).
91
 In addition, the Institutes of Directors from twelve African countries launched the 
African Corporate Governance Network (ACGN) whose main objective is to strengthen 
“national corporate governance standards through shared learning, experience exchanges and 
dissemination of best practices aimed at addressing on-going corporate governance 
challenges in Africa”.92 
 
3.6 FUNDAMENTALS OF AN EFFECTIVE BOARD 
In an effort to find possible solutions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of boards of 
public entities, this study examines five elements considered vital to an effective board. The 
selected elements are role, selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and 
evaluation of the board. The selection of the critical aspects was based on previous research 
                                                                                                                                                        
governments through “raising awareness, promoting debate on a wide range of governance priorities, encouraging the 
exchange of African governments and other national stakeholders’ experiences in governance” (Mekelo A and Resta V 
Governance Progress in Africa: Challenges and Trends (2005) 11-12). 
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Governance Progress in Africa: Challenges and Trends (2005) 11-12). 
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91 The Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG) was “established by a private sector initiative for corporate governance in 
1999 to foster the highest standards of corporate governance in all types of corporations”. The Centre was first registered as 
the Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust (PSCGT) but was later renamed the Centre for Corporate Governance in 
2002. The Centre’s main objectives are to promote the implementation of good corporate governance principles and 
practices in Africa by creating awareness to the public, corporate leaders and policy makers on the need to observe good 
corporate governance. The objectives are achieved through conducting research studies, facilitating the development and 
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operating and coordinating with similar organisations within and outside the continent to advance the cause of good 
corporate governance. Visit http://www.ccg.or.ke/index.php, for more information.  
92 The ACGN was launched on 16 October 2013 in Mauritius. The NEPAD Business Foundation serves as the Secretary of 
the ACGN. Visit http://www.afcgn.org/ for more information about the ACGN. 
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which identified them as the major components of board effectiveness.
 93
 It is important to 
note that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these elements in detail. Only certain 
aspects of the elements, as they relate to the effectiveness of boards of Zimbabwean public 
entities, are focused on. In addition, the general enforcement mechanisms put in place to 
encourage compliance with good corporate governance are examined and their effectiveness 
reviewed.
94
 
 
3.6.1 Role of the Board 
Corporate governance must be evaluated not only in terms of rights, but also in terms of 
duties and responsibilities.
95
 As an example, shareholders and the board are expected to 
perform certain duties in the accomplishment of company objectives. The shareholders 
contribute to corporate governance by virtue of their obligation to “appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place”.96 
The shareholders also have a duty to behave responsibly by attending general meetings, 
voting, and exercising their authority within the organisation.
97
 After appointing the directors, 
                                                 
93 See John K and Senbet LW “Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness” (1998) 371-403, Vagliasindi M The 
Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 3-12, Fernando AC 
Business Ethics: An Indian Perspective (Pearson Education India 2009) 148-141 and Robinett D The Challenge of SOE 
Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 23-27. Some of the corporate governance codes also highlight these 
aspects as important aspects of the board, for example, Principle 2 of the South African King III Report (2009), Principle 2 
of the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014) and Chapter 3 of the Zimbabwean National Code (2015).  
94 Ibid. The issue of enforcement of compliance has been identified as an essential element of corporate governance hence 
the reason the research focuses on it. See La Porta R et al “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” (2002) 57 The 
Journal of Finance 1147-1170, Berglöf E and Claessens S Corporate Governance and Enforcement (World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3409, September 2004) 1 available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-
3409 (accessed on 10 September 2014) and “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report. 
95 Fernando AC Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (Pearson Education India 2009) 16-18. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, para 1.5.1 above, the role or responsibilities of the board has come under significant scrutiny partly 
due to the recurring corporate collapses and also due to the changing nature of the business environment. It is thus 
universally accepted that most of the corporate scandals were due to a “breakdown of the governance relation between 
shareholders, the board, and the senior executives” (Heath J and Norman W “Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance 
and Public Management: What Can the History of State-Run Enterprises Teach us in the Post-Enron Era?” (2004) 53 
Journal of Business Ethics 247-265). See also Cadbury A Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View 
(2002) 36. 
96 The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2014) 1. See also Part Two (II) of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and Principle 8 of the King III Report. 
97 Principle 8 of the King III Report, Section E of the UK Corporate Governance Code and Part One (II) of the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. Further to the general shareholders’ responsibilities, institutional investors (e.g. banks, 
development financial institutions, insurance companies, mutual funds, foreign institutional investor and provident funds) 
are expected to monitor the decisions of the board and help in building effective corporate governance practices as well as 
conduct research on critical issues and make appropriate recommendations to other shareholders. Institutional investors, due 
to the size of their investments, are able to effect change through exercising their voting rights as well as to effectively 
monitor the board and management (Gillan SL and Starks LT “Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: 
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the shareholders expect the former, particularly executive directors, to carry out the day to 
day management of the company and to ensure that the company observes good corporate 
governance.
98
   
 
The extent of the power exercised by and the legal responsibilities of directors vary with the 
nature of the organisation and the jurisdiction within which it operates.
99
 In the past, 
directors’ duties in many common law jurisdictions were owed almost entirely to the 
company
100
 and its members, and the board was required to carry out its duties for the 
financial benefit of the company.
101
 However, recently efforts have been made to provide for 
                                                                                                                                                        
The Role of Institutional Investors” (2000) 57(2) Journal of Financial Economics 275-305 and OECD The Role of 
Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance (OECD Publishing 2011) 8-10 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
98 Colley Jr. JL et al Corporate Governance (New York: McGraw-Hill 2003) 3-5. For public entities, the board is crucial to 
maintain the independence of the entity and to detach it from political intrusion. The board is thus expected to act as a shield 
between the parent ministry and the management of the public entity (Wong SCY “Improving Corporate Governance in 
SOEs: An Integrated Approach” (2004) 5-15). 
99 Davies PL The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers (OECD Publishing 2001) 3-4 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1857291.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2014). Different 
jurisdictions have different frameworks. For example, board structures differ in that they can either follow the Anglo-
American style (e.g. United States of America, Canada, South Africa and United Kingdom) or the German style (e.g. 
Finland, Germany and Netherlands) also known as the one tier or two tier system, respectively. The one tier board system 
refers to where the governing body is comprised of a single board consisting of both executive and non-executive directors 
whilst the two tier board system refers to where the governing body is comprised of two separate boards, a supervisory board 
(consisting of non-executive directors) and a management board (consisting of executive directors) (Shivnath T Comparative 
Board Structures under Corporate Governance Framework (2013) 1-2 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2282924 and 
Bezemer P et al “How Two-Tier Boards Can Be More Effective” (2014) 14(1) Corporate Governance 15-31 available at 
http://www.governanceuniversity.nl/images/bestanden/6688-2014.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015). 
100 A company is a legal entity separate from its management and shareholders. It has legal rights and obligations in the same 
way that a natural person does. Under the traditional rules of company law, directors’ duties are owed to the company and to 
the company alone; and for this purpose the company’s interests are equated with the interests of the members collectively 
(Mann R and Roberts B Essentials of Business Law and the Legal Environment 12th ed. (Cengage Learning 2015) 668-670 
and Harvey D, McLaney E and Atrill P Accounting for Business (Routledge 2013) 198). 
101 This has been referred to as the shareholder theory which was originally proposed by Milton Friedman (1970) (Friedman 
M The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits (The New York Times Magazine of 13th September 1970 
available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html) (accessed on 13 
October 2015). The theory is based on the premise that the board and management should run the company for the 
shareholders’ benefit and the sole responsibility of business is to increase profits. The courts have traditionally tended to 
hold directors have a duty to promote the success of the company only for the financial well-being of present and future 
shareholders (Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health (1971) Ch 317 at 330 and Provident International Corp v 
International Leasing Corp Ltd (1969) 1 NSWR 424, 440). However, the theory is now viewed as the outdated way of doing 
business with business entities now acknowledging that “acting in the best interests of the company” does not mean 
concentrating solely on the interests of shareholders. The current view is expressed in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac 
Banking Corporation, where Owen J found that “it does not follow that in determining the content of the duty to act in the 
interests of the company, the concerns of shareholders are the only ones to which attention need be directed or that the 
legitimate interests of other groups can safely be ignored” (The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 
9) (2008) 39 WAR 1, 534). See also Gerner-Beuerle C, Paech P and Schuster E P Directors’ Duties and Liability (Study 
prepared for the European Commission DG Markt by Department of Law, London School 2013) 63-66 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2014), Havenga 
MK “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties under our Future Company Law Regime” (1997) 9 South African Mercantile Law Journal 
310- 324, Brink A Corporate Governance and Business Ethics (Springer Science & Business Media 2011) 333-335 and 
Smith M and Rezek B Director Fiduciary Duties: Owed to the Corporation or the Shareholders? (King and Spalding 
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more scope for directors to act as good corporate citizens by considering a wide range of 
other stakeholders’ interests102 and the impact of their actions and decisions on the societies 
and environments in which they operate.
103
 The directors should thus, whilst seeking to 
maximise profit for the company, exercise their duties in the best interests of the company, all 
other stakeholders and the environment.
104
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Directors Governance Center 2014) available at http://www.directorscenter.com/director-fiduciary-duties-owed-corporation-
shareholders/ (accessed on 27 April 2015). 
 
102 “Stakeholder” refers to any person or group of persons which can affect or be affected by the actions of a business and 
includes employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, competitors and local communities (CAGG Guidelines (1999) 3-4, 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 58, Chapter 8 of the King III and Chapter 3 of Zimbabwe National 
Code). See also Mason C and Simmons J “Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility in Corporate Governance: A 
Stakeholder Systems Approach” (2013) Journal of Business Ethics 1-10 and Awotundun DA, Kehinde JS and Somoye ROC 
“Corporate Governance and Stakeholders Interest: A Case of Nigerian Banks” (2011) 6(10) International Journal of 
Business and Management 102-112. 
103 This is known as the stakeholder theory and was originally proposed by Edward Freeman (1963) (Freeman RE and Evan 
WM “Corporate Governance: A stakeholder Interpretation” (1990) 19 Journal of Behaviour Economics 337-359 and 
Freeman RE Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Cambridge University Press 2010) 32-33). The theory states 
that a company owes a responsibility to a wider group of stakeholders, other than just shareholders. For example, in 
Germany, South Africa, UK and Zimbabwe the focus for directors shifted from looking solely at shareholders’ interests and 
“in the interests of the company” has been interpreted to mean that directors are expected to, where appropriate, recognise 
the importance of other stakeholders over and above the company itself (Keay A “Tackling the Issue of the Corporate 
Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach” (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 
577-612 available at http://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr29_4/Keay.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2014) and Mason C and 
Simmons J “Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility in Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Systems Approach” 
(2013) 1-10). In a recent Canadian Supreme Court judgement, the court found that “in the interests of a corporation” did not 
equate simply with “the best interests of shareholders” hence consideration of other stakeholders’ interests was legally 
acceptable in appropriate circumstances. The Court held that in determining whether directors are acting in the best interests 
of a company, “it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances surrounding the case, for the board of directors to consider, 
inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment” 
(Trustee of Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise (2004) SCC 68). A number of English decisions confirm that 
directors have an indirect obligation to consider the interests of other stakeholders e.g. creditors. In Lonrho v Shell Petroleum 
it was held that the best interests of the company “are not exclusively those of its shareholders, but may include those of its 
creditors” (Lonrho v Shell Petroleum (1980) 1 WLR 627 at 634).  This perspective was confirmed in the decision in The 
Liquidator of the Property of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd and Another where it was held that the interests of 
the company include the interests of creditors, because the company was insolvent (The Liquidator of the Property of West 
Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd and Another (1988) BCLC 250 (CA)). Some countries have enacted specific 
legislation that makes it mandatory for companies to consider the interests of certain stakeholders, for example, section 172 
of the UK Companies Act 2006 (Chapter 46). The section obliges directors to have regard to the interests of the company's 
employees and creditors, the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others and to 
consider the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment. See also Esser I Recognition of 
Various Stakeholder Interests in Company Management Published Thesis (UNISA 2008) 211-213 and Garcia CR et al 
“Shareholder vs. Stakeholder: Two Approaches to Corporate Governance” (2008) 17(3) Business Ethics, A European 
Review 1-7 available at http://www.ieseinsight.com/tipo.aspx?tipo=1 (accessed on 17 May 2015).  
104 Directors should “pursue shareholder wealth with a long-run orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based 
on responsible attention to the full range of relevant stakeholder interests” (the enlightened shareholder value approach) 
(Keay A “Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s Enlightened Shareholder 
Value Approach” (2007) 577-612, Awotundun DA, Kehinde JS and Somoye ROC “Corporate Governance and Stakeholders 
Interest: A Case of Nigerian Banks” (2011) 102-112 and Keay A The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit 
For Purpose? (University of Leeds 2011) 6-8 available at http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-
duties/keay-the-duty-to-promote-the-success.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015). See also comments from Mervyn King, when 
he states that “Directors in the twenty-first century have to be seen to be directing companies to be good corporate citizens. 
The inclusive approach recognizes that a company is a link that brings together the various stakeholders relevant to the 
business of the company” (King M Governance for all Entities (2006) 14).  
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In most common law countries, directors are subjected to various duties which include 
statutory and common law duties.
105
 In undertaking these responsibilities, directors are bound 
by a fiduciary duty and a duty of skill, care and diligence to the company.
106
 In a number of 
jurisdictions, the common law directors’ duties of care and skill have become more stringent 
over time and have been codified in company legislation.
107
 The fiduciary duties include the 
duty to prevent a conflict of interests,
108
 not exceed the limitation of their powers,
109
 maintain 
an unfettered discretion
110
 and exercise their powers for the purpose for which they were 
conferred.
111
 A director’s fiduciary obligation entails that he should undertake his duties in 
                                                 
105 Davis G and Whitley D “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Increasing Focus on Good Faith and Independence” (2009) 83(7) 
The Florida Bar Journal 31-58 available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/ (accessed on 13 
February 2015). See also Ramsay I Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors (Centre for Corporate Law 
and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne 1997) 10-12 available at http://law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/139-
Law_Mono1.pdf (accessed on 13 February 2015). 
106 Davies P Gower and Davies’ Principles of Company Law 8th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 506-508. According 
to Hahlo, the “paramount duty of directors, individually and collectively, is to exercise their powers bona fide in the best 
interests of the company” (Pretorius JT et al Hahlo’s South African Company Law Through the Cases 6th ed. (Juta & Co, 
Kenwyn 1999) 279. See also para 5.1.1 of the South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, 
section 4 of the Malawi Code II: Sector Guidelines for Parastatal Organisations and State Owned Enterprises and para 3.3 
of the Zimbabwe CGF. 
107 The main reasons advanced for the codification include the need to foster best practices and improved corporate 
governance, provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the law more accessible and predictable. See 
for example, sections 171-177 of the UK Companies Act (2006), sections 115, 131-132 & 361 of the New Danish 
Companies Act (No. 470 of 2009), sections 180-184 of the Australian Corporations Act (Act No. 50 of 2001) and section 76 
of the South African Companies Act (2008). See also Harner MM “A More Realistic Approach to Directors’ Duties” (2013) 
15 The Tennessee Journal of Business Law 15-31 available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2380&context=fac_pubs (accessed on 13 May 2015). 
108 For South African case law examples, see Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company Limited 1921 (AD) 168 
where it was held that “where one man stands to another in a position of confidence involving the duty to protect the 
interests of that other, he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense or place himself in a position where his 
interests conflict with his duty”. In Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC (1988) 2 SA 54 (T ) it was held that  
“It would be a most unusual situation which allowed directors... of one company to act in the same or similar capacity for a 
rival without actual or potential conflict situations arising with frequent regularity”. See also Langford TL and Ramsay IM 
“Conflicted Directors: What Is Required to Avoid a Breach Of Duty?” (2014) 8 Journal of Equity 108-127 available at 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/Conflicteddirectors-......JnlEquity20142.pdf (accessed on 27 February 2015). 
109 Generally directors must manage the company within the limits of legislation and other company constitutive documents 
(Watson SM “The Significance of the Source of the Powers of Boards of Directors in UK Company Law” (2011) Journal of 
Business Law 597-613, Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 162-171 
and Van Bekkum J et al “Corporate Governance in the Netherlands” (2010) 14(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1-
35 available at http://www.ejcl.org (accessed on 13 May 2015)). 
110 Ferran E “The Decision of the House of Lords in Russel v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd” (1994) 53(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 343-366. A director must also not allow his judgment to be interfered with and must objectively 
apply his mind to the business of the company (Campbell D and Woodley S Trends and Developments in Corporate 
Governance (Kluwer Law International 2003) 17-18). 
111 Ibid. See Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 at 440 where it was held that directors should exercise their powers 
“bona fide – that is for the purpose for which it was conferred, not arbitrarily or at the absolute will of the directors, but 
honestly in the interest of the shareholders as a whole”. If directors exceed their authority and their powers, they may be held 
liable and their decisions may be set aside even if they have acted honestly. An example is the case of Howard Smith Ltd v 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd where the Privy Council found that the board had acted for an improper purpose, even though the 
directors had acted honestly and not for personal advantage. In this case two shareholders who held fifty-five per cent of the 
shares in a company announced that they would vote against any offer from a bidder in an intended takeover. The board of 
directors then allotted new shares to the bidder. The Privy Council found that the board had used the shares purely for the 
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good faith and in the interests of the company.
112
 When a director acts in the company’s 
interests,
113
 he should exercise whatever skill he has with the reasonable care expected from a 
person of his standing.
114
  
 
Furthermore, a director is prohibited from using his corporate position for personal gain or 
profit and from acting ultra vires his powers.
115
 Therefore, directors are obliged to act both 
within the powers of the company as well as within their fiduciary duties to the company.
116
 
But, it is important to note that ordinarily, directors do not work individually. They act 
collectively as a board although they are empowered to delegate their powers to individual 
directors, a committee of the board, an officer of the company or competent specialists.
117
 
                                                                                                                                                        
purpose of destroying an existing majority (Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd (1974) AC 821 (PC)).See also Davies 
P Gower and Davies’ Principles of Company Law (2008) 506-510. 
112 Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464 at 479. It has been acknowledged that the law concerning the duty 
of care and skill could be precisely stated as requiring a director to show the degree of skill as may be reasonably expected 
from a person with his knowledge and experience and requiring a director to take such care as an ordinary man might be 
expected to take on his own behalf (Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing (1989) BCLC 498). See also Austin RP, Ford HAJ 
and Ramsay IM Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate Governance (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney 
2004) 271-276. Also para 3.3 of the Zimbabwean  CGF requires directors to act in good faith, with diligence, skill and care 
and in the best interests of the state owned enterprise. In the modern world, observing good corporate governance can be 
interpreted to be acting in the interests of the company as the credibility of the company is enhanced if the directors observe 
good corporate governance.  
113 See Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd (1942) 1 Ch 306 where it was held that directors “must exercise their discretion bona fide 
in what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in the interests of the company, and not for any collateral 
purpose”. 
114 See Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425 at 437 where it was held that, when performing 
their duties, directors must attend carefully to the affairs of the company and must exhibit the “reasonable care” which any 
ordinary person might be expected to take under the same circumstances. In Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Healey (2011) FCA 717 at 17-18 it was held that  “…. a director is not relieved of the duty to pay attention to 
the company’s affairs which might reasonably be expected to attract inquiry, even outside the area of the director’s 
expertise”. See also Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co (1925) Ch 407 at 427-429 and Zwinge T Have Directors' Duties of 
Care and Skill Become More Stringent? What has Driven this Development? Is this Development Beneficial? An Analysis of 
the Duty of Care in the UK in Comparison to the German Duty of Care (Research Paper of October 2009) 3-4 available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591590 (accessed on 10 November 2014).  
115 See Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd (1967) Ch. 254 where directors, fearing a takeover bid and their subsequent removal from the 
board of directors, allotted shares to their supporters. The court held that although the directors acted under the belief that it 
would be in the company’s interests to preserve their board positions they had acted for an improper cause and thus declared 
the allotment of the shares to be voidable. See also Davies P Gower and Davies’ Principles of Company Law (2008) 506-
510, Palmiter AR “Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty” (2010) 55(11) New York Law School Law Review 457-478 
available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/wp-content/../../16/2013/11/55-2.Palmiter.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015) and 
Havenga M “Directors' Fiduciary Duties under Our Future Company-law Regime” (1997) 310-324. 
116 Ibid. This rule is so strictly enforced that, even where the conflict of interest/duty is purely hypothetical, the directors can 
be forced to surrender all personal gains arising from it (Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) 1 All ER 378). The law’s 
position is that “good faith must not only be done, but must be seen to be actually done, and seriously monitors the conduct 
of directors in this regard; and will not allow directors to escape liability by contending that his decision was in fact well 
founded.” (Adler A Type of Director Duties Based on Enron Case from the Perspective Company Law in Malaysia available 
at http://www.scribd.com/Type-Of-Director-Duties-Based-On-Enron-Case/d/14179407 (accessed on 17 May 2014)).  
117 Browne J Company Law in Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 71 and Vasudev PM and Watson S Corporate 
Governance After the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 212-215. The duty to act as a board does not 
exonerate individual directors from exercising their individual judgement in respect of issues presented before the board (Re 
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Boards, as indicated above, play a crucial role in the successful governance of an enterprise 
and a number of views have been advanced as to what constitutes the board’s role. 
 
Nicholson and Newton ascribe three key roles to the board namely; to monitor management 
(control role), to provide advice and links to external resources (service role); and to set 
overall corporate strategy (strategic role).
118
 According to the OECD, the board is responsible 
for “reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual 
budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and 
corporate performance and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and 
divestitures”.119 The new South African Companies Act introduced a shift in power in the 
company from the shareholders to the board.
120
 Section 66 of the Companies Act provides 
that:  
the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board, 
which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the 
company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise.  
Therefore, in South Africa, the board has been granted the ultimate power in the management 
of the company, subject to the Act and the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.121 
 
The United Kingdom Corporate Governance Code states the board’s role as to:  
provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and 
effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed......set the company’s 
strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the 
company to meet its objectives and review management performance........ set the company’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Barings Plc (No 5) (2000) 1 BCLC 489 and Gerner-Beuerle C, Paech P and Schuster EP Directors’ Duties and Liability 
(2013) 170-172)). See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 164-
165. The CGF states that “directors are jointly and severally responsible for all the decisions taken by the Board” (para 3.6 
of the CGF). 
118 Nicholson GJ and Newton CJ “The Role of the Board of Directors: Perceptions of Managerial Elites” (2010) 16(2) 
Journal of Management and Organization 201-218. See also Nicholson G and Kiel G “A Framework for Diagnosing Board 
Effectiveness” (2004) 12(4) Corporate Governance an International Review 442-460.  
 
119 Part One (VI) of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. See also Chapter 2 of the King III Report. 
120 Delport PA “The Division of Powers in a Company” in Visser C and Pretorius JT Essays in Honour of Frans Malan 
(LexisNexis, South Africa 2014) 84-92. 
121 Ibid. 
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values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are 
understood and met.
122
 
Specific to the public entities, the OECD notes that the board’s role is to monitor 
management and provide strategic guidance in accordance with the objectives set by the 
shareholders.
123
 
 
However, the role of public entity boards is not as clear as that of private companies’ boards 
due to a number of factors.
124
 First, it has been found that these boards have not been fully 
empowered or are not sufficiently independent to discharge their duties mostly due to the 
legal status of the public entity, lack of clear policy objectives
125
 and inadequate regulatory 
and legislative frameworks.
126
 In many cases, the responsibilities of a public entity board may 
be performed or greatly manipulated by government which is the 100% shareholder.
127
 In 
some instances, it has been found that a government may usurp the power of the boards and 
run the public entity directly, circumventing the board altogether both through the influence 
of its board nominees and the objectives and directives given to the management of the public 
entity.
128
 The board is thus not empowered to address certain fundamental problems as a 
                                                 
122 Section A of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014). 
123 Chapter VI of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. 
124 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 3-4. 
See also Ho D and Young A “China’s Experience in Reforming Its State-Owned Enterprises: Something New, Something 
Old and Something Chinese?” (2013) 2(4) International Journal of Economy, Management and Social Sciences 84-90, 
available at www.waprogramming.com/download.php?download...14604602.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2014) and  
Akoum I The Political Economy of SOE Privatization and Governance Reform in the MENA Region (International Scholarly 
Research Network (ISRN) Economics, Article ID 723536 of 2012) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5402/2012/723536 
(accessed on 22 November 2014). 
125 According to Wilkinson and Peddler, officer bearers, frustrated with lack of policy and strategic direction may fill the 
vacuum themselves which leads to conflict of power as interdependent roles become difficult to disentangle (Wilkinson N 
and Peddler S Introduction to Social Research (McGraw Hill, New York. 1995) 24). 
126 Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 23. See also Garrat B Thin on 
Top –Why Corporate Governance Matters and How to Measure and Improve Board Performance (Nicholas Brealey, 
London 2007) 1, where the author argues that “the roles, tasks, and accountabilities of the board of directors are not clearly 
understood by politicians, business executives themselves or the general public” and this has resulted in poor compliance 
with good corporate governance standards and principles. In addition, sometimes there is lack of communication by the 
government regarding its objectives and its plan to monitor and influence the pursuit of those objectives. 
127 Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance 
in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75. Shliefer and Vishny observed that the 
management and oversight of state owned enterprises by politicians and bureaucrats was undesirable because, in the majority 
of cases, politicians set goals for state owned enterprises which were not in the best interest of the public but rather as a 
means of getting re-elected (Shliefer A and Vishny RW “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 737-783). 
128 Such intervention can take the form of a directive in response to a government need, and may override the needs of the 
public entity. Often, such a state of affairs places boards in unsustainable situations, “torn between their obligation of loyalty 
to the public entity and the need to act on behalf of” the shareholders (Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of 
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significant number of the issues that determine the success of the public entity’s operations 
are under government control.
129
  
 
For example, government may set and drive the strategy of public entities; appoint and 
dismiss board members and the chief executive officer; approve executives’ and board 
members’ remuneration and approve financial and major capital expenditures of public 
entities.
130
 This creates a complex situation in which various factors contribute to confuse the 
board as to its powers and their execution.
131
 This also has the tendency of undermining the 
general “objective of reducing political interference” and increasing public entity 
independence.
132
 It further reduces transparency, as such directives may evade prescribed 
systems of control and make board accountability fundamentally worthless because the board 
may have very little to account for.
133 
 
A second observation has been that public entity boards have customarily focused more on 
conformity with rules and compliance with the directives of government authorities than on 
performance and other strategic issues.
134
 The conformance mentality has been attributed to 
governance customs which encourage the setting of comprehensive quantitative performance 
targets and monitoring accomplishment against such targets as the best way to promote and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 10). See also Ashe PA Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative 
Case Study of Five State Owned Enterprises (2012) 47. 
129 Some commentators argue that weak governance practices of the government, the influence of changing political currents 
and gaps in the legal framework prevent better performance by boards of public entities (Mwaura K “The Failure of 
Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially 
Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75). 
130 Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 11-12. See also Ashe PA 
Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State Owned Enterprises (2012) 47.   
131 The numerous approval requirements have the overall effect of constraining the ability of the board to make timeous 
commercial decisions (IFAC Governance in the Public Sector: A Governing Body Perspective (Study by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) Public Sector Committee in August 2001) 6-8 available at http://www.ifac.org/ (accessed 
on 15 July 2014).  
132 Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24-25. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Some commentators have argued that boards of public entities sometimes lack the motivation to adequately and 
effectively supervise management because they are not shareholders and also they are not entitled to profit sharing 
(Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 121 and Wicaksono A Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Investment Holding Structure of Government-Linked Companies in Singapore and 
Malaysia and Applicability for Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (2009) 158). 
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administer the public entity for positive results.
135
 The challenge with focusing excessively 
on conformance is that boards and state owners may mistakenly believe that they are 
fulfilling their fiduciary functions yet they are neglecting more important issues such as the 
effectiveness of the overall business strategy.
136
 An example is a situation where the board 
may preoccupy itself with the budget setting processes and variations from budgets and plans 
at the expense of performance and risk management issues. 
 
In the third instance, the absence of sufficient training programs to particularly train and 
develop public entity board members in many developing countries has significantly 
contributed to the ineffective discharge of the board’s role.137 In some cases, boards of the 
entities are not properly inducted or tend to attribute little significance to training especially 
with regard to their roles and corporate governance issues.
138
 Furthermore, at times board 
members have neither sufficient time nor the willingness to understand the intricacies of the 
business, its competitors and the industry environment.
139
 All these factors may compromise 
the quality of the board’s performance and its effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the 
respective public entities. 
 
 
                                                 
135 Nedelchev M “Good Practices in Corporate Governance: One-Size-Fits-All vs. Comply-or-Explain” (2013) 4(6) 
International Journal of Business Administration 75-81. See also Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State 
Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of 
Kenya” (2007) 34-75. 
136 Bosch H “The Changing Face of Corporate Governance” (2002) 25(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 270-
293. See also Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 13 and Stuart S 
The Governance Challenge: Compliance Versus Excellence in Singapore (Paper presented at Annual Spencer Stuart 
Singapore Board & CEO Summit of March 2013) available at https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight (accessed 
on 12 September 2014).  
137 OECD Board of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (Report prepared by the 
OECD Corporate Governance Committee December 2012) 36-39 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/ (accessed on 21 May 2014).  
138 Most directors shun formal training but prefer to do their learning on the job and through meetings with management and 
auditors, interactions with outside experts and memberships on other boards. However, on the job training has been 
considered insufficient especially in developing countries where skilled individuals are in short supply (Frederick W 
Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 25-26). 
139 In order to fulfil this strategic role, the board needs to be adequately empowered and have an understanding of the 
company’s essential business, competitors and industry atmosphere. But, there has been general consensus that directors, 
especially non-executive directors, have inadequate knowledge of the company’s business and industry environment as well 
as lack strategic focus (Bosch H The Director at Risk: Accountability in the Boardroom (Melbourne, Pearson Professional 
1995) 106). 
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3.6.2 Selection and Appointment of Board Members 
The performance of an entity depends largely on the capabilities and performance of its 
board.
140
 It is therefore, imperative that the appointed directors should have relevant 
qualifications, background, experience, integrity, diverse skills and/or specialised knowledge 
to effectively contribute to the organisation’s business growth.141 The directors should be able 
to relate well with all stakeholders and have the ability to translate their knowledge and 
experience to the benefit of the organisation in which they would have been appointed.
142
 
Recent corporate governance codes specify numerous conditions related to appropriate 
number of directors, diversity in terms of gender and race, their type (e.g. executive, non-
executive and independent directors), requisite skills and recommended restrictions on factors 
such as age and the number of boards on which directors should sit.
143
 Also, the different 
codes have strongly advocated for increased transparency in the selection and appointment of 
board members of public entities.
144
  
 
However, it has been found that, in a number of developing countries, transparent selection of 
competent board members and creation of effective boards may not be easily achievable.
145
 
This has been found to be mostly as a result of the absence of specific guidelines for the 
identification and selection of directors and political interference in the board appointment 
process.
146
 In the majority of cases, public entity boards are occupied by people chosen for 
                                                 
140 Ngoe AO The Effect of Board Structure on the Performance of Quoted Companies at the Nairobi Stock Exchange (2011) 
3. 
141 OECD Board of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (2012) 27-28. See also 
Principle 2.19 of the King III Report, para 5.1.6 of the South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public 
Sector and section B of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
142 Argüden Y Measuring the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance (Research Paper published by INSEAD Business 
School of the World in April 2010) available at http://knowledge.insead.edu/csr/corporate-governance/measuring-the-
effectiveness-of-corporate-governance-1149 (accessed on 15 January 2015). 
143 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 2-3. 
See also Principle 2.18 of the King III Report, para 5.1.6 of the South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the 
Public Sector, section B of the UK Corporate Governance Code and section 2.0 of the ICGN Principles. 
144 Para 5.1.6 of the South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, para 2.7 of Australia’s 
Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise: Governance and Oversight Guidelines (Australian Government, 
Department of Finance and Deregulation 2011) and section B of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
145 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries 3. See also 
Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 26. 
146 OECD Corporate Governance Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises An Overview of National Practices: An 
Overview of National Practices (OECD Publishing 2013) 30-31. The political influence goes either through the selection and 
appointment process itself, which involves complicated political negotiation among different organs of the government, or 
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their political loyalty rather than business expertise,
147
 for example, senior government or 
military officials who do not possess relevant qualifications, appropriate technical or 
commercial skills and experience.
148
 The same civil servants normally sit on too many boards 
thus weakening their capacity to learn the intricacies of the business as well as attend to and 
monitor corporate events.
149
 To worsen the situation, sometimes the appointed board 
members end up seeking to protect the interests of their ministry or government thus 
weakening the public entity’s corporate governance as well as negatively impacting on the 
effective implementation of the public entity’s strategy and fulfilment of its mandate.150  
 
The other established challenge has been that, in some cases, skilled persons are not willing 
to be appointed to public entity boards because of the excessive interference by governments 
in the operations of the public entities which renders the board ineffective and also for fear of 
the reputational damages associated with being a board member in a poorly performing 
public entity.
151
 The refusal by some professionals to be appointed as public entity board 
members exacerbates the already existing challenge in most countries of limited numbers of 
people who qualify to be board members.
152
 Too short tenures and frequent changes in boards 
                                                                                                                                                        
through express appointment of political appointees chosen for their political allegiance rather than business knowledge 
(Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 18-19).  
147 Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges (2014)) 18. Although 
it has been argued that the appointment of politically affiliated board members reduces the operational autonomy of the 
public entity, others have argued that appointing board members with political affiliations and contacts enables the board to 
have easy access to government policies and decision making processes. The other reason for appointing political 
representatives on the board is to ensure that the board’s decisions and actions are aligned with the interests of the state as 
principal shareholder (Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 120-122). 
148 Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance 
in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75. The appointment of qualified persons would 
enhance the performance of the boards by raising the standard of care expected from directors. But, because the vast 
majority of directors lack the relevant qualifications, skills and experience they are likely to escape liability for breach of 
their duties of skill and care. See also Ashe PA Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State 
Owned Enterprises (2012) 47. 
149 Nellis J Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why State-Ownership Is No More Promising the Second Time 
Around (2006) 9. 
150 Ibid. It has also been argued that public entities boards may be concerned more about their chances of being re-elected to 
current board positions, which makes them inclined to focus on the kinds of governance decisions that please the 
government-owner, sometimes at the expense of good corporate governance (Ludvigsen S State Ownership and Corporate 
Governance: Empirical Evidence from Norway and Sweden Unpublished Thesis (BI Norwegian School of Management 
2010) 22-23). 
151 Generally, directors would not want to be associated with poorly performing business entities or entities whose image has 
been tarnished because of business scandals or poor performance (Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of 
State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 7). 
152 Okeahalam CC and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges    
(2003) 24. See also Part 3 of the CAGG Guidelines which indicates that “shortage of skills and lack of familiarity with board 
functions and fiduciary responsibilities” has presented challenges in most countries. 
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have also been found to be detrimental to the successful operations of public entities.
153
 For 
example, it has been found that, in most countries, a change in government is normally 
accompanied by enormous changes in public entity boards.
154
 As a result of the cited 
challenges, transparent and merit-based selection and appointment of board members as well 
as board continuity have been difficult to achieve in many countries. 
 
3.6.3 Composition of the Board 
Board composition is essential to its proper functioning and effective performance.
155
 Most 
corporate governance promoters acknowledge that board effectiveness is dependent on a 
properly composed board in terms of diversity, experience, skills and judgments of individual 
directors and the ways in which they relate as a board in seeking to accomplish organisational 
objectives.
156
 According to Roberts et al, board effectiveness is related to the “degree to 
which non-executives acting individually and collectively are able to create accountability 
within the Board in relation to both strategy and performance”.157 This means that it is crucial 
for board members to have interpersonal skills such as being able to work in a group and 
respecting each other’s views if the board is to be effective.158  
 
The board members should also have skills and experience that enable them to significantly 
contribute to debates and respond to the requirements of the company. Thus, the composition 
of the board in terms of a suitable combination of skills, knowledge and experience (e.g. 
professional backgrounds and industry experience), board independence (ratio of executive 
                                                 
153 Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 120-121. 
154 Ibid. See also Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges 
(2014)) 18. 
155 Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 15. See also Principle 2 of 
the King III Report, para 10 of the Malawi’s Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, section B of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and Principle 2 of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 
(CGC) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations 3rd ed. (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2014). 
156 Roberts J, McNulty T and Stiles P “Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating 
Accountability in the Boardroom” (2005) 16 British Journal of Management S5-S26.  
157 Ibid. 
158  According to Hendrikse, board performance is a factor of teamwork on the notion that the sum of individual directors’ 
knowledge and abilities and their shared perception of role of board is what distinguishes a mediocre board from an effective 
one (Hendrikse K Positive Accounting Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1995) 29). 
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and non-executive directors), size and diversity has been considered important in enhancing 
the effectiveness of the board.
159
 Although some empirical studies have found evidence of 
positive links between the composition of the board of directors and the performance of an 
organisation,
160
 other researchers have argued that there is a negative relationship
161
 or no 
prominent relationship between the composition of the board and the company’s 
performance.
162
 There has therefore, been no agreed position as to the impact of the 
composition of the board on the performance of the company either “directly or through 
corporate activities thought to affect shareholder wealth”.163  
 
Promoters of good corporate governance recommend that “there should be a sufficient 
number of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors to create a suitable 
balance of power and prevent the dominance of the board by one individual or by a small 
number of individuals”.164 The other reason put forward in support of the recommendation is 
that a board composed of a majority of non-executive directors is more effective in that it is 
able to act in shareholders’ best interests, critically review management proposals and control 
management decisions as the directors are not directly affiliated with the management.
165
 In 
                                                 
159 Leblanc RW “What is Wrong with Corporate Governance? A Note” (2004) 12 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 436-441. 
160 Uadiale OM “The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance in Nigeria” (2010) 5(10) International 
Journal of Business and Management 155-166.  
161 Erickson J et al “Board Composition and Firm Value under Concentrated Ownership: The Canadian Evidence” (2005) 13 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 387- 410. 
162 Bhagat S and Black B “The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long Term Firm Performance” (2002) 27 
Journal of Corporation Law 231-274. See also Choi TH and Jung J “Ethical Commitment, Financial Performance and 
Evaluation: An Empirical Investigation of Korean Companies” (2008) 81 Journal of Business Ethics 447-463 and Staikouras 
PK, Staikouras CK and Agoraki MK “The Effect of Board Size and Composition on European Bank Performance” (2010) 
23(1) European Journal of Law and Economics 1-27. 
163 Nicholson GJ and Kiel GC “Can Directors Impact Performance? A Case Based Test of Three Theories of Corporate 
Governance” (2007) 15(4) Corporate Governance: An International Review 585-608. 
164 Coyle B Risk Awareness and Corporate Governance 2nd ed. (Global Professional Publishing 2004) 236. See also 
Principle 2.18 of the King III Report, Section 1 (A.3) of the Combined Code, Part VI of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and paras 3.1 & 3.8 of the CGF which make similar recommendations. What is clear is that policy makers and 
governance proponents believe that inside directors lack the necessary objectivity and independence to properly monitor the 
organisation’s operations hence the need to have a sufficient number of non-executive directors in the board to bring 
independence to the board’s judgment. It is thus believed that a board is more independent as the number of outside directors 
increases proportionately (Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 26-27). 
165 Ibid. In support of this assertion, Fairfax demonstrated that with a combination of inside and independent directors, the 
directors are better able to monitor the performance of the corporation and the management team, prevent dominance by the 
CEO and senior managers and improve the corporate governance within the corporation (Fairfax D “The Uneasy Ride for 
the Inside Directors” (2010) 96 IOWA Law Review 127- 193). See also Scherrer PS “Director’s Responsibilities and 
Participation in the Strategic Decision Making Process” (2003) 3(1) Corporate Governance 86-90. 
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addition, non-executive directors provide the company with opportunities to link with the 
outside world, thereby assisting it in securing essential resources and expanding 
networking.
166
  
 
Another view is that, although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently 
from management, in practice, they are unable to effectively do so because they rely heavily 
on the same management to provide them with relevant information to make critical 
decisions.
167
 Some researchers have argued that having non-executive directors on the board 
of directors could negatively affect firm performance due to the fact that non-executive 
directors may not have access to and adequate knowledge of the company, may have limited 
understanding of the complexities of the company and also may not be able to commit 
adequate time to the organisation due to the nature of their appointments which are part-
time.
168
 According to this view, the presence of independent directors on a board is no 
guarantee for company success.
169
 In support of their view they argue that, although the 
boards of directors of Enron Corporation, Parmalat and WorldCom were varied with both 
inside and independent directors, the level of corporate oversight was still poor and the board 
members could not prevent the corporate failures.
170
 
 
Therefore, the results of studies investigating the relationship between the existence of non-
executive directors on the boards of companies and company performance have not resulted 
                                                 
166 Weisbach MS “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover” (1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 431-460. See Moloi 
STM Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting in the Annual Reports of South African Listed Companies (2008) 95-
97. 
167 Turnbull S “Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories” (1997) 5 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 180-205.  
168 Schwartz M, Dunfee T and Kline M “Tone at the Top: An Ethics for the Directors” (2005) 58 Journal of Business Ethics 
70-100. 
169 Ibid. See also Bhagat and Black who express the view that it is unlikely that board composition has a direct impact on 
company performance (Bhagat S and Black B “The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm 
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170 Dembinski PH et al Enron and World Finance: A Case Study in Ethics (2006) 29-30. See also Gwilliam D and Marnet O 
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Accounting Applied Research Working Paper Series of Coventry University of Business School 2009) 5-8, 29-3 available at 
www.coventry.ac.uk/Global/.../Research%20Paper%202009%2013.pdf (accessed on 28 July 2014). Similarly, Johl et al 
found that board independence does not affect firm performance (Johl SK, Kaur S and Cooper BJ “Board Characteristics and 
Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Public Listed Firms” (2015) 3(2) Journal of Economics, Business and 
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in a conclusive position.
171
 But, it is apparent that proponents for good corporate governance 
have revealed a clear preference for boards composed of a majority of non-executive 
directors for the main reason that this promotes a wider perspective, minimises potential 
conflict of interests and allows for greater objective decision making.
172
 The other area that 
has been of interest with regard to board composition is the effect of the size of the board on 
its effectiveness. Attempts to establish whether a direct or indirect correlation exists between 
the performance of a company and the size of the board have also been inconclusive.
173
  
 
Some commentators have argued that boards with diverse members in terms of skill, gender 
and experience are better able to respond more rapidly to the challenges of an uncertain and 
dynamic business environment.
174
 They argue that diversity enhances the board’s flexibility 
in its decision-making process due to a wider set of perceptions and views as well as unique 
and different experiences.
175
 Accordingly, a large and diverse board is better able to initiate 
and implement more extensive policies, strategies, activities and projects.
176
 In support of this 
view, other researchers suggest that the size of the board increases with the complexity and 
diversity of the company, hence large boards may be appropriate in complex and large 
corporations where more resources and expertise are required to maintain sufficient contacts 
                                                 
171 This is because some researchers have found a positive relationship between board independence and the company’s 
financial performance, others have found a negative relationship and others have established no relationship at all (Fauzi F 
and Locke S “Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Study of New Zealand Listed-Firms” (2012) 
8(2) Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance 43–67). 
172 This is demonstrated in the majority of corporate governance codes (e.g. Chapter 2 of the King III Report, Section 3 of 
the Malawi Code II: Sector Guidelines for Parastatal Organisations and State Owned Enterprises, section B of the UK 
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Empirical Evidence from Kenya” (2011) 1(3) International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 99-122. 
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Company Performance in South Africa Unpublished Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 2006) 4, 85-86. 
175 Wang J and Dewhirst HD “Boards of Directors and Stakeholder Orientation” (1992) 11(2) Journal of Business Ethics 
115-121. Too small boards may not have the critical mass to sustain healthy debates. 
176 Cox TH and Blake S “Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organisational Competitiveness” (1991) 5 Academy 
of Management Executive 45-56. Other researchers argue that a large board size is better than a small size one for the reason 
that it allows for specialisation and diversity in the effective monitoring and advising functions of the board (Andres PD and 
Vallelado E “Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of Directors” (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 2570–2580).  
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with the external environment.
177
 Moreover, a small board has the disadvantage that it may be 
easily manipulated by the chief executive officer.
178
 
 
On the other hand, some authors have suggested that large boards can be less effective than 
small boards because small boards provide a greater opportunity for each director to 
contribute substantively to the discussions and the decision-making processes.
179
 Their main 
argument is that while the board’s capacity to monitor performance may be enhanced if the 
number of directors is increased, the benefit may be outweighed by the incremental cost of 
poorer communication and bureaucratic processes associated with larger groups.
180
 In 
addition, it is argued that a large board encourages laxity and free-riding among directors as 
far as the monitoring of the public entity’s strategy implementation and effectiveness of 
management is concerned.
181
 Thus, it has been found that limiting its size may improve board 
effectiveness. The above contradictory arguments are a clear indication that there is no 
prescribed right or optimum size of a board, but that the board size should be determined by 
the specific needs of the organisation.
182
 It seems that the number that is popularly considered 
                                                 
177 Boone A et al “The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis” (2007) 66-101. See 
also Eisenberg T, Sundgren S and Wells MT “Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms” (1998) 48 
Journal of Financial Economics 35-54. 
178 Jensen MC “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems” (1993) 48(3) Journal of 
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Evidence From Turkish Listed Companies” (2013) 9(4) Intangible Capital 1068-1075 available at 
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Financial Economics 185-211. 
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Effective Corporate Governance in Tanzania Unpublished Thesis (University of Twente, The Netherlands 2005) 144-145. 
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Governance, UK Corporate Governance Code and South African King Report do not specify the number of directors to be 
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sufficient for a public entity board to be effective is between six and ten as shown in the 
statutes creating some public entities.
183
 
 
In addition, corporate governance experts support the view that, given the current dynamic 
global business environment and the emergence of greater power being assigned to a wider 
set of stakeholder groups, greater demographic diversity
184
 amongst members of corporate 
boards may lead to improvements in a company’s performance.185 In particular, one 
demographic characteristic that has been recognised as beneficial to the company is the 
representation of women on boards.
186
 Unfortunately, similar to the above aspects, research 
findings on the relationship between the percentage of women on boards and company 
performance have also been rather conflicting.
187
  
 
On the one hand, it has been argued that there is a positive relationship between the 
percentage of women on a board and the company’s performance.188 As such, it has been 
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found that boards with women performed much better in terms of governance and share price 
performance than those with only men.
189
 The main reason for this argument is that 
differences in the gender backgrounds of directors can add different sociological perceptions 
and understandings to strategy formulation and decision-making processes.
190
 As an example, 
some researchers found that female directors on a company’s board may assist in facilitating 
strategic change, increase financial performance and provide greater idea generation and 
innovation.
191
 Robinson and Dechant argue that gender diversity leads to creativity and 
innovation as well as enables effective market penetration through matching the diversity of 
directors to that of customers and employees.
192
  
 
Others found that female directors are more concerned and give “greater emphasis to social 
welfare, legal protection and transparency in government and business” than male 
directors.
193
 Similarly, others argue that, by virtue of their position at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy, female directors can serve other corporate women in various ways, “as role 
models, as mentors and champions for high-performing women”, and as promoters of the 
“recruitment, retention and advancement of women” in organisations.194 In support of these 
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2014). 
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views, a significant number of corporate governance codes
195
 and statutes have given 
prominence on the need to promote and observe gender equality in organisations and society 
at large.
 196
 Furthermore, a number of international and regional instruments have been put in 
place to promote gender equality and women empowerment.
197
 
 
Contrary to the above, it has been shown that women’s impact on company performance is 
negative.
198
 The main argument has been that gender diversity on the board may negatively 
impact to the organisation’s performance because it may increase the likelihood of intra-
group conflicts resulting in slower decision-making processes.
199
 In addition, it was found 
that women are more risk averse than men in financial decision making which may adversely 
affect the organisation’s resource allocation.200 Another view is that increased gender 
diversity may negatively affect the performance of a company as women tend to increase 
costs due to higher turnover and absenteeism.
201
 
 
Some researchers fail to establish a meaningful relationship between the presence of women 
on the board and company performance.
202
 These researchers concluded that companies 
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employing female board members perform neither significantly better nor worse than firms 
with no female board representation.
203
 The main reasons for failing to establish a 
relationship was said to be the low number of women that were actually on the boards and the 
fact that women were disadvantaged by the type of assignments they were traditionally given 
whilst on the board.
204
 The other observation was that, women managers tend to be 
scrutinised and criticised more than men, and they tend to be evaluated less favourably, even 
when performing as effectively in exactly the same leadership roles as men.
205
  
 
From the above, it is clear that there is no conclusive position on the relationship between the 
board composition and company performance. In spite of the conflicting views, it seems like 
the majority opinion is in favour of some relationship existing between board composition 
and company performance. This view is supported by the prominence this aspect has been 
given in international codes of corporate governance like the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, ICGN Principles, CAGG Guidelines and other country specific codes like the 
King Report, UK Corporate Governance Code, Malawi’s Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance.
206
  However, achieving the most appropriate board composition for a 
public entity remains a difficult matter.  
 
First, it has been established that there is a limited number of professional and experienced 
people from whom to select appropriately qualified directors resulting in inexperienced board 
members being selected.
207
 Secondly, board members are sometimes appointed for political 
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reasons rather than business experience, for example, senior government officials who do not 
possess relevant qualifications, appropriate technical or commercial skills and experience 
have been seconded to public entities to represent government interest.
208
 Such actions have 
resulted in a poor skills mix in boards thus causing ineffectiveness.  
 
A third challenge has been that board gender diversity has not been achieved mostly due to 
negative perceptions on the capabilities of female board members, stereotyping and mere lack 
of willingness to implement governments’ policies on gender promotion.209 Also, it has been 
argued that women tend not to be as ambitious in terms of professional development as men 
and to have fewer acquaintances on professional networking platforms which reduces their 
opportunities of board appointments.
210
 With regard to board independence and size, research 
has found that most countries do not experience challenges because the statutes enabling the 
creation of the entities normally stipulate the number of directors of which the majority are 
non-executive directors, with the chief executive officer being the only executive director.
211
 
 
3.6.4 Remuneration of Directors 
The structure and level of remuneration is another contentious area with contradicting views 
on whether directors are, in general, appropriately or excessively remunerated.
212
 On the one 
hand, some commentators believe that board remuneration, especially in public entities, is not 
sufficient to attract as well as to motivate directors to offer their maximum efforts towards 
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achieving organisational objectives.
213
 This is so especially considering the increasingly high 
level of obligations required from them and the potential legal liability and reputational 
risks.
214
 They also argue that, apart from demoralising directors, poor remuneration 
discourages them from complying with strict business principles and practices.
215
 On the 
other hand, some commentators are of the opinion that directors are excessively paid 
especially considering the fact that, in most cases, their remuneration is not linked to their 
performance.
216
  
 
The main argument is that directors are paid the same packages whether or not the company 
performs well, which does not make much business sense.
217
 Non-performance related 
remuneration could result from directors or managers “who may rationally sacrifice 
shareholder value in pursuance of their own” personal interests.218 This is because managers 
are better informed on investments and company prospects than the shareholders.
219
 
Nevertheless, it has been considered imperative that the level of remuneration for members of 
the board should be sufficient to attract and retain the quality and calibre of individuals 
needed to run the organisation successfully.
220
 At the same time, it has been suggested that 
the structure of an individual’s remuneration package should motivate the individual towards 
the achievement of performance that is in the best interests of the company, its stakeholders 
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and those of the individual.
221
 Thus, it is strongly recommended that directors’ remuneration 
should be fair and linked to individual and company performance in order to align their 
interests with those of the shareholders.
222
 To assist in the achievement of fair remuneration 
for directors, most corporate governance codes recommend the establishment of 
remuneration committees whose main role is to  assist the board in determining and 
administering remuneration policies in the company‘s long-term interests.223 
 
Despite the general acknowledgement that directors need to be adequately remunerated as a 
performance motivational tool, it has been found that the challenge is that, in most countries, 
public entity boards, in comparison to their private sector counterparts, are not adequately 
remunerated.
224
 First, the remuneration paid to the public entity directors is far below market 
levels when considering the responsibilities involved and the competencies and experience 
required.
225
 One of the reasons established is that the responsible government authorities 
regulate and prescribe remuneration packages without taking into account the prevailing 
market conditions.
226
  
 
In some cases, for example in Australia and Turkey, independent statutory bodies have been 
set up to determine board remuneration payable to board members of certain public 
entities.
227
 However, it has been established that, whilst government control may be essential 
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to prevent the public entities boards from  abusing the entities’ funds and excessively paying 
themselves, poor remuneration makes it difficult for the entities to attract experienced 
directors who are able to add the highest value.
228
 To further complicate matters, boards may 
be compelled to cushion themselves by holding unnecessary board meetings so as to earn 
sitting fees thus enhancing their remuneration.
229
 
 
Secondly, it has been argued that the remuneration paid to directors is, in most cases, not 
linked to achievement of performance targets.
230
 Directors are, therefore, assured of obtaining 
their full remuneration regardless of ineffectively discharging their duties and not achieving 
organisational goals.
231
 It has been established that the main reason for non-recognition of 
performance is that most public entity boards do not have clear policies on performance 
measurement and the responsible authorities sometimes do not have the capacity to 
effectively evaluate the boards’ performance so as to determine the appropriate 
remuneration.
232
 A third observation is that, in the majority of situations, the remuneration 
committees of public entity boards have minimal say on directors’ remuneration as their 
function is, contrary to good practices, just to make recommendations to the relevant 
government authority which has the final say.
233
 The non-executive directors’ remuneration 
is, thus, more or less dictated by government authority. Therefore, if board effectiveness is to 
be improved, governments need to do much more to ensure that board remuneration is 
commensurate with the level of expertise required, the enormous board responsibilities and 
the liability risk associated with being a public entity board member.  
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3.6.5 Evaluation of Board Performance  
It seems to be internationally acknowledged that board performance needs to be regularly 
monitored and evaluated.
234
 Although board evaluations are mostly common in large private 
sector companies, they have gradually become more prevalent in public entities.
235
 The need 
to monitor and measure board performance has become more widespread because the board 
is increasingly held accountable for corporate performance and there is an increase in 
shareholder activism resulting in investors demanding more from boards than before.
236
 In 
addition, the increase in media and community scrutiny and lawsuits against boards or 
individual directors has also reinforced the general public expectations that boards should be 
held accountable for the performance of the companies they preside over.
237
 Board scrutiny 
has also increased due to the escalation in corporate collapses and the increase in board 
autonomy, which has limited the government’s ability to directly assess the performance of 
boards.
238
  
 
Performance evaluation is essential for two reasons. First, it serves as means by which boards 
can identify strengths, areas of improvement, corporate governance problems as well as 
particular skills that will best increase board effectiveness and add real value to shareholders 
and their organisations.
239
 In a similar way, board evaluations are a useful incentive for 
individual board members to devote sufficient time and effort in carrying out their critical 
functions, and for the board as a whole to really be the strategic leader and monitor of the 
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public entity.
240
 The second benefit derived from evaluation of board performance is that it 
enables the responsible authorities and other interested stakeholders to assess whether the 
board is effectively performing its duties in the best interests of the organisation and thus 
enables the former to act accordingly.
241
 At the same time, the evaluation process enables 
those responsible for appointing board members to recognise necessary competencies and 
board member profiles as well as the director development activities essential to address any 
skills gaps in boards.
242
 
 
The enormous benefits of board performance evaluations have caused some commentators to 
call for and some countries to implement compulsory board performance appraisals to 
promote board effectiveness, corporate transparency and accountability.
243
 However, 
internationally, the majority of the corporate governance codes or reports have left it to 
organisations to voluntarily implement board evaluations although they make specific 
recommendations on such evaluation.
244
 Most board evaluation systems concentrate on the 
agents performing the evaluation (e.g. self-evaluation, consultants), the issues to be assessed 
(e.g. accountability, knowledge and contribution), the stakeholders involved (e.g. 
shareholders, major customers), the way the evaluation is performed (e.g. interviews, 
observations, surveys) and for what purpose the results are used (e.g. review corporate 
governance processes, review of board composition and performance).
245
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Despite the general agreement on the necessity of evaluation of board performance, it has 
been found that the majority of public entities seem to be lagging behind in so far as 
implementation of systematic and consistent board evaluations is concerned.
246
 Moreover, in 
some cases where board evaluations have been improperly conducted they have caused 
disharmony in the boards and between the board and management.
247
 The first challenge has 
been identified as lack of formal board evaluation systems in the majority of the public 
entities.
248
 Most governments, especially in developing countries, were found to have no 
objective and standardised evaluation of board performance tools in place which makes it 
difficult to conduct effective board performance assessments.
249
 The second challenge has 
been the setting of incomprehensive, uncoordinated and vague performance indicators and 
lack of capacity to conduct performance assessment by the responsible authorities.
250
  
 
Too much interference by governments on operational issues of public entities has been 
established as the third challenge.
251
 Governments tend to interfere with operational decisions 
which, under normal circumstances, should be the prerogative of the boards, for example, the 
appointment of senior managers like the chief executive officer.
252
 The resultant challenge is 
that managers may be appointed on criteria other than managerial skills and executive 
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247 Kiel GC and Nicholson GJ “Evaluating Boards and Directors” (2005) 613-631. 
248 Most companies are yet to develop their own internal indicators to evaluate the performance of board members. There are 
currently no formal mechanisms to assess the performance of state representatives; neither are there any practices to make 
them liable for underperformance of duties (Filatov A, Tutkevich V and Cherkaev D Board of Directors at State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) in Russia (OECD Publishing 2005) 22 available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/35175304.pdf (accessed 
on 28 August 2014). 
249 The World Bank Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Toolkit (2014) 202. 
250 In some instances, there are completely no written performance contracts for some of the public entities boards and where 
they are in place they are not effectively implemented and monitored by the respective government authorities because of 
lack of capacity (PwC and IoDSA State-owned enterprises: Governance responsibility and accountability (Public Sector 
Working Group: Position Paper 3 of 2011 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) & Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
(IoDSA)) available at www.iodsa.co.za  (accessed on 28 April 2014)). 
251 See para 3.6.1 above and Wong SCY “Improving Corporate Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach” (2004) 5-15. 
See also Salleh MFM and Ahmad A “Political Influence on Economic Decision-Making in Government-Owned Companies: 
From the Perspectives of Key Players” (2012) 6(7) African Journal of Business Management 2716-2726. 
252 In practice, the major key mandate of the board may be undertaken or at least heavily influenced by the responsible 
government authority which effectively means that the government would have a greater say in the strategy and purpose of 
the public entity than its board (Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24). 
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leadership which compromises the efficiency of the public entities.
253
 Similarly, the 
appointment of directors without considering the relevancy of their skills and competences 
creates challenges for boards to effectively discharge their duties.
254
 In addition, the 
numerous ministerial approval requirements (for example budget and strategic plan 
approvals) and delays in obtaining such approvals have the overall effect of constraining the 
ability of directors to make commercial and strategic decisions on a timely basis.
255
 The 
many issues beyond the board’s control make it difficult to effectively measure its 
performance and to attribute poor performance of the entity wholly to the board. 
 
A fourth challenge experienced by boards in effectively discharging their duties and 
achieving the entities’ objectives has been found to be the high turnaround of directors which 
makes it difficult to achieve continuity, measure performance and does not allow boards to 
exercise any influence in corporate events.
256
 In some cases, the dismissal of board members 
was undertaken without using any concrete performance data but simply based on perception 
which makes it difficult to assess whether or not evaluation of board performance is at all 
important.
257
 Fifthly, due to the absence of transparency (timely and accurate disclosure) in 
public entities, the shareholder and other stakeholders have not had access to sufficient and 
timely information about the operations and financial position of the public entity such that 
they have been unable to effectively evaluate whether the board or management have 
effectively discharged their duties.
258
  
                                                 
253 Sule OE and Ugoji IE “Impact of Personal Recruitment on Organisational Development: A Survey of Selected Nigerian 
Workplace” (2013) 4(2) International Journal of Business Administration 79-103. See also Ireri E Appointment of Board of 
Directors to State Owned Enterprises in Kenya: Towards A Stricter Regulatory Framework Unpublished Thesis (University 
of Nairobi 2009) 28-29.  
254 Ibid. See also Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (2006) 106-107. 
255 Wong SCY “Improving Corporate Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach” (2004) 5-15 and Salleh MFM and 
Ahmad A “Political Influence on Economic Decision-Making in Government-Owned Companies: From the Perspectives of 
Key Players” (2012) 2716-2726. 
256 Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 3-4. 
257 Ibid.  
258 Wickberg S Transparency of State-Owned Enterprises (Transparency International 2013) 1-3 available at 
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Transparency_of_state_owned_enterprises.pdf (accessed on 25 
September 2014). See also Xu X and Xu X “Information Disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises in China” (2012) 4(1) 
Tsinghua China Law Review 3-10 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505713 (accessed on 25 September 2014). Best 
practice of corporate governance requires that public entities should report annually to inform the public of their activities 
and performance (For example, para 5.2.13 of the South African Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, 
Part 3 of the Australian Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise (GBE) Governance and Oversight Guidelines, 
schedule C of the Combined Code and section 20 of the Malawi Code II: Sector Guidelines for Parastatal Organisations 
and State Owned Enterprises).   
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Evaluation of board performances have been complicated further by the requirement for 
public entities to accomplish numerous and contradictory objectives.
259
 The entities are 
expected to operate in a commercially efficient and profitable manner whilst required to 
provide goods and services at subsidised prices, create employment and to make other 
decisions “based on political rather than commercial criteria”.260 Thus, by acting in the best 
interest of a public entity, the board may violate the shareholder’s social, economic or 
political goals. All these challenges make it complicated to evaluate and conclude whether or 
not a board has effectively performed its duties. 
 
However, where board evaluations have been properly implemented, enormous benefits have 
been derived.
261
 As indicated above, the evaluation of board performance assists government 
authorities to assess the overall functioning of the board, determine the characteristics that the 
board should have and, in doing so, to improve future board nominations and its supervisory 
functions. Board evaluations also assist the board to identify its weaknesses (the areas that 
need to be worked on), areas of strength and help it to cooperate more efficiently and to 
perform better in future. 
 
3.6.6 Enforcement of Corporate Governance Compliance 
The King Committee made the following observation regarding compliance and enforcement: 
 “all principles embodied in a code of corporate governance are effective only if adequate 
remedies and sanctions exist to enforce compliance with those principles.”262 According to 
the Committee, rules are only as effective as their enforcement. This is also supported by 
                                                 
259 Omasa JMM Failure of Good Corporate Governance in State Owned Corporations in Kenya: Towards a More Effective 
Parliamentary Monitoring Role Unpublished Thesis (University of Nairobi 2014) 27-28. 
260 Ashipala  SM An Analysis of Corporate Governance within the Framework of State Owned Enterprises Governance Act 
in Namibia with Specific Focus on Namwater, Nampower And Transnamib Unpublished Thesis (University of Stellenbosch 
2012) 3. 
261 Examples of countries that have seriously and formally implemented board evaluations are Mexico, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Finland (OECD Board of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (2012) 
50-53). 
262 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report.  
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Berglöf and Claessens who found that corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms 
are “intimately linked”.263  
 
Originally, countries left the issues of corporate governance to self-regulation
264
 but the 
continued increase in poor corporate governance practices and their disastrous consequences 
led a number of countries to consider self-regulation as insufficient on its own.
265
 For this 
reason, it was considered necessary to complement self-regulation with some legal and 
regulatory mechanisms so as to encourage companies to comply with good corporate 
governance principles.
266
 As a result, most countries have resorted to applying a combination 
of codes and principles on one hand, and legal and regulatory instruments on the other.
267
  In 
fact, in a number of countries, it is obligatory to disclose and provide explanations where 
certain code recommendations are not observed.
268
 The countries have, therefore, not 
                                                 
263 Berglöf E and Claessens S Corporate Governance and Enforcement (2004) 1. 
264 Several corporate governance codes acknowledge that there is no “one size fits all” solution to corporate governance 
hence the reason they have sought to promote self-regulation in corporate governance. As an example, the King III Report 
recommends an “apply or explain” approach which means that where entities have applied the Code and best practice 
recommendations in the Report, a positive statement should be made to the stakeholders to this effect and where the entities 
have not complied with any principle or recommendation they should fully explain the reasons to the stakeholders 
(“Introduction and Background” to the King 111 Report). The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends a “comply or 
explain” approach which requires corporations to indicate how the principles of the Code have been applied and to provide 
an explanation when they do not comply with certain provisions of the Code (UK Corporate Governance Code) 4). 
265 Bhasin ML “Corporate Governance Disclosure Practices: The Portrait of a Developing Country” (2010) 5(4) 
International Journal of Business and Management 150-167. See The World Bank Corporate Governance Country 
Assessment (Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Corporate Governance 2006) 10-12 available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_bhutan.pdf (accessed on 15 October 2014). The continued increase in corporate 
collapses has made a number of policy makers and researchers to concede to the fact that the development of corporate 
governance in a country is largely determined by the availability and proper enforcement of legal and regulatory systems (La 
Porta R et al “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” (2002) 1147-1170). 
266 The main elements of the legal and regulatory framework include company law, securities law and other relevant 
regulations on corporate governance. A number of countries’ legislative frameworks provide for penalties to be imposed on 
those who fail to implement good corporate governance standards. (The World Bank Corporate Governance Country 
Assessment (2006) 10-12). See also Chu Ngum P Using the OECD Principle of Corporate Governance as an International 
Benchmark: A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Legislation in the UK, US and South Africa Unpublished 
Thesis (Anglia Ruskin University 2009) 7-9 and OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (OECD Publishing 2014) 13 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/CorporateGovernanceFactbook.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2014). 
267 Picciotto S “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 42(131) Columbia Journal of 
Business Law 133-151 available at www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/lwasp/coljtnl03.doc (accessed on 13 October 2014). Examples 
are South Africa, Australia and the UK. South Africa has prescriptive rules and regulations (for example the Companies Act, 
PFMA, Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listing Requirements) but continues to strive to promote self-regulation in corporate 
governance as evidenced by the provisions of its King Reports. Australia’s self regulatory regime is supported by the ASX 
CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and GBE Governance and Oversight Guidelines and the 
legislative framework comprising of the Corporations Act 50 of 2001, Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 153 
of 1997, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 123 of 2013, among others. Similarly, the UK 
framework has prescriptive rules and regulations (for example the Companies Act 2006, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) Listing Rules) and best practice principles as stipulated in the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
268 In the majority of countries, stock exchanges are responsible for monitoring and analysing whether listed companies are 
adequately disclosing the matters relating to adherence to the provisions of the Codes and whether they provide adequate 
explanations for non-compliance. The non-disclosure or false disclosure could lead to a range of legal penalties such as, 
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prescribed corporate governance behaviour per se, but require entities to voluntarily 
implement the recommendations in the corporate governance codes and provide justifications 
for non-compliance.  
 
Some countries have resorted to a more prescriptive regulatory approach which makes 
compliance with good corporate governance principles mandatory.
269
 These countries do not 
have national codes or principles under the “comply or explain” framework, instead all 
corporate governance issues are covered by either laws or regulations (including listing 
rules).
270
 An example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
271
 which is legislation passed by the United 
States of America Congress to protect shareholders and the general public from accounting 
errors and fraudulent practices in the enterprises, as well as to improve corporate governance 
and accountability.
272
 Another example is the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act
273
 
which seeks to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development 
of, and to regulate, the securities market, all of which have a significant impact on corporate 
governance in India.
274
   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
among others, fines, legal liability for damages and holding a person inappropriate for acting as a director in cases of 
extreme disobedience (OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2014) 15). See also Study on Monitoring and Enforcement 
Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States conducted by RiskMetrics Group in September 2009 61-63 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf 
(accessed on 17 October 2014). 
269 Picciotto S “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business” (2003) 133- 151. See also OECD 
Corporate Governance Factbook (OECD 2014) 13.   
270 Ibid. See also OECD Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries (OECD Publishing 2004) 40-41 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/21755678.pdf (accessed on 21 October 2014).  
271 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
272 “Preamble” to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was drafted by U.S. Congressmen Paul Sarbanes and 
Michael Oxley and enacted by the U.S Congress in response to a series of high-profile financial scandals that occurred in the 
early 2000s at companies including Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. The Act was designed to improve corporate governance 
and accountability and to protect investors from the possibility of fraudulent accounting activities by corporations. All public 
companies must comply with the Act (Jahmani Y and Dowling WA “The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act” (2008) 6(10) 
Journal of Business & Economics Research 57-66 and Clark KN The Effects of Sarbanes Oxley on Current Financial 
Reporting Standards Unpublished Thesis (Liberty University 2012) 4-7). 
273 Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 15 of 1992. 
274 “Preamble” to the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act. The overall objectives of SEBI are to protect the interest 
of investors, promote the development of stock exchange, regulate the activities of stock market and to prevent fraudulent 
and malpractices by having balance between self-regulation of business and its statutory regulations (Pujari S The Purpose, 
Objective and Functions of SEBI Published Article available at http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/education/sebi-the-
purpose-objective-and-functions-of-sebi/8762/  (accessed on 12 February 2015). 
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A number of researchers have strongly argued that an overly prescriptive approach as 
contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley and Securities and Exchange Board of India Acts might not 
solve the corporate governance challenges as there are restrictions to legislating on corporate 
governance.
275
 Much depends on the reliability and ethical values of the directors and 
management.
276
 In support of this assertion Keutgen states that “one must above all be wary 
of the temptation to believe that salvation can only come from the law to the extent that 
corporate governance, correctly understood, is more a matter of ethics than for regulatory 
restraint”.277 Policymakers, investors and other stakeholders have therefore, acknowledged 
that, although the law is necessary, it is not an adequate factor in coercing directors and 
management to comply with good corporate governance practices as even the strictest 
corporate governance standards may not be enough to restrain fraud and other corrupt 
tendencies.
278
 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that there is no single prescribed way of enforcing good 
corporate governance principles hence most countries have tried to match whatever 
enforcement mechanisms they consider necessary to their local environment.
279
 Corporate 
governance practices tend to reflect the country’s underlying cultural values.280 Transplanted 
laws may, therefore, not be as effective in addressing the corporate governance challenges 
                                                 
275 Anand AI “An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post Sarbanes-Oxley” (2006) 31 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 229-252 available at http://www.djcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ (accessed on 22 
April 2015. See also DeJong A et al “The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance: Evidence and Implications 
from The Netherlands” (2005) 11 Journal of Corporate Finance 473–503 and Andreadakis S Corporate Governance in the 
Aftermath of the Scandals: The EU Response and the Role of Ethics Unpublished Thesis (University of Leicester 2010) 282-
284. 
276 Ibid. See also Cunningham GM and Harris JE “Enron and Arthur Andersen: The Case of the Crooked E and the Fallen 
A” (2006) 3(1) Global Perspectives on Accounting Education 27-48. 
277 Van den Berghe L International Standardisation of Good Corporate Governance: Best Practices for the Board of 
Directors (Springer Science & Business Media 2012) 55. For similar comments, see also Anand AI “An Analysis of 
Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post Sarbanes-Oxley” (2006) 229-252. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Trebeck K “Exploring the Responsiveness of Companies: Corporate Social Responsibility to Stakeholders” (2008) 4(3) 
Social Responsibility Journal 349-365. See also Langtry S Corporate Governance (A Discussion Paper to Assist with the 
Preparation of South Africa’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Self Assessment Report 2005)) available at 
www.aprm.org.za/docs/APRMOpinionPiece-CorporateGovernance (accessed on 15 October 2014). 
280 Miles L Transplanting the Anglo American Corporate Governance Model into Asian Countries: Prospects and 
Practicality Unpublished Thesis (Middlesex University 2010) 49-50. See also Reyes MP The Challenges of Legal 
Transplants in a Globalized Context: A Case Study on ‘Working’ Examples Unpublished Thesis (University of Warwick 
2014) 36-37. 
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especially in developing countries.
281
 A similar argument on the applicability of transplanted 
laws has been made in respect of other areas of corporate law.
282
  
 
Despite the acknowledgement of the need to enforce compliance with corporate governance 
principles, many countries, especially developing and transitional countries, do not have 
effective institutions to enforce such compliance.
283
 This is mostly because few developing 
and transitional countries have “adequate courts, judges and public enforcement agencies, 
and the means for shareholders to institute legal actions on their own”.284 As a result, 
enforcing compliance has not been effective enough to produce desired results in a number of 
countries as proved by the continued occurrence of corporate scandals and collapses. 
 
3.7 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter defined corporate governance for purposes of this thesis, discussed its 
importance and the value it adds to an organisation. It also outlined some international 
corporate governance developments, examined the crucial elements in ensuring an effective 
board and reviewed mechanisms put in place by countries to enforce compliance with good 
corporate governance practices. Five major areas were considered as crucial in improving 
board effectiveness, namely its role, selection and appointment, composition, remuneration 
and performance evaluation. These five aspects were considered especially to ascertain how 
they should be structured and managed to enable the boards of public entities to effectively 
discharge their duties.  
                                                 
281 Researchers have, in some instances, attributed the poor corporate governance in developing countries to the fact that 
laws in these countries were transplanted from developed countries (mostly colonial masters) rather than derived from local 
practices (Berglof E and Claessens S Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Three Views (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3409, September 2004) 4-5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=625286 (accessed on 2 September 
2014)). See also Graham D and Woods N “Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries” (2006) 
34(5) World Development 868–883 available at http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/annet/sum/SUM4022/h08/Graham.pdf 
(accessed on 17 May 2015). 
282 As an example, commenting on the applicability of English law to the South African situation, Pretorius and Others 
indicated that English law could not be binding in South Africa but could only be persuasive (Pretorius JT et al Hahlo’s 
South African Company Law Through the Cases (1999) 2). See also Havenga M “The Business Judgment Rule – Should We 
Follow the Australian Example?” (2000) 12 South African Mercantile Law Journal 25-37 and Jones E “Directors’ Duties: 
Negligence and the Business Judgment Rule” (2007) 19 South African Mercantile Law Journal 326–336. 
283 Millstein IM Non-Traditional Modes of Enforcement (Paper presented at the Lex Mundi North America Regional 
Conference jointly organised by Lex Mundi and the Global Corporate Governance Forum in 2003) 1 available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/../357100Focus1ENFCorpGov3.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2014). 
284 Ibid. 
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Corporate governance essentially concerns how organisations are directed, managed, 
controlled and held accountable to their stakeholders. The purpose of any corporate 
governance system is to concurrently improve corporate performance and accountability as a 
means of attracting financial and human resources and to prevent corporate failure. Following 
rampant worldwide corporate collapses, a number of international organisations have come 
up with guidelines and procedures on corporate governance to address the various challenges. 
Public entities have not been spared of the need to observe good corporate governance 
principles especially considering their importance both economically and socially.  
 
A number of analysts and researchers have established that having an effective board is one 
of the key elements to a successful public entity. According to the literature analysed, the 
effectiveness of the boards in public entities is achieved through clear and comprehensively 
articulated roles, empowering boards to discharge their duties with minimum interference, 
transparent and proper appointment of directors, appropriately composed boards in terms of 
independence and diversity, evaluating boards’ performance and payment of adequate 
remuneration to motivate board members to exert their best efforts. It has been established 
that the majority of countries apply a combination of self-regulatory codes and principles and 
legal and regulatory instruments. But, a number of countries, particularly developing 
countries, have not had adequate resources to effectively enforce compliance with good 
corporate governance standards. 
 
Having looked at the corporate governance framework from a general perspective, the next 
chapter analyses Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework with particular focus on 
measures put in place to enhance the effectiveness of boards of public entities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ZIMBABWE’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Zimbabwe obtained its independence in April 1980. The country’s first ten years of 
independence were characterised by rigorous policy making efforts to address inequalities 
and injustices created by policies before independence.
1
 However, in spite of the 
commendable efforts by the policy makers, the country started experiencing economic and 
social challenges in the 1990s resulting in huge debts,
2
 worsened poverty levels and 
retardation in economic growth.
3
 Since then, the country has implemented a number of 
policies to economically and socially resuscitate the country. Examples of the recovery 
programmes are the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP),
4
 the Zimbabwe 
Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST),
5
 the Short Term 
                                                 
1 Zhou G and Zhou H “Public Policy Making in Zimbabwe: A Three Decade Perspective” (2012) 2(8) International Journal 
of Humanities and Social Science 212-222.  
2 The country experienced a plethora of economic hardships which resulted in the need to control government expenditure, 
particularly the huge subsidies to the public entity sector (Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A 
Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges (2014) 49. 
3 Saunders R “Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)’s Fables II” (1996) 11(4) Southern Africa Report (SAR) 
8 available at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3876 (accessed on 13 November 2014). 
4 Zimbabwe's ESAP was launched in 1990 and lasted until 1995. ESAPs were adopted across Africa and the rest of the 
world in line with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank recommendations. The recommended policy 
measures involved, inter alia, reducing government budget deficit, raising investment and reducing inflation. During the 
same period Zimbabwe implemented public enterprise reforms, like deregulating sectors in which public entities operate and 
restructuring them (commercialising and privatising), as part of structural adjustment programmes. However, an assessment 
of the results derived from implementing ESAP indicates that the desired results were not achieved as the budget deficit 
increased, inflation worsened, level of investment declined and public entities continued to incur losses (Zhou G and Zhou H 
“Public Policy Making in Zimbabwe: A Three Decade Perspective” (2012) 212-222).  
5 The ZIMPREST programme was implemented in 1998. The programme sought to address the limitations of ESAP through 
restoration of “macro-economic stability, poverty alleviation as well as facilitating public and private savings and 
investment”. Nonetheless, the programme was not so successful due to the fact that the programme’s goals were too 
“ambitious”, absence of political will to implement, lack of international financial support to fund programme 
implementation and absence of enabling legal and institutional frameworks (Shizha E and Kariwo MT Education and 
Development in Zimbabwe: A Social, Political and Economic Analysis (Springer Science & Business Media 2012) 8-9 and 
Zhou G “From Interventionism To Market-Based Management Approaches: The Zimbabwean Experience” (2001) XXVIII 
(ii) Zambezia 229-261). 
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Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP),
6
 the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
Policy (IEEP)
7
 and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(Zim Asset).
8
  
 
Despite the significant number of policy initiatives, the country has continued to encounter a 
number of economic and social challenges. These challenges have not spared public entities 
which have continued to be a drain to the fiscus due to poor performance financially and 
otherwise.
9
 Over the last two decades, a number of major public entities have been found not 
to be financially sustainable and there have been revelations of increased misappropriation of 
funds allegedly due to a lack of efficient corporate governance systems.
10
 Furthermore, the 
entities and the whole country have also experienced pressure from international investors 
                                                 
6 STERP was a 2009 emergency short term government stabilisation programme, whose key objectives were to stabilise the 
economy, “recover the levels of savings, investment and growth, and lay the basis of a more transformative midterm to long 
term economic programme” that would turn Zimbabwe “into a progressive developmental State”. The key priorities for 
STERP were political and governance issues, social protection and stabilisation (STERP document is available at 
www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/zim-asset (accessed on 1 December 2014).   
 
7 The IEEP was formulated in 2008. The objective of promulgating the IEEP is to empower black populations which were 
disadvantaged in the colonial era by giving them an opportunity to participate in the national economy through owning 
businesses and increasing their share in the corporate sector (“Preamble” to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
Act (Chapter 14:33) (Act No. 14 of 2007). The main challenge with this policy is that it has stalled investment into the 
country allegedly because it has a lot of ambiguities and has the effect of disempowering investors (Sibanda A “The 
Corporate Governance Perils of Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Act 17 of 2007” (2014) 4(1) 
International Journal of Public Law and Policy 24-36). See also Mzumara M Indigenisation Act Continues to Create 
Confusion (The Financial Gazette of 5 June 2014 available at www.financialgazette.co.zw newspaper) 8 and Ncube S 
Indigenisation Act’s Ambiguities Repelling Investors – EU Block, (The Zimbabwe Mail of 22 November 2014) 6 available at 
http://www.thezimbabwemail.com. 
8 Zim Asset is a government economic blueprint that aims to spearhead the turnaround and development of the economy 
over the next five years (2014-2018). Its main aim is “to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on 
indigenization, empowerment and employment creation”. It identifies four, but all-encompassing clusters namely; food 
security and nutrition, social services and poverty reduction, infrastructure and utilities and value addition and beneficiation 
(Zim Asset Policy Document is available at www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/zim-asset (accessed on 1 December 2014). It is 
premature to assess whether the policy has been implemented successfully or not although some of the programmes have not 
been implemented as per plan. 
9 Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The case of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation” (2014) 
9 Journal of Academic and Business Ethics 1-8 and Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s State 
Enterprises: Can the Situation be Rescued? (2012). During the period 2012 to 2014, seven public entities were reported to 
have received US110 million “draining Treasury which last year failed to pay civil servants” (Makoshori S Parastatals 
Bleed Broke Govt (The Financial Gazette of 11-17 June 2015) 1). According to a report produced by the then Ministry of 
State Enterprises and Parastatals on the performance of parastatals in 2011, “the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and TelOne were draining the fiscus, while those 
performing well, which included Zimbabwe Power Company, Petrol Trade and National Oil Infrastructure Company of 
Zimbabwe only made marginal profits” (Mambo E CEO Salaries Bleed Parastatals (Zimbabwe Independent of 11 October 
2013) 1). 
10 Ibid. Examples of inefficiently performing public entities are Air Zimbabwe Ltd, Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation (ZMDC) Zimbabwe United Passengers Company (ZUPCO), Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and National 
Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) which have failed to efficiently render air, mining related, public transport, grain related and 
railway services to the public, respectively (Mutanda D “The Impact of the Zimbabwean Crisis on Parastatals” (2014) 5(2) 
International Journal of Politics and Good Governance 1-14). See also State Entities, Parastatals in Shambles and Govt 
Tackles US$600m Inter-Parastatal Debt (The Zimbabwe Independent of 5-12 April 2012 and 17-23 October 2014 
respectively) available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw (accessed on 3 December 2014). 
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who demand good standards of corporate governance before investing their monies.
11
 The 
poor corporate governance practices by public entities have adversely affected their service 
delivery and have retarded the economic growth and social development of the country.
12
  
 
Following the economic and social challenges that Zimbabwe continued to experience and 
encouraged by international social and economic developments, the country made concerted 
efforts to restore investor confidence and enhance corporate transparency and accountability 
in its public and private sectors.
13
 This chapter analyses Zimbabwe’s public entity corporate 
governance framework.
14
 The ultimate goal is to establish the extent to which the framework 
has enabled boards of public entities to effectively discharge their duties, with the aim of 
recommending measures which can strengthen this effectiveness so that the boards and public 
entities can significantly contribute to economic and social development.
15
 
 
4.2 ZIMBABWE’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
4.2.1 Overview of Corporate Governance Developments in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe responded to international developments and challenges of poor corporate 
governance practices by creating a solid corporate governance framework to mitigate further 
occurrences of corporate failure. In developing its corporate governance systems, Zimbabwe 
adopted a mixture of aspects of the corporate governance structures found in developed 
                                                 
11 Tsumba LL Corporate Governance Country Case Experience - Perspectives and Practices: Zimbabwe (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe Paper 2004) 15-18. 
12 Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The case of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation” (2014) 
1-8. See also Chisango FFT and Dube LG “Perception on the Impact of Corruption and Salary Gate Scandals on the Image 
and Reputation of Parastatal Entities in Zimbabwe: A Case of Premier Service Medical Aid Society PSMAS and Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation ZBC, Gweru” (2015) 4(4) International Journal of Innovative Research & Development 345-351 
available at http://www.ijird.com/index.php/ijird/article/viewFile/69977/54948 (accessed on 17 December 2015) and 
Mhlanga P Chidhakwa Slams Parastatal Boards (The Financial Gazette of 28 January 2016) C5. 
13 To prove the concerted efforts and seriousness good corporate governance is being given, the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators in Zimbabwe (ICSAZ) has introduced annual awards that seek to cultivate a culture of good 
corporate governance (Chenga N Poor Corporate Governance behind Corporate Failures (Financial Gazette of 21 
November 2013) 3 available at www.financialgazette.co.zw › News › Companies & Markets (accessed on 27 October 2014). 
14 As highlighted before (Chapter 1, para 1.5), the research focuses on five major areas namely; the role, selection and 
appointment, composition, remuneration and evaluation of the board. 
15 These are the subject matters of chapters 7 and 8 below. 
108 
 
markets
16
 and other developing countries.
17
 The corporate governance framework in 
Zimbabwe has been self-regulatory.
18
 Although Zimbabwe has relied on a self-regulatory 
environment in its approach to corporate governance, some statutory institutions and 
instruments, such as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and the Public Finance Management Act, 
make it a requirement that specific entities comply with and subscribe to the 
recommendations of certain corporate governance codes.
19
 
 
The Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe (IoDZ) spearheaded the campaign to adopt principles 
enshrined in the Cadbury Report, the Combined Code, the King Reports of South Africa, the 
Malawi’s Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance and other international corporate 
governance codes.
20
 Technical assistance, to enhance the country’s corporate governance, 
was provided by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank, the African 
Management Services Company (AMSCO) and the Government of Denmark.
21
 Valuable 
insights were also drawn from the CACG Guidelines, ICGN Principles and OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance.
22
  
                                                 
16 For example, the Zimbabwean framework has been predominantly based on the UK Cadbury Report and its legal system 
(based on Roman-Dutch law) has been biased towards the British legal system due to its colonial history. It has been 
established that most developing countries have adopted similar institutional arrangements and laws to those found in their 
colonial masters (La Porta R et al “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2000) 3-27).  
17 The country borrowed from neighbouring countries like South Africa, Malawi and Namibia in developing its corporate 
governance framework. It borrowed considerably from the South African King Reports and Protocol on Corporate 
Governance in the Public Sector and the State Owned Enterprises Governance Act of Namibia (Act No. 2 of 2006) 
(“Introduction” to the CGF and Moyo G The state of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s State Enterprises: Can the 
Situation be Rescued? (2012)). 
18 This is confirmed by the provisions of the country’s corporate governance codes namely; the Manual, CGF and National 
Code. See also Maune A “Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” (2015) 167-178.  
19 Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002) and section 50 of the Public Finance Management Act. The ZSE Listing 
Requirements compel companies to include a statement in their annual reports indicating the extent to which they comply 
with “the principles set out in the Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct as set out in the King Report or Cadbury Report 
on Corporate Governance” to enable shareholders and potential investors to evaluate how the principles have been applied 
(Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). 
20 Mangena M and Tauringana V “Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange” (2007) 18(2) Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 53-85. See also Maune A “Corporate 
Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” (2015) 167-178, “Introduction” to the CGF and The World 
Bank Zimbabwe: Corporate Governance Assessment and ROSC Module (World Bank ROSC Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes) available at Modulehttp://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_zimbabwe.html (accessed on 3 December 
2014). 
21 Ibid. See also “Foreword” to the Manual. 
22 Section C of the Manual and Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s State Enterprises: Can the 
Situation be Rescued? (2012). The Pan African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Union (AU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) have assisted Zimbabwe in developing its corporate governance 
framework (Tsumba LL Corporate Governance Country Case Experience - Perspectives and Practices: Zimbabwe (2004) 
17-18).  
109 
 
 
Zimbabwe also participated in and benefited from Africa specific corporate governance 
initiatives like New Partnership for Africa’s Development, African Peer Review Mechanism, 
Africa Governance Forum and Africa Governance Inventory.
23
 The African Development 
Bank and Centre for Corporate Governance programs targeted at promoting good corporate 
governance standards were of additional benefit in the development of the Zimbabwean 
corporate governance framework.
24
 To further confirm its commitment to good corporate 
governance, Zimbabwe is one of the twelve African countries who are founder members of 
the African Corporate Governance Network launched in October 2013.
25
 
 
The corporate governance framework in Zimbabwe is determined by the Principles for 
Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best Practices, the Constitution, various 
Acts of Parliament governing public entities, for example, the Companies Act, Acts 
establishing public entities
26
 and the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), National 
Code of Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises 
and Public Entities, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements, common law and 
the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework.
27
 However, as indicated 
above,
28
 a number of organisations in Zimbabwe have adopted, in addition to the above 
instruments, corporate governance principles as outlined in other internationally recognised 
corporate governance codes and guidelines to promote good corporate governance.
29
 
                                                 
23 Tsumba LL Corporate Governance Country Case Experience - Perspectives and Practices: Zimbabwe (2004) 16-18. 
24 AfDB Zimbabwe Country Brief 2013-2015 (African Development Bank (AfDB) Group 2013) 5-7 available at 
http://www.afdb.org/../../afdb/Docs/Project-and-Operations/2013-2015_-_Zimbabwe_-_Country_Brief.pdf (accessed on 12 
February 2015).  
25 See Chapter 3, para 3.5 above. 
26 For example, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act 2 of 1982, Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation Act 31 of 1982 and the Grain Marketing Act 20 of 1966. It should be noted that all the Acts governing the 
public entities follow the same format and wording except in very few sections. The main difference in the Acts is in 
connection with the different functions for which the entities were created. In the discussion of these statutes, sections from 
any of them will be used as examples. The comparable sections in the other Acts are only referred to where the provisions 
differ. 
27 Maune A “Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” (2015) 167-178. 
28 Chapter 1, para 1.5.6 above. 
29 Maune A “Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of Its Current State” (2015) 167-178. For example, the 
MMCZ 2009 Annual Report states that “the Board regularly reviews the Corporation’s policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance and consistency with the principles enshrined in the King III Report and other reports on corporate governance” 
(MMCZ 2009 Annual Report) 7. See also Delta Corporation Zimbabwe’s 2013 Annual Report, where it was reported that the 
company has put in place “responsive systems of governance and practice which the Board and management regard as 
entirely appropriate and in accordance with the code of Corporate Practices and Conduct contained in the Cadbury and King 
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4.2.1.1The Principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best 
Practices  
 
The first corporate governance instrument to be established by Zimbabwe, in 2001, was “The 
Principles for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: Manual of Best Practices”.30 The 
Manual was produced by concerted efforts of several institutions and individuals under the 
leadership of Minor C A (African Management Services Company) and Van Hoestenberghe 
K (Carl Bro Group, Denmark).
31
 It was developed based on existing local conditions to 
ensure local ownership and participation.
32
 The main aim of the Manual is to encourage the 
highest standard of corporate governance in Zimbabwe by recommending standards of 
conduct for directors and emphasising the need for responsible corporate conduct.
33
  
 
The other objectives are stated as to create an enabling environment for business and attract 
outside investment and to “improve the institutional capacity to build good corporate 
governance in Zimbabwe”.34 The Manual focuses more on the qualitative rather than 
quantitative aspects of good corporate governance in that it extends beyond the existing legal 
and regulatory framework and seeks to identify key areas of good corporate governance 
practice which would be voluntarily and effectively applied by all companies,
35
 directors and 
management.
36
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Reports on Corporate Governance” (Delta 2013 Annual Report 30 available at http://www.investinginafrica.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Delta-Annual-Report-2013.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2014). 
30 Hereinafter referred to as the Manual.  
31 Examples of institutions that participated in the development of the Manual are the International Finance Corporation, the 
World Bank, the African Management Services Company, the Government of Denmark and People & Systems Inclusive 
Management Consultants of Zimbabwe. Examples of the individuals include G Mundela, J Kimemiah, D Pasipanodya and P 
Mugoni who worked with a Taskforce of Zimbabwe Business leaders. Prof B Garatt and Mr. M Masunda (corporate 
governance experts) reviewed the Manual (“Foreword” to the Manual). 
32 “Introduction” to the Manual. 
33 The Manual seeks to create an enabling environment for business and to attract outside investment. It “intends to 
complement the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CAGG) Guidelines and to articulate, expand and 
clarify these guidelines” (“Introduction” to the Manual). 
34 “Introduction” to the Manual. 
35 These include both public and private entities (“Introduction” to the Manual). 
36 “Introduction” to the Manual. The Manual is therefore a voluntary code intended to promote good corporate governance 
in all entities in Zimbabwe. 
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4.2.1.2 Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe repealed its Constitution of 1980 and developed a new Constitution in 2013.
37
 The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, which is the supreme law of the country, raises the quality of 
governance demanded of the Zimbabwean society and sets out corporate governance as an 
inherently vital part of a healthy and prosperous nation.
38
 The Constitution states that 
Zimbabwe is founded on respect for internationally accepted principles of good corporate 
governance.
39
 Section 9 of the Constitution provides for good governance. It states that the 
government must adopt and implement policies and legislation “to develop efficiency, 
competence, accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial probity” in all 
institutions.  
 
The same section states that public office bearers must be appointed based on merit and 
measures must be taken to “expose, combat and eradicate all forms of corruption” by such 
officers. In addition, section 195 of the Constitution provides that companies and other 
commercial entities owned or wholly controlled by the state must conduct their operations so 
as to maintain commercial viability and abide by generally accepted standards of good 
corporate governance namely transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness, 
among others.
40
 Other examples of sections of the Constitution that seek to promote good 
corporate governance include sections 56(2),
41
 165,
42
 194-198,
43
 265(1),
44
 and 298(1).
45
 
                                                 
37 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 20 of 2013). 
38 The Constitution states that Zimbabwe is founded on respect for internationally accepted principles of good corporate 
governance (Section 3 (1) (h) and (2) (g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.   
39 Section 3 (1) (h) and (2) (g) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
40 See also sections 9(1), 56(2), 73, 165 (1) and (2), 194-198, 255(1), 264, 265(1), 270(1), 298(1) and 308(2-4) of the 
Constitution which also seek to promote good corporate governance in Zimbabwe. 
41 This section provides for equality and non-discrimination and requires that all persons should have the right to be 
protected and benefit from the law. The Constitution mandates the government to put in place legislative and other measures 
to promote the achievement of equality and protection of all persons. 
42 This section compliments section 56 by providing that justice should be done to all persons, regardless of status.   
43 Sections 194-198 provide for how public entities should be governed to achieve good corporate governance. For example, 
section 194 provides for a high level of professional ethics, transparency and economical and efficient uses of resources in 
public entities.  
44 This section provides that provincial, metropolitan councils and local authorities must ensure good governance by being 
“effective, transparent, accountable and institutionally coherent”.   
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The Constitution also borrows from the UN Global Compact Guiding Principles as regards 
the universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption, factors which have a bearing on good corporate governance.
46
 The UN 
Global Compact’s Guiding Principles are derived from the Universal Declaration of 
Rights,
47
 the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work,
48
 the RIO Declaration on Environment and Development
49
 and the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
50
 The UN Global Compact was officially 
launched at UN Headquarters in July 2000 with nine principles and the tenth principle was 
added in June 2004 during the first Global Compact Leaders’ Summit.51  
 
The Guiding Principles seek to “provide an authoritative global standard for preventing and 
addressing the risk of adverse human rights impacts linked to business activity”.52 The 
Guiding Principles are a strategic policy initiative that is voluntary in nature and targeted 
                                                                                                                                                        
45 Section 298 refers to the principles of public financial management and requires that there must be transparency, prudency 
and accountability in public finance management. 
46 Chapter 4 of the Constitution. See the UN Global Compact Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN, New 
York and Geneva, 2011) available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
(accessed on 17 April 2015). 
47 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 10 December 1948 in Paris. Member states pledged themselves “to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the 
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The declaration has twelve 
articles that focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms and is available at www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 
on 22 September 2015). 
48 The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was adopted in June 1998, at the 86th International 
Labour Conference held in Geneva. It is a statement made by the International Labour Convention (ILO) requiring all its 
members “to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles 
concerning the fundamental rights” which are the subject of four Conventions. The Conventions are freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour; the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
ILO members, by virtue of being members of the Organisation, are required to comply with the declaration whether or not 
they have ratified the Conventions in question. The declaration is available at 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (accessed on 22 September 2015). 
49 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development was adopted at a United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held Rio 4 de Janeiro in June 1992. The declaration has 27 principles which aim to promote future global 
sustainable development with regard to environmental and developmental systems. Visit 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration.1992/portrait.a4.pdf for more information.  
50 United Nations Global Compact The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Relationship to UN Global 
Compact Commitments (June 2014) 1 available at 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/GPs_GC%20note.pdf (accessed on 27 
September 2015). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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towards businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with the ten 
universally accepted principles.
53
 Participating states are required to enact and enforce 
effective policies, legislation and regulations to align their operations and strategies with the 
principles.
54
 
 
4.2.1.3 Companies Act 
The Companies Act
55
 has been in existence since 1951 although part amendments have been 
undertaken where considered necessary.
56
 The Act governs the constitution, incorporation, 
registration, management, administration and winding up of companies and other institutions 
and provides for regulation of powers, duties and remuneration of directors.
57
 It imposes a 
number of statutory duties on directors which, if properly observed, should result in good 
corporate governance practices.
58
 Although the Companies Act does not specifically provide 
for corporate governance, it ascribes liability on directors for conducting the business of a 
company fraudulently or recklessly and for falsification of information.
59
 It can be argued, for 
instance, that disregarding good corporate governance principles may amount to fraud and/or 
recklessness.
60
  
 
 
                                                 
53 UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights Business and Human Rights (UN Publication of 2015) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx (accessed on 27 September 2015). 
54 UN Global Compact The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Relationship to UN Global Compact 
Commitments (2014) 1. 
55 Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) (Act 47 of 1951).  
56 Efforts are underway to update the Companies Act (Chizana T Business Rescue and the Companies Act (The Independent 
of October 2013) 3). See also World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Zimbabwe: 
Accounting and Auditing of 15 February 2011 6-8 available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_zimbabweZimbabwe-
-ROSC).pdf  (accessed on 29 November 2014). 
57 Ibid. The Companies Act applies to companies registered in terms of this Act and that are wholly owned by the 
government either directly or through existing public entities. For a detailed discussion on the provisions of the Companies 
Act that are relevant from a corporate governance perspective, see paras 4.2.2-4.2.7 below. 
58 Sections 169-189 of the Companies Act. Discussions on the provisions in the Act that are relevant from a corporate 
governance perspective are made in paras 4.2.2-4.2.7 below.  
59 Sections 340-345 of the Companies Act. The provisions of the Zimbabwean Companies Act are therefore an enforcement 
mechanism that can be used to ensure good corporate governance practices. 
60 Moyo NJ South African Principles of Corporate Governance: Legal and Regulatory Restraints on Powers and 
Remuneration of Executive Directors Unpublished Thesis (UNISA 2010) 54. 
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4.2.1.4 Acts Establishing Public Entities  
In Zimbabwe, the majority of the public entities are established through an Act of 
Parliament.
61
 The specific Act provides the main objective of establishing the public entity, 
how it should be governed and stipulates the functions, powers and duties of the entity. For 
example, the Grain Marketing Act provides that the public entity should be directed by a 
board, known as the Grain Marketing Board and the board should be appointed by the 
Minister, in consultation with the country’s President.62 The Act further stipulates the entity’s 
main objectives, functions, powers and duties.
63
 The establishing Acts make various 
provisions aimed at ensuring that the public entities are properly governed.
64
 For example, 
the MMCZ Act provides that when exercising any power or performing any function or duty 
in terms of this Act, the public entity should, at all times, take into account the national 
interest of Zimbabwe and the common interests of all producers of minerals.
65
 In performing 
the functions, the entity is also required to “keep its expenses as low as is consistent with the 
provision of efficient services to producers and sellers of minerals”.66 
 
4.2.1.5 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
The PFMA
67
 was enacted in 2009 to provide for the control and management of public 
resources and the protection and recovery thereof; the regulation and control of public 
entities; general treasury matters; the examination and audit of public accounts and to provide 
for matters pertaining to financial misconduct of public officials.
68
 The PFMA requires every 
                                                 
61 Examples are the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation Act, 
the Grain Marketing Act and Tourism Act 15 of 1995. 
62 Sections 4 and 5 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
63 Sections 26-28 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
64 For example, Part II and III of the Grain Marketing Act and Part II and III of the MMCZ Act. These sections stipulate that 
the entity should act only in accordance with the law, provide for the establishment of a board and how it should operate and 
states the principles that the entity should observe (e.g. observing national interest of the country). 
65 Section 22 of the MMCZ Act. See also section 23 of the ZMDC Act. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) (No. 11 of 2009). 
68 “Preamble” to the PFMA. 
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state enterprise or parastatal to adhere to and implement the principles of sound corporate 
governance policies, procedures and practices.
69
 The Act provides for penalties for 
noncompliance with principles of sound corporate governance policies, procedures and 
practices which makes it mandatory for public entities to comply.
70
 
 
4.2.1.6 Zimbabwe National Code of Corporate Governance  
The National Code of Corporate Governance (hereinafter referred to as National Code) was 
developed under the chairmanship of Dube C F, signed by the country’s President in 2014 
and officially launched in April 2015. According to the Chairman’s words, “the crafting of 
the Code benefited immensely from the codes of other countries, such as South Africa, which 
have had national codes for a long time. This ensured that the Code would be comparable to 
the codes in countries which are our major trading partners and its principles and practices 
would meet international standards”.71 The new corporate governance Code is expected not 
only to enhance the country’s standing with the business community internationally and 
regionally, but also to help entrench sustainable practices through clearly outlined rules, 
responsibilities and benchmarks for measuring success, all of which ultimately stand to 
benefit the country over the long term.  
 
The purpose of the National Code is precisely to assist business entities at all levels 
regardless of the manner and form of their incorporation or establishment, address the 
corporate governance problems in Zimbabwe and to achieve favourable corporate governance 
practices which are respected internationally.
72
 The National Code adopts the “apply or 
explain” approach, which means that business entities should apply the provisions of the 
Code and, where they fail to do so, they should explain or give reasons for the failure or for 
                                                 
69 Section 50 of the PFMA. 
70 Section 91 of the PFMA. 
71 According to the Project Chairman, the research unit carried out the necessary research into corporate governance issues 
and studied over one hundred governance codes from other countries. The main objective was to develop a National Code 
that is unique and specific to Zimbabwe’s corporate needs and history (KPMG Demystifying the Zimbabwe Code of 
Corporate Governance (The Zimbabwe Independent of 16-22 October 2015 X4)). 
72 “Introduction and Background” and Chapter 1 of the National Code. See also Besada H and Werner K The Environment 
and Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe (The Centre for International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 19 of July 
2010) 2-3 available at www.cigionline.org/publications (accessed on 29 September 2014). 
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adopting a different principle or approach.
73
 Although the country has adopted its own code 
of corporate governance, the King Report, Combined Code, OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, CAGG Guidelines and other corporate governance codes have been adopted or 
used as a basis for developing internal codes by a reasonable number of entities in 
Zimbabwe.
74
 To confirm this assertion, some organisations report that their operations are 
guided by universally recognised corporate governance codes like the King Reports and 
Combined Code.
75
  
 
4.2.1.7 Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Public Entities  
The Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Public Entities (hereinafter 
referred to as the CGF) was a result of a series of extensive stakeholder consultations and 
officially launched in November 2010. Regional and international best practices were taken 
into account in drafting the CGF.
76
 The Zimbabwean government introduced the CGF “after 
realising that corruption and unethical behaviours were rampant” in public entities.77 The 
main objective of the CGF is to “promote the efficient use of public resources and to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources” in order to enable public entities to 
make a “positive contribution to the economy”.78 The CGF provides the government, public 
entities and stakeholders “with a common frame of reference on corporate governance issues” 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – Executive Directors Gone to Sleep?” (2014) 78-86. See 
also Tsumba LL Corporate Governance Country Case Experience - Perspectives and Practices: Zimbabwe (2004) 16-18. 
However, for the purpose of this chapter, the research focuses only on Zimbabwe’s corporate governance instruments. 
75 Some corporate entities have developed their own in-house corporate governance manuals based on internationally 
recognised corporate governance codes. For example, Zimplats’ Annual Report indicated that the group “had integrated the 
majority of King III principles into its internal controls, policies, terms of reference and overall procedures” (Zimplats 2012 
Annual Report 102 available at http://financialresults.co.za/2012/implats_ir2012/downloads/04_responsibility_reporting.pdf 
(accessed on 21 July 2014). See also Delta Corporation Zimbabwe’s 2013 Annual Report, which reported that the company 
has in place systems of governance and practice which are “in accordance with the code of Corporate Practices and Conduct 
contained in the Cadbury and King Reports on Corporate Governance” (Delta 2013 Annual Report 30). 
76 These include “the Malawi Code, the King III Code of Governance for South Africa, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises, the United States’ 
Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) of 2002 and subsequent revisions to the 
Act following the global economic crisis, and practices in the East, especially in China” (section 1 of the CGF). 
77 Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The case of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation” (2014) 
1-8. 
78 “Preface” to the CGF and para 1.2 of the CGF. According to the CGF, the objective will be achieved by ensuring that 
boards of public entities “have the necessary authority, competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic 
guidance and monitoring of management” with integrity and in an accountable manner. 
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but is not mandatory.
79
 It is applicable to parastatals established through an Act of Parliament 
and to state enterprises registered under the Companies Act.
80
 The Framework was designed 
around four pillars of corporate governance namely; responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency.
81
  
 
4.2.1.8 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Listing Requirements  
The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE)
82
 is a body corporate established by the Stock 
Exchange Act
83
 and has extensive regulatory powers.
84
 It “provides facilities for the listing of 
the securities of companies (domestic or foreign) and provides its users with an orderly 
market place for trading in such securities and regulates accordingly”.85 The ZSE is 
responsible for developing and periodically reviewing the Listing Requirements, thus 
ensuring legislative changes and market practice (locally and internationally) are accounted 
for.
86
  
 
The ZSE Listing Requirements apply to both applicants for listing and presently listed 
companies and are aimed at ensuring that the business of the ZSE is carried on with due 
regard to the public interest.
87
 The Requirements indicate, inter alia, the rules and procedures 
governing new applications, proposed marketing of securities and the continuing obligations 
                                                 
79 Section 1 of the CGF. 
80 Para 1.4 of the CGF. 
81 “Preface” to the CGF. 
82 The ZSE was established in 1896, initially to provide a forum through which mining companies could raise equity 
financing to fund operations. However, today, the majority of companies listed on the ZSE are non-mining. The ZSE is 
organised as a body corporate under the supervision of a committee of the exchange which falls under the Ministry of 
Finance. Although the ZSE is small by global standards, it is the second largest and most active in the Southern African 
region after the JSE Securities Exchange. 
83 Chapter 24:18 (No. 27 of 1973). The Act provides for the establishment and regulation of the ZSE, the appointment of the 
Registrar of the Stock Exchange, procedures for the registration of stock brokers, regulation of the financial affairs of the 
Exchange and prohibits the issuing of misleading circulars/statements and fraudulent acts in conducting the business of the 
Exchange, among others (Part II-VII of the Stock Exchange Act). 
84 Mangena M and Tauringana V “Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange” (2007) 53-85. 
85 “Preface” to the ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). 
86 Ibid. 
87 “Introduction” to the ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). However, worth noting is that currently very few of Zimbabwe’s 
public entities are listed on the Stock Exchange hence the minimal applicability of the Listing Requirements. 
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of issuers. The Listing Requirements compel companies to include a statement in their annual 
reports indicating the extent to which they comply with “the principles set out in the Code of 
Corporate Practice and Conduct as set out in the King Report or Cadbury Report on 
Corporate Governance” to enable shareholders and potential investors to evaluate how the 
corporate governance principles have been applied.
88
 In cases where the recommended 
governance structures were not applied, the company is expected to provide an explanation 
for the noncompliance in the annual reports to shareholders.
89
 
 
4.2.1.9 Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework. 
In 2014, Zimbabwe developed a draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework, that governs the operations of state-owned enterprises and local authorities with 
regard to remuneration and corporate governance practices.
90
 The Framework was approved 
by Cabinet at its Fifth Meeting of 4 March 2014.
91
 The adopted policy framework is still to 
be enacted as an Act of Parliament (the Public Sector Corporate Governance Act) so that it 
can have the force of law and carry legal sanctions.
92
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the public entities have already been instructed by the government to implement the 
provisions of the Framework whilst awaiting its promulgation.
93
 
 
In addition to existing laws and regulations governing operations of business entities, entities 
in Zimbabwe are also affected by rules and regulations of national voluntary business 
associations such as Chamber of Mines,
94
 Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce
95
 and 
                                                 
88 Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). The ZSE Listing Requirements were last officially amended in 2002 
hence the lack of reference to more recent reports. However, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, in consultation with 
stakeholders, is in the process of reviewing the Listings Rules (The Newsday of 13 March 2014 11 (available at 
https://www.newsday.co.zw), The Herald of 14 July 2013 B4 (available at www.herald.co.zw) and The Financial Gazette of 
17-23 September 2015 C2 (available at www.fingaz.co.zw). 
89 Ibid. 
90 The Zimbabwe Mail of 16 April 2014 13 and The Herald of 16 April 2014 1 and 19 June 2014 1.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 The instructions were in the form of directives issued to the public entities to start implementing the provisions of 
Framework (The Herald of 19 June 2014 1). 
94 The Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe is a private sector voluntary organisation established in 1939 by an Act of 
Parliament. Its membership includes mining companies, suppliers of mining related equipment and consumables, service 
providers such as banks, insurance companies, consulting engineers and various mining related professional bodies and 
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Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
96
 and professional bodies such as Institute of 
Bankers,
97
 Institute of Chartered Secretaries & Administrators
98
 and Zimbabwe Institute of 
Management,
99
 among others.
100
 Membership to these associations requires that the 
individuals observe the rules and regulations thereof. These associations have greatly assisted 
in the reinforcement of professionalism and ethical conduct as members are obliged to 
observe these and other values, failure of which they are struck off the membership 
register.
101
 
 
In the discussion below, the provisions of the various Zimbabwean corporate governance 
instruments that seek to enhance the effectiveness of the boards of public entities are 
discussed. In Chapter 7 it is considered whether these provisions have yielded positive results 
in assisting boards of public entities to effectively discharge their duties. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
individuals. The primary objectives of the COMZ are “to advocate and lobby in order to promote, encourage and protect the 
interests of the mining industry in Zimbabwe”. Visit http://www.chamberofminesofzimbabwe.com/ for more information. 
95 The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) is a non-profit making membership-based organisation that 
provides services designed to support its members in business development through lobbying, collaboration and facilitation. 
Visit http://www.zncc.co.zw/ for more information. 
96 The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) was established in 1923. It is “an independent, self-financed, legally 
constituted not-for-profit Business Membership Organisation that represents and serves interests of members in a wide array 
of matters affecting their viability and competitiveness”. Visit http://www.czi.co.zw/ for more information. 
97 The Institute of Bankers of Zimbabwe (IOBZ) was founded in 1947. It is a supervisory board for bankers and any 
prospective professionals in the banking and financial services. Its main objective is to “equip students with industry-specific 
skills and towards this end, it offers Banking examinations at Certificate, Intermediate and Diploma levels”. Visit 
http://www.icsaz.co.zw/ for more information. 
98 The Institute of Chartered Secretaries & Administrators of Zimbabwe (ICSAZ) is an international organisation with 
established offices in Zimbabwe. The ICSAZ’s main objective is to promote and advance the “efficient administration of 
commerce, industry and public affairs by the continued development of the study and the practice of secretaryship and 
administration of companies and other bodies.” Its activities include holding of professional conferences and seminars, 
conducting examinations and professional supervision over the membership and taking appropriate action to promote and 
safeguard the professional standing of the Institute’s members. Visit http://www.icsaz.co.zw/ for more information. 
99 Zimbabwe Institute of Management (ZIM) is an autonomous, non-profit making, membership-based organization founded 
in 1957. Its objectives include promotion and development of best practices in management and leadership. ZIM facilitates 
and organises a range of activities and functions where executives from organisations in the public and private sector 
converge to discuss topical issues, exchange information and ideas. It has also established a network system with other 
management institutes and training organisations locally, regionally and internationally. Visit http://www.zim.ac.zw/ for 
more information. 
100 Para 17 of the Manual. 
101 For examples, see Bankers Association of Zimbabwe Code of Best Practice available at  http://baz.org.zw/ and the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries & Administrators of Zimbabwe Members Code of Conduct available at  
http://www.icsaz.co.zw/. 
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4.2.2 Role of the Board 
The necessity for good corporate governance ignited more interest in the duties of company 
directors.
102
 A director is defined as including “any person occupying the position of director 
or alternate director of a company, by whatever name he may be called”.103 With the 
objective of ensuring that the management of companies is in responsible hands, the 
Companies Act disqualifies certain persons from appointment as a director.
104
 Those 
disqualified include a body corporate, a minor or other person under legal disability, an 
unrehabilitated insolvent, a person previously convicted and sentenced for theft, fraud, 
forgery or uttering and a person disqualified by a court order under section 344 of the Act.
105
   
 
Most Memorandum and Articles of Association provide for the management of the company 
by directors who may act individually, corporately as a board or in committees.
106
 Directors 
can also delegate their powers to management or any other person but such delegation does 
not exonerate them from personal liability.
107
 Any effort to relieve the directors from personal 
liability, whether by the Memorandum and Articles of Association, contract of service or any 
                                                 
102 Bryne M “Directors to Hide From a Sea of Liabilities in a New Safe Harbour” (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 255-274. See also Van Der Linde K “The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Fault –An Exploration” (2008) 
20 South African Mercantile Law Journal 439–461 and Meyer E and de Wet JH “The Impact of Board Structure on the 
Financial Performance of Listed South African Companies” (2013) 9(3) Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition 19-
31. 
103 Section 2 of the Companies Act. The establishing Acts refer to a director as a “member of the Board” (section 2 of the 
Grain Marketing, ZMDC and MMCZ Acts). The ZSE Listing Requirements define a director as “any person occupying the 
position of director or alternate director of a company, by whatever name he or she may be designated and, in relation to an 
issuer which is not a company, a person with corresponding powers and duties” (“Definitions” section of the ZSE Listing 
Requirements). 
104 Section 173 of the Companies Act. 
105 When considering the application of a person who has been previously disqualified for issues relating to, for example, 
insolvency, fraud and forgery,  the court requires to be satisfied that the applicant has rehabilitated himself and is worthy of 
trust (Tengende v Registrar of Companies (1988) (2) ZLR 259 (S)). 
106 Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 409. Board committees are a mechanism to aid the board and its directors 
in giving detailed attention to specific areas of their duties and responsibilities in order to evaluate more comprehensively 
certain issues, such as audit, internal control, risk management and remuneration. Given that the time available to the board 
to accomplish all its tasks in a single meeting is not sufficient, some issues need to be dealt with in a focused way at 
committee level, and then later presented to the board as a whole (Adams RB, Hermalin BE and Weisbach SM “The Role of 
Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey” (2010) 48(1) Journal of Economic 
Literature 58-107)).  
107 Ibid. 
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other means is rendered void by the Companies Act.
108
 However, the court is empowered to 
relieve a director from liability if it can be proved that he acted honestly and reasonably.
109
 
 
Traditionally, Zimbabwean directors owed their fiduciary duties almost exclusively to the 
company and its members but there has been a considerable departure from this traditional 
notion and the interests of other stakeholders
110
 are now part of directors’ fiduciary duties.111  
In Zimbabwe directors derive their powers from the Companies Act, the enabling statutes (in 
the case of parastatals or state-owned enterprises),
112
 common law,
113
 the company’s 
Memorandum and Articles of Association,
114
 PFMA, Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements
115
 as well as corporate governance codes.
116
 Directors’ duties are categorised 
                                                 
108 Section 190 of the Companies Act. See also Volpe PL “The Duties of Company Directors in Zimbabwe (1979) 19(2) 
The Zimbabwe Law Journal 114-139. 
109 Section 349 of the Companies Act. 
110 The other stakeholders include employees, creditors, suppliers, among others. Directors are also expected to “consider not 
only financial performance but also the impact of the company’s operations on society and the environment, protect, enhance 
and invest in the wellbeing of the economy, society and the environment”. As a result, the company is expected to put 
measures in place that protect and enhance the wellbeing of the economy, society and the natural environment (paras 22 & 
28 of the National Code). See also para 21 of the Manual. 
111 Sifile O, Susela DKS, Mabvure JT, Chavunduka MD and Dandira M “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non 
– Executive Directors Gone to Sleep?” (2014) 78-86. According to Mervyn King, “Directors in the twenty-first century have 
to be seen to be directing companies to be good corporate citizens. The inclusive approach recognizes that a company is a 
link that brings together the various stakeholders relevant to the business of the company” (King M Governance for all 
Entities (The Corporate Citizen, Johannesburg 2006) 14). Although the Manual (para 21) and National Code (paras 22 & 28) 
do not specifically state that they have adopted the enlightened shareholder value approach as far as the protection of the 
interests of stakeholders is concerned, I submit that they do follow it. 
112 For example, the Minerals marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) Act which brought into existence MMCZ 
provides how board members should exercise the powers granted to them. The Act stipulates how board meetings should be 
conducted, how urgent transactions should be dealt with and how contracts and instruments by Corporation should be 
executed, among other things (sections 11-19).  
113 As indicated above, Zimbabwean company law is mostly derived from both the statutory and common law position in the 
UK. The law on directors’ duties is considerably based on case law and the courts, when interpreting or applying the 
provisions of the Companies Act, may consider foreign company law (Nkala J and Nyapadi TJ Nkala & Nyapadi on 
Company Law in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Distance Education College (ZDECO) Publishing House 1995) 21-23). 
114 The Companies Act defines “memorandum” as “the memorandum of association of a company as originally framed or as 
altered in pursuance of any law hitherto in force or of this Act”. The Memorandum should state the name of the company, 
the objects of the company; that the liability of the members is limited; the amount of share capital with which the company 
proposes to be registered and the division thereof into shares of a fixed amount. The “articles” are defined as “the articles of 
association of a company as originally framed, or as altered by special resolution, and includes, so far as they apply to a 
company, the regulations set out in Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Ordinance, 1895, or Table A in the First 
Schedule”. A company may choose to adopt all or any of the regulations contained in Table A in the First Schedule in 
developing its Articles of Association (sections 2, 8-19 of the Companies Act).  
115 A few public entities are listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, e.g. Hwange Colliery Company Limited (HCCL), 
Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited (DZL) and Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) Holdings Limited. This means that only a 
few public entities are governed by the Listing Requirements. However, the government is considering setting up a specific 
stock exchange for state-owned enterprises and parastatals to raise fresh capital for their operations (The Standard of 16 
September 2012 3 available at http://www.thestandard.co.zw (accessed on 9 November 2013)).  
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into fiduciary duties of good faith and the duty to act with the necessary care and skill when 
performing company duties.
117
 The directors must act honestly, in good faith (bona fide) and 
in the best interests of the company.
118
 The duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company applies equally to all directors, whether executive or non-executive.
119
  
 
The Companies Act specifically provides that directors have the duty to act in good faith, 
duty to act in the interest of the company, duty to disclose the directors’ emoluments and 
pensions and duty to declare interests in contracts.
120
 The duty to act in good faith includes 
the duty to prevent a conflict of interests,
121
 not exceed the limitation of their power,
122
 
maintain an unfettered discretion and exercise their powers for the purpose for which they 
were conferred.
123
 The duty to act in the interests of the company is reinforced by section 186 
of the Companies Act which requires a director to inform his company of any personal 
financial interests he may, directly or indirectly, have in a contract which has been or is to be 
entered into by the company.
124
 The company must maintain a register of such interests.
125
 To 
ensure that directors observe this obligation, any director or officer of a company who fails to 
comply with any of the provisions regarding declaration of interest is guilty of an offence.
126
 
                                                                                                                                                        
116 The corporate governance codes include the Manual, CGF and National Code. 
117 Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 410-411 and Nkala J and Nyapadi TJ Nkala & Nyapadi on Company Law 
in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Distance Education College (ZDECO) Publishing House 1995) 21-23. 
 
118 Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 410. See also L Piras & Son (Pvt) Ltd v Piras (1993) (2) ZLR 245 (S) 
where it was held that a director is under an obligation to observe the utmost good faith towards the company; to exercise his 
powers for its benefit, not his own; and to ensure that he avoids a conflict between the company’s interests and his own.. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Sections 170 -189 of the Companies Act. 
121 The directors may not put themselves in a position where their personal interests and duties conflict with the duties that 
they owe to the company. The duty to the company requires that, where a director enters into a transaction on behalf of the 
company, he should ensure that the company gets as much as it can out of the transaction and not seek to satisfy his own 
interest (Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 411).  
122 Directors must exercise their powers for a proper purpose which means that they should exercise their powers only for the 
purpose for which they are conferred. They should act within the confines of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
and all relevant legislation (Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law 2nd ed. (Department of Law, 
University of Zimbabwe 1986) 205-214). 
123 Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law (1986) 205-214. 
124 See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company Limited 1921 (AD) 168 where it was held that “where one 
man stands to another in a position of confidence involving the duty to protect the interests of that other, he is not allowed to 
make a secret profit at the other’s expense or place himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty”. 
125 Sections 187 of Companies Act. 
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The main reason for imposing penalties is to deter directors from deriving personal benefits at 
the expense of the company as well as to enhance transparency and independence.
127
 
 
In discharging his duties, a director is also required to act with the necessary care and skill 
which an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances.
128
 He is, therefore, 
not expected to, in the performance of his duties, exhibit a greater degree of care and skill 
than may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge, skill and experience.
129
 
The Companies Act does not explicitly provide for a director’s duty to act with the necessary 
degree of skill and care but common law has been used to establish whether or not a director 
has exercised due skill and care.
130
 A director who fails to observe his duty of care and skill is 
liable to the company for any loss suffered as a result of such failure.
131
 A director may, 
however, be excused from liability if he took reasonably diligent steps to become informed 
about the matter, has no material financial interest in the matter or had properly disclosed 
such interest, and made a decision rationally in the belief that it was in the best interests of 
the company.
132
 
 
To assist the directors in performing their duties, the Companies Act provides for the 
appointment of a company secretary who should be ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe.
133
 The 
secretary qualifies as an officer of the company
134
 and therefore, is expected to, like the 
directors and managers, observe the statutory duties imposed on officers.
135
 Because of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
126 Ibid. 
 
127 Moyo NJ South African Principles of Corporate Governance: Legal and Regulatory Restraints on Powers and 
Remuneration of Executive Directors (2010) 23. 
 
128 Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 410. See also Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (1911) 1 
Ch 425 at 437 where it was held that, when performing their duties, directors must attend carefully to the affairs of the 
company and must exhibit the “reasonable care” which any ordinary person might be expected to take under the same 
circumstances. 
129 Ibid. See also Volpe PL “The Duties of Company Directors in Zimbabwe” (1979) 114-139. 
  
130 Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law (1986) 209-211. 
131 Section 190 of Companies Act imposes liability for negligent conduct of director’s duties. 
132 Section 349 of Companies Act and Christie RH Business Law in Zimbabwe (1998) 410. 
 
133 Section 169 of the Companies Act. 
134 Section 2 of the Companies Act defines “Officer” as including a director, manager or secretary. 
135 Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law (1986) 205-214. Traditionally, the position of a secretary 
was considered so inferior that a third party could not accept that the secretary had any authority to contract on the 
company’s behalf, but the increased intricacies of company administration and the professional status of many secretaries 
124 
 
crucial role played by the secretary in the management of a company, the Act prohibits 
certain people from being appointed as secretaries, e.g. a minor or other person under legal 
disability, an unrehabilitated insolvent, a person previously convicted and sentenced for theft, 
fraud, forgery or uttering and one who has been removed by a competent court from any 
office of trust on account of misconduct.
136
  
 
The secretary’s main role is to ensure that the company and its officers comply with the 
provisions of the Act and other relevant legislation.
137
 Like the directors, the secretary may 
not be relieved of personal liability by the articles, his contract of service or other means.
138
 
The secretary’s other duties include convening meetings of shareholders and directors, 
writing and keeping the minutes, rendering statutory returns (e.g. the annual return in terms 
of section 123) and maintaining the statutory registers (e.g. register of directors’ shareholding 
and register of directors and secretaries) as required by section 338 of the Act.
139
  
 
Like the Companies Act, the statutes that established the public entities require that the 
directors should perform their duties in compliance with the relevant legislation.
140
 Directors 
are also required to declare their direct or indirect interests with companies and institutions 
dealing with the entities they serve.
141
 Failure to observe any of the provisions may result in 
the directors being charged with misconduct and being stripped of their duties.
142
 The various 
Acts of Parliament which established the public entities also detail the roles and 
responsibilities of each of their boards which are derived from the functions and the powers 
                                                                                                                                                        
now entitles a third party to assume that the secretary has  authority to contract on the company’s behalf on administrative 
matters or matters related to the day-to-day running of the company (Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis 
Furnishing Fabrics Ltd (1971) 3 All ER 16 (CA). 
136 Section 173A & 173B of the Companies Act. 
137 Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law (1986) 205-214. 
138 Section 190 of the Companies Act. 
139 Tett M, Chadwick N and Volpe PL Zimbabwe Company Law (1986) 205-214. 
140 Sections 21 & 22 of the MMCZ Act and 26 & 28 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
141 Section 15 of the MMCZ Act, section 13 of the Railways Act and section 15 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
142 Sections 9 and 53 of the MMCZ Act, section 9 of the Railways Act and section 9 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
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of respective the entities.
143
 For example, sections 11-19 of the MMCZ Act and sections 11-
18 of the Grain Marketing Act detail how the boards of these public entities should operate.  
 
The Acts empower boards to source external advice and to meet the associated costs through 
the entity’s financial resources.144 They also provide for all acts, matters or things authorised 
or required to be done by the board to be decided by majority vote at a meeting of the board 
at which a quorum is present.
145
 The board is further empowered, in consultation with the 
Minister, to establish one or more board committees for the better exercise of its functions 
and powers.
146
 The board committees should be properly composed and given clear terms of 
reference so as to effectively conduct the business of the board.
147
 
 
Similarly, the PFMA provides that the board has fiduciary duties to “act with fidelity, 
honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the affairs of the 
public entity” and “exercise the utmost care to ensure reasonable protection of the assets and 
records of the public entity”.148 Directors are empowered to, in writing, delegate any of the 
powers entrusted or delegated to them under the Act to a committee or an employee of that 
public entity.
149
 However, similar to the provisions of the Companies act, such delegation or 
instruction shall not divest the directors of the responsibility for the exercise of the delegated 
power or the performance of the assigned duty.
150
  
 
                                                 
143 Sections 20-24 of the ZMDC Act and sections 20-24 of the MMCZ Act and section 26-28 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
144 Section 13 of the ZMDC Act and MMCZ Act and section 14 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
145 See sections 11 and 12 of the MMCZ Act, ZMDC Act and Grain Marketing Act. Sections 128 1nd 138 of the Companies 
Act make similar provisions with regard to the holding of board meetings and making of decisions thereat. However, the 
Acts provide that no “decision or act of the Board or act done under the authority of the Board shall be invalid” due to the 
fact that the board was not properly constituted or that a disqualified person acted as a member at the time the decision was 
taken or the act was done (section 170 of the Companies Act and section 16 of the MMCZ and ZMDC Act). 
146 Ibid. The audit committee is mandatory and its main tasks are stated as to assist the board to fulfil its obligations relating 
to financial reporting, strengthen the independence of the external auditors and to enhance public confidence in the integrity 
of the company’s financial statements (section 84 of the Public Finance Management Act).    
147 Para 29 of the Manual and para 97 of the National Code. 
148 Section 42 of the PFMA. 
149 Section 43 of the PFMA. The audit committee is mandatory in terms of section 84 of the PFMA. 
150 Ibid. 
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The directors are also prohibited from using their position or any confidential information 
obtained by virtue of their position, “for personal gain or to improperly benefit another 
person”.151 The Act also requires that the board should establish and maintain “effective, 
efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal controls” as 
well as comply and ensure compliance by the public entity, with the provisions of this Act 
and any other enactment applicable to the public entity.
152
 Failure to comply with the 
provisions of the PFMA constitutes an offence in terms of section 91 of the Act and the 
director so charged may, upon conviction, be liable to a fine or imprisonment or to both such 
fine and imprisonment.
153
  
 
The ZSE Listing Requirements make it mandatory for companies to comply with and 
subscribe to certain principles enshrined in the Cadbury Report and the King Reports and to 
disclose the extent of their compliance with the Reports.
154
 Due to the fact that, to qualify for 
listing the business has to be registered in terms of the Companies Act, all listed companies 
are expected to comply with the provisions of the Companies Act. The ZSE also requires 
companies seeking a listing to submit each director’s declaration, demonstrating that the 
directors are free of conflicts of interest between the duties they owe the company and their 
personal interests.
155
 It is also a listing requirement that directors of listed public entities 
should retire by rotation at least once in every three years.
156
   
 
Failure to observe the Listing Requirements may result in the suspension or termination of the 
company’s listing.157 Directors who wilfully violate the provisions of the Listing 
Requirements may also be charged for misconduct which may result in a fine, imprisonment 
or both.
158
 The sanctions are provided to ensure that directors do not abuse their powers, 
                                                 
151 Section 42 of the PFMA. 
152 Section 44 of the PFMA. The Act clearly outlines how the board, as the accounting authority, is expected to conduct itself 
and details the responsibilities of the board in the management of the public entity. 
153 Due to the fact that the PFMA is an Act of Parliament, it may be considered as the ‘strongest’ source of corporate 
governance in public entities which provides for sanctions in cases of defaulters.   
154 Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). 
 
155 Sections 3- 4 & 7.B.16 of ZSE Listing Requirements. 
 
156 Para 3.68 (i) of the ZSE Listing Requirements. 
157 Paras 1.18-1.19 & 3.21 of the ZSE Listing Requirements. 
158 Sections 55 and 96 of the Stock Exchange Act. 
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recklessly carry out their duties and that they are held accountable for their actions. This has 
the effect of promoting good corporate governance as it encourages directors to observe some 
of the key principles of corporate governance namely; transparency, accountability and 
discipline. 
 
The codes of corporate governance namely; the Manual, CGF and National Code 
complement the statutory instruments discussed above as regards public entity directors’ 
duties and strongly influence the way that the performance of the directors is viewed. The 
codes of corporate governance confirm the position that all directors have a legal duty to act 
in good faith, with due care and skill and in the interests of the company as well as to exercise 
their powers only for the purpose for which they are conferred.
159
 They also articulate what 
the role of the board is and provide guidance as to how the role should be exercised.
160
 
 
The Manual recommends that the directors should perform their roles in a careful, diligent 
and skilful manner to achieve the long-term growth of an organisation.
161
 In addition, the 
directors are required to act “in a transparent, accountable and responsible manner” in the 
interests of the organisation and all stakeholders.
162
 In conducting the duties, the board should 
determine the strategy and policy of the organisation, manage risks and monitor management 
to ensure that the objectives of the organisation are achieved in compliance with the relevant 
laws, regulations and corporate governance codes.
163
  
 
                                                 
159 Para 14 of the Manual, para 61 of the National Code and para 3.3.5 of the CGF. The Manual, CGF and National Code 
provide guidelines for directors in performing their duties of care and skill and stipulate requirements for the acquisition of 
knowledge, expertise and an understanding of the affairs of the company. 
 
160 For instance, the CGF, Manual and National Code acknowledge the main functions of the board as to monitor 
management, provide advisory services, set overall corporate strategy to achieve the company’s purpose and to identify key 
risk areas and key performance indicators of the company (para 3.3 of the CGF, paras 17-19 of the Manual and paras 59-60 
of the National Code and paras 9-10 of Annexure B of the National Code). According to the Manual, in Zimbabwe, “the 
primary accountability for acts of the company rests ultimately” with the board or officers of the company who may be 
members of the board or members of management (para 17 of the Manual) 
161 The primary role of the board is to advance and protect the interests of the company (para 14 of the Manual). According 
to para 109 of the Manual, the director’s duty of care requires a board member to, inter alia, “participate effectively in board 
and committee meetings” and to “communicate and work effectively with the Chairman of the Board and Managing 
Director”. See also Chapter 2, para 2.6.1 above as to what acting in a careful, diligent and skilful manner entails. 
162 Para 14 of the Manual. The stakeholders include shareholders, employees, creditors, communities, among others. The 
Manual adopts the traditional view of considering only shareholders’ interests as discussed above. 
163 Para 14 of the Manual.  
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To assist the board in achieving this mandate, the Manual recommends that the role of the 
board should be clearly defined in a written document which should explain the board’s 
authority when conducting organisational activities.
164
 The main aim of the written document 
is to avoid conflict between shareholders, the board and management, mostly resulting from 
usurping each other’s roles or powers.165 As a second measure, it is recommended that new 
board appointees should be adequately inducted as regards the business of the organisation 
and be continuously trained so as to be up to date with internal and external developments.
166
  
 
Thirdly, the Manual recommends that board members should have unlimited access to 
records and information of the organisation and be able to consult external experts at the 
organisation’s expense in order to maintain their independence from management.167 In the 
fourth instance, the Manual recommends that the board should establish board committees, 
which should have clear terms of reference, to assist it in effectively discharging its duties.
168
 
It is also recommended that the board should appoint a competent board secretary who should 
be responsible for ensuring that the board functions effectively through provision of board 
secretarial and advisory services.
169
 
 
Similar to the Manual, the CGF provides that the board should be held accountable and 
responsible for the efficient and effective governance of the organisation
170
 and for ensuring 
that the organisation complies with all applicable laws and/or the memorandum of association 
                                                 
164 Paras 14 and 15 of the Manual.  
165 Ibid. 
166 Induction programs are necessary to allow new directors to understand their rights, duties and responsibilities so as to 
participate wholly and actively in board decision-making at the earliest opportunity (para 30 of the Manual). For similar 
sentiments, see Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – Executive Directors Gone to Sleep?” 
(2014) 78-86, Long T “Diving for Pearls: the Importance of Board Induction and Re-Induction” (2008) 4(1) International 
Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 40-50 and Hendricks K and Louw-Potgieter J “A Theory Evaluation of an 
Induction Programme” (2012) 10(3) SA Journal of Human Resource Management 421-471. 
167 External advice is necessary to augment directors’ own skills and to ensure that directors perform their duties in 
accordance with the law and regulations, without having to entirely depend on the company and its management (paras 27 
and 131 of the Manual). 
168 Para 29 of the Manual. Section 84 of the PFMA makes it mandatory for every public entity to have an audit committee. 
169 Para 121 of the Manual. As indicated at the beginning of this section, the appointment of a secretary is statutorily 
provided for in the Companies Act. 
170 The CGF summarises the role of the board as to establish, monitor and review corporate strategy for the entity and to 
ensure that it has effective management teams, the shareholders and other interested stakeholders are informed of its 
operations, effective risk management, internal control, internal audit processes and other key policies are in place as well as 
to adhere to and implement the principles of sound corporate governance policies, procedures and practices. 
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of the company, regulations, government policies and codes of business practice.
171
 To guide 
the operations of the board, enable its members to appreciate what is expected of them 
beforehand and to minimise on government interference in board operations, the CGF 
requires the Responsible Minister and board to sign a performance agreement which sets 
performance targets for the board.
172
 The performance of the board is then evaluated against 
the set performance targets.
173
 To enable the board to make informed decisions and 
effectively discharge its duties, the CGF provides that board members should have 
unrestricted access to accurate, relevant and timely information about the public entity.
174
  
 
The CGF also recommends the establishment of board committees to assist the board to 
effectively discharge its duties.
175
 The board should clearly and formally define the levels of 
materiality or sensitivity so that, upon delegation of authority, it reserves specific powers and 
authority to itself.
176
 A fourth recommendation is that new and existing board members 
should be subjected to appropriate and effective induction, education and training 
programmes to improve and maintain the effectiveness of the board.
177
 Fifthly, to achieve 
board efficiency, the board is expected to put in place measures to ensure that the public 
entity has an effective management team in place and that there is minimal conflict of 
interest, among board members and management.
178
 The board as a whole and each 
individual director are not allowed to accept any unauthorised payment or commission, any 
                                                 
171 Para 3.3 of the CGF. Para 3.3.1 of the CGF states that the “Boards of SEPs have responsibility for the performance of the 
SEPs and are fully accountable to the shareholders for such performance and in all cases are guided by relevant legislation 
and/or the Memorandum of Association of the Company”. The board, thus, should ensure that the public entity is fully aware 
of and complies with applicable laws, regulations, government policies and codes of business practice. “SEPs” refers to State 
Enterprises and Parastatals. 
172 The CGF provides that the “relationship between the shareholders and the Board of Directors shall be governed by a 
written agreement” makes it a requirement for the parent ministry and the board to sign performance contracts to guide the 
operations of the board (paras 3.4 and 3.5 of the CGF). Paras 14 and 15 of the Manual provide for a similar performance 
agreement. See also paras 4, 11-13 of Annexure B of the National Code. 
173 Para 3.5 of the CGF. To ensure that board members apply themselves whole heartedly, there are consequences for failure 
to meet performance targets. For example, the whole board or individual board members may be dismissed (para 3.4 of the 
CGF). 
174 See para 3.3.5 of the CGF. Paras 27 and 131 make similar provisions. 
175 Para 3.12 of the CGF.  
176 The CGF recommends that delegated authority must be in writing and evaluated on a regular basis (para 3.3.9 of the 
CGF). 
177 Para 3.3.11 of the CGF. 
178 Paras 3.3.8 and 3.3.13 of CGF.  
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form of bribery, gift or profit for itself or himself as these may compromise the way that 
duties are discharged.
179
 Lastly, the CGF recommends the appointment of a board secretary 
who should be responsible for ensuring that the board functions effectively through provision 
of guidance and advisory services, arranging board and committee meetings and recording 
minutes thereof, facilitating board induction and training and guiding both the board and 
management on issues of corporate governance, among others.
180
 
 
The other corporate governance instrument, the National Code, recommends that, in the 
discharge of its role and functions, the board should conduct itself with honesty and integrity 
and, above all, it must always act in the best interests of the company that include the 
interests of the organisation and all stakeholders.
181
 The National Code recommends that the 
board should have a charter that sets out its role and functions.
182
 The National Code further 
recommends that board members, collectively and individually, should adopt clearly defined 
methods of work, systems, procedures and processes which are designed to achieve effective 
interaction, decision making and implementation.
183
 A third recommendation is that the board 
should be adequately resourced, obtain independent professional advice when necessary and 
also put in place procedures and systems on the governance of information, knowledge and 
experience to act as checks and balances to enable it to effectively perform its functions.
184
  
 
The National Code also recommends the appointment of a company/board secretary to assist 
the board through provision of necessary advice and information, keeping custody of 
company documents, organising and duly recording proceedings at board meetings and 
                                                 
179 Para 3.3.8 of the CGF. 
180 Para 3.16 of the CGF. 
181 Para 61 of the Zimbabwe National Code. Para 3.3.5 of the CGF and para 14 of the Manual echo the same sentiments. The 
board members are required to observe the “legal duties of good faith, loyalty, care, skill and diligence in the discharge of 
their functions” (Para 65 of the National Code). See Chapter 2, para 2.6.1 above for more information about the duties of 
directors. 
182 Para 60 of the National Code. In terms of the Code, the role of the board includes determining the company’s purpose, 
vision, mission and values; setting strategies for achieving the company’s purpose; ensuring that procedures, policies and 
practices are established and implemented; approving, monitoring and evaluating the implementation of strategies, policies, 
procedures and business plans and regularly assessing the company’s performance and effectiveness and that of individual 
directors, the whole board and the chief executive officer, among others. 
183 Para 147 and 144 of the National Code.  
184 Para 64 of the National Code. 
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attesting to the resolutions adopted by the board.
185
 As a fifth measure, the National Code 
recommends that new and existing board members should be subjected to formal induction, 
on-going education and training programmes to enable them to effectively discharge their 
duties.
186
 Furthermore, the National Code recommends the setting up of board committees to 
assist the board in efficiently discharging its obligations.
187
  
 
It is clear that Zimbabwe has significantly borrowed from internationally adopted principles 
of good corporate governance given the similarity of its provisions to those of other countries 
and those proposed by organisations such as the OECD, CAGG and ICGN.
188
 The policy 
makers have tried to put in place measures to ensure that board members are adequately 
educated about what is expected of them, are equipped and empowered to undertake their 
duties and are regularly guided and advised by competent professionals. 
 
4.2.3 Selection and Appointment of Board Members 
In conformity with the universally accepted principles described above,
189
 the Constitution 
requires that public office bearers, which include board members of public entities, must be 
appointed based on merit.
190
  Similarly, the Companies Act specifies the kind of persons who 
should be appointed as directors and disqualifies certain persons from such appointment.
191
 In 
addition, the various Acts of Parliament which established Zimbabwean public entities detail 
                                                 
185 Para 138-143 of the National Code. 
186 Para 188-190 of the National Code. According to the National Code, the formal induction programme should be 
established to familiarise incoming directors with the company’s operations, its business environment and sustainability 
issues relevant to its business, introduce the directors to members of senior management and appraise them of their 
respective duties and responsibilities and enable new directors to make maximum contribution as quickly as possible.  
187 Para 97 of the National Code. 
188 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. 
189 Chapter 3, para 3.6.2 above. 
190 Section 9 of the Constitution. This is, according to the Constitution, to ensure that there is efficiency, accountability, 
transparency, competence, personal integrity and financial probity in the management of public entities and other 
government institutions. See also Chapter 2, para 2.6.2 above. 
191 The persons disqualified include a body corporate, a minor or other person under legal disability, an unrehabilitated 
insolvent, a person previously convicted and sentenced for theft, fraud, forgery or uttering and a person disqualified by a 
court order under section 344 of the Act (sections 171 and 173 of the Companies Act). See also sections 169-180 of the 
Companies Act and Chapter 3, para 3.2.2 above for more information. 
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how members of the boards are to be selected and appointed.
192
 The Acts provide that board 
members should be chosen for their ability and experience in the relevant industry or 
administration and for their suitability otherwise for appointment as members.
193
 The board 
members are also supposed to be “appointed by the Minister, after consultation and in 
accordance with any directions the President may give him”.194 The main aim of requiring 
that the Minister consults and seeks presidential approval is to enhance transparency in the 
appointment process and to ensure that appropriate directors are appointed.
195
  
 
To complement the establishing Acts, the CGF provides that the appointment of the board 
shall be in accordance with “the provisions of the relevant legislation, that is, the enabling 
Acts of Parliament or Articles of Association of the Company”.196 Likewise, the Manual and 
the National Code advocate for a formal, robust and transparent way of appointing directors 
to the board that reflects largely the diversity of the shareholders.
197
 The CGF, Manual and 
National Code further require that board members should be selected based on their skills, 
qualifications, level of experience, good leadership qualities and core competencies required 
by the company so as to be able to effectively discharge their duties.
198
 It is also 
recommended that board appointments should take into account the need for gender 
                                                 
192 Sections 6-10 of the MMCZ and ZMDC Act. The establishing Acts borrow significantly from the provisions of the 
Companies Act e.g. qualifications of prospective directors and persons disqualified to be directors (sections 171 and 173 of 
the Companies Act) 
193 See section 5 of the ZMDC Act, MMCZ Act, Railways Act and Grain Marketing Act. See also para 2.2.1 of the CGF 
which states that the Responsible Minister should ensure that “only competent and reliable persons with appropriate 
knowledge, skills and experience are appointed to the Board…”. According to Johnson, being knowledgeable about the 
intricacies of an industry determines how effectively directors process information and greatly impacts on the board’s 
performance (Johnson SG et al “Board Composition beyond Independence: Social Capital, Human Capital and 
Demographics” (2013) 39 Journal of Management 232–262). 
194 The Minister is also required to consult relevant industrial organisations (e.g. Chamber of Mines for MMCZ board 
appointments) and related ministries before nominating a person for appointment as a director (section 5 of the MMCZ Act 
and section 5 of the Grain Marketing Act). The criteria that is followed to appoint directors is not available to the public but 
the Acts simply indicate that the Minister should consult the cited organisations on potential board members as well as 
obtain guidance from the President of the country (section 5 of the MMCZ, ZMDC and Grain Marketing Act). 
195 Para 3.2.3 of the CGF. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Para 22 of the Manual and para 86 of the National Code. See also section 173 of the Companies Act as to whom can be 
appointed as a director. The main idea behind recommending that there be transparency in the appointment of directors is to 
curb potential for corruption in the appointment process. For instance, a chief executive officer can nominate directors who 
may further his and the board’s interest rather than the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. (Boyd BK “Chief 
Executive Officer Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model” (1995) 16 Strategic Management Journal 301-
312).  
198 Paras 3.2.1 of the CGF, para 22 of the Manual and para 84, 99-100 of the National Code. Examples of core competencies 
are indicated as accounting or financial expertise, legal skills, business and managerial experience, industry knowledge, 
strategic planning experience and customer-based experience and knowledge.  
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balance.
199
 The main reason for recommending gender balance in the board is to allow for 
diversity in perceptions and ideas.
200
  
 
As a way of ensuring that board members have sufficient time to effectively render their 
services, it is recommended that nominated individuals should not be serving on any other 
board of a state enterprise or parastatal.
201
 Furthermore, to promote new and sound 
viewpoints and ideas into discussions and decision-making for the growth of the entity, it has 
been recommended that board members should be appointed for a limited period.
202
 No board 
member should serve on the same board for more than two successive terms except in 
exceptional circumstances.
203
 The main reason for rotating board members is to allow for 
new members to bring in new energy and perspectives because, generally, what an 
organisation needs on its board in terms of skills, demographics and professional experience 
changes with time and organisational growth level.
204
 The needs of a newly formed 
organisation may be very different from those of a fully developed one; what it needs during 
a period of growth may not necessarily be what it needs during a period of stability.
205
  
 
                                                 
199 Paras 3.2.2 and 3.8.3 of the CGF and para 99 of the National Code. Section 17 of the Constitution mandates the state to 
take measures, including legislative measures, to promote full gender balance and full women participation in all spheres of 
Zimbabwean society. The draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework actually proposes a 50-50 
gender representation on all boards (section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework). To 
further emphasise the importance the country attaches to gender equality, Zimbabwe subscribes to a number of international 
conventions or instruments on promotion of gender equality, for example, the SADC Gender Policy, United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, (CEDAW) (1979) and Optional Protocol to 
the Convention 1999 and African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality (2004) (United Nations Country Analysis 
Report for Zimbabwe (Report prepared by Government of Zimbabwe in conjunction with United Nations Country Team in 
August 2010) available at http://www.undg.org/docs/12123/Zimbabwe-Country-Analysis-2010-Report_05-09-11.pdf 
(accessed 6 January 2015)). 
200 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.2 above. 
201 Para 3.2.5 of the CGF and para 8 of Annexure B of the Zimbabwe National Code. The National Code recommends that 
board members should not serve on more than six boards at the same time and a person should not be appointed as 
chairperson of more than four boards except in exceptional circumstances based on good and sufficient reasons and 
demonstration of ability, availability and capacity to discharge duties effectively (paras 103-104 of the National Code).  
202 Para 3.2 of the CGF and paras 110-111 of the National Code. However where the statutes do not indicate the term of 
office, the term should not exceed three years. Once retired, an ex-board member should not be eligible for re-appointment 
to the same board for a period equivalent to the number of years he/she served that public entity (Para 3.7.3 of the CGF). 
203 Para 2.2.2 and 3.2.4 of the CGF. See also para 7 of Annexure B of the Zimbabwe National Code which makes similar 
provisions. In considering the exceptional circumstances, it is recommended that an independent assessment should be done 
to determine whether there are no relationships or circumstances likely to affect the director’s independence and decision 
making, such as impairment of character and judgment by long service.  
204 Para 110 of the National Code. See also Otten L Term Limits for Non-profit Boards (The Non-profit Center at La Salle 
University 2009) 1 available at http://www.nprcenter.org/Boards (accessed on 16 January 2014). 
205 Ibid. 
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However, the CGF recommends that at the expiry of the board tenure, efforts should be made 
to enable continuity and stability to leadership by retaining at least a third of the board and 
allowing for smooth hand over processes.
206
 Further to the above, Zimbabwe’s corporate 
governance framework seeks to minimise political interference in board appointments. The 
CGF provides that a board member’s term of office should not be “affected by the tenure of 
office of the Responsible Minister” but should be determined by the relevant Act of 
Parliament or Articles of Association, whichever is applicable.
207
 Also, the draft Corporate 
Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework provides for exclusion of the relevant 
ministry’s permanent secretary from board membership.208  
 
The above efforts are an indication of Zimbabwe’s desire to bring about transparency in the 
board appointment process with a view to ensuring that appropriately qualified and skilled 
board members are appointed in public entities. What remains is to establish how effective 
the framework put in place has been in achieving the desired transparency and objectivity in 
the board selection process. This is considered in chapter 7 below.
209
 
 
4.2.4 Composition of the Board 
Like other jurisdictions, Zimbabwe appears to have also adopted the view that board 
composition may have a positive or negative influence on the performance of an 
organisation.
210
 The country’s corporate governance framework considers a right sized and 
properly composed board to be an important factor in building an effective board.
211
 It is 
therefore, recommended that collective knowledge, skills, experience, the nature of the 
                                                 
206 Paras 3.2.4 and 3.2.6 of the CGF and also paras 98 and 5-7 of Annexure B of the National Code.  
207 Para 3.7.4 of the CGF. Section 6 of the ZMDC Act provides that an appointed member shall hold office for a period not 
exceeding three years. The draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework advocates for a four year 
term, renewable only once. 
208 Section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework. However, the Framework allows the 
responsible Minister to appoint ministry representatives to attend board meetings and report back on the deliberations. 
209 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.3 below. 
210 Para 3.2.1 of the CGF acknowledges the fact that the performance of a public entity largely depends on the capabilities 
and performance of its board. Similarly, para 84 of the National Code recommends that the board “should be composed of 
persons with good leadership qualities and core competencies required by the company”. Proper board composition is, 
therefore, considered a very important ingredient for achieving optimum board effectiveness and good corporate governance. 
211 Ibid. 
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company’s business, resources required for conducting the business of the board, the need to 
have sufficient directors to structure board committees appropriately, potential difficulties of 
raising a quorum with a small board and the need to comply with regulatory requirements 
should be considered when determining the number and quality of directors to serve on the 
board.
212
 The size of the board should also be determined in accordance with section 169 of 
the Companies Act
213
 or the statute applicable.
214
  
 
The Manual, CGF and National Code also suggest that the board should be properly 
composed in terms of independence. To achieve this objective, it is proposed that boards 
should be composed of both executive and non-executive directors with the majority of board 
members being non-executive and the roles of chairman and chief executive officer should 
not be exercised by the same individual.
215
 This is to allow for greater independence and 
diverse viewpoints and to ensure that power is evenly balanced and exercised in the best 
interests of the company.
216
 The statutes establishing public entities provide for a board 
composed of a majority of non-executive directors with the chief executive officer being the 
only executive director.
217
  
 
In addition, it is recommended that the board should be diverse and well balanced in terms of 
skills, gender and leadership experience.
218
 The National Code also recommends that the 
board should be composed of persons with core competencies required by the company, such 
as “accounting or financial expertise, legal skills, business and managerial experience, 
industry knowledge, strategic planning experience, and customer-based experience and 
                                                 
212 Paras 100-101 of National Code. 
213 Section 169 provides that every company shall have at least two directors, other than alternate directors; preferably there 
should be at least one non-executive director for every executive director. 
214 The majority of the establishing Acts provide for a maximum of ten and a minimum of six board members. For example, 
section 5 of the MMCZ Act provides that the board shall consist of “not fewer than six and not more than ten other 
members...” See also para 3.8.1 of the CGF which provides that the size and composition of boards shall be in accordance 
with the provisions of the enabling Act or Articles of Association. 
215 Paras 27-28 of the Manual and para 3.8.2 of the CGF. 
216 Ibid.  
217 Section 5 of the ZMDC Act and section 5 of the Railways Act. 
218 Para 114 of the Manual, para 84 of the National Code and para 3.2.1 of the CGF. Board members are expected to have 
the ability to translate their knowledge and experience into solutions that can be applied in the interests of the company and 
all relevant stakeholders (para 115 of the Manual). See also Chapter 3, para 3.2.3 above with regard to the promotion of 
gender equality in the board appointment process.  
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knowledge”.219 Similarly, the CGF recommends that the board should consist of competent 
individuals with a relevant complementary expertise and skills mix to enable it to effectively 
discharge its duties.
 220
   
 
To promote gender equality and non-discrimination, the Constitution requires that “the State, 
all institutions and agencies of government at every level must take practical measures” to 
promote gender equality.
221
 The Constitution requires that all persons should have the right to 
be protected and benefit from the law.
222
 It mandates the government to put in place 
legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and protection of all 
persons. The Constitution also requires the setting up of a Gender Commission whose main 
functions are monitoring, investigating, researching, advising institutions and making 
appropriate recommendations on issues relating to gender equality.
223
  
 
The country has even created a ministry (Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and 
Community Development) to specifically focus on promoting the rights and interests of 
women.
224
 The Ministry, in liaison with other gender-focused institutions, spearheaded the 
enactment of a number of gender-sensitive legislative instruments. In addition to the 
Constitution,
225
 the Sex Discrimination and Removal Act,
226
 Indigenisation and Economic 
                                                 
219 Para 84 of the National Code. Para 85 further sets out in detail the core qualities, membership criteria and qualifications 
of board members e.g. academic qualifications, emotional and social intelligence, competence in their field of endeavour, 
among others. Similarly, the establishing Acts provide that board members should be appointed for “their ability and 
experience in the ..... industry or administration and for their suitability otherwise for appointment as members.” (section 5 
of the ZMDC Act). 
220 Para 3.2.1 of the CGF.  
221 See sections 17 and 56 of the Constitution which deal with gender balance, equality and non-discrimination. The 
provisions in the Constitution show that it has extensively borrowed from the UN Global Compact Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (2011) as regard gender equality promotion. 
222 Section 56 of the Constitution. 
223 Sections 245-246 of the Constitution. The Bill to establish the Gender Commission was gazetted in July 2014 and 
members of the Gender Commission were appointed in June 2015 (The Herald of 30 June 2015 1). See also Makunike R 
The Quality of Women’s Employment: An Analysis of the Vertical Representation of Women in Employment in Zimbabwean 
Parastatals Unpublished Thesis (Southern and Eastern African Regional Centre for Women’s Law, University of Zimbabwe 
2012) 10-12. 
224 Matizha C A Stumbling Block or Foundation Builder: An Assessment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Promoting 
Women’s Rights in Zimbabwe Unpublished Thesis (University of Zimbabwe 2006) 12-13. 
225 Chapter 4 of the Constitution provides for human rights which include the right to be equally treated and not to be 
discriminated in any way.  
226 Act No. 18 of 1983. The Act was created to enable women to have equal opportunity with men to hold public office and 
carry out all public functions in terms of national legislation.   
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Empowerment Act
227
 and Labour Relations Act
228
 are examples of some of the statutes that 
promote gender equality.
229
 Zimbabwe has also acceded to a number of international 
conventions and ratified protocols that address issues of gender equality or representation,
230
 
for example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (December 1979),
231
 the Beijing Declaration on the Platform for Action (1995)
232
 
and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (August 2008).
233
  
 
The CGF, National Code and draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework embedded the constitutional requirement for gender equality promotion in their 
recommendations that board composition should take cognisance of the need for gender 
                                                 
227 Act No. 14 of 2007. The main objectives of the Act are to, inter alia, provide for support measures for the indigenisation 
of the Zimbabwean economy and the economic empowerment of indigenous people. The Act requires the Government to 
implement the support measures specifically on behalf of women, young persons under a prescribed age and disabled 
persons as defined in the Disabled Persons Act (No. 5 of 1992). 
228 Act No. 16 of 1985. The Act prohibits employers from discriminating any potential employee on the basis of gender, 
inter alia. 
229 The cited are examples of legislation that relate to employment but there are other statutes over and above this, e.g. the 
Legal Majority Act (No. 15 of 1982) which granted majority to every Zimbabwean aged 18years and above and the 
Matrimonial Causes Act (No. 11 of 1987) which provide for equal distribution of matrimonial property on divorce. See 
Zvobgo CJM A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
2009) 292-295. 
230 Matizha C A Stumbling Block or Foundation Builder: An Assessment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Promoting 
Women’s Rights in Zimbabwe (2006) 12-13. See also the National Gender Policy (2013-2017) (Policy developed by 
Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development) 2 available at 
http://www.women.gov.zw/downloads?download=3:2013-national-gender-policy (accessed on 17 November 2014). 
Although international conventions do not automatically become part of national law, ratification is an important step in that 
it indicates government’s commitment to the principles and actions specified. 
231 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 18 December 1979 and entered into force as an international treaty on 3 September 1981. The 
Convention positively affirms the principle of gender equality by requiring states parties to take “all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men”. Visit 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm for more information.  
232 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. It 
reasserts the fundamental principle that the rights of women are an “inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal 
human rights.” The Platform for Action also calls upon governments to implement policies that deal with issues women’s 
rights, among them equal treatment of women. Visit http://www.stopvaw.org/beijing_declaration_and_platform_for_action 
for more information. 
233 The Protocol aims to “provide for the empowerment of women, to eliminate discrimination and achieve gender equality 
by encouraging and harmonising the development and implementation of gender responsive legislation, policies and 
programmes and projects” in SADC member states. The Protocol is available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/803 (accessed on 17 July 2014). 
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balance.
234
 All public entities are, therefore, required to ensure that their boards are properly 
composed in terms of expertise, skills, gender and other required attributes.
235
 
 
4.2.5 Remuneration of Directors 
Board remuneration is one of the critical elements that contribute to public entity boards’ 
effectiveness in Zimbabwe. The Companies Act provides that directors’ remuneration should 
be fixed by the company in a general meeting whilst the articles of some companies authorise 
directors to determine their own remuneration.
236
 The Act prohibits tax-free payments to 
directors,
237
 loans to directors except in certain circumstances
238
 and the issue of shares to 
directors on more favourable terms than are available to members unless approved by the 
company in a general meeting.
239
 To enhance transparency, the Act requires directors’ 
remuneration, pensions and compensation for loss of office to be fully disclosed in “any 
accounts of a company laid before it in general meeting or in a statement annexed thereto”.240 
In addition, the statutes establishing public entities require that board remuneration or any 
allowance to meet any reasonable expenses incurred by a board member in connection with 
the business of the board or committee should be fixed by the Minister.
241
 It can be concluded 
that these provisions aim to ensure that board remuneration is determined in a transparent 
                                                 
234 Para 3.2.2 of the CGF, para 99 of the National Code and section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration 
Policy Framework. This is in line with international corporate governance developments which aim to promote gender 
equality (see Chapter 2, para 2.6.3 above, Part VI of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Principle 2.18 of 
the King III Report). 
235 An assessment of the usefulness of the corporate governance measures put in place to enhance the effectiveness of public 
entity boards through the creation of properly composed boards is made in Chapter 7, para 7.2.4 below. 
236 Table A, Article 5 of the Companies Act. The assumption is that the power to fix directors’ remuneration means the 
“power to fix reasonable remuneration” (The Master v Thompson’s Estate (1961) (2) SA 20 (FC). 
237 Section 176 of the Companies Act. 
238 Section 177 of the Companies Act. The exceptional circumstances include: where the loan is meant to meet expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred by the director for the purposes of the company or for the purpose of enabling him to properly 
perform his duties as an officer of the company; where the company’s ordinary business includes the lending of money or 
the giving of guarantees in connection with loans made by other persons; the making of the loan is to enable the director to 
purchase or subscribe for fully paid shares in the company to be held by him or in trust for him or where the loan is issued by 
a private company, which is not a subsidiary company, with the consent of members holding at least nine-tenths of the 
issued share capital.  
239 Section 183 of the Companies Act. The objective of these restrictions is to prevent undeclared remuneration which may 
circumvent the disclosure requirements of section 184 of the Act. 
240 Section 184 of the Companies Act. 
241 Section 13 of the MMCZ Act, section 14 of the Grain Marketing Act and para 13 of the CGF.  
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manner and that there is an independent checking mechanism to minimise abuse of authority 
by the board as far as its remuneration is concerned. 
 
The principle that the level of directors’ remuneration should be adequate to attract and retain 
appropriately qualified and competent individuals who are able to successfully run the 
organisation has been widely accepted in Zimbabwe.
242
 To achieve this objective, the 
National Code recommends that the size and mix of the remuneration package of board 
members “should attract, retain and motivate persons of high calibre, relevant experience and 
appropriate skills, but must be affordable to the company.”243 In the same way, the CGF 
recommends that the remuneration for board members should be affordable, sustainable, 
competitive and reasonable.
244
 Moreover, the National Code recommends that directors’ 
remuneration should be indicative of the level of commitment and time devoted by them to 
the company’s business as well as their responsibilities and experience.245 It is thus accepted 
that performance related elements of remuneration should constitute a substantial portion of 
the total remuneration package of directors to promote long term success of the company.
246
 
The corporate governance frameworks also require that the remuneration packages should be 
transparently determined and fully disclosed.
247
 The Manual, CGF and National Code 
provide that the annual report of an entity should sufficiently disclose directors’ annual 
remuneration including beneficial and non-beneficial shareholdings.
248
  
 
To assist the board in setting up and administering remuneration policies that comply with 
good corporate governance, the National Code and the Manual provide for the establishment 
of a remuneration committee which should be composed of independent non-executive board 
                                                 
242 Paras 2.2.2 and 3.2.4 of the CGF support this opinion.  
243 Para 169 of the National Code. Similarly, the National Code provides that board remuneration should be attractive and 
fair enough to enhance “commitment and effectiveness, and to promote the creation of value for the company and advance 
its short and long term interests” (para 167 of the National Code). See also para 3.13 of the CGF. 
244 Para 3.13 of the CGF.  
245 Para 173 of the National Code. 
246 Para 168 and 172 of the National Code. 
247 Para 3.13 of the CGF and para 35 of the Manual. Disclosure assists in achieving transparency and accountability and has 
the effect of deterring directors from receiving unscrupulous benefits. In addition, disclosure brings to light any form of 
misconduct and noncompliance enabling shareholders and other interested people to take appropriate corrective action. 
248 Para 36 of the Manual, para 3.13 of the CGF and para 287 of the National Code. To achieve the same objective, section 
184 of the Companies Act provides for full declaration of payments made to directors in the financial statements. 
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members.
249
 The committee should assist the board in setting up and administering 
remuneration policies that promote fair remuneration in order to motivate board members and 
enhance their reliability, commitment and effectiveness in creating value for the company 
and advancing its interests.
250
  However, it would appear like this committee might not be so 
relevant when it comes to public entity board remuneration as this is determined by the 
Minister.
251
  
 
Chapter 7 analyses whether or not the efforts put in place by Zimbabwe to match 
international corporate governance standards with regard to directors’ remuneration, have 
yielded positive results.
252
 
 
4.2.6 Evaluation of Board Performance 
The evaluation of board performance has been acknowledged as a critical aspect in enhancing 
the effectiveness of boards of public entities in Zimbabwe. To achieve this, the CGF and the 
National Code require the board to sign a performance agreement
253
 with the responsible 
Minister and to evaluate itself against agreed performance indicators and targets on an annual 
basis.
254
 The Minister is in turn supposed to; using an agreed performance management 
system and with the assistance of outside experts, if considered necessary, appraise the 
performance of the board at intervals agreed to by the parties.
255
 To assist in managing 
performance, the government has, as part of its “Zim Asset Program”, introduced a results 
                                                 
249 Paras 170 and 171 of the National Code and Annexure 3 (para 6) of the Manual. 
250 Paras 167 and 171 of the National Code. 
251 Section 13 of the MMCZ Act and section 14 of the Grain Marketing Act. 
252 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.5 below. 
253 The performance agreement is a kind of contract between the government usually represented by the ministry and the 
public entity board which defines the broader policy objectives of the entity, the goals and requirements for the entity and 
sets financial performance targets expected to be achieved by the entity. The success or failure of the board is reflected on 
the results achieved during the agreed period (Paras 3.4 and 3.5 of the CGF and para 11 of Annexure B to the National 
Code). 
254 See also paras 4, 11-13 of Annexure B of the National Code and para 6.5 of the CGF. 
255 Paras 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 of the CGF and paras 13-14 of Annexure B of the National Code. 
141 
 
based management (RBM) system to be implemented by all government departments and 
state-owned enterprises.
256
  
 
The Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework provides that the 
responsible Minister should appoint appropriately qualified and experienced personnel from 
the Ministry to attend board meetings and report back on the deliberations. All board 
resolutions should be submitted to the responsible Minister, all public entities should hold 
annual general meetings which should be attended by different government stakeholders and 
the chief executive officer should, on a regular basis, report directly to the Permanent 
Secretary on operational issues and significant board decisions.
257
 Furthermore, the 
Framework provides for performance related contracts for the board, chief executive officer 
and senior management that clearly stipulate the minimum performance standards which, if 
not achieved, can result in termination of service.
258
 The main objective of these measures is 
to assist the Minister in monitoring the performance of the board and thus to enable him to 
evaluate its effectiveness. Where the board does not perform to expectation or in accordance 
with the mandate of the organisation, the responsible Minister is mandated to change the 
chairperson and/or the composition of the board.
259
 Also, the Minister is empowered to 
discipline or dismiss any directors for non-performance, corrupt conduct or any behaviour 
which brings the name of the public entity into disrepute.
260
 
 
As another performance measure, the board is expected to produce a special report on 
corporate governance which should be attached to the annual report.
261
 The report should 
                                                 
256 Zim Asset Policy Document 118-119 and The Herald of 4 December 2013 5.The RBM system is a tool that can be used to 
help policy-makers and decision makers to track progress and demonstrate the impact of a given policy, programme or 
project (Madhekeni A “Implementing Results-Based Management Systems in Zimbabwe: Context and Implications for the 
Public Sector” (2012) 2(8) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 122-129). 
257 Section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Para 2.2.2 of the CGF and section 9 of the MMCZ, ZMDC and Grain Marketing Acts. 
260 Para 3.7 of the CGF. Measures to be taken are determined in accordance with relevant legislation and/or applicable code 
of conduct. The enabling Acts provide for the suspension or dismissal of board members if they fail to perform according to 
expectations. For instance, section 9 of the Grain Marketing Act empowers the Responsible Minister to suspend or request 
an appointed member to vacate office if the Minister is satisfied that the member has been guilty of misconduct, has failed to 
comply with the conditions of his office or is physically incapable of efficiently performing his duties as a member (see 
section 9 of the MMCZ, ZMDC and Grain Marketing Acts). 
261 Para 6.10 of the CGF. 
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indicate whether or not the public entity is complying with the CGF, giving a brief 
description of how this instrument is being applied, whether or not the entity has been audited 
and the skills, experience and expertise held by each director in office at the date of the 
report.
262
 It should also state those rules or principles of the CGF that the public entity 
deviated from and the reasons for each deviation, among other issues.
263
 In addition, the 
board is expected to prepare financial statements in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and standards and to present annual audited financial accounts at the 
annual general meeting in compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act, PFMA 
and the responsible Minister.
264
 This enhances transparency and allows the responsible 
Ministers and other interested stakeholders to assess the performance of the board and public 
entity, as well as to ask informed questions. 
 
The board evaluation framework set out above clearly has the ability to assist in improving 
the effectiveness of public entity boards in Zimbabwe. The aim of this research is to find out 
the extent to which the recommendations and legal provisions have been implemented and 
whether they have yielded positive results.
265
 
 
4.2.7 Enforcement of Corporate Governance Compliance  
Zimbabwe has, to a large extent, relied on a self-regulatory environment in its approach to 
corporate governance because the basic requirements of corporate governance have not been 
given the force of an Act of Parliament.
266
 However, the continued corporate collapses, as a 
result of poor corporate governance practices, are a clear indication that the voluntary nature 
of compliance may not be sophisticated enough to generate an absolute transformation in 
corporate governance standards and practices in Zimbabwe. The country has thus recognised 
                                                 
262 The Ministry of State Enterprises and Parastatals, in consultation with the responsible ministers, should monitor 
compliance with corporate governance principles by public entities (para 2.3 of the CGF and paras 32 and 40 of the National 
Code). 
263 Para 6.10 of the CGF. 
264 Para 5.1 of the CGF. The PFMA requires public entities to prepare quarterly management accounts, half-yearly unaudited 
reports and annual audited reports (sections 48 and 49 of the PFMA). 
265 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 below. 
266 See the ‘Introduction and Background’ to the National Code which clearly indicates that the Code adopts the “apply or 
explain” approach which means that all entities are expected by way of explanation to make a positive statement about how 
the principles have been applied or have not been applied. 
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that other interventions are necessary to create a climate necessary to ensure adherence to 
good corporate governance principles.
267
 As a result, the country has come up with a 
legislative and regulatory framework. 
 
In terms of legislative instruments, the Companies Act, Public Finance Management Act, 
statutes enabling the creation of the public entities and the Anti-corruption Commission Act 
have played a significant role in the enforcement of good corporate governance practices in 
Zimbabwe’s public entities.268 The ZSE Listing Requirements have also significantly 
contributed to the promotion of good corporate governance through its mandatory 
requirement for listed companies to comply with certain corporate governance standards.
269
 
The Companies Act provides for a number of ways to enable directors to practice good 
corporate governance
270
 as well as for measures to deter directors from violating the 
provisions of the Act.
271
 To enforce compliance the Companies Act imputes liability to 
directors for various offences committed in violation of the provisions of the Act. As an 
example, section 147 of Companies Act requires directors to attach to every balance sheet, 
laid before a company in general meeting, a report with respect to the state of the company’s 
affairs, failure of which they will be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine.
272
  
 
The other offences for which directors may be liable include making, circulating and 
publishing false statements in relation to any property or affair of the company,
273
 
                                                 
267 Zhou D “Three Decades of Public Enterprise Restructuring in Zimbabwe a Will-Of-The-Wisp Chase?” (2012) 2(20) 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 175-184. See also Mambondiani L, Zhang Y and Arun T Corporate 
Governance and Bank Performance: Evidence from Zimbabwe (Discussion Paper at the Institute of Development Policy and 
Management (IDPM, University of Manchester 2013) 8-10 available at http://zimbabweinvestor.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/LanceMambondiani.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2015). 
268 Chapter 9:22 (Act 13 of 2004). 
269 Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). 
270 These range from requiring directors to disclose interests, prohibiting them from accessing tax free payments and loans 
and allowing members and the public to inspect the company’s books to enhance transparency (sections 156-159, 176-177 
and 186 of the Companies Act). 
271 The Companies Act imposes civil and criminal liability for directors who are charged with acts of misconduct (sections 
169-186 and 343 of the Zimbabwean Companies Act). 
272 However, where, in the opinion of the court dealing with the case, the director committed the offence willfully he shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment. 
273 Section 343 of the Companies Act. A charged director shall be exonerated from liability if he is able to prove that he 
conducted reasonable investigation and had “reasonable ground to believe and did believe that the statement, report or 
account was true and that there was no omission to state any material fact necessary to make the statement as set out not 
misleading”. 
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falsification of company books (e.g. minute books, registers or accounts)
274
 and failure to 
submit company returns to Registrar as required by the Act.
275
 The Act also allows for the 
removal of directors from office as one of the penal provisions for failing to properly carry 
out one’s duties.276 Other examples of deterrent measures are disqualification277 and penalties 
in the form of fines or imprisonment.
278
  
 
The PFMA provides that every public entity should adhere to and implement the principles of 
sound corporate governance policies, procedures and practices.
279
 In the event of failure to 
comply, the Act provides for disciplinary proceedings to be instituted against any accounting 
authority of the public entity.
280
 The Act further provides that where the accounting 
authority
281
 is a board or other body, every member of the authority is individually liable for 
any financial misconduct of the accounting authority.
282
 To enforce the provisions of the Act, 
the PFMA provides for the establishment of a Treasury whose main mandate is to “determine 
the manner in which public resources shall be accounted for” and to supervise and give 
directions on how public resources should be effectively managed.
283
  
                                                 
274 Section 345 of the Companies Act. Unless the director proves to the court that he had no intention to defraud or deceive, 
he shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not or to imprisonment or to both such fine and such imprisonment. 
275 Section 346 of the Companies Act. The Registrar may direct the director should make good the default within such time 
as may be specified in the order. Such order may provide that all costs of and incidental to the application should be borne 
by the director responsible for the default. The Registrar may also invoke the provisions of any law that provides for the 
imposition of penalties for failure to submit company returns as required by the Companies Act. 
276 The Act provides for the removal of a director before the expiration of his period of office, through a resolution of which 
special notice has been given, for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his office (Section 175 of the 
Companies Act). 
277 According to section 173(2), a director is disqualified from continuing to act as such if he “has at any time been or is 
adjudged or otherwise declared insolvent or bankrupt under a law in force in Zimbabwe or any other country”, is convicted 
of theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document or perjury and has been sentenced therefor to serve a term of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine or to a fine exceeding level five or if he is removed by the court from any office of 
trust on account of misconduct. Any person who directly or indirectly continues to act as a director when he has been 
disqualified under the Act is considered guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level ten or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment (section 173(2) of the Companies Act). 
278 See sections 173, 175 and 340-345 of the Companies Act.  
279 Section 50 of the PFMA. 
280 Section 41 and 87 of the PFMA. An act of financial misconduct occurs if a person wilfully or negligently fails to comply 
with the provisions of the Act or makes or permits any unauthorised expenditure, irregular expenditure or fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure (sections 85 and 87 of the PFMA). 
281 The PFMA defines an accounting authority as a board or other controlling body, the chief executive officer or the person 
in charge of that public entity (section 41 of the PFMA). 
282 Section 86(2) of the PFMA.  
283 Section 6 of the PFMA. 
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The PFMA also provides for the appointment of auditors and audit committees to conduct 
independent checks on compliance by public entities with relevant laws and regulations 
which includes compliance with good corporate governance principles.
284
 The majority of the 
public entities are audited by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG)
285
 
to check their level of compliance.
286
 To complement the efforts of the OCAG, an Anti-
Corruption Commission has been established in Zimbabwe. Its main purpose is to combat 
corruption by investigating reported cases of alleged corruption and recommending 
prosecution of defaulters, where considered necessary.
287
 Similarly, an Office of the Attorney 
General has been established to assist in enforcing compliance. Its main functions are to, inter 
alia, act as the principal legal advisor to the government, represent the government in legal 
proceedings and “to promote, protect and uphold the rule of law and to defend the public 
interest”.288  
 
In addition to the provisions of the PFMA, the Acts that established public entities provide 
for dismissal of board members on charges of misconduct as a means of instilling discipline 
and promoting good corporate governance.
289
 As an example, the ZMDC Act empowers the 
Minister to request a board member to leave his office on the grounds of improper conduct as 
a member and failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his appointment.
290
 
Similarly, the ZSE Listing Requirements compel companies to include a statement in their 
listing particulars indicating and explaining the extent to which they comply with the 
                                                 
284 Sections 80-84 of the PFMA. 
285 OCAG is a government institution formed to examine, audit and report to Parliament on the management of public 
resources of Zimbabwe with the aim of improving accountability and good corporate governance. Its mandate is derived 
from the Constitution of Zimbabwe (section 309) and the PFMA (section 9). 
286 To complement this, the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework requires that all external audit 
reports should be submitted by the Auditor directly to the board and Responsible Minister to enhance transparency and 
accountability (section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework).  
287 The objects of the Anti-Corruption Commission are stated in the Act as  “to promote the investigation of serious cases of 
corruption and fraud” and “to make proposals for the elimination of corruption in the public and private sectors”, among 
others (section 11 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act). The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 
terms of section 254 of the Constitution. 
288 Section 114 of the new Constitution. The Attorney General’s Office falls under the Ministry of Justice of Zimbabwe.  
289 Section 9 of the ZMDC and MMCZ Acts. 
290 Ibid. 
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principles set out in the Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct of the King Report and 
Cadbury Report.
291
  
 
The voluntary codes that aim to guide entities to observe good corporate governance 
principles include the Manual, CGF and National Code.
292
 In the meantime, organisations 
have also had to rely on other international codes on corporate governance, for example, the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG Guidelines, King Report and the UK 
Combined Code to assist them in complying with good corporate governance.
293
 
Furthermore, Zimbabwe developed a draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework in 2014. It is anticipated that this Framework will be promulgated as an Act of 
Parliament that governs the operations of state-owned enterprises and local authorities with 
regard to remuneration and corporate governance practices.
294
  
 
The Framework’s objective is to ensure that public entities boards and management observe 
good corporate governance. Sanctions can be imposed if the provisions of the Framework are 
not observed. To complement the above initiatives, the government has set up a Corporate 
Governance and Delivery Agency whose role is to ensure that parastatals comply with the 
Manual, CGF and the National Code
295
 through overseeing the selection and appointment of 
board members, monitoring operations, reviewing directors and senior management 
remuneration and overseeing audits.
296
  
                                                 
291 Section 7.F.5 of ZSE Listing Requirements (2002). 
292 See Chapter 3, para 3.2.1 above. The voluntary nature of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework is confirmed by 
the fact that it is not obligatory for organisations to apply the provisions of the various instruments but just to explain or give 
reasons where they fail to do so or where they adopt a different practice, approach or principle (“Introduction” to the 
Manual, para 6.10 of the CGF and “Introduction and Background” to the National Code). 
293 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 above. 
294 The Zimbabwe Mail of 16 April 2014 13 and The Herald of 19 June 2014 1. 
295 In line with the Plan for Economic Growth outlined by the country’s President in the State of the Nation Address 
delivered to Parliament in August 2015, the “Office of the President is working on proposals to transform the National Code 
into law to enable the government to deal with corruption and other shenanigans in companies” (The Herald of 6 October 
2015 1). Converting the National Code into law will make it mandatory for organisations to comply with the corporate 
governance principles enshrined in the Code otherwise they would risk being subjected to penalties. 
296 Section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework. See also Mthombeni D Public Sector 
Corporate Governance Bill (The Zimbabwe Mail of 25 June 2014) and Public Sector Corporate Governance Bill (The 
Herald of 19 June 2014). The Corporate Governance and Delivery Agency is mandated to “compile and maintain a 
“Databank (Directory) of all potential Board members on a parastatal by parastatal basis”, from which the Ministers should 
select potential board members for approval by the President (section 1 of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration 
Policy Framework). 
147 
 
 
Further to the above, Zimbabwe has a judicial system which plays a crucial role in the 
effective enforcement of the above measures. The country’s judicial system is derived from 
section 176 of the Constitution which vests the judicial authority of Zimbabwe in the 
Constitutional Court, Supreme Court; High Court, magistrates and such other courts as may 
be established by or under an Act of Parliament.
297
 The court system comprises of ordinary 
courts and special courts.
298
 The ordinary courts (Supreme Court; High Court, Magistrates 
Court) possess both criminal and civil jurisdiction. The special courts derive their existence 
from section 92(4) of the Constitution and have limited and frequently exclusive jurisdiction 
in one or more specific area of the law as defined by or under an Act of Parliament.
299
 
 Examples of special courts are the Labour Court, the Administrative Court, the Special Court 
for Income Tax Appeals and the Fiscal Appeal Court.
300
  
 
The Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe (IoDZ) has also been actively involved in the 
promotion of good corporate governance in Zimbabwe.
301
 The institution played an integral 
role in the development of the National Code and the CGF. To enhance good corporate 
governance practices, it disseminates information on corporate governance trends around the 
world as well as provides technical training on directorship and board effectiveness. 
However, the best the IoDZ can do is to encourage compliance but it has no powers to 
compel any entity to observe good corporate governance principles.
302
  
 
                                                 
297 Madhuku L An Introduction to Zimbabwean Law (2010) 61-65. See also Dube B “Roman-Dutch and English Common 
Law: The Indespansable Law in Zimbabwe” (2014) V(4) 1-18 and Keynote Address by the Honourable Mr Justice 
Chidyausiku GG, Chief Justice at the Joint Bar-Judiciary End of Term Colloquium Held on 28 November 2014 at Vumba, 
Zimbabwe available at http://www.jsc.org.zw/index.php/how-courts-operate (accessed on 27 April 2015). 
298 Ibid. See also Saki O and Chiware T The Law in Zimbabwe (Midlands State University, Zimbabwe, Research Paper of 
February 2007) 14-16 available at ww4.msu.ac.zw/.../1211357129The%20Law%20in%20Zimbabwe.doc (accessed on 12 
January 2015)). 
299 Ibid. 
300 Feltoe G A Guide to Administrative and Local Government Law in Zimbabwe (University of Zimbabwe 2012) 13-14. 
301 To show the high level of commitment to promoting good corporate governance, the IoDZ is one of the twelve Institutes 
of Directors that founded the African Corporate Governance Network (ACGN). 
302 Research has shown that, despite IoDZ’s efforts, entities across different sectors do not fully comply with good corporate 
governance standards (Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The Case of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation” (2014) 9 Journal of Academic and Business Ethics 1-8, Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in 
Zimbabwe’s State Enterprises: Can the Situation be Rescued? (2012) and Chidoko C and Mashavira A “An Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector of Zimbabwe” (2014) 2(3) Humanities and Social Sciences Letters 174-180). 
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The challenge remains to ascertain how effective these enforcement mechanisms have been 
in promoting good corporate governance and enhancing the effectiveness of public entities 
boards so that the entities do not continue to be a drain to the fiscus but instead promote 
economic and social development.
303
 
 
4.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examined the corporate governance framework in Zimbabwe with particular 
emphasis on the framework that has been put in place to enhance the effectiveness of boards 
of public entities.  
 
In Zimbabwe, like in most jurisdictions, the issue of good corporate governance has come up 
mainly in the wake of corporate collapses, the need to attract foreign investment and the 
necessity to sustain long term company growth. Compliance with good corporate governance 
has been largely voluntary. The country has tried to conform to internationally recognised 
corporate governance principles by coming up with localised corporate governance 
instruments, namely the CGF, Manual and National Code. The instruments have 
recommended that, among others, boards should be fully aware of their roles, the board 
members should be transparently appointed based on merit and relevant experience, the 
composition of the board should be properly balanced in terms of skills, independence and 
gender, directors’ remuneration should be adequate and performance related and the 
performance of the board should be regularly and objectively evaluated to assess its 
effectiveness.  
 
However, due to the prevalence of corporate collapses, Zimbabwe has taken steps to 
complement the existing self-regulatory corporate governance regime with legislative and 
regulatory instruments. In this regard, the Constitution, Public Finance Management Act, 
Acts establishing public entities, Companies Act, Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 
Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework and the ZSE Listings 
Requirements require the boards of public entities to observe good corporate governance at 
all times. To assist in enforcing the corporate governance principles, the country has set up 
                                                 
303 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.7 below. 
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institutions like Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Corporate Governance and 
Delivery Agency and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission.
304
  
 
In addition to these measures, Zimbabwe’s entities are also guided by internationally 
recognised codes on corporate governance like the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the CAGG Guidelines and national codes like the King Reports, Malawi’s 
Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance and UK Combined Code in their practice of 
good corporate governance.
305
 A number of institutions have supported efforts to promote 
good corporate governance in Zimbabwe, for example, the Institute of Directors, African 
Management Services Company, World Bank, Centre for Corporate Governance and African 
Development Bank.
306
 
 
Having considered the corporate governance framework from Zimbabwe’s perspective, 
chapters 4 and 5 compare and contrast the Zimbabwean framework to those of South Africa 
and Australia, respectively.
307
 The objective is to establish how well Zimbabwe’s corporate 
governance standards compare to those of other jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
304 See para 4.2.7 above. 
305 See para 4.2.1 above. 
306 Ibid. 
307 See Chapter 1, para 1.2 above for the reasons why South Africa and Australia were chosen for the comparison. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance law is continuously reformed to keep abreast of developments in the 
world and the changing business environment.
1
 It is thus imperative that, whenever a country 
decides to enact legislation or put in place regulatory systems, they are compatible with 
international best practice.
2
  
 
As the King Committee on Corporate Governance observed, companies are governed within 
the framework of the laws and regulations of the country in which they operate.
3
 There can 
therefore, be no single generally applicable corporate governance model especially in view of 
the fact that countries differ in culture, regulation, law and generally the way business is 
conducted.
4
 But, considering the fact that a significant number of investors now invest all 
over the world, there are certain international standards
5
 that every country is required to 
                                                 
1 “Preamble” to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and “Preface” to the CAGG Guidelines.  
2 Ibid.  
3 “Introduction and Background” to the King II Report.   
4 Corporate governance practices and their efficiency are largely determined by the corporate governance system of a 
country because practices that may appear appropriate and efficient for one country may not necessarily be appropriate for 
another country due to contextual differences of countries. Differences in each country’s political, legal, social and cultural 
systems thus need to be taken into account when transferring a set of corporate governance systems from one context to 
another (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 13). See also Claessens S and Yurtoglu B Corporate 
Governance and Development - An Update (Global Corporate Governance Forum Focus (10) 2012) 11-12 available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/.../Focus10_CG%26Development.pdf? (accessed on 15 May 2015). 
5 International guidelines have been developed by, inter alia, the OECD, ICGN and CACG to guide member and 
nonmember countries in developing legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance in their 
countries which match their individual developmental experiences. Four pillars have been considered essential to all 
international guidelines of corporate governance namely; fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency (OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 17-23). 
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comply with to attract and retain investors.
6
 It is thus, desirable that Zimbabwe should 
harmonise its legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance with other 
jurisdictions to reduce the cost of conducting business and increase certainty both for 
international companies and investors and for the benefit of local companies involved in 
international trade and investment.  
 
In this chapter, a comparative analysis between Zimbabwe and South Africa’s corporate 
governance frameworks is conducted to establish the extent to which Zimbabwe has tried to 
harmonise its systems with other neighbouring and regional players.
7
  The main objective is 
to establish how Zimbabwe has performed, in comparison with other countries in the region, 
in so far as empowering boards to promote good corporate governance in public entities is 
concerned.  
 
5.2 COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE’S CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS 
Zimbabwe relies on its neighbours and other regional countries as models for reform and 
recognises the fact that complementary regulations will immensely benefit the neighbouring 
countries. Due to geographical proximity, Zimbabwe’s economy “relies heavily on South 
Africa with which it has close political, economic and cultural ties”.8 South African statutory 
instruments have been influential in the establishment of Zimbabwean statutory instruments 
and courts have referred to South African case law/precedents in passing court judgements.
9
 
This is because the legal system governing business entities in Zimbabwe “originated from 
that which was operating in the Cape Province of South Africa in 1891, which was in itself 
                                                 
6 It has been established that raising foreign finance and maintaining liquidity is easier if investors have confidence in the 
country and particular company’s corporate governance procedures and standards (Huy DTN, Hung NV and Hien DTN 
Modern International Corporate Governance Principles and Models After Global Economic Crisis (Partridge, India 2014) 
430 and Abdioglu N, Khurshed A and Stathopoulos K “Foreign Institutional Investment: Is Governance Quality At Home 
Important?” (2013) 32 Journal of International Money and Finance 916–940). 
7 Chapter 4 of this thesis concentrated on analysing the Zimbabwean corporate governance framework. In this chapter the 
South African framework is discussed in greater detail and compared to the Zimbabwean ramework.  
8 Besada H and Werner K The Environment and Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe (The Centre for International 
Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 19 of July 2010 available at http://www.cigionline.org (accessed on 5 August 
2014). 
9 Saki O and Chiware T The Law in Zimbabwe (Midlands State University, Zimbabwe 2014) 13-15. See also Dzvimbo RS 
Should the Zimbabwean Companies Act Move Away From Judicial Management and Adopt Business Rescue? Unpublished 
Thesis (University of Cape Town 2013) 5-6. 
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based on Roman-Dutch law”.10 South African textbooks on law have also been persuasive 
authority upon which Zimbabwean courts have relied in making judicial decisions.
11
 In 
addition, the drafters of the Manual, CGF and National Code
12
 confirm that precedents set in 
the King Reports on Governance for South Africa were persuasive in the development these 
codes.
13
  
 
In view of the close linkages between the two countries, this section compares and contrasts 
the Zimbabwean corporate governance framework to that of South Africa with special 
reference to selected corporate governance aspects. The selected aspects are the board’s role, 
selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and performance evaluation as well as 
enforcement of compliance with good corporate governance standards.  
  
5.2.1 Overview of South African Corporate Governance Framework 
During the period of apartheid in South Africa, the level of corporate governance was 
compromised because the economic and trade sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
resulted in the country facing difficulties in interacting with the global economy.
14
 This 
resulted in the country’s “corporate practices, laws and regulation” not conforming to 
international standards and businesses and regulators disrespecting good corporate 
management and professional ethics.
15
 After a democratic government was elected, the 
country had to undertake a number of corporate governance reforms to manage demands 
from international investors, meet the requirements for external financial support and 
                                                 
10 Owusu-Ansah S “The Impact of Corporate Attributes on the Extent of Mandatory Disclosure and Reporting by Listed 
Companies in Zimbabwe” (1998) 33(5) The International Journal of Accounting 605-631. See also Dube B “Roman-Dutch 
and English Common Law: The Indispensable Law in Zimbabwe” (2014) 1-18. 
11 Ibid. See also Madhuku L An Introduction to Zimbabwean Law (2010) 15-17. 
12 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 for details on these Zimbabwean corporate governance codes. 
13 “Foreword” to the Manual, “Introduction and Background” to the Zimbabwe National Code and “Introduction” to the 
CGF.  
14 Afolabi AA “Examining Corporate Governance Practices in Nigerian and South African Firms” (2015) 3(1) European 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance Research 10-29 available http://www.eajournals.org/ (accessed on 15 April 
2015). See also Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2006) 210. 
15 Afolabi AA “Examining Corporate Governance Practices in Nigerian and South African Firms” (2015) 10-29. 
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encourage the highest standard of corporate governance in the country.
16
 South Africa has 
thus, acknowledged good corporate governance as a fundamental instrument for the efficient 
utilisation and management of private and state-owned assets as well as a tool to restore 
investor confidence and enhance corporate transparency and accountability.
17
  
 
Historically, the South African corporate governance framework has emulated that of the 
United Kingdom in that it has two systems namely; the legal sources (which include 
legislation and case law)
18
 and non-binding codes of best practice to guide corporate 
behaviour.
19
 The country acknowledges that effective corporate governance requires a 
balance between allowing directors to run the company in the way they consider best for the 
stakeholders, while providing stakeholders with some protection against a board that ignores 
its responsibilities and is not held properly accountable.
20
 The Institute of Directors of South 
Africa (IoDSA) was one of the first bodies to be actively involved in the promotion of good 
corporate governance in South Africa mostly through its integral role in the development of 
the King Report on Corporate Governance (King Reports I-III)
21
 which forms the basis of the 
                                                 
16 Ibid. See also Mallin CA Corporate Governance 4th ed. (Oxford University Press 2013) 340. 
17 Okeahalam CC and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges 
(2003) 3-5. See also Hendricks E Towards Good Corporate Governance in South Africa: Private Enforcement versus Public 
Enforcement Unpublished Thesis (University of Cape Town 2010) 13.  
18 South African law is a combination of different legal systems, with its origin in Europe and Great Britain. Its foundation 
lies in Roman-Dutch law, which is itself a blend of indigenous Dutch customary law and Roman law (Van der Merwe CG 
and Du Plessis JE Introduction to the Law of South Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2004) 2-12). See also 
Kitchin SB “The Judicial System of South Africa” (1914) 62(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law 
Register 441-449 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3313881?seq (accessed on 27 March 2015) and Schreiner OD The 
Contribution of English Law to South African Law; And the Rule of Law in South Africa (Juta & Company Limited 1967) 5-
9.  
19 This is mostly because the corporate governance regime is characterised by a unitary board system, a reliance on capital 
markets to raise finance, a strong legal framework to protect shareholder rights and a set of self-regulatory measures 
designed to shape management and board behaviour (West A “Theorising South Africa’s Corporate Governance” (2006) 
68(4) Journal of Business Ethics 433 – 448). See also Croucher R and Miles L “Corporate Governance and Employees in 
South Africa” (2010) 10 (2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 367-389. 
20 Muswaka L “Corporate Governance under the South African Companies Act: A Critique” (2013) 3(3) World Journal of 
Social Sciences 11-19. See also Mallette P “State Anti-corporate Takeover Laws: Issues and Arguments” (1995) 7 Journal 
on Managerial Issues 142-160. 
21 The King Reports have been developed, in line with global developments, from King I in 1994, King II in 2002 and 
subsequently King III in 2009 (Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 
32-35). It is also worth noting that efforts are underway to review the King III Report and produce King IV Report. It has 
been reported that the set-up phase on the project plan, which includes governance structures and project plan, has been 
completed. The initial research consisting stakeholder consultations and a comparative analysis of King III with the major 
international governance codes has also been completed. Currently the project team has published the draft document for 
public comment. This thesis does not discuss the King IV Report in detail since it is still in draft form. For more information 
on the draft Report, visit http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/King_IV/King_IV_Progress_update. 
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debate on corporate governance in South Africa.
22
 To enhance its efforts, in 2001, the IoDSA 
established the Centre for Directorship and Corporate Governance, which disseminates 
information on corporate governance developments around the globe in addition to providing 
technical training on directorship and board effectiveness.
23
  
 
The main sources of corporate governance in South Africa are the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), Acts of Parliament,
24
 particularly the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999 and Companies Act 71 of 2008, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Listings Requirements
25
 and common law
26
 with rich 
and extensive case law pertaining to corporate governance.
27
 Examples of other Acts
28
 which 
impose, although indirectly, corporate governance obligations on companies and its directors 
include (as amended), the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995,
29
 the Basic Conditions of 
                                                 
22 Koma SB “Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector: Issues, 
Trends and Prospects” (2009) 44(3) Journal of Public Administration 451-459. However, “the government, regulatory 
agencies, the accountants’ profession and the stock exchange have also been forces for change, motivated largely by the 
desire to apply international standards in South Africa” (Oman CP Corporate Governance in Development: The Experiences 
of Brazil, Chile, India, and South Africa (OECD Publishing, 2003) 163). See also Luo Y and Tung RL “International 
Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: A Springboard Perspective” (2007) 38 Journal of International Business Studies 
481–498. 
23 The Institute of Directors (IoDSA) Governance Assessment Instrument, Information 2012 (IoDSA 2012) 9-10 available at 
http://www.iodsa-gai.co.za/documents/iodsa_gai_handout_2012.pdf. (accessed on 29 September 2015). For more 
information on the Center for Directorship and Corporate Governance, visit http://www.iodsa.co.za/.   
24 Included among the key statutes are the Public Audit Act (No. 25 of 2004), Acts that enabled the formation of the public 
entities (e.g. the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998 and Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001) and sector 
legislation (e.g. Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 and Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005).  
25 The Johannesburg Securities Exchange Listings Requirements make it mandatory for companies and directors to observe 
certain corporate governance principles as enshrined in the King Report (section 3.84 of the JSE Listings Requirements). The 
JSE Listings Requirements are available at https://www.jse.co.za/.../JSEEducationItems/Service%20Issue%2017.pdf 
(accessed on 10 October 2014). 
26 Although the new Companies Act incorporates numerous provisions of common law, the Act does not replace the 
common law but rather endorses it (section 77 of the Companies Act). See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An 
Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 31. 
27 Moloi STM Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting in the Annual Reports of South African Listed Companies 
(2008) 46. See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 30-32. It is 
important to note that this study mostly focuses on corporate governance instruments that are applicable to public entities. 
28 It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse these other Acts in detail as the major focus is on the main Acts, i.e. the 
Constitution, Companies Act, Public Finance Management Act and Acts establishing public entities. 
29 The Labour Relations Act was effective from December 1995. Its main purpose is to “advance economic development, 
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. The Act was enacted to, among other things, give 
effect to section 23 of the Constitution, regulate the organisational rights of trade unions and to give effect to the public 
international law obligations of the Republic of South Africa relating to labour relations (section 1 of the Labour Relations 
Act). The Labour Relations Act is relevant in promoting good corporate governance because employees are one of the 
stakeholders directors need to take cognisance of in undertaking their duties in the modern society. 
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Employment Act 75 of 1997,
30
 the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998,
31
 the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998,
32
 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act 53 of 2003
33
 and the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004.
34
 In addition to these statutory 
instruments, the King Report on Corporate Governance and the Protocol on Corporate 
Governance in the Public Sector have sought to promote good corporate governance 
practices in South Africa.
35
 
 
5.2.1.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The South African Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 
1996 and became effective on 4 February 1997. The Constitution acknowledges the 
importance of good governance.
36
 It is founded on; inter alia, “the achievement of equality 
                                                 
30 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act was promulgated in 1997. Its purpose is to “advance economic development 
and social justice” through giving effect to and regulating the right to fair labour practices conferred by section 23(1) of the 
Constitution and giving effect to “obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour 
Organisation”. The Act establishes and enforces basic conditions of employment by regulating the variation of basic 
conditions of employment (section 2 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act). 
31 The Act was promulgated in October 1998. Its purpose is to promote the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of 
true democracy, promote equity in the workplace through the elimination of unfair discrimination and “implementing 
affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups” (section 2 of 
Employment Equity Act).  
32 The National Environmental Management Act commenced on 29 January 1999. Its purpose is to “provide for co-operative 
environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, institutions 
that will promote cooperative governance and procedures for coordinating environmental functions exercised by organs of 
state; to provide for certain aspects of the administration and enforcement of other environmental management laws” 
(“Preamble” to the National Environmental Management Act). In the modern world, directors have an obligation to preserve 
the environment in which they operate by preventing pollution and ecological degradation and promoting conservation. The 
Act is therefore relevant to directors in undertaking their duties.  
33 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act was promulgated in January 2004. It seeks to “promote the 
achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-based and effective participation of black people in the 
economy and promote a higher growth rate, increased employment and more equitable income distribution; and establish a 
national policy on broad-based black economic empowerment so as to promote the economic unity of the nation, protect the 
common market, and promote equal opportunity and equal access to government services” (“Preamble” and section 2 of the 
Act). The Act was passed to set up a legal framework for the promotion of black economic empowerment so that black 
people have sufficient influence over strategic direction and core management of businesses (Southall R “The ANC and 
Black Capitalism in South Africa” (2004) 100 Review of African Political Economy 313-328). The Act provides for, inter 
alia, issuance of codes of good practice and transformation charters (section 9 and 12 of the BEE Act). 
34 The Securities Services Act was gazetted in January 2005. It seeks to increase confidence in the South African financial 
markets by requiring that securities services be “provided in a fair, efficient and transparent manner” and through promoting 
the international competitiveness of securities services in the country (section 2 of the Securities Services Act). See Naidoo 
R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 34-36. 
35 Although there are other self-regulatory instruments in South Africa, this thesis mainly focuses on the King Report and 
Protocol. 
36 Nevondwe L, Odeku KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in the South African 
Public Sector” (2014) 40(2) Journal of Social Sciences 261-275. 
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and the advancement of human rights and freedoms” and “a multi-party system of democratic 
government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”. The Constitution is the 
supreme law of the country and binds all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state at 
all levels of government. Chapter 2 of the Constitution, containing the Bill of Rights, 
enshrines the rights of all people in South Africa and “affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. The Constitution forbids unfair discrimination directly 
or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, “including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”.37 In addition, Chapter 10 of the Constitution 
aims to promote good corporate governance by providing for; inter alia, economic and 
effective use of resources, high standard of professional ethics, transparency, fairness and 
accountability in the administration of all organs of state and public entities. 
 
5.2.1.2 Companies Act 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 was promulgated on 9 April 2009 and became effective on 1 
May 2011. The Act, inter alia, repealed the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and made certain 
amendments to the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984.
38
 The Companies Act applies to every 
company incorporated in terms of this Act.
39
 The Act is not a complete codification of the 
company law applicable to companies regulated by it and common law principles have been 
referred to where necessary.
40
 In this respect, English law has played a significant role in 
South Africa given the fact that the country’s legal system originated from and was modelled 
after its English counterpart.
41
 As a result, many of the English company law rules have been 
readily accepted in South African law especially in respect of directors’ fiduciary duties.42 
                                                 
37 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
38 “Preamble” and section 7 of the Companies Act. 
39 Sections 7-10 of the Companies Act. 
40 Kanamugire JC and Chimuka TC “The Directors’ Duty to Exercise Care and Skill in Contemporary South African 
Company Law and the Business Judgment Rule” (2014) 20(5) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 70-78 available at 
http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/viewFile/3710/3635 (accessed on 4 November 2015). See also Delport 
P The New Companies Act Manual (LexisNexis 2009) 58-59. 
41 Du Plessis JJ, Saenger I and Foster R “Board Diversity or Gender Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia and 
South Africa” (2012) 207-249. 
42 Ibid.  
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Nonetheless, English company law has been merely persuasive and not binding authority in 
South African law because where English principles conflict with South African law, the 
courts have disregarded them.
43
 
 
The objectives of the Companies Act are to, inter alia, provide for the incorporation, 
registration, organisation and management of companies and to define the relationships 
between companies and their respective shareholders or members and directors.
44
 In the 
purpose clause, the Companies Act specifically provides that one of its purposes is to 
promote the development of the South African economy by “encouraging transparency and 
high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, given the significant role of 
enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation”.45 The Act governs how 
companies should be administered and imposes a number of statutory duties on directors 
which should result in good corporate governance, if properly observed.
46
 The Companies 
Act further provides for a partial codification of directors’ duties with the objective of, inter 
alia, providing clarity to directors concerning their duties and enlightening all stakeholders 
on the rules that govern directors’ conduct.47 The Companies Act also applies to state owned 
enterprises.
48
 The Act specifically states that any provision of the Act “that applies to a public 
company applies also to a state-owned company, except to the extent that the Minister has 
granted an exemption in terms of subsection (3)”.49 
 
                                                 
43 See Roodepoort United Main Reef GM Co Ltd (in Liquidation) and Another v Du Toit NO where Solomon CJ warned that 
“Although, therefore, there is force in the argument that as our Companies Act is taken over from the English Act, we should 
be guided in our interpretation of it by decisions of English courts on identical sections, the argument cannot be pressed too 
far, and does not justify us in adopting any English decision which is based upon legal principles which are foreign to our 
system of law” (at 71-72) (Roodepoort United Main Reef GM Co Ltd (in Liquidation) and Another v Du Toit NO 1928 AD 
66). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Section 7(b) of the Companies Act. 
46 Muswaka L “Corporate Governance under the South African Companies Act: A Critique” (2013) 11-19. 
47 Sections 75-78 of the Companies Act. See also Esser I Recognition of Various Stakeholder Interests in Company 
Management (2008) 286-287. 
48 A “state owned company” is defined as an enterprise that is registered in terms of the Companies Act as a company and 
either is listed as a public entity in Schedule 2 or 3 of the Public Finance Management Act or is owned by a municipality, as 
contemplated in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Chapter 1, Part A of the Companies Act). 
49 Section 9(1) of the Companies Act. The exemption can only be granted where the provisions of the Companies Act 
overlap or duplicate an applicable regulatory scheme established in terms of any other national legislation. 
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5.2.1.3 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
The PFMA was promulgated on 2 March 1999 and became effective on 1 April 2000. It 
repealed the Reporting by Public Entities Act 93 of 1992. The PFMA aims “to secure 
transparency, accountability, and sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets and 
liabilities” of departments, public entities, constitutional institutions and provincial 
legislatures.
50
 The Act gives managerial and operational autonomy to the public entities and it 
adopted several principles in the King Reports to promote the effectiveness of public entity 
boards.
51
 The PFMA plays an important role in regulating good corporate governance 
practices and presents more comprehensive standards for reporting and accountability 
through embracing an approach to financial management in public entities that requires 
performance in service delivery and economic and efficient deployment of state assets and 
resources.
52
 It is mandatory for entities to comply with the provisions of the PFMA and the 
Act imposes sanctions for noncompliance.
53
  
 
5.2.1.4 Acts Establishing Public Entities 
The majority of South African public entities are established through an Act of Parliament.
54
 
The Act specifies the main objective of establishing the respective public entity, how it 
should be governed and stipulates the functions, powers and duties of the entity.
55
 For 
example, the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act provides that the Authority must 
                                                 
50 Preamble, sections 2 and 3 of the PFMA. The PFMA defines a public entity as a national government business enterprise; 
“or a board, commission, company, corporation, fund or other entity (other than a national government business enterprise) 
which is—   
(i) established in terms of national legislation;   
(ii) fully or substantially funded either from the National Revenue Fund, or by way of a  
tax, levy or other money imposed in terms of national legislation; and   
(iii) accountable to Parliament” (See Chapter 1 of the PFMA). 
51 Sections 46 through 86 of the PFMA are of particular importance for financial governance issues. 
52 Madue SM “Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 1999 – A Compliance Strategy” (2007) 26(3) Politeia: South 
African Journal for Political Science and Public Administration 306-318 available at 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2902/madue1.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 23 October 2015). See also 
Nevondwe L, Odeku KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in the South African Public 
Sector” (2014) 261-275. 
53 See para 5.2.7 below. 
54 Examples are the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998, South African National Roads Agency Limited 
Act 7 of 1998 and Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001. 
55 See “Preamble” and sections 2 and 25 of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act. The Act thus seeks to 
ensure that the public entity is properly governed. 
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perform its functions in a manner consistent with the obligations of the Republic under any 
international agreement and customary international law binding on the Republic in terms of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
56
 The Authority is also obliged to perform 
its functions without unreasonably discriminating” against or among various participants or 
categories of participants in civil aviation safety and security”.57 The Authority should be 
governed by a board that is appointed by the Minister of Transport in the national sphere of 
government.
58
  
 
5.2.1.5 King Reports on Corporate Governance 
The notion of corporate governance was formally introduced in South Africa in March 1992, 
with the formation of the King Committee on Corporate Governance.
59
 The Committee came 
up with recommendations which resulted in the adoption of the King I Report on Corporate 
Governance (hereinafter referred to as King I Report) in November 1994. The King I Report 
aimed to encourage the highest standard of corporate governance in South Africa and served 
as “a reference point for policy makers in the examination and development of legal and 
regulatory frameworks for corporate governance”.60 In 2002, following the adoption of a new 
Constitution and economic developments locally and internationally, the King I Report was 
revised, and King II Report on Corporate Governance (hereinafter referred to as King II 
Report) was published.
61
  
 
The King II Report focused more on the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of good 
corporate governance in that it extended beyond the existing legal and regulatory framework, 
                                                 
56 Section 4 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. See also section of 12 of the South African National Roads 
Agency Limited Act. 
59 Scholtz H and Smit AR “Factors Influencing Corporate Governance Disclosure of Companies Listed on the Alternative 
Exchange (AltX) in South Africa)” (2015) 29(1) South African Journal of Accounting Research 29-50 available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/ 0.1080/10291954.2015.999471 (accessed on 9 November 2015). 
 
60 Bekink M “An Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth Century to the 
Companies Bill of 2007” (2008) 20 South African Mercantile Law Journal 95–116. According to Bekink, the key challenge 
for the drafters of the King I Report was to seek principles striking an appropriate balance between the freedom to manage, 
accountability and the interest of stakeholders. 
 
61 Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 218-
219. 
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and sought to identify key areas of good corporate governance practice which would be 
voluntarily and effectively applied by companies and directors.
62
 The King II Report was 
applicable to all companies listed on the JSE Limited, banks, financial and insurance entities, 
public sector enterprises falling under the Public Finance Management Act and the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, including any state department 
acting in terms of the Constitution or legislation.
63
 All other entities were, however, also 
expected to take into account the provisions of the King II Report where applicable.
64
 
 
The then anticipated new Companies Act and changes in international corporate governance 
trends since the release of the King II Report necessitated the issuance of the King III Report 
(hereinafter referred to as King III Report) in September 2009.
65
 The King III Report became 
effective from March 2010 and applies to all entities regardless of their nature, size or form 
of incorporation or establishment.
66
 In contrast to the previous Reports, the King III moves 
from a “comply or explain” approach to a principles-based “apply or explain” approach.67 
This means that all entities are not necessarily obliged to comply with all aspects of the King 
III Report but are expected, by way of explanation, to make a positive statement about how 
                                                 
62 Ibid. The King II Report identifies seven fundamental characteristics of good corporate governance namely discipline, 
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility (“Introduction and Background” 
to the King II Report). 
 
63 Nevondwe L, Odeku KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in the South African 
Public Sector” (2014) 261-275. According to Mallin, the main reason for the “selective application was to target companies 
and institutions that fall within a structured and more readily regulated environment in which the corporate governance 
standards could be more easily identified and measured” (Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: 
Country Analyses (2006) 218-219). 
64 Koma SB “Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector: Issues, 
Trends and Prospects” (2009) 451-459. See also Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country 
Analyses (2006) 218-219. 
65 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report and Moloi T and Barac K “Assessment of Corporate Governance 
Reporting in the Annual Report of South African Listed Companies” (2010) 10(1) Southern African Journal of 
Accountability and Auditing Research 19-31. See also De Beer F and du Toit DH “Human Resources Managers as 
Custodians of the King III Code” (2015) 18(2) South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 206-217 
available at http://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/viewFile/769/539  (accessed on 29 October 2015).  
66 Muswaka L “Corporate Governance Best Practices Vital for Good Corporate Citizenship: Guidance from King III” (2013) 
3(4) World Journal of Social Sciences 25-35. See also Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG “South Africa’s King III: A 
Commercial Governance Code Determining Standards of Conduct for Civil Society Organizations” (2010) 12(2) The 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 1-109 available at http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12iss2/art_1.htm 
(accessed on 25 October 2015). 
 
67 Ibid. The “apply or explain” approach means that where entities have applied the best practice recommendations in the 
Report, a positive statement should be made to the stakeholders to this effect and where the entities have not complied with 
any principle or recommendation they should fully explain the reasons to the stakeholders (Scholtz H and Smit AR “Factors 
Influencing Corporate Governance Disclosure of Companies Listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) in South Africa” 
(2015) 29-50). 
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the principles have been applied or have not been applied.
68
 The framework recommended by 
the King III Report is principles-based and recognises that there is no “one size fits all” 
solution to good corporate governance.
69
  
 
In addition, the King III Report takes an integrated approach to corporate governance which 
“recognizes that stakeholders such as the community in which the company operates, its 
customers, its employees and its suppliers, need to be developed when developing the 
strategy of the company”.70 The King III Report thus advocates for a balance in corporate 
governance between allowing directors to run the company in the way they consider as best 
for the stakeholders, while providing stakeholders with some protection against a board that 
disregards its responsibilities and is not held accountable.
71
  
 
Since the King III Report was issued in 2009, important corporate governance and regulatory 
developments have taken place both locally and internationally. As a result, the Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) has spearheaded the development of the King IV 
Report. Another consideration in the development of the King IV Report is that whilst listed 
companies are generally applying King III Report,
72
 other entities like non-profit 
organisations, private companies and public sector organisations have experienced challenges 
in interpreting and adapting King III Report to their particular circumstances.
73
 The King IV 
                                                 
68 Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG “South Africa’s King III: A Commercial Governance Code Determining Standards of 
Conduct for Civil Society Organizations” (2010) 1-109. It has been proposed that the term “apply or explain” is preferred to 
the term “comply or explain”, so as to avoid the impression that failure to comply equals non-compliance, that is rule-
breaking. Commenting on the effectiveness of the Combined Code, Sir Derek Higgs says “apply or explain” is better than 
“comply or explain,” because “comply” connotes some regulatory compliance or rule where there is none (FRC The Review 
on Effectiveness of the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 2009) 6-7 available at 
www.frc.org.uk/documents/.../Cable%20&%20Wireless.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2015). 
 
69 Entities are therefore encouraged to adapt the principles of the King III Report as appropriate to the size, nature and 
complexity of their organisation (Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG “South Africa’s King III: A Commercial Governance 
Code Determining Standards of Conduct for Civil Society Organizations” (2010) 1-109). See also BPeSA Corporate 
Governance Handbook (Business Process enabling South Africa (BPeSA) Western Cape 2011) 12-14 available at 
http://www.bpesa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/BPeSA-WC-CG-Manual_Sep-2011_V2.0.pdf (accessed on 17 
September 2015). 
 
70 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report. See also Hamann R South Africa: The Role of History, 
Government, and Local Context (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2009) 435-439, for a similar line of argument. 
 
71 Moyo NJ South African Principles of Corporate Governance: Legal and Regulatory Restraints on Powers and 
Remuneration of Executive Directors (2010) 85. 
72 This is mostly because it is mandatory for listed companies to comply with the King Report in terms of section 3.84 of the 
JSE Listings Requirements. 
73 See www.iodsa.co.za/ ?page=KingIV and Paper titled “Changes in Corporate Governance – An Introduction to King IV” 
presented by Parratt J at the Institute of Chartered Secretaries Administrators (ICSA) Annual Conference 2016 available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/ICSAevents/icsa-annual-conference-day-1-1530 (accessed on 15 March 2016). 
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Report, thus, aims to, inter alia, “broaden the acceptance of corporate governance by making 
it accessible and fit for application by organisations of a variety of sizes, resources and 
complexity of strategic objectives and operations”.74 The King IV Report “does not represent 
a significant departure from the philosophy underpinning King III” but just redefines some 
concepts.
75
 
 
To ensure compliance with the recommendations of the King Reports, South African courts 
have found that companies and their boards are required to measure up to the principles set 
out in the King Report.
76
 An example is the case of South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) Ltd & Another V Mpofu, where the court observed that the board and its directors are 
ultimately accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the company as 
required by the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002.
77
 
 
5.2.1.6 Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector 
In 1994, the new South African Government observed that the control and governance of 
public entities was “not based on any standardized principles or rules”.78 As a result, the 
South African Department of Public Enterprises published the Protocol on Corporate 
Governance in the Public Sector (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol) in 1997 with a view 
to inculcate the principles of good corporate governance in public entities.
79
 The Protocol 
was reviewed in 2002 based on the King II Report and international developments.
80
 In 
contrast to the King Reports, “which cover a wide spectrum of entities in both private and 
public sectors, the Protocol aims to provide guidance specifically to the public sector, taking 
                                                 
74 “Part 1: Introduction and Foundational Concepts” to the draft King IV Report on Corporate Governance, 2016. 
75 Ibid. 
76 See  para 29-30 of South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Ltd & Another V Mpofu (2009) 4 All SA 169 and 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry V Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others (2006) (5) SA 333 (W). See also 
Nevondwe L, Odeku KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in the South African Public 
Sector” (2014) 261-275. 
77 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Ltd & Another V Mpofu (2009) 4 All SA 169. 
78 “Historical Background” to the Protocol. 
79 The Protocol governs how public entities are directed, managed and held accountable (para 2.3 of the Protocol).  
80 Para 2.2 of the Protocol. 
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into account the unique mandate” of public entities.81 It therefore, applies to all public entities 
listed in Schedules 2 and 3 (B) and (D) to the PFMA and any unlisted public entities that are 
subsidiaries of a public entity, whether listed or not.
82
 
 
5.2.1.7 Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Listings Requirements 
The JSE was established “to provide facilities for the listing of securities (including securities 
issued by companies, domestic or foreign), to provide the JSE’s users with an orderly market 
place for trading in such securities and to regulate the market accordingly”.83 To achieve its 
objectives, the JSE produced the Listings Requirements which have been regularly amended 
to align them with domestic laws and international best practice.
84
 The Listings Requirements 
aim to ensure that the “business of the JSE is carried on with due regard to the public 
interest” and to increase investor confidence in the South African equities market.85 The 
Listings Requirements apply to “companies seeking a listing for the first time, presently listed 
companies, all other securities that applicants may wish to list and those presently listed and, 
where applicable, to directors (as defined in each relevant section) of applicant issuers and to 
sponsors”.86  
 
The Listings Requirements comprise “rules and procedures governing new applications, all 
corporate actions and continuing obligations applicable to issuers and issuers of specialist 
securities”.87 They accommodate certain provisions of the King Report on Corporate 
                                                 
81 However, it should be noted that the principles of the Protocol only seek to augment and “not supersede (or conflict with) 
those contained in the King Code and should, in fact, be read in conjunction with the King Code” (para 2. 2 of the Protocol). 
See also Koma SB “Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector: 
Issues, Trends and Prospects” (2009) 451-459. 
82 Para 4.4 of the Protocol. 
83 “Introduction” to the JSE Listings Requirements. See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South 
African Companies (2009) 28. 
84 Scholtz HE “Share Options as Part of Executive Remuneration: Aligning the Interests of Stakeholders” (2009) 13(2) 
Southern African Business Review 58-87. 
85  Ibid. 
86 “Introduction” to the JSE Listings Requirements. 
87 Ibid.  
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Governance and apply equally to companies listed on the JSE.
88
 All listed companies are 
required to disclose in the annual report the extent of the company’s compliance with the 
principles set out in the King Report on Corporate Governance and to proffer explanations 
where the principles were not complied with.
89
  
 
Organisations in South Africa have also been extensively guided by other international 
corporate governance codes like the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG 
Guidelines and ICGN Principles.
90
 Like a number of African countries, South Africa has 
benefited from corporate governance initiatives such as New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD),
91
 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),
92
 Africa Governance 
Forum (AGF) and Africa Governance Inventory (AGI).
93
 The country is also one of the 
founder members of the African Corporate Governance Network (ACGN) which was 
established to enhance the corporate governance standards of African nations through 
information and experiences sharing.
94
 
 
The next section considers how the various instruments have assisted the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of boards of public entities. In this chapter, the research highlights the 
recommendations and regulatory provisions put in place by the two countries. A comparative 
                                                 
88 Section 3.84 of the JSE Listings Requirements provides that, in addition to complying with section 8.63(a) of the JSE 
Listings Requirements, listed companies must also comply with a number of specifically itemised corporate governance 
requirements and must disclose their compliance therewith in their annual report. For example, every listed company is 
required to have a policy detailing the procedures for appointments of board members and “a clear balance of power and 
authority at board of directors’ level”.  
89 Section 3.84 of the JSE Listings Requirements. 
90 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report. See also Ncube B Corporate Governance? Future Perspective in 
Light of the 2008/09 Global Economic Meltdown Unpublished Thesis (University of Stellenbosch 2010) 8-9. These 
initiatives are discussed under Chapter 2, para 2.5 above. 
91 See Chapter 3, para 3.5 above for more details on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. 
92 South Africa conducted its first African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Report (CRR) in 2007 where it 
identified numerous governance challenges. As a result of the identified challenges, the country introduced and is in the 
process of implementing a National Programme of Action. In 2013, South Africa presented its third progress report on the 
implementation of the APRM Program Action to the Committee of Heads of State and Government of participating 
countries of the African Peer Review Mechanism (Turianskyi Y South Africa’s Implementation of the APRM: Making a 
Difference or Going Through the Motions? (South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Briefing 99 of July 2014) 
1-2 available at http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/550 (accessed on 13 March 2015)). 
93 Carmody P “Another BRIC in the Wall? South Africa's Developmental Impact and Contradictory Rise in Africa and 
Beyond” (2012) 24 European Journal of Development Research 223–241 available at http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/ejdr/journal/v24/n2/full/ejdr20128a.html (accessed on 15 March 2015). See para 2.5 for a discussion of these 
initiatives. 
94 See Chapter 3, para 3.5 above. 
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assessment of the effectiveness of the guidelines and regulatory instruments in enhancing the 
effectiveness of boards of public entities and promoting corporate governance is carried out 
in chapter 7. 
 
5.2.2 Role of the Board 
Historically, South African company law focused on the shareholder wealth maximisation 
approach and obliged directors to employ their powers for the benefit of the company.
95
 But, 
the country has progressively developed the idea of an inclusive approach to corporate 
governance to ensure that directors act in the interests of all relevant stakeholders.
96
 In 
carrying out their various duties, the directors are guided by common law, several statutes 
(e.g. the Companies Act),
97
 the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and corporate 
governance instruments like the King Reports and the Protocol.
98
 Although directors’ duties 
in South Africa have traditionally been largely regulated by the common law, in a change of 
approach, the Companies Act has partially codified these duties by specifically setting a 
standard of directors’ conduct.99 For clarity, the Act provides that the provisions of the Act 
                                                 
95 Principle 8 of the King III Report. See also Muswaka L “Shareholder Value versus Stakeholders’ Interests– A Critical 
Analysis of Corporate Governance from a South African Perspective” (2015) 43(3) Journal of Social Sciences 217-225, 
Miles L and Jones M “The Prospects for Corporate Governance Operating as a Vehicle for Social Change in South Africa” 
(2009) 14(1) Deakin Law Review 53–77 and Esser I Recognition of Various Stakeholder Interests in Company Management 
(2008) 211-213. For information on the shareholder wealth maximisation approach as well as explanations on what “the 
benefit of the company” entails, see Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. 
96 The Companies Act acknowledges the importance of considering the interests of other stakeholders, for example, when it 
states that one of its purposes is to “provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a 
manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders” (section 7(k) of the Companies Act).  For more 
information on the inclusive approach to corporate governance, see Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above, Croucher R and Miles L 
“Corporate Governance and Employees in South Africa” (2010) 367-389, Muswaka L “Corporate Governance under the 
South African Companies Act: A Critique” (2013) 3(3) World Journal of Social Sciences 11-19, “Introduction and 
Background” & section 4 of the King II Report and Principle 8 of the King III Report.  
97 The Companies Act is the main Act (for example sections 75-77 of Companies Act 71 of 2008) with other legislation also 
providing for directors’ duties, for example, the PFMA, Labour Relations Act and the Income Tax Act (No. 28 of 1997). 
98 See Bouwman N “An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill” (2009) 21 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 509-534 and Esser I and Coetzee J “Codification of Directors’ Duties” (2004) 12(1) Juta’s Business 
Law 26-31. 
99 Partial codification, unlike complete codification, involves adopting the general principles of law but allows some room 
for the development of the common law. This means that the Companies Act does not replace the common law duties of 
directors that are not expressly amended or are not in conflict with the Act (Delport P The New Companies Act Manual 
(2009) 58-59). See also Kanamugire JC and Chimuka TC “The Directors’ Duty to Exercise Care and Skill in Contemporary 
South African Company Law and the Business Judgment Rule” (2014) 70-78. 
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are in addition to, and not in substitution of, any duties of the director
100
 of a company under 
the common law.
101
 This means that directors are still obliged to comply with their common 
law duties unless the duties have specifically been amended by section 76 or are in conflict 
with that section.
102
  
 
Concerns were raised by some commentators as to whether it was necessary to partially 
codify directors’ duties as a way of encouraging a higher standard of conduct by directors. In 
response to the concerns, those in favour of codification said that the move was necessary as 
a starting point to promote professional and ethical conduct by directors as it enables 
“directors to identify the scope of their duties clearly”.103 Their line of argument was that the 
existing standards were insufficient, archaic and spread in decided cases which may not be 
easily available to both directors and stakeholders of the company.
104
 Havenga
105
 argues that 
partial codification is the most suitable for South Africa as it helps in making the law 
understandable and easily accessible, whilst retaining some flexibility.
106
 She further argues 
that codification of directors’ duties does not only make the law accessible and assist 
directors to be clear about their obligations, but enlightens investors on the rules that govern 
the behaviour of directors and the associated liabilities or remedies where the rules are not 
observed.
107
 Other analysts also contend that codification has the potential to induce directors 
                                                 
100 The Act defines a director as “a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate director 
of a company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name 
designated”. 
101 Section 76(6) of the Companies Act. The fact that section 76 does not substitute the common law duty of the director to 
exercise care and skill means that a director can be held liable in terms of the common law principles (section 77(2) of the 
Companies Act) of delict for any loss, damages or costs incurred by the company which resulted from the director’s breach 
of his statutory duty of care and skill (Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law 2nd ed. (Juta, Cape Town 2012) 558-
560 and Bouwman N “An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill” (2009) 509-534). 
102 Delport P The New Companies Act Manual (LexisNexis 2009) 58-59. 
103 Esser I and Coetzee J “Codification of Directors’ Duties” (2004) 26-31. 
104 Grové AP Company Directors: Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Care and Skill Unpublished Thesis (University of 
Pretoria 2012) 39-43.  
 
105 Havenga M “Regulating Conflicts of Interest and South African Company Law Reform” (2005) 26(3) Obiter 609-621.  
 
106 Directors need to know what their duties are, and directors must be aware of what is expected of them, because the 
standards of director’s conduct can influence the profitability of a company, determine the extent of foreign and domestic 
investments and ultimately determine the success of a company (Kiggundu J and Havenga M “The Regulation of Directors’ 
Self-Serving Conduct: Perspectives from Botswana and South Africa” (2004) 37(3) Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 312-326). 
107 Havenga M “Regulating Conflicts of Interest and South African Company Law Reform” (2005) 609-621. 
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to act in accordance with professional standards of care and to make proper and sound 
business decisions.
108
 
 
On the other hand, those opposed to codification of directors’ duties argue that the common 
law adequately outlines and deals with directors’ duties and liabilities such that it was 
unnecessary to codify those duties as codification may be inadequate to address the dynamics 
of duties of directors’.109 They argue that it may not be possible to standardise directors’ 
duties due to the differences in the type of decisions directors have to make and also 
differences in the nature of business conducted by the companies.
110
 It would be difficult to 
comprehensively codify directors’ fiduciary duties and their obligations of care and skill as 
there are simply too many matters to be taken care of.
111
 The analysts are also of the view 
that codification may create rigidity and conciseness which may cause directors to; for 
example, assume that the omission of certain requirements from legislation implies that the 
omitted requirements are less important and to disregard some duties and obligations which 
may be contained in other legislation and regulations.
112
 They further contend that directors 
might not be motivated to take the necessary risks and to fully engage their entrepreneurial 
abilities for the economic growth of their companies’ but might just focus on observing rules 
and regulations.
113
 
 
Arguments have also been presented to the fact that, unlike the traditional position which 
gave shareholders powers to oversee the management of a company, the new Companies Act 
empowers the board to manage the business and affairs of a company, subject to the Act or 
the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.114 The Act specifically states that a board has 
                                                 
108 Bekink M “An Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth Century to the 
Companies Bill of 2007” (2008) 95-116. 
 
109 Ibid. See also Havenga M “Regulating Conflicts of Interest and South African Company Law Reform” (2005) 609-621. 
 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. See also Esser I Recognition of Various Stakeholder Interests in Company Management (2008) 291-292. 
113 Bekink M “An Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth Century to the 
Companies Bill of 2007” (2008) 95-116. See also Havenga M “Regulating Conflicts of Interest and South African Company 
Law Reform” (2005) 609-621. 
114 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act provides that “the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under 
the direction of its board”. Even though directors are required to act collectively as a board, the board cannot owe a fiduciary 
duty because it is not an independent legal persona and is not incorporated as a legal entity. Therefore, liability for failure to 
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the “authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, 
except to the extent that the Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise”.115 According to Delport, the new Companies Act changed the original doctrine 
which provided that “the division of powers is regulated by the agreement between the 
shareholders and the board of directors”.116  The powers of directors are now derived from 
statute and do not originate from the agreement between the shareholders and directors.
117
 
This makes the board of directors the highest authority in the company.
118
 
 
The Companies Act provides for various directors’ duties which encourage integrity, 
transparency and accountability thus enhance good corporate governance practices.
119
 For 
example, directors are obliged to act in good faith
120
 and for a proper incumbent purpose,
121
 
                                                                                                                                                        
properly carry out the fiduciary duties devolves on the directors as individuals not as a board (Naidoo R Corporate 
Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 160). 
115 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act. However, according to Delport, it is not clear whether the “except to the extent that 
the Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise” extend to the management of the business and 
affairs of the company too and whether it only qualifies the authority to “exercise all of the powers and perform any of the 
functions of the company” (Delport PA “The Division of Powers in a Company” in Visser C and Pretorius JT Essays in 
Honour of Frans Malan (2014) 90-92).  
116 Delport PA “The Division of Powers in a Company” in Visser C and Pretorius JT Essays in Honour of Frans Malan 
(2014) 90-92. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Section 76 of the Companies Act. In addition to their statutory duties, directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and 
common law duties to take reasonable care in the running of a company’s affairs (Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 165 
(C) at 170). Since the Companies Act only partially codifies directors’ duties and the common law is not specifically 
excluded, the rules contained in the common law remain relevant and of utmost importance. See also Nevondwe L, Odeku 
KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector” (2014)  261-
275. 
120 Directors have a fiduciary duty to exercise their powers and perform their functions in good faith and in the best interests 
of the company. In Cyberscene Ltd and Others v i-Kiosk Internet and Information (Pty) Ltd 2000 (3) SA 806 (C) it was 
confirmed that a director stands in the fiduciary relationship to the company of which he or she is a director, even if he or she 
is a non-executive director. The court held that a director acts in breach of his fiduciary duty to the company where he 
disadvantages the company of its contractual opportunities for his own benefit, or where he uses confidential information, 
obtained as a director, to advance the interests of a rival business entity or his own business at the expense of his company’s 
interests. Section 76(2) prohibits a director from using information gained by virtue of his office for personal gain. 
According to Cassim, section 76(2) is applicable when certain requirements are met, namely;  the defendant must be a 
director within the definition of a director, the information or advantage must have come to the director,  the director must 
have used his/her position as or information gained as a result of being a director to gain an advantage or knowingly cause 
harm to the company or wholly owned subsidiary and such advantage must have been obtained for the director or some other 
person other than the company or its wholly owned subsidiary(Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 552-
554). 
121 Section 76(3)(a) of the Companies Act. According to Delport et al, “in good faith and for a proper purpose” entails that a 
director must act honestly and may not exceed the limitations of his own authority and must not exceed the capacity or 
authority of the company. The fact that the directors honestly believed that it was in the best interest of the company to act 
outside their proper purpose duties is irrelevant and they may still be rendered personally liable (Delport PA et al 
Henochsberg on the Company Act 71 of 2008 (LexisNexis 2012) 1(2) 296). Directors must, therefore, use their powers for 
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in the interests of the company
122
 and with the necessary degree of skill and care expected of 
a reasonable person.
123
 They are also expected to ensure that all company profits are detailed 
and accounted for, thereby ensuring accountability
124
 and to disclose any interests they may 
have in a contract with a company, thereby encouraging transparency.
125
  
                                                                                                                                                        
the benefit of the company and not to their own advantage. Directors are liable if they act beyond their authority and their 
powers exercised for an improper purpose may be set aside even if they have acted honestly. In Punt v Symons & Co Ltd 
(1903) 2 Ch 506 it was held that it is improper for directors to use their powers to issue shares in order to rob the existing 
majority shareholders of their voting control. A similar decision was made in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd (1967) Ch 254. Cassim 
states that the appropriate test to determine whether the duty to act “in good faith and for a proper purpose” has been 
complied with is found in Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood (2003) 1 BCLC (ChD) 619. In this case four steps 
were said to be essential namely; identification of the particular power being challenged, identification of the proper purpose 
for which the power was given, identification of the substantial purpose for which the power was in fact exercised and 
deciding whether the purpose was proper (Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 527-528). 
122 Section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act. A director’s fundamental duty is to act in the best interests of the company. 
Henochsberg suggests that section 76(2) places a duty upon the director to account for secret profits which means that should 
a director gain such a corporate opportunity for himself, the law will treat the acquisition as being made on behalf of the 
company. It is further contended that a director’s liability to account is linked to the fact that profit has been made and not to 
the presence of any form of fraud or the absence of bona fides (Delport PA et al Henochsberg on the Company Act 71 of 
2008 (2012) 289-291). Cassim suggests that the test found in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank (1970) Ch 62 
should be used in order to determine whether a director has fulfilled his duty to act in the best interests of the company. The 
test seeks to establish whether or not an intelligent and honest person acting in the position of the director could in the 
prevailing circumstances have reasonably believed that he or she was acting in the interest of the company (Cassim FHI et al 
Contemporary Company Law (2012) 525). 
123 Section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act. See Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425 at 437 
where it was held that, when performing their duties, directors must attend carefully to the affairs of the company and must 
exhibit the “reasonable care” which any ordinary person might be expected to take under the same circumstances. To be 
considered reasonable the director’s actions must have been in the interests of the company, the director must have taken 
diligent steps to understand the subject matter and he must not have a personal financial interest in the subject matter. It is 
also important that he must have exercised his judgment in the belief that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company and in a way any reasonable man in similar circumstances would have done. A similar ruling was made in Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co (1925) Ch 407 at 427-429 where the Court of Appeal found that a director need not show a 
greater degree of skill when performing his duties than may be reasonably expected of a person of his knowledge or 
experience. According to Cassim et al, the new Companies Act upgrades the director’s duty of care and skill, and it imposes 
a less subjective and more demanding standard for directors than the common law. The introduction of this statutory duty 
reflects the modern commercial fact and contemporary attitude towards the management of companies as well as corporate 
governance best practices. The standard of care, skill and diligence is now partly objective and partly subjective. It is 
objective in that the director should exercise the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the same functions as the director. It is partly subjective to the extent that the knowledge, skill and 
experience of the particular director are also taken into account. The more experienced, knowledgeable and skilled the 
director is, the higher the level of care, skill and diligence that he must exercise (Cassim FHI et al Contemporary Company 
Law (2012) 560 and Bekink M “An Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth 
Century to the Companies Bill of 2007” (2008) 95–116). 
124 Section 30 of the Companies Act. A director will be accountable for any profit made using a corporate asset through 
holding the office of director. In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) 1 All ER 378 (HL), the House of Lords held that the 
directors were liable for the profits in respect of the sold subsidiary company’s shares. The court disregarded the fact that the 
directors had acted in good faith and tried to assist the company in acquiring the corporate opportunity. The court found that 
the directors had acquired the profits only by reason of their holding the office of directors. To enhance accountability, 
section 214 of the Companies Act provides that if any company’s financial statement is false or misleading, any person who 
is “a party” (as defined) to the preparation, approval or publication of that statement is guilty of an offence. 
125 Section 75 of the Companies Act. Directors are required not to put themselves in a position where there is, or may be, a 
conflict between their personal interests and their duties to the company. In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 
Ltd 1921 AD 168, it was held that a director will not be allowed to retain a benefit or profit obtained through a breach of his 
fiduciary duties to the company. In this case, a director of the plaintiff company had purchased property in circumstances 
under which it was his duty to acquire the property for the company and not for himself. See also Sher H “Company 
Directors’ Duties and Responsibilities” (2005) 13(3) Juta’s Business Law 129-131. 
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The Act also provides for the mandatory appointment of a company secretary who is 
accountable to the company’s board.126 The secretary assists the board and individual 
directors in executing their duties through provision of guidance as to their duties, 
responsibilities and powers.
127
 The secretary ensures that, inter alia, minutes of all 
shareholders, board and board committee meetings are properly recorded in accordance with 
the Act and that the company complies with all the applicable legislation.
128
 The Companies 
Act further provides for the establishment of board committees to assist the board to 
effectively carry out its obligations.
129
 In terms of the Act, the audit committee
130
 and social 
ethics committee
131
 are mandatory for certain companies. The board or board committees are 
empowered to engage the services of legal counsel, accountants, or other professional persons 
retained by the company on matters involving skills or expertise within the particular 
person’s professional or expert competence.132 
                                                 
126 Section 86 of the Companies Act. 
127 Section 88 of the Companies Act. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Section 72 of the Companies Act. Research has found that board committees are necessary to assist the board to 
effectively manage its workload, thereby strengthening the board’s governance role. The committees focus on specific areas 
allowing the board to concentrate on broader and strategic issues and directions (Donaghey B “Board Committees: An 
Overview of Their Role” (2008) 13 AISSA School Board Governance Journal 1-3 available at 
http://www.ais.sa.edu.au/__files/f/2113/....Board%20Committees...pdf/ (accessed on 25 February 2016)). 
130 An audit committee is a requirement for every public company, state-owned company or other company that is so 
required only by its Memorandum of Incorporation. The audit committee must comprise of a minimum of three non-
executive persons with adequate relevant knowledge and experience to perform the committee’s functions. The main 
functions of the committee are to, inter alia, nominate, for appointment, independent external auditor, determine the fees and 
terms of engagement for the external auditor, prepare a report, to be included in the annual financial statements for that 
financial year describing how the audit committee carried out its functions and to make submissions to the board on any 
matter concerning the company’s accounting policies, financial control, records and reporting (Section 94 of the Companies 
Act). Generally, audit committees have assisted companies to improve the quality of their accounting and internal controls, 
strengthen the objectivity and credibility of their financial reporting, strengthen the independence of their internal and 
external auditors and to create a climate of discipline and control that minimises fraudulent activities (Marx B “An Analysis 
of Audit Committee Responsibilities and Disclosure Practices at Large Listed Companies in South Africa” (2009) 23(1) SA 
Journal of Accounting Research (SAJAR) 31-44 and Van der Nest DP, Thornhill C and de Jager J “Audit Committees and 
Accountability in the South African Public Sector” (2008) 43(4) Journal of Public Administration 545-558)). 
131 The new Companies Act introduced a requirement that state-owned companies and listed public companies, among 
others, must establish a social and ethics committee (section 72 of the Companies Act). The committee is expected to 
advance corporate social responsibility, sound ethical leadership and human rights imperatives. The Regulations state the 
committee’s functions as, to monitor the company’s activities in certain spheres, having regard to relevant legislation, legal 
requirements or prevailing codes of best practice (Regulation 43(5)(a)). The committee reports to the board and to 
shareholders at the company’s annual general meeting on the matters within its mandate (Regulations 43(5)(b)-43(5)(c)). In 
addition, the committee is required to monitor the non-financial aspects of management activity, including ethical conduct, 
social and environmental responsibility, and health and safety to the extent that these aspects are not dealt with by 
committees specifically appointed for that purpose. It is believed that this committee may enhance the company’s reputation 
and improve its management of risk, legal compliance, social and ethics performance (Havenga M “The Social and Ethics 
Committee in South African Company Law” (2015) 78 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law (THRHR) 285-292). 
132 Section 76 of the Companies Act. 
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Comparable the Companies Act, the PFMA and the statutes that established the public 
entities prescribe how directors should carry out their duties. The PFMA provides that 
directors should “exercise the duty of utmost care to ensure reasonable protection of the 
assets and records of the public entity”.133 To achieve this, the directors are expected to “act 
with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the 
financial affairs of the public entity”.134 They are also expected to disclose all material facts 
about the operations of the public entity which may influence the decisions or actions of the 
relevant authorities to prevent any financial prejudice to the entity.
135
 For example, directors 
are required to disclose any “direct or indirect personal or private business interest” that he, 
his immediate relative or business partner may have in any matter relating to the public 
entity.
136
 In addition, the board is required to ensure that the public entity’s activities are 
conducted in an effective, efficient and transparent manner and in compliance with all the 
relevant legislation.
137
  
 
Similarly, the various Acts of Parliament which established the public entities detail the roles 
of each of their boards which are derived from the functions and the powers of respective the 
entities.
138
 The boards of public entities are therefore guided by the provisions of their 
respective Acts in carrying out their duties. For example, the Acts require the board and 
responsible Minister to sign a performance agreement which clearly states the government’s 
“requirements in respect of the Authority’s scope of business, efficiency and ﬁnancial 
performance, and achievement of objectives” as well as the “principles to be followed by the 
Authority for purposes of business planning”.139 To promote transparency and objectivity, 
directors of public entities are required to declare any direct or indirect ﬁnancial interest they 
or their close relative or business partner may have in a matter relating to the business of the 
                                                 
133 Section 50 of the PFMA. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Section 50 of the PFMA. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Section 51 of the PFMA. 
138 Sections 3-4 and of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998 and sections 25-26 of the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act 7 of 1998. 
139 Section 5 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. 
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public entity.
140
 The Acts also provide for the establishment of board committees to assist the 
board in the performance of its functions.
141
 
 
To complement the Acts, the Protocol and the King Reports detail the roles of the board and 
recommend how directors should operate to achieve good corporate governance. According 
to the Protocol, the role of the board of a public entity is to oversee the performance of the 
entity, be fully accountable to the shareholder for such performance, give strategic direction, 
appoint the chief executive officer, monitor management closely in implementing board plans 
and corporate strategies and to ensure that the entity is fully aware of and complies with 
applicable laws, regulations, government policies and codes of business practice.
142
 The 
Protocol emphasises the need for the board to act in good faith, with diligence, skill and care 
and in the best interests of the public entity and all stakeholders, independent of 
management.
143
  
 
Similarly, the King III Report also recommends that the board and its directors should act as 
the focal point for and custodian of corporate governance and in the best interest of the 
company and all relevant stakeholders.
144
 To ensure that the board is empowered to direct the 
operations of the entity, the King III Report recommends that it should be in “effective 
control of the company” which basically means it must have the ability to make critical 
decisions for the benefit of the entity with minimal interference from the shareholders.
145
 The 
Protocol and King III Report recommend that directors should have adequate knowledge on 
what is expected of them in so far as performing their duties is concerned.
146
 They propose 
                                                 
140 Section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 9 of the South African Construction Industry 
Development Board Act 38 of 2000. 
141 Section 5 of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act and section 16 South African National 
Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act. 
142 Para 5.1.1 of the Protocol. See para 3.3 of the CGF, paras 57-60 of the National Code and paras 17-19 of the Manual in 
respect of Zimbabwe. 
143 Para 5.1.12.8 of the Protocol. Para 21 of the Manual, paras 22 & 28 of the National Code and para 3.3.5 of the CGF 
make similar provisions.  
144 Chapter 1 of the King III Report and para 5.1.1 of the Protocol. 
145 Principle 2.1 of the King III Report. In support of the need to empower the board, the Protocol recommends that the 
board “must retain full and effective control over the SOE and monitor management closely in implementing board plans 
and strategies” (para 5.1.1 of the Protocol). See also section 66 of the Companies Act for similar provisions. 
146 Chapter 1 of the King III Report and para 5.1.1 of the Protocol. Principle 6.2 of the King III Report requires the board and 
each individual director to have a working understanding of the effect of the applicable laws, rules, codes and standards on 
the company and its business. 
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that the shareholder should, in a written charter or performance agreement, describe in as 
much detail as is reasonably possible the role and responsibilities of the board as a whole and 
of individual directors.
147
 The charter should establish the correct balance between complying 
with governance constraints and performing in an entrepreneurial manner.
148
 The charter or 
performance agreement should be disclosed in the annual report and must be available for 
public inspection at the public entity’s head office during business hours to enhance 
transparency.
149
 
 
As a second measure, the King III Report and the Protocol recommend that the board 
members should be properly inducted, educated and trained so that they are adequately 
informed and reminded of their responsibilities.
150
 To support this cause, the IoDSA has 
spearheaded the education, training and induction of board members on their roles and 
responsibilities and updating the boards and other relevant stakeholders on current 
international corporate governance developments.
151
 The third recommendation, which is 
aimed at ensuring that the board maintains its independence and makes informed decisions, is 
that the board should have unrestricted access to accurate, relevant and timely information of 
the entity and establish an agreed procedure in terms of which a director may, if necessary, 
solicit independent professional advice at the expense of the public entity.
152
   
 
In the fourth instance, the King III Report and Protocol, like the Companies Act, PFMA and 
the Acts in terms of which public entities are established, recognise the need to have a small 
group working on issues to achieve efficiency. Thus, they recommend that the board should 
delegate certain functions to well-structured committees but without renouncing its own 
responsibilities.
153
 Certain committees have been considered as crucial if the board is to be 
                                                 
147 Principle 2.1 of the King III Report and para 5.1.13.1 of the Protocol. The Protocol further provides that in case of doubt, 
the board should seek clarity from the shareholder or from external professional advisors where the issue cannot be 
objectively resolved internally. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Section 5(4) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and para 5.2.13 of the Protocol. 
150 Principle 2.2 of the King III Report and para 5.1.1.12 of the Protocol. 
151 See http://www.iodsa.co.za for more information. 
152 Para 5.1.3 - 5.1.1.4 of the Protocol and Principles 2.14 and 2.23 of the King III Report. 
153 Board committees constitute an important element of the governance process and should be established with clearly 
agreed written terms of reference and reporting procedures. The committees should also be appropriately constituted, 
considering any relevant legislation and the objectives of the company (Principle 2.23 of King III Report, section 72 of the 
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effective in discharging its duties, for example, the audit, social and ethics and remuneration 
committees.
154
 The Protocol and King Report also recommend that the board should monitor 
and manage potential conflicts of interest of management, board members and the 
shareholder to enable effective discharge of its duties.
155
 Lastly, the King Report and 
Protocol provide for the appointment of a “competent, suitably qualified and experienced” 
company secretary to assist the board in carrying out its obligations.
156
 The duties of the 
company secretary include, inter alia, advising the board, organising shareholders, board and 
board committee meetings, writing minutes, maintaining statutory records and ensuring that 
the company complies with all relevant laws and regulations.
157
  
 
The above analysis shows that Zimbabwe and South Africa have developed similar 
frameworks that seek to enlighten the boards on their fiduciary duties and responsibilities, 
empower them to undertake their roles effectively and to remain accountable for the 
achievement of the entity’s objectives. As in South Africa, in Zimbabwe the way directors of 
public entities operate is governed by legislation (e.g. Companies Act, PFMA and the Acts 
that established the entities), common law, non-binding corporate governance codes (e.g. the 
Manual, National Code and CGF) and Stock Exchange Listing Requirements.
158
 Both 
countries have tried to move away from the shareholder wealth maximisation approach 
towards an inclusive approach.
159
 However, South Africa has overhauled its Companies Act 
and has partially codified directors’ duties which Zimbabwe has not done. To further enhance 
                                                                                                                                                        
Companies Act, section 16 of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act and paras 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.2.2.6 of the 
Protocol). 
154 The audit and social and ethics committees are statutory committees for certain companies (sections 72 and 94 of the 
Companies Act and section 77 of the PFMA). Some of the committees recommended by the King Report are the risk, 
remuneration and nomination, social and ethics, governance, IT steering and sustainability committees (Principle 2.23 of the 
King III Report). See also paras 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.2.2.6 of the Protocol. 
155 Principle 2.14 of the King III Report and para 5.1.1.7 of the Protocol. 
156 Principle 2.21 of King III Report and para 5.1.4 of the Protocol. 
157 Ibid. See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 202-204 and 
Havenga MK and Locke N Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa (Kluwer Law International 2010) 79-80. 
158 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 above. 
159 Para 21 of the Manual, paras 22 & 28 of the National Code and Principle 8 of the King III Report. See Chapter 3, para 
3.2.2 for the discussion on Zimbabwe’s position. 
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transparency and accountability, South Africa, unlike Zimbabwe, also introduced a social and 
ethics committee as a mandatory committee in some of its companies.
160
  
 
5.2.3 Selection and Appointment of Board Members 
South Africa has acknowledged the importance of appointing directors in a transparent and 
objective way. The Companies Act provides that a company may appoint a person who 
satisfies the requirements for election as a director to serve as a director of the company.
161
 
To minimise the risks of corporate failure as a result of unethical conduct and 
mismanagement by directors, the Companies Act disqualifies certain persons from 
appointment as a director.
162
 Examples of disqualified persons are a person who, has been 
prohibited by a court to be a director, has been declared delinquent in terms of section 162
163
 
or in terms of section 47 of the Close Corporations Act (No. 69 of 1984), is an unrehabilitated 
insolvent, has been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of misconduct involving 
dishonesty or has been convicted, in South Africa or elsewhere, for theft, fraud, forgery or 
perjury.
164
  
                                                 
160 The social and ethics committee established by South Africa, if properly utilised, is likely to enhance the governance of 
South African public entities thus promote good corporate governance. The committee may enable South Africa to score 
higher than Zimbabwe in terms of advancing sound ethical leadership and corporate social responsibility as well as 
enhancing transparency in the operations of public entities. 
161 Section 66 of the Companies Act. The Act and the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company set the requirements for 
one to qualify for appointment as a director. The directors must be elected by persons entitled to exercise voting rights in 
such an election. However, strictly speaking there are no specific legal “qualifications required for a person to hold the 
position of director and there is no legal limit to the number of directorships an individual may have” (Naidoo R Corporate 
Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 110). 
162 Section 69 of the Companies Act. The Act actually nullifies the election or appointment of a person as a director if, at the 
time of the election or appointment, that person was ineligible or disqualified in terms of the Act. See Carciumaru LM An 
Assessment of the Impact of Corporate Governance Codes and Legislation on Directors and Officers Liability Insurance in 
South Africa Unpublished Thesis (University of the Witwatersrand 2009) 145-147. 
163 To understand the circumstances under which a director may be declared delinquent, see Kukama v Lobelo and Others 
(38587/2011) (2012) ZAGPJHC 60. In this case the director in question had, among other things, permitted some R2.2 
million intended for the company to be paid into an alternative account to the disadvantage of the company, had failed to 
detect a fraud on SARS amounting to R39 million and had further failed to inform his co-director and co-shareholder of such 
fraudulent dealings. The Presiding Judge ruled that the director concerned had contravened section 76 (standards of directors 
conduct) and section 22 (reckless trading) of the Companies Act. The court found that the director’s conduct did “not 
measure up to the standard required and expected of a director” and as a result found that he was in breach of his fiduciary 
duties to the company. The court further found that the director's conduct was grossly negligent, constituted wilful 
misconduct, a breach of trust and a gross abuse of his position as a director. Consequently, the court ruled that the director 
should be declared delinquent in terms of section 162 of the Act. 
164 Carciumaru LM An Assessment of the Impact of Corporate Governance Codes and Legislation on Directors and Officers 
Liability Insurance in South Africa (2009) 145-147. See also Van der Merwe JG and Du Plessis JE Introduction to the Law 
of South Africa (Kluwer Law International 2004) 385-386. Examples of circumstances where a director can be disqualified 
are in the case of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Swan & Others. In this case, the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry sought disqualification orders against X and Y alleging that they were aware of the process of cheque kiting 
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The Acts that established public entities also seek to ensure that board members are appointed 
transparently and based on merit. Examples are the South African Civil Aviation Authority 
Act and the Construction Industry Development Board Act. Both Acts require the responsible 
Minister to, specifying the required criteria,
165
 invite persons interested in board appointment 
by notice in the Gazette and widely accessed media.
166
 In the appointment of the members of 
the board, the Minister must aim to achieve a reasonable balance of expertise and knowledge 
of the relevant industry, “whilst broadly reflecting the race, gender and geographic 
composition of the Republic”.167 The Minister is then required to submit a list of the names of 
at least fifteen suitable candidates or of all potential candidates, if less than fifteen candidates 
apply, to the relevant committees of Parliament.
168
 The committees consider the applications 
and shortlist at least ten candidates to the Minister.
169
 Only after this process has been 
completed, can the board be appointed by the Minister.
170
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
which, it was argued, allowed the group to trade in breach of its banking agreements. The Secretary further alleged that X 
was directly responsible for an inaccurate statement in a circular sent to shareholders which inaccurately stated the group’s 
cash balances and Y had failed to investigate the financial irregularity allegations concerning the company. The Court held 
that X, as director and CEO, had failed to act diligently as he should have been knowledgeable of practices of cheque kiting. 
Furthermore, the Court held that X had failed to make appropriate enquiries into the issue of several large cheques which 
resulted in a serious negligence of his duty as director. X was disqualified for 4 years. The Court also held that Y had failed 
to exercise due care and diligence in that he failed to pursue an enquiry into the financial irregularities as robustly as he 
should have done and that his behavior was really below the conduct expected of someone with his experience and in his 
position. Y was disqualified for 3 years (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Swan & Others (2005) EWHC 603 
(CH)). 
165 The South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and the Construction Industry Development Board Act require that a 
potential candidate must be a citizen of and ordinarily resident in South Africa, may not be an unrehabilitated insolvent , 
may not be a person who has been removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct and may not be a person who 
has been convicted of an offence and was sentenced to imprisonment without an option of a fine  in South Africa or in a 
foreign country (section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 6 of the Construction Industry 
Development Board Act). The Acts further provide that any person who is disqualified from being appointed as a director of 
a company in terms of the Companies Act may not be appointed as a board member of a public entity (section 12 of the 
South African National Roads Agency Limited Act and section 8(4) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act). 
166 Section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 6 of the Construction Industry Development 
Board Act. 
167 Section 6 of the Construction Industry Development Board Act and section 12 of the South African National Roads 
Agency Limited Act. 
168 Section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. In terms of the Construction Industry Development Board 
Act (section 6), “the Minister must, within 60 days from the expiry 30 date specified in the invitation, appoint” the members 
of the board. 
169 The Parliamentary committees consider whether or not a potential director is not disqualified in terms of the Act when 
shortlisting the candidates (sections 8(6) and 9(3) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act). 
170 Ibid. 
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After appointing the board, the Minister is further required to, as soon as possible, publish in 
the Gazette the names of every person appointed as a member, the date from which the 
appointment takes effect and the period of the appointment.
171
 To minimise political 
interference in the operations of the public entity, if a person, who is a political office bearer, 
accepts an appointment in terms of the Act, he or she must vacate the political office before 
the appointment takes effect.
172
 In addition, the majority of the members of the board “must 
not be in the full-time service of the State”.173 The period of appointment as a board member 
differs with each public entity. For example, the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 
stipulates that a director should hold office for a period not exceeding ﬁve years whilst the 
Construction Industry Development Board Act states that a board member should hold office 
for a period not exceeding three years.
174
 To achieve continuity, it is provided that a third of 
the board members or a number as near to a third of the members as possible must be 
reappointed at the expiry of a board’s term of office.175 
  
To achieve the same objectives as above, the King Report and the Protocol recommend that 
there should be a formal,
176
 rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board which should include background and reference checks.
177
 It is further 
provided that appointments to the board should, preferably, be through a nomination 
committee and based on merit and against objective criteria.
178
 Furthermore, the King Report 
                                                 
171 Section 6(10) of the Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
172 Section 6 of the Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
173 Section 8(4) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. 
174 However, a member may be reappointed for one more term or for more terms if the Minister finds it “necessary to 
reappoint a member to ensure continuity or on the grounds of the specific expertise of that member” (section 9 of the South 
African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 7 of the Construction Industry Development Board Act). See also section 
13 of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act which limits the director’s term of office to three years and also 
states that a director’s term of office can be extended subject to fulfilment of certain conditions prescribed in the Act. 
175 Section 7(3) of the Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
176 The appointment of a director should be formalised in an agreement between the company and the director. The 
agreement should include a director‘s code of conduct to be complied with and the contribution that is expected from the 
specific individual (Principle 2.19 of King III Report). 
177 Principle 2.19 of the King III Report and para 5.1.6.1 of the Protocol. The King Report recommends that, prior to their 
appointment, the directors’ backgrounds should be investigated along the lines of the approach required for listed companies 
by the JSE Listing Requirements. The board should also “make full disclosure regarding individual directors to enable 
shareholders to make their own assessment of directors”. 
178 The nomination committee should constitute only non-executive directors, of whom the majority must be independent 
and should be chaired by the board chairman (Principle 2.18 of the King III Report). The nominating committees provide a 
list of suitable candidates to the Executive Authority that oversees the state owned enterprise, which has the final power of 
178 
 
and Protocol recommend that public entity board members should be appointed based on 
their integrity and accountability, competence, relevant and complementary skills and 
expertise.
179
  
 
In view of the time and dedication required to fulfill the directors’ duties properly, it is also 
recommended that potential directors should not hold more directorships than is reasonable 
for them to be able to exercise due care, skill and diligence.
180
 The board should, therefore, 
examine the number of directorships held by an individual as part of the due diligence 
process to ensure that the appointed directors are able to effectively discharge their fiduciary 
obligations.
181
 To enable new perspectives and ideas, the Protocol and King III Report 
recommend that board members should serve for a certain period.
182
 Furthermore, to enhance 
continuity and stability for the success of an entity, the Protocol and King III Report 
recommend that, whenever a new board is put in place, some members from the dissolved 
board should be included and their selection must be based on good performance.
183
  
 
To complement the above efforts regarding the appointment of public entity boards, a 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled 
Institutions was published.
184
 The Handbook’s main purpose is “to provide best practice 
                                                                                                                                                        
appointment (Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24-28). However, the 
relevancy of the nomination committee is questionable since, in the majority of public entities, the board is appointed by the 
Minister, in accordance with statutory requirements (Section 12(2) of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act 
and section 8(2) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act). It is therefore assumed that, in appointing board 
members, the line Minister/Executive Authority should take into account the qualities recommended by the King Report and 
the Protocol. 
179 Principle 2.18 of the King III Report and para 5.1.6.1 of the Protocol. It is also recommended that board appointments 
should take into account the need for gender balance (Principle 2.18 of the King III Report and para 5.1.6.1 of the Protocol). 
180 Principle 2.19 of the King Report and para 5.1.6.1 of the Protocol. For more details with regard to the challenges 
associated with multiple directorships, see Kiel GC and Nicholson GJ “Multiple Directorships and Corporate Performance in 
Australian Listed Companies” (2006) 14(6) Corporate Governance: An International Review 530-546 and Hassim HA and 
Rahman MSA “Multiple Board Appointments: Are Directors Effective?” (2005) 2(7) International Journal of Business and 
Social Science 137-143. 
181 Ibid.  
182 Para 5.1.6.2 of the Protocol and Principle 2.18 of the King III Report. The Protocol proposes three years which can be 
extended for a second term of three years subject to the directors’ performance and their skills continuing to be relevant to 
the entity. The King III Report recommends that at least one third of the non-executive directors should rotate every year and 
any “independent non-executive directors serving more than 9 years should be subjected to a rigorous review of his 
independence and performance by the board”. 
183 Paras 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 of the Protocol and Principle 2.18 of the King III Report. 
184 The Handbook was approved by Cabinet on 17 September 2008 and issued by the Department of Public Service and 
Administration in 2009 (PwC, IoDSA and DBSA State Owned Enterprises: Governance Responsibility and Accountability 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), South Africa, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) and the Development 
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guidelines to promote uniformity in the appointment of persons to boards of state and state 
controlled institutions”.185 It recommends that the board appointment process186 should be 
merit-based,
187
 transparent,
188
 representative
189
 and consistent.
190
 It also prescribes qualifying 
criteria for board membership.
191
 For example, the Handbook recommends that a member of 
the National Assembly or a member of a provincial legislature, a special adviser to an 
Executive Authority or head of department
192
 may not serve on the board of any state or state 
controlled institution.
193
  
 
The Handbook limits multiple memberships of boards by recommending that a person may 
not serve on more than three boards, whether private or public, be chairperson of more than 
one board at any time and may not “be serving on the board of a regulatory entity may not 
simultaneously serve on the board of a government enterprise that is regulated by the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) Public Sector Working Group, 2011 Position Paper 3) 13 available at 
www.iodsa.co.za/.../PSWG_Position_Paper_3 Governance_in_SOEs.pdf (accessed on 18 May 2014)). 
185 The Handbook “builds on the good governance principles and practices provided for in the PFMA” to promote 
transparency, accountability, sound administration and good governance practices in all organs of state (RSA DPSA 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (South African Department of 
Public Service and Administration (RSA DPSA) 2009) 1-2 available at http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents.asp 
(accessed on 18 May 2014)). 
186 According to the Handbook, the appointment process should include, inter alia, advertising board vacancies, shortlisting 
and interviewing candidates, recommendations of suitable candidates and approval by the relevant authorities (RSA DPSA 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 44). 
187 Board members should be appointed based on their competencies (skills, expertise, experience, and knowledge) and 
qualifications and on the needs of the entity (RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and 
State Controlled Institutions (2009) 30). 
188 The appointment process and phases should be standardised, objective, clear, understandable transparent and in 
compliance with applicable legislation ((RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State 
Controlled Institutions (2009) 26, 30-31). 
189 It is proposed that the appointment process should take into consideration employment equity legislation and policies to 
achieve broad representation of the South African population according to race, gender, and disability (RSA DPSA 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 26, 30-31). 
190 The appointment process should be applied consistently in all cases (RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of 
Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 26).  
191 RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 30. 
192 A head of department “may not serve on the board of a state or state controlled institution for which his/her department is 
the parent department and in respect of which his/her Executive Authority has an oversight responsibility” except in 
exceptional cases for a specific period, to promote a government objective (RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of 
Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 13). 
193 RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 26) 10-
15. 
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particular regulatory entity”.194 If a retiree, the person may not serve on more than five 
boards.
195
 It is provided that a selection committee should be established to assess “the 
capacity, availability and competencies of candidates to meaningfully contribute their time to 
the affairs of the board, particularly where candidates serve on a number of boards”.196 
 
Similar to the above instruments, the JSE Listing Requirements provide that there must be a 
policy detailing the procedures for appointments to the board and such appointments must be 
formal and transparent.
197
 Where appropriate, the board should be assisted by a nomination 
committee composed of only nonexecutive directors, of whom the majority must be 
independent.
198
 The Listing Requirements require that directors of an applicant “must 
collectively have appropriate expertise and experience for the governance and management 
of the applicant and the group’s business”.199 
 
The Zimbabwe corporate governance system with regard to board appointment is not very 
different from that of South Africa. The Zimbabwean framework, like that of South Africa, 
provides for a formal, robust and transparent board selection and appointment process which 
should be based on merit.
200
 The Zimbabwean instruments also prescribe the minimum 
requirements for directorship, limit the period of directorship, discourage multiple 
directorships to boards and encourage board continuity and stability.
201
 Despite the 
similarities, Zimbabwe and South Africa have differed in a number of aspects. South Africa, 
unlike Zimbabwe, has developed and adopted a Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to 
                                                 
194 According to the Handbook, the main reason for limiting multiple board membership is “to ensure that members are able 
to pay proper attention to the affairs of the institutions on whose boards they serve, to broaden participation in public sector 
governance, to avoid tokenism, to minimise opportunities for corruption and to minimise conflicts of interest” (RSA DPSA 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 17). 
195 Ibid. However, the Handbook states that the proposals can be varied if there are justifiable reasons for exceeding the limit 
for multiple memberships. 
196 RSA DPSA Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions (2009) 17. 
197 Section 3.84 of the JSE Listing Requirements.  
198 Ibid. 
199 Section 4.8 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
200 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 for a discussion on the board appointment process in Zimbabwe. 
201 Ibid. 
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Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions to enhance the board appointment process in 
public entities whereas Zimbabwe does not have such a guiding document.
202
  
 
South Africa has also specifically detailed how the board members should be appointed to 
promote transparency, for example, the requirement for advertising of board vacancies, 
shortlisting and interviewing of candidates and notifying the public of board appointments in 
the Gazette. Zimbabwe’s framework just indicates that the appointment process should be 
formal and transparent but does not give specific details on how this can be achieved as is the 
case in South Africa.
203
 The lack of a standardised framework in Zimbabwe may make it 
difficult to achieve uniformity and objectivity in public entities’ board appointment process.   
 
5.2.4 Composition of Board 
Universally, it has been accepted that, for a board to be effective, it should be properly 
balanced in terms of power, skills, independence and diversity.
204
 The Companies Act and the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation set the minimum qualifications to be satisfied by 
directors.
205
 However, as indicated above,
206
 the Act does not prescribe any specific 
professional or academic qualifications as a requirement for a person to be appointed as a 
director.
207
 The Acts that established public entities require that the boards of the respective 
entities should be composed of directors with relevant qualifications and experience.
208
 It is 
                                                 
202 However, the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework, if enacted into law, may save a similar 
purpose. 
203 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.3 above. 
204 Roberts J, McNulty T and Stiles P “Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating 
Accountability in the Boardroom” (2005) 16 British Journal of Management S5-S26. See also Principle 2.18 of the King III 
Report and Part 2 (IV) of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
205 Sections 68-69 of the Companies Act. 
206 Para 5.2.3 above. 
207 Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 110. 
208 The Acts prescribe that the prospective board members should have special knowledge of or experience in matters 
relating to the functions of the entity (section 8(2) of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 6(3) of the 
Construction Industry Development Board Act). 
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also a requirement that the majority of the directors should be non-executive members with 
the chief executive officer being the only executive director by virtue of his office.
209
  
 
To complement the statutes, the King III Report and the Protocol recommend that the board 
should be composed of properly qualified and experienced people, the majority of which 
should be competent non-executive directors, with a sufficient number of the non-executive 
directors being independent.
210
 The King III Report also recommends that at least one third of 
the non-executive directors should rotate every year and any independent non-executive 
director serving more than nine years should be subjected to a rigorous review of his 
independence and performance by the board.
211
 The board should “include a statement in the 
integrated report regarding the assessment of the independence of the independent non-
executive directors”.212 In the same way, the JSE Listing Requirements provide that there 
must be a policy evidencing a clear balance of power and authority at board level, to ensure 
that no one director has unfettered powers of decision-making.
213
  
 
                                                 
209 Section 12(2) of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act and section 8(2) of the South African Civil 
Aviation Authority Act. However, the King III Report recommends a minimum of two executive directors which should 
include the CEO and Financial Director so that “there is more than one point of contact between the board and the 
management” (Principle 2.18 of the King III Report). 
210 Independence was emphasised after inquiries following recent corporate scandals and failures revealed that the board of 
directors was often not sufficiently independent from management, and as a result, did not inquire meticulously about 
questionable practices proposed and undertaken by executive management. The main idea behind the recommendation is 
thus to have a board balanced in terms of power and authority to avoid one member or a few directors dominating the 
board’s decision-making, reduce the possibility of conflicts of interest and promote objectivity (Petrick JA and Scherer RF 
“The Enron Scandal and the Neglect of Management Integrity Capacity” (2003) 18(1) American Journal of Business 37-50). 
See also para 5.1.6.1 of the Protocol and Principle 2.18 of the King III Report. 
211 Principle 2.18 of the King III Report. There have been conflicting views on whether or not the issue of a director’s 
“independence” is necessary to promote good corporate governance in companies. Some commentators have argued that 
independent directors are necessary to achieve good corporate governance as they provide an oversight role on management, 
solve inefficiencies in the company and protect shareholders’ interest (Brickley JA, Coles JL and Terry RL “Outside 
Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills” (1994) 35 Journal of Financial Economics 371-390 and Cotter J, Shivdasani A 
and Zenner M “Do Outside Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offer Contests?” (1997) 43 
Journal of Financial Economics 195-218). On the other hand, other commentators have been unable to establish a direct link 
between independent directors and company performance. Instead, the later commentators found that independent directors 
are an inefficient monitoring device because they lack the ability, knowledge and experience to drive the company 
appropriately as a result of the fact that they may possess inadequate knowledge about the company, its business and its 
industry. Accordingly, they may end up relying on management to provide them with the necessary information to undertake 
their functions (Bhagat S and Black B “The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance” 
(1999) 54(3) Business Lawyer 921-963 and Hermalin BE and Weisbach MS “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance” (1991) 20(4) Financial Management 101–112). 
212 Ibid.  
213 Para 3.84 of the JSE Listing Requirements.   
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Further to the requirement for a balance in terms of power, skills and independence, the size 
of the board has also been considered an essential element of board composition. The 
Companies Act and the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation set the minimum number 
of directors for companies to at least one director for a private company and at least three 
directors in respect of public companies and non-profit companies.
214
 The Acts that 
established public entities prescribe either the minimum or maximum number of directors. 
For example, the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and The South African National 
Roads Agency Limited Act provide that the board should consist of not more than seven 
members whereas the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act provides 
that the board must consist of not fewer than nine, but not more than thirteen members.
215
  
 
Unlike the statutes, the King III Report and the Protocol do not specify the size of the board 
but acknowledge that the nature of the company business, the board’s collective knowledge, 
skills and experience and the need to comply with regulatory requirements should be 
considered when determining the number of directors to serve on the board.
216
 In addition, 
the King III Report recommends that diversity should be considered in coming up with a 
properly composed board.
217
 Thus, when composing a board, cognisance must be taken of the 
need to reflect the race, gender and geographic composition of South Africa.
218
  
 
To achieve this objective, South Africa has developed policies and promulgated a number of 
statutes, for example, the Constitution,
219
 the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
                                                 
214 Section 66-69 of the Companies Act. The minimum number is “in addition to the minimum number of directors that the 
company must have to satisfy any requirement, whether in terms of this Act or its Memorandum of Incorporation, to appoint 
an audit committee, or a social and ethics committee”. See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for 
South African Companies (2009) 105. 
215 Section 8 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act, section 12 of the South African National Roads Agency 
Limited Act and section 6 of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
216 Principle 2.18 of the King III Report and para 5.1.6 of the Protocol. The King III Report recommends that, in determining 
an appropriate board number, it is crucial to consider the nature of business and requisite skills, the need to achieve an 
appropriate mix of executive and independent non-executive directors, the need to have sufficient directors to structure board 
committees appropriately and establish a quorum and statutory requirements, among others.  
217 Diversity has been defined to include academic qualifications, technical expertise, relevant industry knowledge, 
experience, nationality, age, race and gender (Principle 2.18 of King III Report).  
218 Section 6(3) of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
219 The Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of marital status, sexual 
orientation, gender, sex, among others. 
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policies,
220
 the Employment Equity Act,
221
 the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
222
 and 
the Labour Relations Act.
223
 Commentators have said the Black Economic Empowerment 
policies and legislation have encouraged racial diversity and have indirectly raised the profile 
of women on the board.
224
 Also, the other mentioned Acts, inter alia, consist of provisions 
that seek to address inequalities in the workplace and emphasise the need for gender 
consideration when recruiting employees or appointing board members.
225
 
 
The South African Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Commission for 
Gender Equality to promote gender equality.
226
 The Commission draws its mandate from the 
Commission for Gender Equality Act (No. 39 of 1996). It was created to “advance, promote 
and protect gender equality in South Africa through undertaking research, public education, 
policy development, legislative initiatives, effective monitoring and litigation”.227 The 
                                                 
220 The BEE policies were introduced by the current ANC government with the aim of abolishing the economic legacy of 
apartheid and widening involvement in the economy by everyone, especially by those perceived to have been previously 
deprived of such participation (underprivileged black people). The policies resulted in the promulgation of the Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act (No. 53 of 2003) whose main objective is to empower the previously 
underprivileged black people (section 2 of the B-BBEE Act). The Act was promulgated on the basis of the equality clause 
(section 9) of the Constitution, which provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. In addition to the Act, the South African Department of Trade and Industry published Codes of Good 
Practice “which contain the detail on BBBEE measures and provide the framework for measuring the progress made on the 
implementation and execution of BBBEE measures” (Esser I and Dekker A “The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in 
South Africa:  Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and the Enhancement of Good Corporate Governance 
Principles” (2008) 3(3) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 157-169)). 
221 Act No. 55 of 1998. The Employment Equity Act was created to “promote the constitutional right of equality and the 
exercise of true democracy” and “eliminate unfair discrimination in employment” (‘Preamble’ to the Employment Equity 
Act). South Africa has also enacted the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill (No. 50 of 2013) which is still to be 
gazetted as an Act of Parliament.  The Bill seeks to empower women and encourage their appointment and representation in 
decision-making positions and structures (section 3 of the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill). 
222 Act No. 11 of 2002. The main objective of the Act is to “give effect to and regulate the right to fair labour practices 
conferred by section 23(1) of the Constitution”. 
223 Act No. 127 of 1998. The Act was enacted to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace” by giving effect to and regulating the basic rights bestowed by section 27 of the 
Constitution and “give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour 
Organisation”, among others. 
224 Kruger LP “The Impact of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) on South African Businesses: Focusing on Ten 
Dimensions of Business Performance” (2011) 15(3) Southern African Business Review 207-233. See also Curtis M, Schmid 
C and Struber M Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance (Credit Suisse Research Institute Paper of August 2012) 18-
19 available at https://www.credit-suisse.com/newsletter/doc/gender_diversity.pdf (accessed on 17 July 2015). 
225 See sections 5-6 of the Employment Equity Act, sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and 
sections 4-5 of the Labour Relations Act. 
226 Section 187 of the Constitution. 
227 Section 11 of the Commission for Gender Equality Act. See also DU Plessis JJ, Saenger I and Foster R “Board Diversity 
or Gender Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South Africa” (2012) 17(2) Deakin Law Review 207-249 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/DeakinLRev/2012/10.pdf (accessed on 13 November 2014). 
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Department for Women, Children and Persons with Disabilities (DWCPD) was also 
established to drive the “government’s goal of achieving equality, empowerment and access 
to development opportunities by vulnerable and historically disadvantaged groups” within 
South African society.
228
 In addition, South Africa has ratified a number of international 
agreements that deal with gender promotion issues, for example, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (December 1979) and  the SADC 
Protocol on Gender and Development (August 2008).
229
 
 
Similar to the provisions of the South African instruments, the Zimbabwean instruments have 
greatly sought to increase board effectiveness by providing for the establishment of properly 
composed boards in terms power, expertise, size and diversity (e.g. race, age, gender).
230
 To 
promote gender equality, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe has enacted legislation, set up of a 
Gender Commission, created a particular Ministry and ratified a number of international 
agreements that seek to promote gender equality.
231
 Nonetheless, Zimbabwe appears to be 
lagging behind South Africa in so far as promoting gender equality is concerned because it is 
still to put appropriate structures and enact laws to enforce this aspect.
232
  
 
5.2.5 Remuneration of the Board 
The need to appropriately reward directors to enable them to effectively discharge their duties 
has been acknowledged in South Africa and other countries.
233
 At the same time, there is 
growing concern that company directors and executives are abusing their position in the 
company to pursue their personal objectives instead of focusing on what is best for the 
                                                 
228 The department was established in May 2009. Its main objective is to create “an enabling environment that translates 
constitutional obligations, policies and legislative frameworks into the realisation of gender, disability and children’s rights”. 
Visit http://www.wcpd.gov.za/ for more information. See also Storbeck C and Moodley S “ECD Policies in South Africa – 
What About Children with Disabilities?” (2011) 3(1) Journal of African Studies and Development 1-8. 
229 A Framework for Transforming Gender Relations in South Africa (Paper presented by the Commission on Gender 
Equality 2000) 52-53 available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/transformation_0.pdf (accessed on 12 
September 2014). See also section 3 of the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill. 
230 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 above, for a detailed discussion on Zimbabwe’s position with regard to board composition. 
231 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 above. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Principle 2.25 of the King III and para 5.1.10.3 of the Protocol. 
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company and its shareholders.
234
 In response to these concerns, various corporate governance 
reforms have been advocated.
235
  
 
To achieve objectivity and enhance transparency, the Companies Act prescribes that the 
remuneration of directors must be approved by a prior special resolution of shareholders in 
general meeting passed not more than two years before.
236
 Also a company’s annual financial 
statements should include particulars showing the remuneration and benefits (e.g. bonuses, 
pensions, compensation for loss of office and securities) received by each director, or 
individual holding any prescribed office in the company.
237
 The Companies Act further 
prohibits direct or indirect financial assistance to directors unless the assistance is permitted 
in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company, is made in accordance with an 
employee share scheme and is approved by a special resolution of the shareholders.
238
 The 
board also has to be satisfied that, immediately after providing the financial assistance, the 
company would remain solvent and liquid and that the terms and conditions of the financial 
assistance are fair and reasonable to the company.
239
 In the same spirit as the Companies Act, 
the Acts that established public entities in South Africa prescribe that the remuneration and 
allowances of a board or committee member should be determined and approved by the 
relevant Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Finance and other relevant 
stakeholders.
240
 
 
The King III Report and the Protocol recommend that the level of directors’ remuneration 
should be adequate to attract, incentivise and retain high quality skills, experience and 
                                                 
234 Scholtz HE and Smit A “Executive Remuneration and Company Performance for South African Companies Listed on the 
Alternative Exchange (AltX)” (2012) 16(1) Southern African Business Review 22-38. 
235 Scholtz and Engelbrecht  found that corporate governance reforms “relating to institutional ownership, the number of 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, shareholder voting on the remuneration policy and the number of 
remuneration committee meetings act as an effective governance tool to protect shareholders’ interests with regard to some 
of the elements of executive directors’ remuneration” (Scholtz HE and Engelbrecht WA “The Effect of Remuneration 
Committees, Directors’ Shareholding and Institutional Ownership on the Remuneration of Directors in the Top 100 
Companies in South Africa” (2015) 19(2) Southern African Business Review 22-51). 
236 Section 66 (8-9) of the Companies Act. 
237 Section 30 of the Companies Act. 
238 Section 45 of the Companies Act. 
239 Ibid.  
240 Section 10 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act (No. 40 of 1998), section 13(3) of the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited Act) and section 9 of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
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expertise as well as loyalty and commitment to the public entity.
241
 To assist the entities in 
developing an appropriate remuneration system, it is recommended that a remuneration 
committee, chaired by independent non-executive directors, should be established.
242
 The 
committee should develop a remuneration policy which should be aligned with the strategy of 
the company, linked to a director’s level of skill, experience and expertise and his 
contribution to the performance and success of the entity.
243
 In addition, the remuneration 
policy should be subjected to shareholder approval before its implementation.
244
 But, it is 
questionable whether the remuneration committee is relevant to public entities since the 
statutes do not make any reference to the committee but provide for ministerial approval of 
board remuneration.
245
 
 
The King Report and the Protocol also recommend that the company’s annual financial 
statements should include detailed disclosure of all forms of remuneration paid to individual 
directors to enhance transparency and accountability.
246
 Likewise, the JSE Listings 
Requirements substantially add to the disclosure requirements in an attempt to make the 
information disclosed in companies’ records, for example the prospectus and annual 
accounts, more meaningful and to enhance transparency.
247
 To preserve director 
independence, the King III Report recommends that the “chairman and non-executive 
                                                 
241 Principle 2.25 of the King III and para 5.1.10.3 of the Protocol. 
242 Principle 2.25 of the King III and paras 5.1.9.1 and 5.1.10.2 & 5.1.12.2 of the Protocol. The committee is responsible for 
making recommendations to the board on remuneration issues and assists it in setting and monitoring remuneration policies. 
243 Principle 2.25 of the King III and para 5.1.10.2 of the Protocol.  It has been found that linking remuneration policies to 
performance can increase stakeholder value over the long term. The King III Report’s requirement for disclosure between 
salary and performance-related elements as well as an explanation of the basis on which remuneration is measured, make it 
increasingly difficult for companies to determine directors’ remuneration without considering their performance (Scholtz HE 
and Smit A “Executive Remuneration and Company Performance for South African Companies Listed on the Alternative 
Exchange (AltX)” (2012) 22-38. 
244 Principle 2.25 of the King III Report and para 5.1.10.1 of the Protocol. The proposal by the King III Report that 
shareholders approve the remuneration policy of a company will increase the accountability of executive directors to 
shareholders. 
245 Section 10 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act (No. 40 of 1998), section 13(3) of the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited Act) and section 9 of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
246 Principle 2.26 of the King III Report and para 5.1.9.4 of the Protocol. As part of disclosure, listed companies should 
disclose emoluments, for example fees, basic salaries, bonuses, share options and performance-related payments made to 
directors during the last financial period in their annual financial statements (Principle 2.26 of the King III Report).  
247 Section 3 of JSE Listings Requirements. In line with the international trend of moving from disclosure on an aggregate 
basis to individualized disclosure of remuneration, the JSE now requires listed companies to disclose directors’ 
compensation, as required by the Companies Act, on an individualised basis (Section 7 (para 7.B.7) of JSE Listings 
Requirements). See also Moloi STM Assessment of Corporate Governance Reporting in the Annual Reports of South African 
Listed Companies (2008) 72-75.  
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directors should not receive incentive awards that may impair their ability to provide 
impartial oversight and advice”.248 The Report discourages payment share or incentive based 
remuneration and further suggests that non-executive directors should aim to limit their 
shareholding to the company to a “level which will not impair their independence”.249 
  
To complement the statutes, King Report and the Protocol, the Department of Public 
Enterprises has published State-owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines.
250
 The 
remuneration model was developed based on market data which categorises state-owned 
enterprises according to their asset base and revenue.
251
 The Guidelines suggest that packages 
for chairpersons and non-executive directors should be linked to the size of the public entity 
and determined by asset base and revenue.
252
 The board is, thus, expected to determine the 
sizing of its entity according to the categorisation model prepared by the Department of 
Public Enterprises.
253
  
 
Chairpersons and non-executive directors should be paid annual retainer fees which must be 
determined according to the remuneration model and should not exceed the median amount 
of the retainer fee developed by the department.
254
 The Guidelines further recommend that 
board remuneration should be calculated based on the number of board meetings attended, 
business travelling and accommodation expenses, director’s skill level or scarcity of skill, 
achievement of set performance targets as well as subjected to justification and shareholder 
                                                 
248 Principle 2.26 of the King III Report. 
249 Ibid.  
250 The Guidelines were published in August 2007 and are available at www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100319guidlines1.pdf . 
Similar to the King III Report and the Protocol, the Guidelines provide for the establishment of a remuneration committee 
and detail its responsibilities. Boards and remuneration committees are expected to apply these Guidelines in determining 
remuneration levels of board members and in formulating remuneration policies (section 9 and Annexure A to the SOE 
Remuneration Guidelines).  
251 Section 2 of the State Owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines. The Department of Public Enterprises categorised 
public entities into four categories, namely small (A), medium (B), large (C) and very large (D). The assets and revenue for 
small companies should be less than R143.5 million and R22.8 million and those for very large companies should be above 
R16.3 billion and R2.54 billion, respectively. 
252 Ibid.  
253 Sections 4.2-4.6 of the State Owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines. 
254 Ibid. 
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approval.
255
 Similar to the King III Report, the Guidelines discourage the disbursement of 
incentive payments to directors to protect their independence.
256
 
 
The above indicates that Zimbabwe and South Africa have developed similar corporate 
governance instruments that seek to motivate directors to effectively discharge their duties 
through fair, adequate and performance related remuneration.
257
 Both jurisdictions have tried 
to promote transparency and accountability through providing for shareholder approval and 
advocating for disclosure of board remuneration to allow for public scrutiny. The only main 
difference is that South Africa has developed and publicised State-owned Enterprises 
Remuneration Guidelines aimed at specifically addressing challenges of determining board 
remuneration in public entities whereas Zimbabwe still has a draft Corporate Governance 
and Remuneration Policy Framework. What remains to be established is how effectively the 
measures have been implemented and whether they have assisted boards of public entities to 
achieve set targets.
258
 
 
5.2.6 Evaluation of the Board 
South Africa has joined the rest of the world in valuing the importance of assessing the 
effectiveness of the board of directors for the success of any organisation. As a result, 
measures have been put in place to enable the board to effectively discharge its duties and at 
the same time to promote the assessment of its effectiveness.
259
 Having established measures 
                                                 
255 Sections 4.7-4.13 of the State Owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines. In determining the rate at which to pay board 
or committee fees, an entity is expected to “refer to a remuneration strategy and/or policy document approved by the 
Minister for guidance” (sections 7 of the State Owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines). 
256 The Guidelines state that non-executive directors should neither receive incentive payments nor participate in schemes 
designed for the remuneration of executives (section 4.17 of the State Owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines). 
257 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 above for comparable measures in Zimbabwe.  
258 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.5 below. 
259 See Chapter 4, paras 4.2.2-4.2.5 and Chapter 5, paras 5.2.2-5.2.5 above. To enable the board to be effective in performing 
its role, both countries have put measures to ensure that the roles of boards are clearly and comprehensively expressed, 
directors are appointed based on merit and in a transparent manner, the composition of the board is balanced in terms of 
independence, skills and relevant experience, the board is fully empowered to discharge its duties, and board members are 
adequately remunerated. 
190 
 
to empower the directors, South Africa aims to assess how effectively the board performed 
during a particular period.
260
  
 
South Africa has provided for board performance evaluation in the Acts that established 
public entities to make the process legally enforceable.
261
 To enable the responsible Minister 
to assess whether or not a public entity board has performed to expectations, the Acts that 
constituted public entities prescribe that the Minister and the entity (represented by the board) 
should enter into a written performance agreement.
262
 The agreement details the entity’s 
“scope of business, efficiency and ﬁnancial performance, and achievement of objectives”, the 
principles to be followed by the entity in carrying out its mandate and any other matter 
relating to the performance of the entity’s functions.263 The agreement must be published in 
the Gazette and any amendment thereto must be so published at least 30 days prior to that 
amendment coming into operation. It is also a requirement that a copy of the performance 
agreement must be open to public inspection during business hours at the head office of the 
entity.
264
 The performance of the board is then evaluated against the set and agreed 
performance targets.  
 
The King III Report and Protocol recommend that an evaluation of the board, its committees 
and the individual directors should be performed every year.
265
 According to the King III 
Report and Protocol, the main objectives of annual performance appraisals of individual 
directors, the board and board committees should be to provide a basis for evaluating board 
performance towards the achievement of the set performance objectives and targets of the 
entity, identifying future training needs and, where necessary, explain why a re-appointment 
                                                 
260 However, the framework has not provided a template or specific performance measurement tools leaving that to 
individual public entities and their boards to determine. 
261 For example, see section 5 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 5 of the South African 
Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
262 Section 5 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act. Section 5 of the South African Construction Industry 
Development Board Act states that the board, in consultation with the Minister, may develop and publish targets and 
performance indicators related to best practice standards and guidelines and establish mechanisms to monitor their 
implementation and evaluate their impact. 
263 Ibid.  
264 Ibid. 
265 Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.1.7.2 of the Protocol. 
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may or may not be appropriate.
266
 In addition, the performance appraisal may lead 
shareholders to review the mandate of the board if considered necessary, change the 
composition of the board or to discipline any directors for non-performance.
267
 
 
In South Africa, the public entity board should agree with the shareholder
268
 on performance 
objectives and targets which include shareholder objectives using key performance indicators 
developed for this purpose.
269
 Secondly, the board is expected to regularly keep the Executive 
Authority
270
 informed of the operations of the entity and its subsidiaries and to give the 
Authority such information in relation to those operations as the Authority may require 
occasionally.
271
 Thereafter, a performance appraisal should be carried out to measure the 
extent of achievement by the board as whole and individual members of the set performance 
objectives and targets.
272
 The board is also expected to produce an integrated report stating 
whether the appraisals of the board, its committees and individual directors have been 
conducted.
273
 The report should provide an overview of the results of the performance 
                                                 
266 Ibid. 
267 Paras 5.1.6.3, 5.1.8, 5.1.11 and 5.1.13.7 of the Protocol. 
268 The shareholder of public entities is usually the government represented by the responsible Minister (Bulbuena SS State-
owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges (OECD Corporate Governance Working 
Papers, No. 13 (2014) 41-42). 
269 Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.1.7.2 of the Protocol. The performance objectives and targets should be 
detailed in a shareholder compact as provided in paras 5.1.13 and 5.1.14 of the Protocol. Similarly, the King Report 
recommends that the board charter and the board committees’ terms of reference should be comprehensive enough to state 
the key deliverables expected of the board and its committees to enable the objective assessment of their performance 
against the targets set (Principle 2.2 of King III Report). See also Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for 
South African Companies (2009) 151-152). 
270 Executive Authority means the Cabinet member who is accountable to Parliament for the state owned enterprise or in 
whose portfolio it falls and/or the member of the provincial Executive Council who is accountable to the provincial 
legislature for the state owned enterprise or in whose portfolio it falls (para 3.3 of the Protocol). 
271 Para 5.1.15 of the Protocol. This is expected to follow a disclosure principle which is similar to the continuous disclosure 
requirements of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
272 The board has the prerogative to determine whether the evaluation of performance should be done in-house or conducted 
professionally by independent service providers, subject to legislative requirements. With regard to in-house evaluations, it 
is recommended that the chairman, through the nominations committee, may lead the overall performance evaluation of the 
board, board committees and individual directors with the assistance of a competent, suitably qualified and experienced 
company secretary (Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.1.7.2 of the Protocol). 
273 Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.1.16 of the Protocol. The following aspects regarding directors should be 
disclosed in the integrated report: the composition of the board and board committees, the manner in which the board and its 
committees have discharged their duties, the education, qualifications and experience of the directors, the length of service 
and age of the directors, other significant directorships of each board member, the reasons for the removal, resignation or 
retirement of a director and any other relevant information. 
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assessment and the action plans to be implemented, if any.
274
 In addition to this report, the 
King Report and Protocol recommend the production of a corporate governance report which 
indicates whether or not the entity is complying with the recommended governance 
principles, giving a brief description of how this is being applied and areas of deviation, 
citing the reasons for each deviation.
275
 
 
Zimbabwe, like South Africa, has put in place measures to enable the assessment of board 
effectiveness.
276
 Although the two countries have put in place similar board performance 
evaluation systems, they have differed in that Zimbabwe has provided for government 
representatives, who are not board members, to regularly attend board meetings and give 
feedback to the Minister. South Africa has left the issue to be dealt with through informative 
reports and feedback from the chairman of the board, presumably to avoid excessive 
interference in the entity’s operations.277 South African measures also specifically prohibit a 
person who is or becomes a political office bearer from being a public entity board member 
which Zimbabwe does not do.
278
 In addition, South Africa has legislated for board 
performance evaluations yet Zimbabwe has left this matter to voluntary codes of corporate 
governance.
279
 
 
5.2.7 Enforcement Mechanisms  
South Africa has, to a large extent, relied on a self-regulatory environment in its approach to 
corporate governance.
280
 However, following the prevalence of poor corporate governance 
                                                 
274 Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.2.5 of the Protocol. As indicated in para 5.2.2 above, the performance results 
should be disclosed in the annual report and must be available for public inspection (Section 5(4) of the South African Civil 
Aviation Authority Act and para 5.2.13 of the Protocol). 
275 Principle 2.2 of King III Report and para 5.2.13 of the Protocol. 
276 The comparable measures established by Zimbabwe are discussed in Chapter 4, para 4.2 5 above.  
277 Paras 5.1.14 and 5.1.15 of the Protocol. 
278 For example, see section 9(3) of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act and section 7(4) of the South 
African Construction Industry Development Board Act. The South African Construction Industry Development Board Act 
actually states that the board “must perform its functions free from undue influence” (section 3). 
279 See section 5 of the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act and section 5 of the South African Construction Industry 
Development Board Act. See Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 in respect of Zimbabwe’s position. 
280 Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 28-37. The self-regulatory 
position is confirmed in the King Reports which the courts have referred to in determining whether or not directors have 
breached their duties. See Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry V Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd and Others (2006) (5) 
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practices, the country developed a number of legal and regulatory instruments as a way of 
creating an appropriate climate for adherence to the corporate governance guidelines 
“without unnecessarily imposing restrictive requirements that would inhibit commercial and 
entrepreneurial enterprise”.281 For example, South Africa has relied on its legislation (e.g. 
Companies Act,
282
 PFMA and Acts establishing public entities),
283
 case law (judicial 
precedent)
284
 and JSE Listing Requirements
285
 to enforce corporate governance compliance.  
                                                                                                                                                        
SA 333 (W) where the directors were fined for violating their environmental obligations. In this case the Court found that the 
directors of a company, who all resigned simultaneously, in order to avoid taking certain action, acted in bad faith to the 
company and were liable for the consequences of not discharging their duties. It appeared from the evidence that all directors 
had resigned from their positions on legal advice to the effect that if they continued in office the mine’s non-compliance with 
the court order might render them party to reckless trading. In passing judgment the court considered that the code of 
conduct of the second King Report was almost uniformly endorsed by the corporate community in South Africa and that the 
conduct of the respondent directors was part of their responsibilities in terms of the King Code of Conduct, which they were 
obliged to implement by virtue of the fact that the respondent was a listed company and consequently had to adhere to the 
Listing Requirements of the JSE Securities Exchange. The court held all the respondents guilty of contempt of court. It is 
therefore, important to note that, although the King Report is self-regulatory, the court referred extensively to the King II 
Report to determine if the directors had breached their duties. 
281 Given the voluntary nature of the King Reports, South Africa recognised that other interventions would be necessary to 
enhance the effectiveness of boards and promote good corporate governance practices. In response, the country formulated 
legislation intended to introduce “rigorous provisions relating to delinquent directors and for the introduction of provisions 
that will give legal backing to accounting standards in South Africa” (Armstrong P Corporate Governance in South Africa – 
a Perspective from an Emerging Market (Paper presented at the 5th Meeting of the Eurasian Corporate Governance 
Roundtable organised by World Bank, OECD and GCGF 2004) 22 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31919378.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2014). See Chapter 4, 
para 4.2.7 for Zimbabwe’s comparative enforcement initiatives. 
282 From a reading of the Companies Act, it is apparent that corporate governance issues are not just regulated in codes of 
best practice but are also dealt with in legislation. In the Act, a number of sections deal with corporate governance issues, for 
example, section 7 clearly states that one of purposes of the Act is to encourage “transparency and high standards of 
corporate governance as appropriate”, Chapter 2, Part C deals with general transparency and accountability requirements and 
Chapter 2, Part 7 concentrates on general governance of companies wherein directors’ duties are, for instance, partially 
codified in sections 75 and 76. Where a director breaches certain provisions of the Companies Act, he may incur civil and/or 
criminal liability or be disqualified to serve as a director (sections 162-163). Furthermore, the Companies Act provides that 
any provision of the Act “that applies to a public company applies also to a state-owned company, except to the extent that 
the Minister has granted an exemption…” This means that all penal provisions targeted at directors in private and public 
companies equally apply to state owned enterprises directors (Section 9 of the South African Companies Act).  
283 Various elements of the recommendations in the King Reports have also been incorporated into legislation and 
regulations to ensure that directors practice good corporate governance (Gstraunthaler T “Corporate Governance in South 
Africa: The Introduction of King III and Reporting Practices at the JSE ALT-X” (2010) 7(3) Corporate Ownership & 
Control 146-154 available at http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/Paper26.pdf (accessed on 29 May 2015)). See also 
Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG “South Africa’s King III: A Commercial Governance Code Determining Standards of 
Conduct for Civil Society Organizations” (2010) 1-109 and Institute of International Finance (IIF) Corporate Governance in 
South Africa-An Investor Perspective (IIF Paper of September 2007) available at 
http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=0N6SZ+azhm0 (accessed on 27 August 2014).  
284 Judicial precedent is a body of court judgements which establishes a particular legal principle which, in addition to 
statutory provisions, should be considered in passing future judgements in cases with similar facts. Once established, judicial 
precedent forms part of common law (Naidoo R Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies 
(2009) 31, 162). 
285 The JSE Listing Requirements have been regularly and comprehensively updated to incorporate certain elements of the 
King Reports as mandatory requirements for quoted companies. The JSE thus continues to enforce its existing requirement 
for companies to “comply or explain” their adoption of the King Report guidelines. In terms of section 1 of the JSE Listings 
Requirements, the JSE has the power, subject to the Listings Requirements, to grant, review, suspend or terminate a listing of 
securities or impose a fine on a listed company. Therefore, in the event that a listed company does not comply with such 
specifically itemised corporate governance requirements, the JSE would have the power to suspend or terminate such 
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The Companies Act clearly provides that that a person is not, solely by reason of being a 
director of a company, liable for any liabilities or obligations of the company, unless where 
the Companies Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.286 
Thus, directors may only incur criminal liability and civil liability in specific instances in 
terms of the Act.
287
 A director may be held personally liable, in accordance with the 
principles of the common law relating to breach of a fiduciary duty,
288
 for any loss, damages 
or costs encountered by the company as a result of any breach by him of a duty expected in 
the standard of directors conduct,
289
 failure to disclose a personal financial interest in a 
particular matter,
290
 failure to avoid a conflict of interest
291
 or any breach of a provision of the 
Companies Act or the company’s memorandum of incorporation.292  
 
Furthermore, the Act penalises and imposes personal liability on a director for any loss, 
damage or costs arising as a direct or indirect consequence of his actions.
293
 For example, a 
director is held accountable if he acts on behalf of the company despite knowing that he lacks 
authority to do so, consents to carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it 
amounts to reckless trading in terms of section 22, agrees to being a party to an act or 
omission despite knowing that the act or omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, 
employee or shareholder of the company and signed, consented to, or authorised the 
                                                                                                                                                        
company’s listing of its securities if it is in the public interest to do so or impose a fine on such listed company (section 1 of 
the JSE Listing Requirements). 
286 Delport P The New Companies Act Manual (2009) 38-39. 
287 See, for example, section 216(5) of the South African Companies Act, which makes it a criminal offence for a director to 
fail to notify the company of a change in personal particulars. See also Mammatt J, Du Plessis D and Everingham G The 
Company Director’s Handbook (Cape Town:Siber Ink 2004) 100-112, for a list of all the criminal offences in the Companies 
Act.  
288 Section 77(2) of the Companies Act provides that the section applies in addition to any rule of common law that is 
consistent with the section. 
289 Section 77(2) of the Companies Act.  For example, a director is liable for failing to act in good faith and for a proper 
purpose or in the best interest of the company (section 76(3) of the Companies Act). See also Kanamugire JC and Chimuka 
TC “The Directors’ Duty to Exercise Care and Skill in Contemporary South African Company Law and the Business 
Judgment Rule” (2014) 70-78. 
290 Section 75 of the Companies Act.  
291 Section 76(2) of the Companies Act. See also Kanamugire JC “The Impact of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 on the 
Traditional Director’s Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest” (2014) 5(9) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 75-88. 
292 Section 76(2) and 214 of the Companies Act. See also Delport P, The New Companies Act Manual, (2009) 38-39. 
293 Section 77(3) of the Companies Act. 
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publication of any financial statements that were materially false or misleading or a 
prospectus that contained false or misleading information.
294
  
 
To ensure that unsuitable individuals are not allowed to continue managing the company’s 
affairs, the Companies Act provides for the removal of a director before the expiration of his 
period of office if he fails to perform his duties as expected.
295
 The circumstances under 
which a director may be removed are when he becomes ineligible or disqualified or 
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to execute the functions of a director or neglected 
or has been negligent in the performance of his duties.
296
 A director may also be declared 
“delinquent” if he, inter alia, grossly abuses the position of director or acts in a manner that 
amounts to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the 
performance of the director's functions.
297
 In an effort to further deter directors from not 
complying with statutory requirements, the Companies Act provides for the disqualification 
of directors and for a register of disqualified directors to be maintained.
298
 A disqualified 
person under the Act includes a person who has been declared by a court to be a delinquent 
director, placed under probation by a court, is prohibited in terms of any public regulation to 
be a director of the company or has been removed from an office of trust on the grounds of 
misconduct involving dishonesty.
299
 
 
                                                 
294 Section 77(3) of the Companies Act. The section further states that the liability of a person in terms of the said section is 
jointly and severally with any other person who is or may be held liable for the same act. This means that a single director 
can be held liable for the totality of damages suffered by a third party as a result of the breach of fiduciary duties See also 
Grové AP Company Directors: Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Care and Skill Unpublished Thesis (University of Pretoria 
2012) 41-42. 
295 Section 71 of the Companies Act. Certain requirements have to be met to remove a director, for example, an ordinary 
resolution must be adopted at a shareholders meeting by a majority of persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election 
of that director, prior to such resolution being passed. In addition, the director concerned must be given adequate notice of 
the meeting and the resolution and afforded reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in person or through a 
representative, to the shareholders meeting, before such resolution is put to a vote. See also Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 (1) SA 
178 (W) at 182E-G. 
296 Ibid. See also Grové AP Company Directors: Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Care and Skill (2012) 42-43. 
297 Section 162 of the Companies Act. 
298 Sections 69 and 162 of the Companies Act. Section 69 prohibits a person who has been disqualified from acting as 
director. The register for disqualified directors should be maintained by the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission. Some commentators have argued that disqualifying and declaring directors delinquent may be viewed as 
blacklisting the individuals thus discourage people from accepting directorship. However, others have argued that the 
probability for disqualification is likely to act as a checking mechanism and encourage directors to effectively and ethically 
discharge their duties (Tumuheki J Towards Good Corporate Governance: An Analysis of Corporate Governance Reforms 
in Uganda (2008) 64). 
299 Section 69 of the Companies Act. 
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Any director found guilty of an offence in terms of this Act, is liable (in the case of a 
contravention of section 213(1) or 214(1)) to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years, or to both a fine and imprisonment. In any other case, the director is 
liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months, or to both a fine and 
imprisonment.
300
 However, in any proceedings against a director, other than for wilful 
misconduct or wilful breach of trust, the court may, in terms of the business judgment rule,
301
 
discharge the director, either wholly or in part, from any liability set out in the Act, or on any 
terms the court considers just, if it appears to the court that the director acted honestly and 
reasonably, or having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected 
with the appointment of the director, it would be fair to excuse the director.
302
 In addition, a 
director is specifically entitled by the business judgment rule to rely on the discharge of 
functions, and information presented by, persons such as employees and professional advisers 
who that director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent.
303
 
 
To add to the above, the Companies Act makes provision for a new institutional framework 
consisting of a Companies and Intellectual Property Commission aimed at ensuring proper 
administration, compliance with and enforcement of the provisions of the Companies Act.
304
 
The Commission must receive and promptly investigate complaints concerning violations of 
the provisions of the Act, encourage the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by companies 
for resolving internal disputes and issue and enforce compliance notices.
305
 The Act also 
provides for the protection of whistleblowers which should go a long way in encouraging 
people to disclose information regarding breach of duty by the directors or other officers of 
                                                 
300 Section 216 of the Companies Act. 
301 See section 77(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The excuse is granted if the director took reasonably diligent steps to 
become informed about the matter, has no material financial interest in the matter or had properly disclosed such interest, 
and made a decision rationally in the belief that it was in the best interests of the company. (Havenga M “The Business 
Judgment Rule – Should We Follow The Australian Example?” (2000) 12 South African Mercantile Law Journal 25). 
302 Section 77(9) of the Companies Act. The main aim of the provisions is to protect directors who, in carrying on the 
business of the company, acted honestly and reasonably with the aim of furthering the company's interests. 
303 Davis D et al Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 108-109. Apart from exempting directors 
from liability, it is argued that the business judgment rule serves to motivate capable persons to undertake the directorship 
positions and encourages the directors to engage safely in risk taking activities. 
 
304 Sections 185-188 of the Companies Act.  
 
305 Section 187(2)) of the Companies Act. 
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the company without fear of liability for such disclosure.
306
 All these provisions in the 
Companies Act are aimed at ensuring that directors of all companies, including public 
entities, perform their duties and exercise their powers effectively and within the confines of 
the relevant legal and regulatory provisions.  
 
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) is another Act that South Africa has relied on 
to enhance board effectiveness and accountability as well as to regulate corporate governance 
practices in public entities. Sections 50 and 51 of the Act clearly outline the fiduciary duties 
and general responsibilities of the board as an accounting authority such that the board should 
have no excuse for failing to effectively discharge its duties as expected of it. To enforce 
compliance, the Act imposes criminal liability on accounting officers and authorities who 
willfully or grossly negligently fail to comply with certain provisions of the Act or properly 
perform their duties.
307
 Also, the PFMA provides for the disciplining of accounting officers 
and authorities where they would have committed acts of financial misconduct.
308
 A person 
found guilty of an act of financial misconduct is individually and severally liable for the 
financial misconduct of the accounting authority and may be dismissed or suspended.
309
  
 
The PFMA further provides for appointment of auditors and audit committees to conduct 
independent checks on compliance by public entities with the legal and regulatory systems.
310
 
Lastly, the PFMA has provided for the setting up of a National Treasury which plays a 
supervisory function in the management of public entities through promoting accountability, 
transparency and effective risk management.
311
 The National Treasury is mandated to assist 
departments, public entities and constitutional institutions in building their capacity for 
                                                 
306 Section 159 of the Companies Act. A whistleblower, who makes a disclosure contemplated in terms of section 159 has 
qualified privilege in respect of the disclosure and is immune from any civil, criminal or administrative liability for that 
disclosure. See also section 2 of the Protected Disclosure Act (No. 26 of 2000). 
307 Section 86 of the PFMA. 
308 Sections 81-85 of the PFMA. An act of financial arises when an accounting authority wilfully or negligently fails to 
comply with a requirement of sections 50-55 or makes or permits an unauthorised expenditure, an irregular expenditure or a 
wasteful expenditure (Section 81 of the South African PFMA). 
309 Section 83 of the South African PFMA. 
310 See section 77 of the PFMA. 
311 The National Treasury was established in terms of section 5 of the South African PFMA. Its mandate is to encourage 
good corporate governance in the public entities by promoting corporate governance standards (sections 5 and 6 of the South 
African PFMA). See also Nevondwe L, Odeku KO and Tshoose CI “Promoting the Application of Corporate Governance in 
the South African Public Sector” (2014) 261-275. 
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efficient, effective and transparent financial management and to examine their systems of 
financial management and internal control.
312
 
 
Further to the PFMA, the Acts that established public entities provide for disciplinary action 
against board members who fail to comply with the terms and conditions of their 
appointment. In South Africa, the Acts provide for dismissal of board members on charges of 
misconduct, failing to substantially comply with an order issued by the Minister in terms of 
the Act or failure to perform their functions diligently and effectively, among other issues.
313
 
For example, the responsible Minister is expected to, in writing, immediately dismiss any 
board member of his duties if that member has failed to vacate his office in terms of section 
7(4),
314
 failed to attend two consecutive meetings of the board without leave of the board or 
failed to uphold and advance the objects of the board.
315
 
  
To further enforce compliance, South Africa has established regulatory bodies tasked to 
ensure that companies and their directors comply with corporate governance requirements as 
well as other laws and regulations. The first body to be actively involved in the promotion of 
corporate governance in South Africa was the Institute of Directors (IoDSA). Although it has 
no legal powers to enforce compliance, the Institute of Directors has played an integral role in 
providing technical training to directors and in the development of corporate governance 
codes and dissemination of information on corporate governance trends around the world.
316
  
Secondly, the JSE, through its Listing Requirements, has also played a significant role in 
ensuring that all companies listed with the Stock Exchange are obliged to comply with 
                                                 
312 Section 6 of the PFMA. 
313 Section 9 of the South African Civil Aviation authority Act and section 14 of the South African National Roads Agency 
Limited Act. 
314 Section 7(4) of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act requires a member to immediately 
vacate office if he is convicted, whether in South Africa or elsewhere, of theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, 
perjury or any offence involving dishonesty or of any offence in terms of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992, the Companies Act 
or of contravening the PFMA. He also has to vacate office if he becomes a political office bearer or an insolvent whose 
insolvency was caused by his negligence or incompetence, has been removed from an office of trust on account of 
misconduct or if he discloses or improperly acts on information gained as a result of his board membership without 
authorisation. See also section 9 of the South African Civil Aviation authority Act and section 14 of the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited Act. 
315 Section 7(5) of the South African Construction Industry Development Board Act. 
316 Koma SB “Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector: Issues, 
Trends and Prospects” (2009) 451-459 and Oman CP Corporate Governance in Development: The Experiences of Brazil, 
Chile, India, and South Africa (2003) 163. 
199 
 
relevant corporate governance principles as enshrined in the King III Report and to justify 
areas of non-compliance.
317
 Failure to adhere to the JSE Listings Requirements is an offence 
which attracts stiff penalties and may result in suspension or termination of a listing and 
personal liability of directors.
318
 
 
South Africa has also set up supervisory and regulatory bodies to assist in the enforcement of 
good corporate governance practices. Examples of the regulatory, supervisory and advisory 
bodies include the Department of Public Enterprises,
319
 Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission,
320
 the Accounting Standards Board (ASB),
321
 the Auditor-General of South 
Africa (AGSA),
322
 Public Protector
323
 and Anti-Corruption Commission.
324
 Recently, the 
                                                 
317 Despite the non-binding nature of the King Reports, the JSE requires, as a condition of listing, that companies and 
directors observe certain corporate governance principles as enshrined in the King Report which positively impacts on the 
way directors conduct company business, thus promoting good corporate governance (section 7 (para7.F.5 and 7.F.6) of the 
JSE Listing Requirements).  
318 Section 1.20 of the JSE Listings Requirements. 
319 The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) is the shareholder representative of the South African Government with 
oversight responsibility for State Owned Companies (SOC) in key sectors, including: Defence, Energy, Forestry, ICT, 
Mining and Transport. Visit http://www.dpe.gov.za/ for more information.  
320 The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission was established in terms of section 185 of the Companies Act. Its 
overall functions are to monitor and enforce proper compliance with the Companies Act and any other applicable legislation 
and refer alleged offences in terms of the Acts to the National Prosecuting Authority (section 187 of the Companies Act). 
321 The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was established in terms of section 87 of the PFMA. It is responsible for 
approving South African accounting standards; it sets standards and guidelines for financial statements as mandated by the 
Constitution and makes recommendations to the Minister of Finance. For more information about the ASB, visit 
www.asb.co.za/. 
322 The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) was established in terms of section 181 of the Constitution of South 
Africa. The AGSA annually produces audit reports on all government departments, public entities, municipalities and public 
institutions. The AGSA’s findings are publicised once the audit reports have been tabled in parliament. This “public 
disclosure of audit findings serves as another deterrent to committing economic crime” (Fakie S The Role of the Office of the 
Auditor-General in South Africa (Paper presented at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, South Africa 
in October 1999) 4 available at http://9iacc.org/papers/day4/ws2/dnld/d4ws2_sfakie.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2014)). 
323 The Public Protector was established in terms of section 181(a) of the Constitution. It empowered to investigate any 
conduct in state affairs or in the public administration in any sphere of government that is alleged or suspected to be 
improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice. The Public Protector protects the public “against matters such as 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of government, improper conduct by a person performing a public function, 
improper acts with respect to public money, improper or unlawful enrichment of a person performing a public function…” 
(“Preamble to the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 as amended by Act 22 of 2003). See also Ntlama N “The Brewing Tug-of 
War between South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions: The Public Protector vs the Independent Electoral Commission” (2015) 
10(1) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 13-21. 
324 The Commission was established in terms of section 181 of the Constitution. The Anti-Corruption Commission is 
mandated to enforce the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. Its main mandate is to, without 
fear, favour or prejudice, coordinate the investigation, prevention, education and fighting of corruption in South Africa 
(section 2 of the Anti-Corruption Act). 
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South African President set up a Presidential State-owned Enterprises Review Committee.
325
 
The Committee’s main purpose is to strengthen the role of public entities to ensure that they 
respond to a clearly defined public mandate and support the “developmental State” 
aspirations of government.
326
 The Committee was mandated to, inter alia, propose 
appropriate strategic and legislative frameworks or policies that will enable collaboration 
between government ministries and public entities as well as enhance strategic management 
and operational effectiveness with due regard to the developmental state context.
327
 It was 
also tasked to come up with sustainable business and governance models that create a balance 
between commercial, developmental and shareholder objectives and review the public 
entity’s contribution to human capital development.328 
 
Parent ministries in South Africa have also been tasked with most of the oversight 
responsibilities of monitoring the operations of and promoting good corporate governance in 
public entities.
329
 In addition to parent ministries, the Department of Public Enterprises
330
 was 
established to develop policies and processes for the governance of public entities and 
directly supervise eight major enterprises.
331
 Moreover, the country has a Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) which is responsible for the supervision of compliance by 
organisations with company law, commercial policy and industrial policy as well as 
promotion of economic development, promotion and regulation of international trade and 
                                                 
325 National Development Plan and the Medium-Term Strategic Framework for 2009-2014 of the Ruling (ANC) Party 
available at http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/policies/ndp-140613.htm (accessed on 17 December 2014). 
326 Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management Research Paper of June 2012) 4 available at 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_3/governance_and_ownership/ (accessed on 17 
December 2014). 
327 Ibid. See also Report on State-Owned Enterprises: Briefing by Presidential Review Committee of 9 October 2013 
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20131009-report- (accessed on 12 December 2014). 
328 Ibid. 
329 Para 4 of the Protocol and paras 2.2, 2.3 and 6.1 of the CGF. In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of State Enterprises and 
Parastatals was responsible, in conjunction with parent ministries, for supervising all public entities before it was dissolved 
in 2013 when a new government came into place. 
330 The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) is the shareholder representative for government with oversight 
responsibility for eight major state owned enterprises namely, Alexkor, Eskom, Denel, Safcol, Broadband Infraco, South 
African Airways, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and Transnet. The Department is responsible for ensuring that public entities 
perform to their best capabilities, “overseeing the implementation of skills development; board appointment processes; board 
induction and determining board remuneration” (Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of 
Reforms and Challenges (2014) 41). Also visit http://www.dpe.gov.za/ for more information. 
331 Bulbuena SS State-owned Enterprises in Southern Africa: A Stocktaking of Reforms and Challenges (2014) 41. See also 
Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 41.  
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consumer protection.
332
 The DTI has developed a corporate governance model informed by 
requirements of the King Reports that is specific to public entities.
333
  
 
To strengthen the effectiveness of all the above enforcement measures, South African 
authorities considered it essential that the country’s judicial system should be strong and 
reliable. The judicial authority in South Africa is “vested in the courts, which are independent 
and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and 
without fear, favour or prejudice”.334 The Constitution provides for a number of courts 
namely; the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Courts,
335
 magistrates’ courts and any 
other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament.
336
 Other courts 
include; the Income Tax Court, Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court, the Land Claims 
Court, the Competition Appeal Court, the Electoral Court, divorce courts,  “military courts” 
and equality courts.
337
  
 
                                                 
332 NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism: Country Review Report of South Africa, September 2007 (NEPAD Country 
Review Report 2007) available at http://www.aprm.org.za/docs/SACountryReviewReport5 (accessed on 18 July 2014). Also 
visit http://www.thedti.gov.za/ for more information. 
333 Koma SB “Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Corporate Governance in the South African Public Sector: Issues, 
Trends and Prospects” (2009) 451-459. The DTI has also set up two significant governance structures, namely, the 
Executive Board (ExBO) and an Operations Committee (OPSCOM). The EXBO and OPSCOM are governed by clearly laid 
down terms of reference that are regularly reviewed  “through assistance of external expertise aimed at drawing best 
practices related to corporate governance”. The purpose of ExBo is to, in consultation with the Minister, provide direction 
towards the achievement of departmental strategic objectives. The ExBo annually conducts a strategic risk assessment to 
identify risks that could impede the department from achieving set targets and considers and approves policy 
recommendations of strategic importance. The OPSCOM was established as a consequence of the need to separate strategic 
policy and operational decision-making in the Department with the operational decision-making mandated to it (Department 
of Trade and Industry Annual Report 2011/2012) 79-80 available at 
www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/AR2012sml_Part1b.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2015)). 
334 Van der Merwe CG and Du Plessis JE Introduction to the Law of South Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
2004) 19. See also Lewis C “A Mixed Legal System with a Constitution on Top: South African Law in the Era of 
Democracy” (2005) 57 Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies 12-14 available at 
http://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/148/1/LewisCaroleIssue057.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015) and Office of the Chief Justice The 
South African Judiciary available at www.judiciary.org.za/judicial-authority.html  (accessed on 27 April 2015). 
335 Decisions of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High courts are an important source of law. 
These courts uphold and enforce the Constitution, which has an extensive Bill of Rights binding all state organs and all 
people. 
336 Section 166 of the Constitution and Van der Merwe CG and Du Plessis JE Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 
21-27. South African law employs the law of precedent or stare decisis, in that‚ lower courts are bound by the decisions of 
higher courts unless the decision was subject to a material error (Kotzé LJ and du Plessis A “Some Brief Observations on 
Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2010) 3(1) Journal of Court Innovation 157-176). 
See also South Africa Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (A Review by AfriMAP and Open Society Foundation for South 
Africa 2005) 15-17 available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/afrimapreport_20060223.pdf 
(accessed on 27 April 2015).  
337 Ibid. 
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Zimbabwe and South Africa have adopted similar frameworks with regard to promoting 
voluntary corporate governance compliance and enforcing compliance where necessary. The 
colonial and legal history of Zimbabwe, “although unique and independent, is interconnected 
and interrelated to the history of South Africa's legal developments and colonial 
developments”.338 As a result, the two countries’ legal judicial systems share many 
similarities.
339
 However, as seen above, South Africa has done more in terms of updating its 
legislation in line with local and international developments (e.g. overhauling the Companies 
Act). The new South African Companies Act has partially codified the directors’ duties, 
created a Companies and Intellectual Property Commission and provided for a register of 
disqualified directors which Zimbabwe has not done. South Africa has also established more 
supervisory and regulatory authorities to enforce compliance than Zimbabwe.  
 
An assessment of the effectiveness of the guidelines, statutory and regulatory mechanisms 
put in place by the two countries in enhancing the enforcement of good corporate governance 
practices is done in chapter 7 below.
340
 
 
5.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
Zimbabwe and South Africa have adopted comparable frameworks to promote good 
corporate governance practices in their respective countries and align their business practices 
with regional and international corporate governance standards.
341
 The Institute of Directors 
has played a fundamental role in promoting good corporate governance in both 
jurisdictions.
342
 The two countries have imitated United Kingdom’s corporate governance 
system that comprises of legal and regulatory sources and a system of non-binding codes of 
best practice. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe’s legal and regulatory frameworks comprise 
                                                 
338 Saki O and Chiware T The Law in Zimbabwe (2007) 2. 
339 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 as regards the Zimbabwe’s judicial system. 
340 See Chapter 7, para 7.2.7 below. 
341 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 above, for a detailed discussion of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework. 
342 Institutes of Directors seem to be common institutions globally, for example, the Australian Institute of Directors, Malawi 
Institute of Directors and UK Institute of Directors.  
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of, inter alia, the Constitution, Companies Act,
343
 Public Finance Management Act, Acts that 
constituted the public entities, sector legislation and policies, common law and case law.
344
  
 
With regard to corporate governance codes, both countries have adopted the “apply or 
explain” approach.345 However, whilst South Africa adopted a national corporate governance 
code (King Report) as early as 1994, Zimbabwe only adopted its own National Code in 
2015.
346
 In the same spirit as South Africa’s Protocol, Zimbabwe developed the Corporate 
Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Public Entities with the objective of 
promoting the efficient use of public resources and fostering a culture of accountability, 
observance and adherence to regional and international best practice in public entities.
347
   
 
Internationally recognised corporate governance codes like the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance
348
 and CAGG Guidelines have influenced corporate governance 
developments in both jurisdictions.
349
 In addition, both countries subscribe to a number of 
corporate governance initiatives specifically targeted towards improving African countries’ 
corporate governance standards, for example, as New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
                                                 
343 Whilst South Africa reviewed and updated its Companies Act in 2008, Zimbabwe is still relying on the old and archaic 
Act which was promulgated in 1951 although amendments have been done to specific areas on a need basis (Saki O and 
Chiware T The Law in Zimbabwe (2007) 5-9). 
344 A comparison of South African and Zimbabwean statutes indicates that the two countries borrow heavily from each other 
and from the United Kingdom’s legal system, with several provisions in the two jurisdictions’ statutes being similar to one 
another, in some cases word for word. An example is the section which deals with the removal of directors in the Companies 
Act of both countries (section 71 of the South African Companies Act and section 175 of the Zimbabwean Companies Act). 
See also the similarity of the provisions of the PFMA pertaining to public entities in both countries (sections 46-55 of the 
South African PFMA and sections 39-51 of the Zimbabwean PFMA). Furthermore, the two countries have greatly relied on 
each other’s case law (Dzvimbo RS Should the Zimbabwean Companies Act Move Away From Judicial Management and 
Adopt Business Rescue? (2013) 5-6 and Saki O and Chiware T The Law in Zimbabwe (2007) 5). 
345 “Introduction and Background” to the King III Report, “Introduction” to the Manual and “Introduction and Background” 
to the National Code. However, the King I and King II Reports, unlike the King III Report, had adopted the “comply or 
explain” approach (see para 5.2.1.5 above).  
346 The Manual (which was introduced in 2001) has, nonetheless, greatly served as a guiding framework to promote good 
corporate governance in Zimbabwe. 
347 The objectives of the Protocol and CGF are to provide guidelines specific to public entities given their uniqueness and 
strategic national importance (para 1 of the Protocol and para 1 of the CGF). 
348 Zimbabwe and South Africa are members of the ‘OECD Network on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
in Southern Africa’ which was launched in 2007. The Network’s main objective is to support regional and national reformers 
in their efforts to improve the performance of public entities in Southern Africa. The Network provides a “forum for regional 
dialogue and co-operation” aimed at improving the governance of public entities (OECD Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises in Southern Africa (OECD Publishing 2013) 2 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/SOESouthernAfrica2013.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2015). 
349 Ncube B Corporate Governance? Future Perspective in Light of the 2008/09 Global Economic Meltdown (2010) 8-9. See 
also the “Introduction and Background” to the King Report and “Introduction” to the Manual.  
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(NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Africa Governance Forum (AGF) and 
African Corporate Governance Network. Stock Exchanges (ZSE and JSE) have also greatly 
contributed to the good corporate governance drive by publishing and monitoring the 
implementation of listings. The Listing Requirements have considerably contributed to the 
improvement of corporate governance practices of listed companies in both jurisdictions.
350
 
 
Overall, the two countries acknowledge that, for boards of public entities to be effective, 
there is need for clarity and director education on the role of the board, the board selection 
process should be transparent and based on merit, the board should be properly composed in 
terms of expertise, independence and diversity, the board remuneration should be fair and 
performance related and the performance of the board should be evaluated regularly.
351
 The 
countries have also put in place enforcement mechanisms ranging from punishment (fines or 
imprisonment) of individual directors, disqualification of directors and removal of individual 
directors or the whole board for misconduct or poor performance in terms of relevant 
legislation.
352
  
 
Companies that default in complying with the Listing Requirements may be suspended or 
delisted in terms of the Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. Both counties have put in 
place a number of regulatory and supervisory bodies to enforce compliance with good 
corporate governance principles.
353
 Examples of such bodies are the Auditor-General and 
Anti-Corruption Commission. Zimbabwe and South Africa also share similar judicial systems 
mostly because of the similar colonial backgrounds.
354
 The judicial authority is vested in 
several courts, which are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. 
 
                                                 
350 The ZSE and JSE Listing Requirements require, as a condition of listing, that companies and directors observe certain 
corporate governance principles as enshrined in the corporate governance codes and provide for penalties for failure to 
observe the Listings Requirements (section 1.1-1.9 of the ZSE Listing Requirements and section 1.20 of the JSE Listings 
Requirements).  
351 See Chapter 4, paras 4.2.2-4.2.6 and Chapter 5, paras 5.2.2-5.2.6 above. The measures put in place by both countries to 
achieve these objectives are in compliance with internationally accepted corporate governance standards such as the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG Guidelines and ICGN Principles. This is because the frameworks that 
Zimbabwe and South Africa instituted significantly borrow from these global instruments. 
352 Chapter 5, para 5.2.7 above. 
353 Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 and Chapter 5, para 5.2.7 above. 
354 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.1 and Chapter 5, para 5.2 above. 
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The next chapter considers the corporate governance framework of Australia, an example of a 
developed country that has influenced developments in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ZIMBABWEAN AND 
AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
With globalisation, innovation and flexibility have become as important for organisations in 
developing and emerging economies as they have been for organisations in developed 
countries.
355
 Innovation and flexibility enable timely responses to accelerated changes in the 
competitive environment leading to the success of long term development and corporate 
governance efforts.
356
 As a result, a number of lessons can be derived by developing and 
emerging economies in the way business has been conducted and corporate governance has 
been practiced in developed economies.
357
 However, it has been noted that, although helpful, 
the corporate governance standards used in developed countries may not be directly 
applicable in developing countries because of economic, political, cultural and technological 
differences.
358
 There is therefore, need for developing countries to develop their own 
corporate governance models that match their level of development and cultural 
backgrounds.
359
 
 
In this chapter, a comparative analysis between Zimbabwe and Australia’s corporate 
governance frameworks for public entities is conducted to establish the extent to which 
                                                 
355 Oman C The Policy Challenges of Globalisation and Regionalisation (OECD Centre Policy Brief No. 11 of 1996) 4-5 
available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-policy-challenges-of-globalisation-and-regionalisation (accessed 
on 3 March 2014). 
356 Oman C, Fries S and Buiter W Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging–Market Economies 
(OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No. 23 of 2003) available at http://www.oecd.org/social/poverty/28658158.pdf 
(accessed on 12 March 2014)). 
357 Ibid. See also Ho LK Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics and Regulations (ISEAS 
Publications 2005) 38. 
358 Mulili BM and Wong P “Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: The Case for Kenya” (2011) 2(1) 
International Journal of Business Administration 14-27.  
359 Ibid. 
207 
 
Zimbabwe has tried to harmonise its systems with developed countries and the areas of 
improvement that need to be given attention, if any.
360
 
 
6.2 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWEAN AND AUSTRALIAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS  
 
6.2.1 Overview of Australian Corporate Governance Framework  
The collapse of big companies in Australia,
361
 perceived deficiencies in the legal duties of 
directors in the corporate regulatory framework and the need to keep pace with international 
corporate governance developments provided the impulsion for continuous corporate law 
reform, examination of the importance of directors’ duties and ethics and an increased 
demand for accountability and reliability in the management of both private and public 
companies.
362
 In response to these challenges and developments, the government developed a 
number of corporate governance instruments which include statutes and regulations 
(mandatory legislation), common law and ‘if not, why not’ guidelines (self-regulation)363 
issued by organisations like the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council’s (ASX CGC)364 and Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA),365 as 
well as policy documents and advisory guidelines.
366
 
                                                 
360 Like in the previous chapters, the main focus is on five aspects considered essential for board effectiveness (Chapter 1, 
para 1.5). In this chapter particular focus and greater details are provided on corporate governance developments in Australia 
given the fact that developments in Zimbabwe have been extensively discussed in Chapter 4 above.  
361 The first major collapse was that of Rothwells Ltd in 1987, followed by a number of other corporate failures like One-Tel 
Ltd., Harris Scarfe and Ansett Airlines. More recent considerations of corporate governance occurred in the Report of the 
HIH Royal Commission, following the collapse of one of the country’s largest insurers, HIH Insurance Ltd. and the dramatic 
collapse of Opes Prime in 2008 (Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (The Australian National 
University 2012) 43-46). 
362 Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 43-46 and Psaros J Australian Corporate Governance: A 
Review and Analysis of Key Issues (Pearson Higher Education 2008) 45-46. 
363 In contrast to the prescriptive rule-based approach to corporate governance that characterised the post-Enron approach in 
the United States of America, as enshrined initially in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Australia subscribes to a more flexible 
principle-based approach to corporate governance regulation (Horrigan B “Directors’ Duties and Liabilities – Where Are We 
Now and Where Are We Going in the UK, Broader Commonwealth, and Internationally?” (2012) 3(2) International Journal 
of Business and Social Science 21-45). 
364 The ASX CGC, which is composed of a mixture of 21 business, investment and shareholder groups, was established in 
2002 to develop and deliver an industry wide supported framework for corporate governance that would provide a practical 
guide for listed companies, their investors and the wider Australian community. It has been considered as the principal 
contributor to corporate governance policies and practices in Australia (ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council 2014) 2.  
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The legal
367
 and regulatory corporate governance framework for Australian companies 
comprise of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Act 90 of 1989, 
the Corporations Act 50 of 2001, Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 153 of 
1997, the Financial Management and Accountability Act 154 of 1997 (FMA Act), Public 
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 123 of 2013, Acts enabling the 
establishment of the public entity (e.g. the Defence Housing Australia Act 101 of 1987 and 
the Australian Postal Corporation Act 64 of 1989), the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 103 of 2004 and the Australian Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules.
368
  
 
The voluntary codes include the Bosch Report titled ‘Corporate Practices and Conduct’ 
(hereinafter referred to as the Bosch Report), the Hilmer Report, the Review of the Corporate 
Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, Report to Commonwealth of 
Australia (hereinafter referred to as the Uhrig Review), Commonwealth Government 
Business Enterprise (GBE) Governance and Oversight Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as 
GBE Guidelines), Governance Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies and  
Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s (ASX CGC) Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations.
369
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
365 The IFSA first published its own corporate governance guidelines in 1995 referred to as “A Guide to Investment 
Managers and a Statement of Recommended Governance Practice” (commonly known as the Blue Book) (Du Plessis JJ, 
Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 165-171). The IFSA Guide is 
available at http://www.ifsa.com.au/. 
366 Psaros J Australian Corporate Governance: A Review and Analysis of Key Issues (2008) 43-44. Examples of 
organisations that produce advisory guidelines are the Australian Council of Super Investors (ACSI), Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Australian Shareholders’ Association 
(ASA) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). See also Armstrong A and Francis R “Loss of 
Integrity: the True Failure of the Corporate Sector” (2008) 3(3) Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics 1-13. 
367 Like Zimbabwe, Australia’s legal system is based on the English common law system developed in the United Kingdom 
(Akpet KO “The Australian Legal System: The Legal Profession and the Judiciary” (2011) 1 Ankara Bar Review 71-94 
available at http://www.ankarabarosu.org.tr/siteler/AnkaraBarReview/tekmakale/2011-1/6.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2015). 
Within this legal system the sources of law are statutes and delegated legislation, common law, judge-made and international 
law (Jakhu RS National Regulation of Space Activities (Springer Science & Business Media 2010) 36)). See also Gillies P 
Business Law (Federation Press 2004) 1. 
368 These statutes are discussed below (paras 6.2.1.1-6.2.1.7). 
369 Some of these initiatives that have been considered essential for this research are discussed below (paras 6.2.1.8-
6.2.1.13). 
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6.2.1.1 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Act 
The main objectives of the ASIC Act are to provide for the establishment of ASIC,
370
 its 
functions, powers and business, among other issues.
371
 The Act sets out the role of ASIC as 
to, inter alia, monitor and promote market integrity and consumer protection in relation to the 
Australian financial system and to be an overseer of corporate governance in Australia.
372
  
 
6.2.1.2 Corporations Act  
The Corporations Act is the principal legislation regulating private and public companies and 
some partnerships and managed investment schemes. The Act includes the framework 
surrounding the formation of companies, duties and liabilities of directors and shareholders’ 
rights and remedies.
373
 It also makes financial reporting provisions which are aimed at 
ensuring that financial aspects of a company’s governance practices are characterised by 
transparency and accountability.
374
 The majority of its provisions are obligatory with 
penalties imposed for non-compliance.
375
 However, the non-prescriptive provisions allow for 
company flexibility in terms of internal arrangements and management.
376
  Some provisions 
are optional for proprietary companies, but obligatory for public companies.
377
  
 
 
                                                 
370 The ASIC is an independent body established in order to facilitate corporate governance and to enforce the laws 
(primarily the Corporations Act and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act) relating to securities of 
publicly listed companies. This Act was repealed by Act No. 55 of 2001. 
371 Section 1 of the ASIC Act. 
372 Section 12 of ASIC Act. After the promulgation of the Act, a number of reports on corporate governance were prepared, 
for example, the Bosch Report, the Hilmer Report and the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and 
Office Holders, Report to Commonwealth of Australia (Uhrig Review). 
373 See Chapters 2A-2D of the Corporations Act. 
374 Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act. See also Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (2010) 162-163. 
375 Ibid. See also Sheehan K “The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia” (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 273-308 available at https://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr31/slr31_2/sheehan.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2015). 
376 Sections 135(2) and 249X Corporations Act. See also du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of 
Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 162-163. 
377 See, for example, section 249X of the Corporations Act. 
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6.2.1.3 Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act  
The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as CAC Act) 
applied to Commonwealth authorities and Commonwealth companies as defined in section 7 
and section 34 of the Act.
378
 This Act was one of the pieces of legislation that provided for a 
framework where observance of the law was the underlying principle applying to public 
sector governance.
379
 In particular, it detailed rules about reporting and accountability that 
apply in addition to the requirements of the Corporations Act.
380
 
 
6.2.1.4 Financial Management and Accountability Act  
The Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act provided the framework for the 
proper management of public money and public property by the Executive arm of the 
Commonwealth.
381
 The Act sets out “the financial management, accountability, reporting and 
audit obligations of agencies that are financially part of the Commonwealth, in particular: for 
managing public resources efficiently, effectively and ethically”.382 However, the FMA has 
since been repealed on 30 June 2014 and replaced by the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability Act which became effective on 1 July 2014.
383
  
 
 
 
                                                 
378 The CAC Act was repealed on 30 June 2014 and replaced by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability 
Act from 1 July 2014. As a result, no much reference is made to it in this study. 
379 Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 41-45. 
380 Ibid.  
381 Bowrey G The Sustainability Of Public Sector Ecological Sustainable Development Reporting (Research Paper presented 
at AFAANZ/IAAER Conference, Sydney, 6-8 July 2008) 2-3 available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/494 (accessed 
on 15 October 2015). Public money and public property is defined in the Act as money and property in the custody or 
control of the Commonwealth (See Part 2 of the FMA Act). 
382 Bowrey G The Sustainability Of Public Sector Ecological Sustainable Development Reporting (2008) 2-3. 
383 Hamilton P Amendments to the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Publication by the 
Australian Parliamentary Library of June 2014) available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/../.../Parliamentary_Library/Flagpost/2014 (accessed on 2 February 2015).  No much reference is 
therefore be made to this Act in this study.  
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6.2.1.5 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 
The Act 103 0f 2004  was enacted in July 2004 and is commonly known as Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) and it significantly modified the Corporations Act 
2001 which governs corporate law in Australia.
384
 The modifications were mostly based on 
the reform proposals contained in the CLERP 9 discussion paper and the Report of the HIH 
Insurance Royal Commission. The CLERP consisted of chronological reforms (CLERP 1–9) 
which began in 1997 in response to the Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System
385
 
and were designed to systematically improve Australia’s corporate law and enforcement.386 
The program mostly focused on principles of market freedom, investor protection and quality 
disclosure of relevant information to the market.
387
 One outstanding feature of the CLERP is 
that it made obligatory some of the corporate governance requirements that were previously 
non-mandatory with the aim of adding legal influence to some corporate governance practice 
in Australia.
388
  
 
6.2.1.6 Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act  
The main objective of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 
(hereinafter referred to as PGPA Act) is to promote good corporate governance across public 
entities by creating a system of “high standards of governance, performance and 
accountability” that ensures that public resources are properly managed.389 The PGPA Act 
replaced the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Commonwealth 
                                                 
384 Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 170-171. 
385 The Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System was produced in 1997 under the leadership of Hanratty Phil 
(Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group). The Report proposed a number of fundamental changes to the 
financial regulatory arrangements in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the system and build upon the 
existing achievements of financial deregulation (Hanratty P The Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System: Summary 
and Critique (Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliamentary Research Service Research Paper 16 1996-97). The 
Report is accessible at austlii.edu.au/~alan/wallis-report.html (accessed on 17 June 2015). 
386 Ibid. See also Department of Parliamentary Services Australia’s Corporate Regulators — the ACCC, ASIC and APRA 
(Research Brief No. 6 of 2005 (Commonwealth of Australia 2005) 14-17 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb16.pdf (accessed on 17 June 2015). 
387 Thomson D and Jain A “Corporate Governance Failure and Its Impact on National Australia Bank’s Performance” (2006) 
2(1) Journal of Business Case Studies 41-56.  
388 Ibid.  
389 Section 5 of the PGPA Act. 
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Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) on 1 July 2014, consolidating the 
governance, performance and accountability requirements of the Commonwealth into a single 
piece of legislation.
390
 The Act applies to all Commonwealth entities and Commonwealth 
companies.
391
 
 
6.2.1.7 Acts Establishing Public Entities 
A significant number of public entities in Australia are constituted in terms of a statutory 
instrument, for example, the Defence Housing Australia
392
 and the Australian Postal 
Corporation.
393
 The Acts that established public entities detail the entities’ mandate and 
provide for how they should be governed.
394
  
 
6.2.1.8 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules 
The ASX Listing Rules apply to all companies and trusts (entities) listed on the ASX most of 
which are also subject to the requirements of the Corporations Act.
395
 The Listing Rules are 
enforceable under the Corporations Act against listed entities and their associates and a 
breach of the rules can result in a variety of sanctions against the company.
396
 The ASX 
Listing Rules require listed companies to provide a statement of the main corporate 
governance practices observed during the reporting period.
397
  
                                                 
390 Australian Government PGPA Legislation and Associated Instruments (Australian Government, Department of Finance 
2014) available at http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/pgpa-legislation/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
391 Section 5 of the PGPA Act. 
392 The Defence Housing Australia Act 101 of 1987 established the Defence Housing Australia (DHA) whose main function 
is to provide adequate and suitable housing for, and housing related services to members of the Defence Force and their 
families (sections 5-7 of the Defence Housing Australia Act). 
393 The Australian Postal Corporation Act established the Australian Post whose principal function is to supply postal 
services or any business or activity relating to postal services within Australia and between Australia and places outside 
Australia (sections 14-16 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act). 
394 For example Part 2 and 3 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act and sections 11-12 of the Primary Industries Research 
and Development Corporation Act 1989 in respect of the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC). 
395 See the “Introduction” to the ASX Listing Rules that are available at www.asx.com.au/regulation/rules/asx-listing-
rules.htm.  (accessed on 12 June 2014). 
396 Sheehan K “The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia” (2009) 273-308. 
397 ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. If a company considers that a Recommendation is inappropriate to its particular circumstances, 
it has the flexibility not to adopt it but just to explain why i.e. the “if not, why not” approach. 
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6.2.1.9 Hilmer Report 
The Hilmer Report was prepared in 1993 by a committee chaired by Professor Fredrick 
Hilmer, alongside a number of major microeconomic reforms instituted by the Keating 
Government.
398
 The committee was tasked to review the Federal Trade Practices Act 1974 
and come up with a National Competition Policy that sought to promote efficiency and 
economic growth through effective competition while providing for situations “where 
competition does not achieve efficiency or conflicts with other social objectives”.399 The 
Committee was thus set up to investigate and advise on appropriate changes to legislation and 
other measures in relation to anti-competitive conduct of persons or enterprises in areas of 
business, inter alia.
400
 The Report had important implications for public entities, “many of 
which had begun entering into commercial activities; the professions; which were excluded 
from the application of Federal law; certain agricultural marketing entities granted monopoly 
rights; and certain infrastructure entities”.401 
 
6.2.1.10 Bosch Report 
The Bosch Report was developed by a Working Group formed by the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD), the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants 
(ASCPA), the Business Council of Australia, the Law Council of Australia, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) and the Securities Institute of Australia under the 
chairmanship of Henry Bosch.
402
 There were three Bosch Reports, the original one in 1991, 
the reviewed version of 1993 and the latest version being 1995.
403
 The aim of the report was 
                                                 
398 Corden S Australia’s National Competition Policy: Possible Implications for Mexico (OECD Publishing 2008) 10-11 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45048033.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2015)  
399 Ibid. See also Hilmer FG Hilmer Report: Strictly Boardroom: Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance 
2nd ed. (Melbourne: Information, Australia 1998) xvi-xix. 
400 Ibid. 
401 OECD Competition Policy in Australia (OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform 2010) 8-10 available at 
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44529918.pdf (accessed on 17 February 2015). 
402 Bosch Report: Corporate Practices and Conduct 3rd ed. (Woodslane Pty Ltd 1995) and Psaros J Australian Corporate 
Governance: A Review and Analysis of Key Issues (2008) 45-46. 
403 Ibid. 
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to improve the performance and reputation of Australian companies by encouraging and 
assisting the adoption of the highest standards of corporate governance as well as to keep 
corporate governance self-regulated.
404
 The Bosch Reports dealt with directors’ duties and 
responsibilities and were specifically designed to guide directors, auditors and accountants to 
uphold principles of good corporate governance.
405
  
 
6.2.1.11 Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders, Report to Commonwealth of Australia  
The Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, Report 
to Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter referred to as the Uhrig Review) was conducted 
under Uhrig J’s chairmanship and concluded in 2003.406 The objective of the review was to 
identify issues surrounding existing governance arrangements and to provide options for 
government to improve the performance and get the best from statutory authorities and office 
holders and their accountability frameworks.
407
 The review was tasked to develop a broad 
template of governance principles and arrangements that the government could extend to 
statutory authorities and office holders, and potentially beyond, to a wider range of public 
sector bodies.
408
 
 
Subsequent to the Uhrig Review, the Department of Finance also published its Governance 
Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies which greatly sought to promote better 
practice of good governance of Australian Government bodies.
409
 This policy document 
outlines principles to help in determining the most appropriate structure and governance 
                                                 
404 Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 170-171. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 1-2. 
407 Ibid. See also Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 49-50. 
408 Ibid. See also Halligan J and Horrigan B Reforming Corporate Governance in the Australian Federal Public Sector: 
From Uhrig to Implementation (University of Canberra Issues Paper Series No. 2 of December 2005) 1-3 available at 
http://www.academia.edu/4053323/ (accessed on 19 October 2015). 
409 See the “Foreword” to the Governance Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies Policy Document of August 
2005 that is available at www.finance.gov.au › Financial Framework (accessed on 13 August 2014). 
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arrangements for Australian Government bodies in line with the recommendations set out in 
the Uhrig Review.
410
 
 
6.2.1.12 Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise (GBE) - Governance and 
Oversight Guidelines 
The Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise (GBE) Governance and Oversight 
Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as GBE Guidelines) were produced by the Government 
Businesses Advice Branch of the Department of Finance and Deregulation and should be 
read in conjunction with the CAC Act.
411
 The GBE Guidelines form the central part of the 
regulatory requirements imposed on public entities
412
 with regard to issues related to 
corporate governance.
413
 They apply to Government Business Entities (GBEs) that are 
Commonwealth authorities and Commonwealth companies.
414
 For Commonwealth 
companies that are not wholly-owned GBEs, the extent to which these GBE Guidelines apply 
are normally acknowledged in legislation applying specifically to the GBE, the company 
constitution or shareholders’ agreement.415 The GBE Guidelines complement government 
policy and seek to ensure that GBEs operate efficiently and effectively to keep pace with 
governance standards in the private sector and international community.
416
 They consist of 
more prescriptive and descriptive details than relevant GBE legislation on the composition 
and appointment of the board.
417
  
                                                 
410 Ibid.  
411 Para 1.4 of the GBE Guidelines. 
412 In Australia, public entities are divided into entities that form part of the Commonwealth financial purposes (Financial 
Management and Accountability Act bodies) and those that are controlled by the Commonwealth while being legally and 
financially separate from it (CAC Act bodies). The CAC Act bodies are further separated into Commonwealth companies 
established under the Corporations Act (e.g. Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited) and Commonwealth authorities 
which are bodies established through an Act of Parliament for a particular purpose (e.g. Defence Housing Australia) (Dewan 
SM Corporate Governance in Public Sector Enterprises (2006) 143 145).  
413 Surgeon P and Dibbs Barker Gosling Lawyers Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties (Global Counsel Handbook 
2003) 21-22 available at www.practicallaw.com/global (accessed on 13 August 2014). 
414 A Government Business Enterprise is a Commonwealth authority or Commonwealth company as defined by the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) and prescribed as a GBE under the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Regulations 1997 (CAC Act Regulations) (Dewan SM Corporate Governance in Public Sector 
Enterprises (Pearson Education, India 2006) 144-146). 
415 Dewan SM Corporate Governance in Public Sector Enterprises (2006) 144-146. 
416 Ibid.  
417 Ibid.  
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6.2.1.13 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s (ASX CGC) 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
The first edition of the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (hereinafter referred to as ASX CGC Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations) was released in 2003 and the latest review 
was done in March 2014.
418
 The main objective of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations recommend corporate governance practices for entities 
listed on the ASX that, “in the Council’s view, are likely to achieve good governance 
outcomes and meet the reasonable expectations of most investors in most situations”.419 The 
ASX CGC Principles and Recommendations are said to have been formulated based on the ‘if 
not, why not’ (comply or explain) approach.420 They are therefore, not obligatory and do not 
seek to prescribe the corporate governance practices that a listed entity must adopt.
421
 
 
In addition to the above, the Good Governance Principles AS 8000-2003
422
 were developed 
to “assist members of boards, chief executive officers and senior managers to develop, 
implement and maintain a robust system of governance” and provide all other stakeholders 
with yardsticks against which to measure the performance of the entity, among other 
things.
423
 The Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) also published a Company 
Directors Corporate Governance Framework which is not prescriptive but designed to 
                                                 
418 However, it is worth noting that the ASX makes reference to other prior general guides to best practice including the 
‘Code of Conduct’ developed by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD, 1995), ‘Corporate Governance: A 
Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations, A Statement of Recommended Corporate Practice’ by the Australian 
Investment Managers’ Association (AIMA, 1997) and the Bosch Report (Psaros J Australian Corporate Governance: A 
Review and Analysis of Key Issues (2008) 45-46). See also Thomson D and Jain A “Corporate Governance Failure and Its 
Impact on National Australia Bank’s Performance” (2006) 41-56. 
419 ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014) 3. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid.  
422 This Standard was prepared by the Standards Australia International Committee MB-004 Business Governance, first 
published in June 2003 and revised in November 2004. The Standard’s main aim is to promote good corporate governance 
and it applies to a wide range of entities. It complements existing guidelines produced by Investment and Financial Services 
Association (IFSA) and the ASX CGC. The Good Governance Principles AS 8000-2003 is accessible at 
infostore.saiglobal.com/store/PreviewDoc.aspx?saleItemID=396440 (accessed on 3 February 2015). 
423 “Foreword” and section 1.3 of the Good Governance Principles AS 8000-2003. The Good Governance Principles AS 
8000-2003 emphasise the fact that there is no prescriptive model of corporate governance hence acknowledge the need for 
flexibility. 
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optimise corporate performance and accountability in the interests of stakeholders.
424
 
Similarly, the Australian National Audit Office
425
 produced guidelines known as ‘Better 
Practice Guides’ to complement government policy in ensuring that public entities are up to 
date with international corporate governance standards.
426
  
 
Other bodies like the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) and Australian 
Investment Managers’ Association (AIMA) have also played a key role in coming up with 
best practice guidelines (based on international standards) to assist the companies to 
determine the most suitable corporate governance model for their individual 
circumstances.
427
 Australia, being one of the OECD member countries, is also guided by the 
OECD Principles for Corporate Governance
428
 as well as by other internationally recognised 
corporate governance codes like the CACG Guidelines and ICGN Principles.
429
 Some 
insights of key elements of good corporate governance are provided by other countries’ 
corporate governance instruments like the Cadbury Report, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Combined Code.
430
 
 
                                                 
424 The Australian Institute of Company Directors’ Company Directors Corporate Governance Framework outlines the 
practices (skills, attributes and expertise) that embrace good director practice as demonstrated by responsible directors. The 
Framework is available at http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications (accessed on 17 
December 2014). 
425 The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) is an independent institution established in terms of section 38 of the 
Auditor-General Act (No. 151 of 1997). It was the primary advocate of corporate governance within the public sector in 
2003 and adopted “public sector governance” for its guidelines. 
426 The ANAO has published guidelines like Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent Assurance and Advice for Chief 
Executives and Boards (August 2011), Public Sector Governance Strengthening Performance through Good Governance 
(June 2014), Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and Controls (June 2013), Preparation of Financial 
Statements by Public Sector Entities (June 2013), among others. The guidelines are available at 
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Better-Practice-Guides. The Public Sector Governance Strengthening Performance 
through Good Governance has been developed to align with implementation of the substantive provisions of the PGPA Act 
(see “Foreword” to the Public Sector Governance Strengthening Performance through Good Governance (ANAO Better 
Practice Guides 2014). 
427 Psaros J Australian Corporate Governance: A Review and Analysis of Key Issues (2008) 43-44. 
428 For example, the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. Australia substantially 
adheres to OECD principles as shown in its own corporate governance framework (Australia and the OECD) (Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Publication of November 2013) 1-2 available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/australia-and-the-oecd.html (accessed on 7 August 2014)). 
429 Barret P Corporate Governance – A More Private Public Sector (Australian National Audit Office 2007) 28-32. 
430 Psaros J Australian Corporate Governance: A Review and Analysis of Key Issues (2008) 46. 
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Having given a general overview of the Australian corporate governance framework, the 
following sections consider the various mechanisms put in place by the country to enhance 
the effectiveness of the public entity boards. 
 
6.2.2 Role of the Board 
Comparable to Zimbabwe and South Africa, the traditional position in Australia was that 
directors should act in the best interests of the company.
431
 However, there has been a 
considerable amount of law reform initiatives in Australia concerning the duties and 
obligations of the directors of companies.
432
 In line with international developments, a 
number of corporate governance initiatives in Australia have recommended the adoption of 
the enlightened shareholder value approach which requires directors to take into account 
other stakeholders’ interests as well as observe the tenets of corporate social responsibilities 
while promoting the success of the company for the benefit of members as a whole.
433
  
 
Dyson Hey observed that, in the new era, the requirement that directors should act bona fide 
for the benefit of the company may be interpreted in four different ways. These are; “first, as 
an example of general duties which are owed by a fiduciary, secondly, as a duty to act bona 
fide for the company’s benefit; thirdly, as a duty to act bona fide for the shareholders’ benefit; 
and finally, as a duty to act bona fide in regard to all those who have interests in the company 
                                                 
431 Section 181(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 requires directors and other corporate officers to exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties “in good faith in the best interests of the corporation”. See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 as to the meaning of 
“in the best interests of the company”. See also Atrill P, McLaney E and Harvey D Accounting: An Introduction (Pearson 
Higher Education AU 2014) 38 and Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (2010) 67-69. This traditional view was confirmed in Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421. In this case, directors 
acquired shares from shareholders without disclosing to the shareholders that they were negotiating to sell the shares to a 
third party at a higher price. The Court held that the directors had no obligation to disclose to the shareholders that 
negotiations were in progress to sell the shares at a higher price. The only duty that was imposed on the directors was to the 
company. According to Horrigan, Australia “subscribes to shareholder primacy as the foundation of corporate law and 
governance” (Horrigan B “Directors’ Duties and Liabilities – Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going in the UK, 
Broader Commonwealth, and Internationally?” (2012) 21-45).   
432 The provisions on directors’ duties are a mixture of the “newer statutory rules and older common law rules” (Tomasic R, 
Bottomley S and McQueen R Corporations Law in Australia (Federation Press 2002) 316-318). 
433 Examples of the initiatives are The Report on Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value prepared by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee and Corporations and Financial Services (June 2006) available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/../../corporate_responsibility/report/ and the ASX CGC Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). See also Marshall S and Ramsay I “Stakeholders and Directors’ 
Duties: Law, Theory and Evidence” (2012) 35(1) UNSW Law Journal 291-316. 
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or who have relations with it”.434 Therefore, according to Hey, the directors are expected to 
consider the interests of, inter alia, the different stakeholders in the company when 
undertaking their duties.
435
 But, some commentators have argued that the current Australian 
company law does not make it mandatory for directors to pursue stakeholders’ interests but 
permits directors sufficient freedom to do so.
436
 They further argue that instead of legislating 
for mandatory recognition of stakeholders’ interests, “policy makers have shown a preference 
for allowing a more temperate adaptation to current practices and views through case law 
developments”.437 
 
In Australia, the general conduct of directors is subject to the provisions of the Corporations 
Act (for a wholly-owned Commonwealth company GBE), the CAC Act (for Authority 
GBEs), the PGPA Act, the legislation that established public entities,
438
 the company’s 
constitution and common law rules.
439
 The Corporation Act
440
 clearly stipulates that directors 
                                                 
434 Tomasic R, Bottomley S and McQueen R Corporations Law in Australia (2002) 321. See also Allen v Gold Reefs of West 
Africa Ltd (1900) 1 Ch 656 for the requirement that powers must be exercised “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole”. 
435 Ibid. In their interpretations of directors’ duties, Australian courts have, to some extent, reflected business reality and 
offered flexibility to directors to consider other stakeholders’ interests provided that the interests of shareholders are thereby 
served. For example, the Australian courts have revealed a willingness to recognise a fiduciary relationship between 
directors and creditors of the company in circumstances such as the insolvency or near insolvency of the companies 
involved. In Jeffree v National Companies & Securities Commission it was stated unequivocally that the directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to present and future company creditors thus are obliged to keep the company's property intact and accessible 
for the repayment of its debts (Jeffree v National Companies & Securities Commission (1989) 15 ACLR 217, 7 ACLC 556). 
Also, the James Hardie scandal is believed to be one of the recent cases that prompted Australia to reconsider its traditional 
shareholder centred approach to corporate law and the issue of corporate social responsibility generally (Hill JG The 
Architecture of Corporate Governance in Australia - Corporate Governance - National Report: Australia (European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 164/2010) 8 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657810  
(accessed on 18 January 2015). In support of the need to consider the interests of other stakeholders, in the Hardie case the 
court of Appeal held that the test under section 674 of the Corporations Act is an objective one. The views of a company’s 
senior management or its directors cannot determine whether disclosure of any given information is required, though they 
may be relevant. The Court also said that: “Even if there were no other evidence apart from the company’s own 
deliberations, it remains for the trial judge to evaluate whether information is material so as to require disclosure under 
section 674” (James Hardie Industries NV v ASIC (2010) 274 ALR 85). See also The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac 
Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 39 WAR 1, 534, Dunn E “James Hardie: No Soul to Be Damned and No Body to Be 
Kicked” (2005) 27(2) Sydney Law Review 339-353, Havenga MK Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors with Specific 
Regard to Corporate Opportunities Unpublished Thesis (University of South Africa 1995) 33-42  and The Bell Group Ltd 
(in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (No 9) (2008) WASC 239.  
436 According to Marshall and Ramsay, “directors do not typically look to the law of directors’ duties for specific guidance 
concerning the interests they should pursue as directors. Rather, that specific guidance is found in a raft of statutes other than 
the Corporations Act, such as labour laws” (Marshall S and Ramsay I “Stakeholders and Directors’ Duties: Law, Theory and 
Evidence” (2012) 291-316). 
437 Ibid. 
438 Section 11B of the Defence Housing Australia Act and section 23 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act specify the 
role and functions of the directors in the public entities. 
439 Surgeon P and Dibbs Barker Gosling Lawyers Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties (2003) 21-22. The 
Corporation Act and the CAC Act make reference to the applicability of common law in a number of sections, for example, 
sections 180 and 185 of the Corporation Act 2001 and section 22 of the CAC Act. According to the Uhrig Review, the board 
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have the duty to discharge duties with care and diligence expected of a reasonable person,
441
 
to act in good faith
442
 without improperly using his position and abusing information obtained 
by virtue of his position and duty to disclose material personal interest when conflict 
arises.
443
 Failure to discharge the duties as prescribed attracts civil and criminal penalties.
444
  
                                                                                                                                                        
can undertake its duties only within the parameters set by the CAC Act, the GBE’s corporate plan, the GBE’s company 
constitution or related legislation and the constraints of being a government body (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate 
Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 41).  
440 The provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 on duties of directors (section 180-184) are similar to those of sections 22-
25 of the CAC Act and sections 25-29 of the PGPA Act. It would appear that most of the directors’ common law duties have 
been incorporated within the company law. 
441 Section 180 of the Corporations Act 2001. According to Du Plessis, in Australia, “the standards of care and diligence 
expected of directors changed drastically with the case of Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 at 645, 657, where 
objective standards were used to determine a breach of directors’ duty of care and diligence, and when objective standards of 
care and diligence were introduced in Australian corporations legislation” (Du Plessis JJ “A Comparative Analysis of 
Directors’ Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence in South Africa and in Australia” 2010 Acta Juridica 263 available at: 
http://www.companylaw.uct.ac.za/clh/research/journal/duplessis#sthash.g95r3qFH.dpuf (accessed on 30 October 2015)). In 
Daniels v Anderson the Court observed that the standards of care and skill which are now expected of directors are now 
more demanding than they were a century ago. The Court of Appeal noted that more “recently the courts have recognized 
that at law more is required of a director than supine indifference. The legislature requires both diligence and action”. A 
similar judgment was made in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 111 at 126. In a recent 
Australian judgment, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey, commonly referred to as the Centro case, 
the court emphasised the need for a director to exercise due care and diligence by paying appropriate attention to the 
business of the company and giving any advice due consideration and exercising his own judgment in the light thereof.  The 
court found that “In the light of the significance of the matters that they knew, they could not have, nor should they have, 
certified the truth and fairness of the financial statements, and published the annual reports in the absence of the disclosure of 
those significant matters. If they had understood and applied their minds to the financial statements and recognised the 
importance of their task, each director would have questioned each of the matters not disclosed. Each director, in reviewing 
financial statements, needed to enquire further into the matters revealed by those statements. The judge further found that 
“the directors failed to take all reasonable steps required of them, and acted in the performance of their duties as directors 
without exercising the degree of care and diligence the law requires of them” (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Healey (2011) FCA 717). 
442 Sections 181 of the Corporations Act 2001. In Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Company Ltd v Ure  (1923) 33 
CLR 199 it was held that, whilst the company’s constitution may give directors the power to make a certain decision, it must 
be exercised bona fide, not arbitrarily or at the absolute will of the directors, but honestly in the interests of the shareholders 
as a whole. In CAC v Popoulias (1980) 8 ACLC 849 at 851 it was held that “the duty of directors to act honestly is one 
familiar to the common law duty” to act in good faith. This common law duty has been incorporated within the statutory 
duty to act in good faith in section 181 of the Corporation Act 2001. Section 181(1) imposes a civil obligation of good faith 
whilst section 184 imposes criminal liability for intentional and reckless breach of the duty of good faith. 
443 Sections 182-183 of the Corporations Act 2001. Directors are required to act in the best interests of the company, and to 
fulfil this duty they must avoid conflicts between their own interests and the interests of the company. The Australian courts 
have tended to take a practical approach in assessing the existence of a conflict. In the case of Aberdeen Railway Co v 
Blaikie Brothers (1843-1860) All ER 249 the court held that “it is a rule of universal application that no-one, having such 
duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, 
or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect”. In Fitzsimmons v R (1997) 23 
ACSR 355 the court found that the facts of each case will determine whether or not a conflict of interest arises. The court 
further found that “The minimum requirement will be disclosure of the interest. This is simply part of, or an extension of, the 
statutory obligation that a director who is in any way ‘interested’ in a contract or proposed contract with the company must 
declare the nature of the interest at a meeting of the directors . . . What action, above and beyond mere disclosure, the 
director must take will vary from case to case depending on the subject matter, the state of knowledge of the adverse 
information, the degree to which the director has been involved in the transaction, whether the director has been promoting 
the cause, the gravity of the possible outcome, the exigencies and commercial reality of the situation and so on. It may be 
enough for the director simply to refrain from voting or even to absent himself or herself from the meeting during discussion 
of the impugned business. The circumstances may require the director to take some positive action to identify clearly the 
perceived conflict and to suggest a course of action to limit the possible damage”. 
444 Sections 184 and 1317E of the Corporations Act and section 26 and Schedule 2 of the CAC Act. An example is the recent 
case of Jones and Ors v Invion Ltd and Anor (2015) QCA 100 (14/6136) which clearly indicates the consequences of acting 
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The Corporations Act further provides that directors may exercise all of the powers of the 
company which may be restricted by the company’s constitution or related legislation.445 
Similarly, the PGPA Act provides for the general duties of directors
446
 and states that the 
responsible authorities (which include the board) should govern an entity in a way that it, 
inter alia, achieves the purposes for which it was created through promoting the proper use 
and management of public resources, appropriately managing risk and encouraging the 
entity’s financial sustainability.447 The PGPA Act requires that board committees should be 
created to assist the board to effectively discharge its duties.
448
 
 
To complement the provisions of the Corporations Act, CAC Act and PGPA Act and to 
ensure that directors clearly understand what is expected from them, the Acts establishing the 
public entities define the role of the board.
449
 For example, the Australian Postal Corporation 
                                                                                                                                                        
in breach of the statutory duties in terms of the Corporations Act 2001. In this case, the first Respondent successfully 
brought proceedings against three former directors for compensation under section 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 for 
breach of statutory duties under sections 180, 181 and 182 of the Act and equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary 
duties. The directors had varied the termination provisions in their contracts, without authorisation, purporting to act on 
Invion Ltd’s behalf and deliberately misinformed the board as to the contractual position. The court found that the directors 
had breached their statutory duties under sections 180, 181 and 182 of the Act as their conduct was dishonest and “in 
dereliction of their duties as directors”. The court ordered the directors to compensate Invion accordingly. It is also worth 
noting that since directors in Australia have the common law fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, under the Corporations Act 
they could be subjected to penalties under common law as well as statutes. Sections 179(1) and 185 of the Corporations Act 
actually make it clear that the statutory duties in the Act do not exclude the operation of other laws, including the general 
law. 
445 Section 198A of the Act provides that the directors should manage and direct the business of a company in terms of the 
powers granted by the Act and the company’s constitution. The responsibilities of public entity boards usually include the 
strategic monitoring of the company, the development and reviewing of the organisational strategy, the negotiation with the 
shareholders (as represented by ministers) of the general business plan and objectives, the appointment of the chief executive 
officer and monitoring of senior management performance and compliance with the law (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate 
Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 41). Although section 198A of the Corporations Act gives 
the directors the ultimate powers to manage and direct the business of the company, it makes it clear that certain powers may 
be granted to shareholders in a general meeting (Delport PA “The Division of Powers in a Company” in Visser C and 
Pretorius JT Essays in Honour of Frans Malan (2014) 90-91).   
446 The duties include duty of care and diligence, duty to act in good faith and for proper purpose, duty not to improperly use 
information and duty to disclose interests (sections 25-29 of the PGPA Act). 
447 Sections 15-19 of the PGPA Act.  
448 The most important committee appears to be the audit committee which is mandatory in Australia for wholly owned 
public entities (sections 17, 45 and 92 of the PGPA Act). The committee’s main responsibility is to review the integrity of 
the company’s financial reporting and oversee the independence of the external auditors (ANAO, Public Sector Audit 
Committees: Independent Assurance and Advice for Accountable Authorities (ANAO Better Practice Guides 2015) 3-5 
available at http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Better-Practice-Guides)). 
449 Section 23 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act and sections 4-7 and 11 of the Defence Housing Australia Act. The 
Uhrig Review recommended that it is necessary for boards to have greater clarity in the definition of their function, direction 
and objectives and to be allowed sufficient independence to effectively discharge their duties. This could be achieved 
through a “Statement of Expectations” to statutory authorities by the relevant Minister (where he has a role in providing 
direction) which spells out government policies, current objectives and any expectations relevant to the authority. Each 
statutory authority would, in response, outline how it proposes to meet the government’s expectations in a “Statement of 
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Act states the role of the board as to “decide the objectives, strategies and policies” of the 
Australia Post, “to ensure that the entity performs its functions in a manner that is proper, 
efficient and, as far as practicable, consistent with sound commercial practice”450 and to 
appoint the chief executive officer who meets its requirements.
451
 Similarly, the Defence 
Housing Australia Act states the functions of the board as “to ensure the proper and efficient 
performance of the functions” of Defence Housing Australia.452 Generally, in Australia, the 
role of the board should be clearly documented in a board charter and all board members 
should be provided with a letter of appointment setting out their duties and responsibilities.
453
 
Directors, therefore, should have no excuse with regard to information relating to what is 
expected of them. 
 
Similar to the above statutes, the ASX CGC recommends that board members, when 
discharging their duties, should exhibit care and diligence expected of a reasonable person, 
act in good faith without abusing their position and disclose material personal interest when 
conflict arises.
454
 Companies are expected to establish and disclose the respective roles and 
responsibilities reserved for the board and those delegated to senior executives in order to 
facilitate board and senior executives’ accountability to both the company and its 
shareholders.
455
 First, the ASX CGC recommends that a formal board charter that details the 
board’s functions and responsibilities should be put in place to enable the board to provide 
                                                                                                                                                        
Intent” wherein it should include key performance indicators agreed with the relevant Minister (Uhrig J Review of the 
Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 7-8). 
450 Section 23 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act. Section 11B of the DHA Act provides the functions of the board as 
to ensure the proper and efficient performance of the functions of DHA and to determine the policy of DHA with respect to 
any matter. 
451 Section 83 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act, para 2.10 and 2.11 of the GBE Guidelines, Principle 1.1 of the ASX 
CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). Giving the board the opportunity to choose the CEO 
enables it to choose a competent person who is able to effectively lead other employees and thus assist the board in 
achieving the entity’s objectives (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders 
(2003) 84). 
452 The functions are articulated in the Act (sections 4-7 and 11 of the Defence Housing Australia Act). The entity is required 
to establish committees to assist the board, the most important of which is the audit committee (section 26 of The Defence 
Housing Australia Act). 
453 ANAO Principles and Better Practices, Corporate Governance on Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
(Discussion Paper prepared by Australia National Audit Office, 2000) 19 available at 
http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/documents. (accessed on 13 September 2014)). 
454 Principle 3 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). 
455 Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). The Principle details the 
general roles and responsibilities of the board.  
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strategic guidance for the company.
456
 The second suggestion is that, upon appointment, 
formal letters should be issued to directors setting out the key terms and conditions relative to 
that appointment so that the directors have a clear understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities and of the entity’s expectations of them.457  
 
As a third measure, it is recommended that the board should establish committees to assist it 
in the effective performance of its functions and the exercise of its powers.
458
 Fourthly, the 
Council recommends the appointment of a corporate secretary whose role is to support the 
effectiveness of the board by ensuring that board policies and procedures are followed and 
coordinating the timely completion and despatch of all relevant material.
459
 In the fifth 
instance, the board should be provided with the information it needs to discharge its 
responsibilities effectively and be allowed to, where necessary, seek for independent expert 
advice at the company’s expense.460 Lastly, the Council recommends that the board should 
establish a program for inducting new directors and provide appropriate professional 
development opportunities for directors to develop and uphold the skills and knowledge 
essential to enable them to successfully execute their role in accordance with the statutes and 
corporate governance standards.
461
 
 
In a similar spirit, the GBE Guidelines provide that the board’s critical responsibility is to 
ensure that an entity performs as expected by all stakeholders.
462
 The board is thus expected 
                                                 
456 Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014).The role and responsibility 
of the board could be set out in a board charter or in some other document published on the entity’s website or in its annual 
report.  
457 The letter of appointment should cover things like term of appointment, powers and duties of directors, shareholder 
Minister’s expectations, any special duties or arrangements attaching to the position, remuneration, induction training and 
continuing education arrangements, a copy of the company constitution, among others (See Principle 1 of the ASX CGC 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014)). 
458 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). See also section 26 of The 
Defence Housing Australia Act and Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders (2003) 95-96.  
459 Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). 
460 The board charter should set out the entity’s policy on when and how directors may seek independent professional advice 
at the expense of the entity (Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014)). 
See also section 24(9) of the Defence Housing Australia Act and section 68(4) of the Australian Postal Corporation Act. 
461 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). See also Uhrig J Review of 
the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 102. 
462 Para 2.2 of the GBE Guidelines and Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders (2003) 102. 
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to implement effective governance frameworks to support its role and responsibilities and 
report on their implementation in the annual report.
463
 To ensure that the board is fully aware 
of expected deliverables, the GBE Guidelines require the Shareholder Minister to issue an 
appointment letter
464
 to the directors which clearly states the fiduciary and other duties 
expected from directors.
465
 The individual directors are required to formally undertake to 
discharge the said duties effectively.
466
  
 
Like the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, the GBE 
Guidelines recommend that directors should be subjected to induction, continuous education 
and training to update and enhance their skills and knowledge so that they are able to 
effectively discharge their duties.
467
 It is worth noting that in Australia formal board 
induction is considered so important that it is mandatory within most individual public 
entities.
468
 Furthermore, the GBE Guidelines also recommend that the board should have 
access to external expert advice and should set up board committees to enable it to effectively 
undertake its roles.
469
 
 
Australia has also put in place measures to minimise government interference by requiring 
that all Ministerial directions to public entity boards should be in writing and tabled in both 
Houses of Parliament. For example, the Postal Corporations Act forbids the Minister from 
                                                 
463 Para 2.2 of the GBE Guidelines.  
464 The appointment letter should provide information on director powers, directors’ responsibilities, the operations and 
legislative obligations of the GBE, director’s term of appointment and remuneration arrangements, among others (para 2.3 of 
the GBE Guidelines). See also Witherell W H Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD 
Countries (OECD Publishing 2005) 90 available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises (accessed on 12 February 2015). 
465 Para 2.3 of the GBE Guidelines. In addition, the government expects GBE boards to establish and maintain a code of 
conduct for directors which covers, inter alia, directors’ professional conduct, work practices and performance and directors’ 
declaration of interests (paras 2.5-2.6 of the GBE Guidelines). 
466 Ibid. 
467 The education and training programs could cover key developments in the company, industry and general environment 
which should incorporate information on general public sector, legal, meeting arrangements, performance and accountability 
obligations (para 2.16 of the GBE Guidelines). 
468 OECD Board of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (OECD Report of December 
2012) 37 available at www.oecd-ilibrary.org/.../board-of-directors-of-state-owned-enterprises (accessed on 27 July 2014). 
See also Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government Boards and Committees Handbook (2009) 20-21 available at 
http://www.cmd.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/113583/boards-committees-handbook09.pdf (accessed on 5 May 
2015).  
469 Paras 2.7-2.8, 2.18 of the GBE Guidelines. Audit committees are mandatory in Australia for wholly owned public entities 
in terms of section 17 of the PGPA Act. 
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giving a directive in relation to certain activities conducted by Australia Post.
470
 Where the 
Minister considers it in the public interest to give a directive in terms of the Act, he must 
consult the board and “cause a copy of the direction to be laid before each House of the 
Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after giving the direction”.471 Furthermore, 
Australia has moved towards a reduced role for sector Ministries by centralising the 
ownership function.
472
 The centralisation function or oversight role is performed by the 
Government Business and Private Financing Advice Unit (GBPFAU)
473
 which reports to the 
Minister for Finance and Administration.
474
 The advantages of centralising shareholder 
oversight is that it has assisted in achieving consistent treatment of GBEs, clarity with respect 
to the government’s shareholder objectives and expectations, clear separation of shareholder 
function from policy and regulation and has enabled development of GBE governance 
policy.
475
 
 
It is clear from the above that the framework put in place by Australia to enhance the 
effectiveness of public entities boards in performing their roles is similar in most respects to 
Zimbabwe’s framework.476 Comparable to Australia, Zimbabwe’s corporate governance 
framework provides for mechanisms that ensure that directors are aware of and empowered 
                                                 
470 Section 49 of the Australian Postal Corporations Act. 
471 Section 49 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act. Section 50 of the Act further provides that except as otherwise 
provided by or under the Act or any other Act, Australia Post and its board are not subject to direction by or on behalf of the 
Australian Government. 
472 The Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) held an inquiry into the corporate governance 
and accountability arrangements for Australian GBEs and came up with a number of recommendations that were presented 
before Parliament in 2000. One of the recommendations was that all portfolio Ministers should be removed from their GBE 
shareholder responsibilities, but remain as the responsible Minister under GBEs’ enabling legislation. The Government's 
shareholder interests in GBEs would then be represented by, and be the responsibility of, the Minister for Finance and 
Administration. As a result, the GBPFAU was formed (Witherell WH Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A 
Survey of OECD Countries (OECD Publishing 2005) 44). 
473 The GBPFAU was established in 1997, following the Humphry Report’s recommendation. The Unit provides oversight, 
management, and strategic advice on the commercial performance of GBEs by “analysing their operations and environment, 
engaging in discussions with them and consulting with their Stakeholders”. It provides strategic advice to the Minister for 
Finance and Administration on the operations and commercial performance of the GBEs and ensures the quality and 
robustness of the GBE corporate governance framework (Witherell WH Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: 
A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 44). 
474 The main disadvantage is the risk of too much focus on commercial issues at the expense of other important issues 
(Witherell WH Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 44). 
475 Ibid. 
476 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2 for a comparative discussion on Zimbabwe. 
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to effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities.
477
 However, the two countries differ 
on a number of aspects. First, unlike Zimbabwe, Australia provides for a detailed 
appointment letter and requires individual directors to formally undertake to discharge their 
duties effectively. Secondly, Australia has put more stern measures to minimise government 
interference than Zimbabwe. Examples are the Australian requirement for the responsible 
Minister to consult the board before giving directives of national interest and to put the 
directive in writing and to report to the House of the Parliament. The third difference is that 
Australia has centralised the supervision of public entities to an independent entity to 
minimize political interference in the operations of the entities and to ensure uniform 
governing of the entities. Australia has also moved towards making it mandatory for public 
entity board members to be formally inducted which Zimbabwe has not yet done. 
 
6.2.3 Selection and Appointment of Board Members 
The corporate governance framework of Australia advocates for a formal and transparent 
process of selection, appointment and re-appointment of directors to the board to promote 
transparency, investor understanding and confidence in the appointment process.
478
 The 
Corporation Act provides for minimum qualifications for one to be appointed as a director.
479
 
Under the Corporations Act, individual resolutions are required for the election of each public 
company director, unless the meeting has resolved, with no dissenting votes, to appoint 
multiple directors by single resolution.
480
 The Acts that established public entities prescribe 
that board members should be appointed by the Minister
481
 by a written instrument.
482
 The 
                                                 
477 Ibid.  
478 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014) and paras 2.7-2.9 of the 
GBE Guidelines. To reinforce transparency in the exercise of ministerial powers, the State of Queensland in Australia 
requires the publication of any ministerial decision affecting Government Owned Corporations (“GOCs”) (The State of 
Queensland (Queensland Treasury), Corporate Governance Guidelines for Government Owned Corporations, Version 2 of 
2009) available at http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/services/government-owned-businesses/documents/corporate-governance-
guidelines.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2014). 
479 Section 201B of the Corporation Act. But, the Corporations Act does not impose minimum standards of education, 
training or competence on directors. Also, in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd, the court found that a director 
“is not bound to bring any special qualifications to his office. He may undertake the management of a rubber company in 
complete ignorance of everything connected with rubber, without incurring responsibility for the mistakes which may result 
from such ignorance” (Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd (1911) 1 Ch 425 at 437). 
480 Section 201E of the Corporation Act. Sections 201E(2) and (3) provide further limitations on the operation of this rule. 
481 This can be the responsible Minister or the Minister of Finance depending on the circumstances prevailing (section of the 
Defence Housing Australia Act). 
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Acts also require that relevant experience should be considered as one of the key factors 
when appointing board members to the respective entities.
483
 Under the ASX Listing Rules, 
listed companies are required to hold an election of directors annually and a director is not 
permitted to hold office, without re-election by shareholders, for a period exceeding three 
years.
484
 
 
The country has also developed structured and clearly skill-based nomination systems and 
specific eligibility guidelines.
485
 The guidelines require that boards of state-owned enterprises 
should comprise people who are of good standing,
486
 with an appropriate mix of relevant 
skills and experience, who are appointed on the basis of their individual capacity to 
contribute to the board’s effectiveness in driving the entity towards achieving its 
objectives.
487
 The process for public entity board appointments involves recommendations by 
the board chairperson, through the board,
488
 of possible candidates to the responsible Minister 
who then consults the Prime Minister before the Cabinet’s approval of the appointment of a 
director.
489
  
                                                                                                                                                        
482 The Australian Postal Corporations Act provides that directors should be appointed by the Governor-General on the 
nomination of the Minister (section 73 of the Australian Postal Corporations Act). 
483 See section 14(2) of the Defence Housing Australia Act and section 73 of the Australian Postal Corporations Act. 
484 ASX Listing Rules 14.4-14.5. 
485 Structured systems are based on an organised assessment of current boards in terms of competences, skills and experience 
to determine the requirements for new board appointments. Thereafter, potential candidates are “systematically identified, 
interviewed and assessed based on profiles drawn up for each board position” (OECD Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (OECD Publishing 2006) 93-94.  
486 The ASX CGC recommends that listed entities should ensure that appropriate checks are undertaken before a person is 
appointed as a director. These should include “checks as to the person’s character, experience, education, criminal record 
and bankruptcy history”. In addition, the independence of the director should be checked through obtaining details of any 
interest, position, association or relationship that might influence, or reasonably be perceived to influence, in a material 
respect his or her capacity to bring an independent judgment to bear on issues before the board and to act in the best interests 
of the entity (Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014)).  
 
487 Ministers are supposed to appoint directors based on merit and to take into account skills, qualifications and experience. 
Examples of relevant skills have been listed as commerce, finance, accounting, law, marketing, workplace relations and 
management as well as the capacity to contribute to the achievement of the GBE’s objectives (Para 2.7 of GBE Guidelines 
and Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, Commonwealth of Australia 
(2003) 97-98). See also section 14(2) of the Defence Housing Australia Act which requires some of the board appointees to 
have a background in Defence, property development or management, finance or business management. 
488 The board should establish a nomination committee, headed by the board chairman, which should be responsible for 
coming up with recommendations on board composition and membership. It has been argued that having a separate 
nomination committee can be an efficient and effective mechanism to bring the transparency, focus and independent 
judgment needed in coming up with an appropriately composed board (Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations and para 2.8 of the GBE Guidelines (2014)). 
489 Paras 2.8- 2.12 of the GBE Guidelines. Under the Corporations Act (section 201) shareholders are responsible for the 
election of directors. The Defence Housing Australia Act provides that the chairperson and the other appointed members, 
other than the member appointed by the Finance Minister, are to be appointed by the responsible Minister by written 
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The appointment process should take into account the strategic requirements of the public 
entity, government policy objectives on fostering a governance culture regarding diversity in 
board composition
490
 and other reporting requirements.
491
 As an example, with regard to 
gender, the Australian Government’s target was that 40% of Government board members 
should be women, 40% of board members to be men, and the remaining 20% of positions to 
be held by either women or men by 2015.
492
 The GBE Guidelines propose public advertising 
or the use of executive search processes as additional processes for identifying board 
candidates so as to ensure that appointments are drawn from the best possible field of 
candidates.
493
  
 
To further enhance transparency and consistency in the board appointment process, the 
GBPFAU has been tasked to advise the Minister on possible board candidates.
494
 It is also 
recommended that board appointments should normally be for terms of three years to 
promote new ideas and perspectives.
495
 However, appointment terms may be extended, 
                                                                                                                                                        
instrument (section 14(1) of the Defence Housing Australia Act). The Australian Postal Corporation Act gives the 
responsibility to appoint the board to the Governor-General on the nomination of the Minister who must consult with the 
Chairperson or representatives of industrial organisations before nominating a person for appointment as a director (section 
73 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act). 
490 According to the GBE Guidelines, diversity includes, but is not limited to, gender, age, ethnicity and cultural background 
(para 2.8 of the GBE Guidelines). 
491 Para 2.8 of the GBE Guidelines. See also Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and 
Office Holders (2003) 96.   
492 Para 2.8 of GBE Guidelines. The ASX diversity guidelines actually require companies to disclose the number of women 
on staff, in senior management and on the board (DU Plessis JJ, Saenger I and Foster R “Board Diversity or Gender 
Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South Africa” (2012) 207-249. 
493 However, this has to be done in consultation with the Shareholder Minister(s) (para 2.8 of the GBE Guidelines). 
494 The GBPFAU is the coordinating agency which is responsible for providing, inter alia, strategic advice to the Minister on 
board appointments and the commercial performance of the Government's investment in entities like the Australian Postal 
Corporation, Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited and Airservices Australia (OECD Board of Directors of State-
Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National Practices (2012) 33). The GBPFAU plays an informal role in the appointment 
process and makes recommendations to widen the pool from which the Minister may choose from (OECD Comparative 
Report on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2005) 90 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/34803211.pdf (accessed on 14 July 2014). 
495 See para 2.13 of the GBE Guidelines and section 14(2) of the Defence Housing Australia Act which limit the term of 
office to 3 years. In this regard, the non-executive directors’ term of office should not normally exceed two terms (i.e. six 
years) and for the chairman three terms (i.e. nine years). However, some public entities limit the term of office to 5 years or 
less, for example the Australia Post (section 74 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act). The term of office is limited to 
allow for new board members who may bring unique and different experiences, attachments and new ideas for the growth of 
the entity as well as to maintain directors’ independence which is likely to be compromised if they stay for too long. 
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spread over a period of time or varied in period to maintain board continuity.
496
 Similarly, 
reappointments after expiry of one’s term may be considered on a case-by-case basis taking 
into account all relevant circumstances, including evidence of good performance, the 
continued need for specific skills or knowledge of an individual director, among other 
issues.
497
 It is also a requirement that individual board members should be able to devote 
sufficient time to the tasks assigned to them hence the number and nature of their 
directorships and other commitments should be taken into account before appointment.
498
 
The Australian corporate governance structure therefore, discourages numerous directorships. 
 
In addition to the above initiatives, Australia has undertaken important reforms to 
professionalise and empower public entities boards. To this end, they seek to limit political 
interference and increase the independence and competence of public entity boards through 
creating a policy that prohibits the appointment of public servants to boards of the entities, 
except in exceptional circumstances.
499
 This assertion is further confirmed by the new 
legislation being put in place by the country. For instance, the National Broadcasting 
Legislation Amendment Act 112 of 2012 formalises a merit-based and independent board 
appointment process. The Act, inter alia, places responsibility for assessing candidates in the 
hands of an Independent Nomination Panel established at arm’s length from the Government. 
The Act also specifies that vacancies are to be widely advertised, establishes a set of core 
criteria (with additional criteria added if the minister so decides) and mandates a report from 
the panel to the minister, including a short-list of at least three recommended candidates.
500
 
                                                 
496 Ibid. See also Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014) and Uhrig J 
Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 101. 
497 Para 213 of GBE Guidelines, Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(2014) and section 15 of the Defence Housing Australia Act. In terms of the ASX Listing Rules, directors must submit for re-
election at the third annual general meeting following appointment, or after three years, whichever is longer (ASX Listing 
Rule 14.4). 
498 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014).  
499 Para 2.7 of the GBE Guidelines. The Australian definition of independence excludes government or political board 
members (The World Bank Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Toolkit (2014) 168-169). The Uhrig 
Review discouraged representative board appointments, including the placement of public servants on boards, because they 
“can fail to produce independent and objective views” and are likely to be primarily concerned with the interests of those 
they represent, rather than the success of the entity they are responsible for governing (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate 
Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 97-98). See also OECD Comparative Report on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 84-89. 
500 Section 24 A-C and 43 of the National Broadcasting Legislation Amendment Act. If the provisions of this legislation 
were to become broader and strictly applied to all public entity boards, then Australia could be said to possess a 
comprehensive merit-based appointment process. 
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The Nomination Panel is not subject to direction by or on behalf of the Government and has 
the “privileges and immunities of the Crown of the Commonwealth”.501 Similarly, the ASX 
CGC has recommended that directors should be nominated through the services of external 
consultants and the use of a “Nomination Committee”.502 
 
Judging from the above, Australia and Zimbabwe’s board appointment processes share a 
number of common features and are aligned to internationally accepted corporate governance 
standards.
503
 For instance, the two countries provide for formal and transparent processes of 
selection and appointment of directors, the need to observe board diversity and to balance 
board expertise, approval of board appointments by the responsible Minister and limitation of 
directors’ term of office and number of directorships.504 However, Zimbabwe appears to be 
lagging behind Australia in so far as other initiatives to enhance transparency in the 
appointment of board members are concerned. First, Australia has developed structured and 
clearly skill-based nomination systems and specific eligibility guidelines which Zimbabwe 
has not yet done.  
 
In the second instance, Australia’s new legislation provides for the creation of an Independent 
Nomination Panel to oversee the selection and appointment of board members of a public 
entity. Zimbabwe’s corporate governance instruments have not yet created such an institution 
although they advocate for transparency in the board appointment process.
505
 Thirdly, whilst 
Australia has advocated for no public servants appointment to the public entities boards, 
except in exceptional circumstances, Zimbabwe has provided for the exclusion of only the 
Permanent Secretary from board appointments living room for other ministry officials to be 
appointed as board members.
506
 Another area of difference is that in Zimbabwe boards are 
not approved by Cabinet, as in Australia, but by the President, following recommendations by 
the responsible Minister. More so, Zimbabwe’s enabling statutes do not provide for the need 
                                                 
501 Sections 24 C-D of the National Broadcasting Legislation Amendment Act. 
502 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
503 The alignment is clear, for instance, if one considers Part VI and Annotations to Chapter VI of the OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises and Part Two (VI) of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
504 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.3 above for more details on Zimbabwe. 
505 Ibid.  
506 Ibid.  
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for the responsible Minister to consult the board or board chairman before nominating a 
person for appointment as a director as does Australia’s statutes.507 Zimbabwe is also still to 
establish an organisation with a mandate similar to GBPFAU to assist it in enhancing 
transparency in the board selection process. 
 
6.2.4 Composition of Board 
Generally, Australia has adopted the universally accepted principle that the board of an entity 
should be appropriately composed if it is to effectively discharge its duties.
508
 The Acts 
establishing public entities require that boards of the entities should be properly balanced in 
terms of qualifications and experience.
509
 It is also a widely accepted principle that a board 
should be of a reasonable size to effectively carry out its obligations. Although the size of 
boards in Australia differs, the statutes creating public entities set limits for the size of the 
board. For example, the Defence Housing Australia Act and the Australian Postal 
Corporation Act limit the number of board members to nine including the chief executive 
officer.
510
 The Corporation Act sets the minimum number of directors for public companies 
to at least three directors, two of which must ordinarily reside in Australia.
511
  
 
The GBE Guidelines and ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations recommend that the board should be large enough to comprise of directors 
possessing an appropriate range of perspectives, skills, expertise and diversity.
512
 In 
determining the size of the board, the responsible authorities should consider factors such as 
“the size, complexity and risk of the entity’s operations and the needs of the board, including 
                                                 
507 However, Zimbabwe acknowledges the importance of consulting relevant industrial organisations and related ministries 
before nominating a person for appointment as a director (see para 4.2.3 above). 
508 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and para 2.7 of the GBE 
Guidelines.  
509 Section 73 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act and section 14 of the Defence Housing Australia Act. 
510 Section 12 and section 22 respectively. 
511 See section 201A(2) of the Corporations Act. 
512 Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014) and para 2.7 of the GBE 
Guidelines. 
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the number of board committees that may be required”.513 Furthermore, the ASX CGC 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations recommend that the majority of the 
board should be independent directors,
514
 the chair should be an independent director and the 
roles of chairman and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual 
to promote objectivity.
515
 Similarly, the statutes constituting public entities provide for a 
board composed of a majority of non-executive directors with the chief executive officer 
being the only executive director.
516
  
 
Australia’s corporate governance framework requires that board appointment processes 
should observe government policy on promoting a governance culture that takes into account 
the need for gender equality in board structures.
517
 The country enacted the Workplace 
Gender Equality Act 179 of 2012.
518
 The main objectives of the Act are to, inter alia, 
promote and improve gender equality in employment and in the workplace through providing 
for full and equal participation of women in employment and in the workplace and 
elimination of discrimination on the basis of gender.
519
 It has also established a Workplace 
Gender Equality Agency whose principal object is to ensure that the objectives of the Act are 
achieved.
520
 The Agency advises and assists employers to promote and improve gender 
equality in employment and in the workplace through issuing guidelines and undertaking 
                                                 
513 Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 96 and paras 2.7 and 
2.13 of the GBE Guidelines. 
514 An independent director is defined as being “a non-executive director, who is not a member of management and, who is 
free of any business or other relationship that could materially interfere with or could reasonably be perceived to materially 
interfere with the independent exercise of their judgement” (Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations (2014) and para 2.4 of the GBE Guidelines). 
515 Para 2.7 of the GBE Guidelines and Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014). 
516 Section 12 of the Defence Housing Australia Act and section 22 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act. 
517 Para 2.8 of the GBE Guidelines. The ASX CGC actually recommends that an entity should develop a diversity policy 
which requires the board or a relevant board committee “to set measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and to 
assess annually both the objectives and the entity’s progress in achieving them” (Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014)). In addition, the AICD offers professional and career development 
mentoring programs to “assist women in obtaining board positions after completion, and allow aspiring female directors to 
form contacts in the industry and acquire knowledge and insight into what is involved in working as a company director” 
(Kashyap M Gender Diversity on Australian Boards (With Reference to Approaches in Europe and India) 9 available at 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/201343.pdf (accessed on 19 March 2015)). 
518 The Act replaced the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999. 
519 Section 2A of the Workplace Gender Equality Act. 
520 Part III of Workplace Gender Equality Act. 
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research and educational programs, among others.
521
 Australia has also ratified a number of 
international agreements that seek to promote gender equality, for example, the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
CEDAW 1979.
522
 
 
To further demonstrate its commitment to promote gender balance, Australia has created an 
office for the Minister for Status of Women that assists the Prime Minister for Women 
through working with “other Government Ministers to ensure that women’s issues and 
gender equality are taken into consideration in policy and program development and 
implementation”.523 An Office for Women has also been established by the federal 
government and each of the state governments to support the Minister’s role in promoting 
gender issues by advancing women’s interests and providing advice on the impact of 
government policies and programs for women.
524
 
 
The standards set in Australia as regards board composition are similar to those provided for 
and recommended by the Zimbabwean corporate governance instruments.
525
 However, on the 
issue of gender equality, Australia has come up with more legislative instruments than 
Zimbabwe. A further difference is that the Australian Government has gone to the extent of 
                                                 
521 The Workplace Gender Equality Agency (formerly known as the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace 
Agency) was established in terms of section 8A of the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012. The Agency can impose 
sanctions for noncompliance which include being labelled as non-compliant in a report to the Minister for the Status of 
Women and not being able to receive future Commonwealth grants or assistance (See Australian Government The 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency available at http://www.wgea.gov.au/.) (accessed on 13 January 2015)). 
522 Australia actively participates in UN forums on gender equality, including the Commission on the Status of Women 
(CSW) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Committee. The Commission 
on the Status of Women (CSW) was established in 1946 by a UN Council Resolution with the main objective of promoting 
gender equality and women empowerment (See www.unwomen.org/en/csw for more details on the Commission on the 
Status of Women). To promote gender equality and women empowerment, in July 1983, Australia ratified the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW 1979 and in 2008 also 
became a party to the CEDAW Optional Protocol (Publication titled United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women: (CEDAW) (2008) produced by Australian Government Office for Women and the 
Human Rights Commission in 2008) available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/.../publications/women-s-
human-rights-united-nations-convention-elimination (accessed on 13 January 2015). 
523 Broderick E How to Promote Gender Equality in Laws and Policies in Australia? (Paper presented at All China 
Women’s Federation (ACWF) Workshop held in Beijing, China in June 2014) available at 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/how-promote-gender-equality-laws-and-policies-australia (accessed on 12 
March 2015). See also Alston M Breaking through Grass Ceiling (Routledge 2014) 60-61. 
524 Visit https://www.dpmc.gov.au/office-women for more information. 
525 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 above. The two countries’ approach to the independence of boards is broadened in that it takes 
into consideration not only the independence of board members, but also the separation of the board chairman from the 
CEO. It is then the role of the board to select the CEO, although responsible Ministers are consulted as part of this process. 
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setting specific time-framed targets aimed at promoting gender equality, that is, 40% of 
Government board members should be women, 40% should be men and the remaining 20% 
of positions to be held by either women or men by 2015. Zimbabwe has not set such specific 
targets. 
   
6.2.5 Remuneration of Directors 
In Australia, director remuneration is regulated by the Corporations Act, the Acts establishing 
public entities, the ASX Listing Rules and the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations.
526
 In response to the corporate scandals,
527
 the CLERP 9 Act and the 
ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations advocated for the need 
to clearly link remuneration to performance, enhance disclosure when reporting and increase 
shareholder participation in directors’ and executive management’s remuneration 
decisions.
528
 It is also a requirement that the level and composition of remuneration of 
directors should serve the long term interest of the company and be sufficient and reasonable 
to attract the right people.
529
 It is further recommended that the board should establish a 
remuneration committee
530
 whose mandate is to design a remuneration policy that, among 
other things, clearly distinguishes the structure of non-executive director remuneration from 
executive remuneration and enables the entity’s sustainable development.531  
                                                 
526 Principle 8 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). 
527 Examples of some of the corporate scandals that took place in Australia include HIH Insurance, Harris Scarfe and 
One.Tel. The collapse of these big corporations demonstrates that weaknesses in governance practice in relation to internal 
control system, financial reporting quality, audit quality, management scrutiny, management communication with the board, 
and the executive pay-to-performance link can be catalysts to corporate collapse (Thomson D and Jain A “Corporate 
Governance Failure and Its Impact on National Australia Bank’s Performance” (2006) 41-56).  
528 Sections 202A and 674 of the Corporations Act, ASX Listing Rule 3.1, Principle 5 of the ASX CGC Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations and para 2.14 of the GBE Guidelines. 
529 Para 2.14 of the GBE Guidelines and Principle 8 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014). The  Corporations Act prescribes that the remuneration to be paid to directors of a company 
should be determined through a company resolution and should include directors’ expenses for attending board or committee 
meetings (e.g. travelling and accommodation expenses) and other business related expenses (Section 202A of the 
Corporations Act). 
530 The recommended committee should consist of a majority of independent directors, be chaired by an independent chair 
and have at least three members to discharge its mandate effectively. The ASX CGC further recommends that the board 
should provide information on the remuneration committee and how its functions are carried out including seeking 
independent external advice from remuneration consultants (Principle 8 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations (2014)). See also ASX Listing Rule 12.8.  
531 Principle 8 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). See also section 300A of the 
Corporations Act which requires that the “directors’ report for a financial year for a company must also include (in a 
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Furthermore, to “de-politicise the directors’ remuneration issue and to avoid conflicts of 
interest”, Australia has set up a specialised statutory authority, the Remuneration Tribunal,532 
whose responsibility is to determine public entities boards’ remuneration that is 
commensurate with their roles and responsibilities.
533
 The statutes constituting the public 
entities specifically provide that the remuneration of board members should be determined by 
the Remuneration Tribunal.
534
 In setting remuneration, the Remuneration Tribunal should 
take into account a number of factors, for example, “the workload and work value of the 
office, fees in the private sector, wage indices, non-cash benefits provided and other 
economic indices and rates set for other bodies”.535  The establishment of an independent 
body to set board remuneration brings in some objectivity and transparency in the process. 
 
The other important matters concerning directors’ remuneration relate to shareholders’ 
approval of non-executive director remuneration, continuous disclosure and reporting in 
terms of the statutes, ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 
ASX Listing Rules and GBE Guidelines.
536
 To further enhance transparency and 
accountability in director’ remuneration, the framework requires that there be adequate 
disclosure of the directors’ fees and benefits in the entity’s annual reports.537 As another 
                                                                                                                                                        
separate and clearly identified section of the report)” the remuneration of a member of the key management personnel for the 
company and that of directors. 
532 OECD Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 154. The Remuneration 
Tribunal is an independent statutory body established in terms of the Remuneration Tribunal Act 215 of 1973. The Tribunal 
was set up to determine the remuneration payable in respect of certain public offices, such as the judiciary, directors of 
boards and Principle Executive Officers of Commonwealth entities (Preamble and section 5 of the Remuneration Tribunal 
Act). See also OECD Comparative Report on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 108-109.  
533 Para 2.14 of the GBE Guidelines.  
534 Section 76 of Australian Postal Corporation Act and section 17 of the Defence Housing Australia Act. 
535 Para 2.14 of the GBE Guidelines. 
536 Section 250R of the Corporations Act, Principle 5 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2014), ASX Listing Rules 3.1 and 4.10.3 and para 3.13 of the GBE Guidelines. 
537 Each year, companies are required, under the Corporations Act (section 250R), to produce a “remuneration report” as part 
of their annual report. The Act specifies the information that needs to be provided in the report. Sanctions for breaches of 
Corporations Act provisions involve fines and, in some cases, imprisonment. In terms of para 3.13 of the GBE Guidelines, 
directors of a GBE are required to provide an annual report to the Shareholder Minister(s) in accordance with the 
requirements of the CAC Act and the Corporations Act. See also Principle 5 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (2014) which provide for timely and balanced disclosure that complies with both the letter 
and the spirit of the continuous disclosure requirements in the Corporation Act and the ASX Listing Rules. Similarly the 
Australian Postal Corporation Act (section 44) provides for the production of an annual report in terms of section 9 of the 
CAC Act. 
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checking mechanism, the Corporations Act makes it a requirement for listed companies to 
submit a remuneration report to shareholders for a non-binding vote and to fully disclose 
directors’ remuneration in the financial statements.538 A listed entity is therefore not 
permitted to increase the total amount of director fees payable without shareholder approval 
by ordinary resolution and non-executive director remuneration must be a fixed sum.
539
 
However, for the majority of public entities, the remuneration paid to board members is 
determined by the Remuneration Tribunal, as indicated above. 
 
It can be concluded that both Zimbabwe and Australia have put in place remuneration 
frameworks that comply with the recommendations of, inter alia, the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance and ICGN Principles which have guided corporate governance 
practices worldwide.
540
 Both countries have put in place systems that ensure that the 
remuneration for directors is sufficient and reasonable to attract competent people, takes into 
account the long term interests of the entity and is performance related.
541
 They both require 
transparency in board remuneration hence the requirements that directors’ remuneration 
should be adequately disclosed in the entity’s annual reports, independently determined by a 
third party and subjected to shareholders’ approval.542 However, Australia has gone a step 
further than Zimbabwe in that it has set up an independent statutory body, the Remuneration 
Tribunal, to determine board remuneration for public entities yet, in Zimbabwe, the 
responsible Minister still determines board remuneration.
543
  
 
                                                 
538 The requirements for a remuneration report and a non-binding shareholder vote was introduced in 2004 as part of the 
CLERP 9 amendments (see section 250R of the Corporations Act). Shareholders have a non-binding or advisory vote on the 
annual report at the annual general meeting. They also have a binding vote on any increases to the total pool of non-
executive director fees as well as on remuneration involving the issue of equity to directors. The main aim of the provision is 
to ensure that shareholders are provided with sufficient information about corporate performance to allow them to make 
informed decisions about the board’s performance when setting remuneration for directors (Clarke T and Banson B The 
SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance (SAGE 2012) 574-576). 
539 ASX Listing Rule 10.17 and Principle 8 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(2014). 
540 Part Two (VI) of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Principle 5 of the ICGN Principles. See Chapter 4, 
para 4.2.5 above for Zimbabwe’s comparative position. 
541 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 above. 
542 Ibid. 
543 It is not yet clear whether Zimbabwe’s Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework will provide for an 
institution to carry out functions similar to Australia’s Remuneration Tribunal. 
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6.2.6 Evaluation of Board Performance 
In Australia, public entity board evaluation may not have been taken seriously in the past but 
it now viewed as “an essential tool to assist in achieving better board performance and 
effectiveness”.544 The Australian framework provides for regular evaluation of board 
performance as an on-going activity.
545
 To show the importance that has been attached to 
board evaluations, the country has legislated for it.
546
 The PGPA Act prescribes that the 
accountable authority (which includes the board) of a public entity “must measure and assess 
the performance of the entity in achieving its purposes”, in accordance with any requirements 
prescribed by the rules.
547
 In addition, the Auditor-General is required to examine and 
produce a report on the entity's annual performance statements, a copy of which should be 
given to the responsible Minister and subsequently tabled in each House of the Parliament as 
soon as practically possible.
548
  
 
Board evaluations provide constructive feedback which should lead to a continuous 
improvement of boards’ and individual directors’ performance and capabilities.549 According 
to the framework, the evaluation should be conducted on the board, its committees and 
individual directors by the shareholding entities/ministers, the board itself (if possible through 
the nomination committee) or independent professional experts, preferably on an annual 
basis.
550
 The performance assessment should include, among others, a review of the level of 
director attendance at board meetings which attendance should be reported in the annual 
                                                 
544 CCG Board Performance and Effectiveness: The State of Play on Board Evaluation in Corporate Australia and Abroad, 
(Research Paper prepared by the Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG) in October 2010) 6 available at 
http://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/centre-corporate-governance (accessed on 13 January 2015). 
545 Sections 37-40 of the PGPA Act, para 2.17 of the GBE Guidelines and Principle 2 of the ASX CGC Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). The objective of board evaluations is to give the ownership entities 
confidence about the performance of appointed board members. It gives an opportunity and a formal means of assessing the 
board’s skills and evaluating the adequacy of the appointment system in enabling the board to effectively perform its duties 
(Section 3.6 of the Public Sector Governance Strengthening Performance through Good Governance (ANAO Better 
Practice Guides 2014) and Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 
103). 
546 Sections 37-40 of the PGPA Act. 
547 Ibid.  
548 Ibid.  
549 Ibid. See also Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
550 Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. See also Uhrig J Review of the 
Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 103. 
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report.
551
 Also, it is a requirement that the performance of the board, its committees and 
individual directors should be reviewed against appropriate set measures and the entities 
should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of the board.
552
  
  
To enable the shareholder to assess whether the board has effectively discharged its duties, 
the CAC Act and the PGPA Act require directors of a public entity to keep the responsible 
Minister or Minister of Finance (where necessary) informed of the operations of the entity 
and its subsidiaries.
553
 The public entities are required to prepare a corporate plan
554
 at least 
once a year and submit a number of reporting documents
555
 to the responsible Minister by set 
deadlines for presentation to Parliament.
556
 Furthermore, within specified dates, the board is 
required to submit, to the shareholder Minister, quarterly progress reports which include, 
inter alia, financial statements, an analysis of the GBE’s quarterly and year-to-date 
                                                 
551 Para 2.17 of the GBE Guidelines and Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations. 
552 Principle 1 of the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and para 2.17 of the GBE 
Guidelines. In this regard, a Director’s Checklist is provided to assist directors to assess the strength of their current 
governance framework (Appendix A, Public Sector Corporate Governance: A Director’s Checklist, in “Principles and 
Better Practices, Corporate Governance on Commonwealth Authorities and Companies” (Discussion Paper by Australia 
National Audit Office, 2000) 38 available at http://www.anao.gov.au (accessed on 25 August 2014). The ASX CGC further 
recommends that when reporting the entity should include “whether or not a performance evaluation for the board, its 
committees and directors has taken place in the reporting period and whether it was in accordance with the process 
disclosed”.  
553 Sections 16 and 41 of the CAC Act, and sections 19 and 91 of the PGPA Act, para 3.3 of the GBE Guidelines and 
sections 38-40 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act. See also para 3.19 of the GBE Guidelines which provides that GBEs 
should follow a disclosure principle which is similar to the continuous disclosure requirements of the ASX Listing Rules. 
Notwithstanding, there is nothing in the CAC Act which gives either the Responsible Minister(s), Finance Minister or other 
relevant authority the power to direct the actual operations of the particular public entity but such power may be provided in 
the entity’s enabling legislation, memorandum and articles of association or simply by virtue of the fact that the government 
is the majority shareholders.  
554 Corporate plans are supposed to be prepared as provided for in the CAC Act and CAC Act Regulations. The Corporate 
plan covers, inter alia, the objectives and broad mandate of the GBE, the business strategies of the GBE, financial targets 
and projections for the GBE, non-financial performance measures for the GBE, analysis of factors likely to affect 
achievement of targets or create significant financial risk for the GBE and review of performance against previous corporate 
plans and targets. The role of corporate plans for public entities is to clarify the aims and objectives of the organisation at the 
broad strategic level and outline the actions and resources required to achieve those objectives. The plans also form part of 
the accountability process by setting out key outputs against which performance can be measured. (Sections 17 & 42 of the 
CAC Act and regulation 6AAA of the CAC Act Regulations, sections 35 and 95 of the PGPA Act, para 3.1-3.3 of the GBE 
Guidelines and sections 38-40 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act). 
555 The other reporting documents include the annual report (sections 9 & 36 of the CAC Act and sections 46 & 97 of the 
PGPA Act), Statement of Governance (Clause 15 of the CAC Act Orders), Supplementary Interim Reports (section 13 & 38 
of the CAC Act) and Performance Audit (section 40 of the PGPA Act and sections 16 and 17 of the Auditor-General Act 
(No. of 1997). The annual report is supposed to be prepared in compliance with the provisions of the CAC Act, the PGPA 
Act, the Corporations Act, the authority’s enabling legislation and any other applicable legislation and guidance issued by 
the Finance Minister or portfolio (Para 2.2 of the GBE Guidelines). Boards are supposed to implement sound governance 
frameworks to support their role and responsibilities, and report on their implementation in the annual report (Para 2.13 of 
the GBE Guidelines). 
556 Sections 9, 11, 16, 17, 36, 41, and 42 of the CAC Act and sections 37-39 of the PGPA Act. 
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performance against corporate plan forecasts for the corresponding period and explanations 
for deviations from corporate plan forecasts.
557
 The Minister then uses the various reports to 
evaluate whether the board has effectively discharged its duties as per the performance 
targets set in the corporate plan and to give appropriate guidance.
558
 
 
In addition to the above, the GBPFAU assists in evaluating board performance and the 
performance of the public entities in general. It provides oversight, management and strategic 
advice to the Minister for Finance and Administration on the operations and commercial 
performance of the GBEs,
559
 seeks to ensure that GBEs operate efficiently and effectively 
and adhere to best practices in governance outlined in the GBE Guidelines, CAC Act and 
PGPA Act, strategically influences “the direction of the entity via the Corporate Planning 
process”, develops, maintains and monitors “Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (including 
benchmarking with similar public or private sector organisations)” and  makes sure that there 
is “a sound and robust governance framework in place by initiating change and contributing 
to policy development”.560 The GBPFAU also greatly assists in achieving transparency and 
accountability in public entity performance.
561
  
 
Public entities are further required to conduct annual strategic meetings, to which the 
responsible Ministers or their delegates are invited to attend.
562
 The main focus of the 
meetings is to discuss both the board’s and the entity’s performance over the past year and to 
develop a new strategy for the future. Where, after the performance assessment, the Minister 
discovers that certain issues need to be addressed, he writes to the GBE requesting the board 
to attend to the matters raised.
563
 In some situations, the Minister is empowered to dismiss 
                                                 
557 Paras 3.10 -3.12 of the GBE Guidelines. However, it is worth noting that should the board become aware of any 
information that may have a material effect on the entity’s value and/or performance, it should not wait for scheduled reports 
but must immediately provide that information to the Shareholder Minister (Para 3.19 of the GBE Guidelines). 
558 The board is expected to provide shareholder Ministers with an annual review of the board’s performance to enable him 
to conduct his assessment (sections 37-39 of the PGPA Act, Para 3.18 of the GBE Guidelines and section 40 of the 
Australian Postal Corporation Act). 
559 The GBPFAU conducts the performance of GBEs by “analysing their operations and environment, engaging in 
discussions with them and consulting with their Stakeholders” (Witherell WH Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 44).  
560 Dewan SM Corporate Governance in Public Sector Enterprises (2006) 150-151.  
561 Ibid. 
562 Para 3.26 of the GBE Guidelines. 
563 Para 3.18 of the GBE Guidelines. 
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and/or replace the board prior to the completion of their term of appointment.
564
 As an 
example, the Australian Postal Corporations Act empowers the Governor-General to 
terminate the appointment of the board or a particular director if the Minister proposes so.
565
 
The basis of the termination may be the Minister’s opinion that the performance of the board 
or a particular director has been unsatisfactory for a significant period of time or that they 
have failed to comply with an obligation under the Act or a relevant provision of any other 
statute.
566
  
 
Australia and Zimbabwe have put in place similar corporate governance frameworks with 
regard to board evaluation.
567
 However, Australia appears to have performed better than 
Zimbabwe by trying to promote the evaluation of public entity boards’ performance in a 
standardised manner in the form of a ‘Director’s Checklist’. Australia has also legislated for 
board evaluations to enhance compliance. Secondly, unlike Zimbabwe, Australia has set up 
the Government Business and Private Financing Advice Unit (GBPFAU) to assist the 
ministers in conducting performance evaluations and to minimise the interference on the 
operations of public entities by the responsible ministers. The other difference is that, whilst 
Zimbabwe has come up with performance agreements which might be equated to the 
Australian corporate plans, the Zimbabwean instruments do not give as much detail as the 
Australian instruments. The framework for Australia adequately guides the board, 
Shareholder Minister or any independent person such that it is easier to objectively evaluate 
the performance of the board.
568
 A uniform board evaluation standard is proposed in 
Australia whereas in Zimbabwe public entities may adopt different performance 
measurement tools. 
 
                                                 
564 Section 79 of the Australian Postal Corporations Act, section 21 of the Defence Housing Australia Act and para 2.15 of 
the GBE Guidelines. It is important to note that directors may also leave through resignation prior to the expiry of their term 
of office as provided in section 14(2) of the Defence Housing Australia Act and section 78 of the Postal Corporations Act. 
565 Section 79 of the Australian Postal Corporations Act. 
566 Ibid. See also section 21 of the Defence Housing Australia Act and Para 2.15 of the GBE Guidelines.  
567 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.6 above for Zimbabwe’s comparative position.  
568 For instance, the GBE Guidelines clearly spell out how performance targets are to be set, areas to be covered, reports to 
be submitted within set timeframes and how the evaluation should be conducted whereas the Zimbabwe’s CGF just indicates 
that the board shall be evaluated against agreed performance indicators and targets in accordance with the guidelines 
developed by the responsible Minister.    
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6.2.7 Enforcement Mechanisms 
Australia has largely relied on a self-regulation environment in its approach to corporate 
governance.
569
 However, following the continued collapse of corporate entities, Australia has 
established a number of regulatory instruments and bodies as a way of enhancing the 
effectiveness of boards of public entities, promoting good corporate governance in the 
entities and enforcing the mechanisms put in place. The Corporation Act, PGPA Act, the 
legislation establishing public entities and other relevant Acts provide measures to enforce 
compliance with the provisions of the Acts and to encourage boards to effectively undertake 
their duties.
570
 A number of these statutory provisions have the potential to strengthen 
enforcement and accountability under Australian corporate law, partly due to the fact that the 
director’s “liability for breach of the duty of care and insolvent trading has become more 
stringent”.571 In particular circumstances, directors may also incur criminal liability if they 
breach some of the statutory provisions.
572
 Private persons, especially members of the 
company, disadvantaged by a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties may pursue private law 
remedies to claim their rights. 
 
Australia’s regulatory system relies on a public enforcement model.573 Some commentators 
have argued that the most important enforcement development has been the use of the civil 
                                                 
569 The CLERP continued to emphasise the non-prescriptive approach to corporate governance (Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Bill of 4 December 2003). See also Hill J “Evolving ‘Rules of the 
Game’ in Corporate Governance Reform” (2007) 1 (2) The GovNet eJournal 112-139 available at 
https://www104.griffith.edu.au/index.php/govnet/article/download/93/69.  (accessed on 27 February 2015). 
570 Examples are sections 180-184 and 1317E of the Corporation Act, sections 26-27J and Schedule 2 of the CAC Act, 
section 79 of the Australian Postal Communication Act which provide for penalties to be imposed on directors for failing to 
perform their duties as prescribed in law. As an example, contravention of certain provisions of the CAC Act subjects a 
director to 2,000 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. 
571 Hill JG The Architecture of Corporate Governance in Australia - Corporate Governance - National Report: Australia 
(2010) 112-139. The Centro decision provides valuable guidance on the corporate accountability of directors under the 
Corporations Act. In this matter, ASIC alleged that the directors of companies within the Centro Group had contravened 
various provisions (e.g. sections 180(1), 601FD(3) and 344) of the Corporations Act relating to directors’ duties. In passing 
judgement, Justice Middleton found that the directors had breached their duties to act with reasonable care and diligence and 
to take all reasonable steps to comply with the financial reporting obligations in Part 2M.3 of the Act. The ruling was based 
on the principles that; directors are required to have the financial literacy to understand basic accounting standards; directors 
cannot rely on management for matters which the Act dictates are specifically within the responsibility of the directors, each 
director must apply an enquiring mind to the review of the financial statements and directors cannot rely on “information 
overload” as a defence (ASIC v Healey & Ors (2011) FCA 717). 
572 Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. In Permanent Building Society (in liq) v McGee (1993) 11 ACSR 260 at 
287 it was held that it was not enough for a director to merely disclose his interest and abstain from voting. He had an 
obligation to take positive steps to protect the interests of Permanent Building Society. It was also held that the duty of care 
and skill should “not be equated with or termed a ‘fiduciary’ duty”.  
573 Under the public enforcement model, the Australian security and Investments Commission (ASIC) operates as the 
enforcement mechanism for breach of directors’ duties under the Australian civil penalty regime (Hill JG Evolving 
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penalty regime by the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC)
574
 and the 
provisions of the Corporations Act.
575
 ASIC monitors and enforces the relevant provisions of 
Corporations law, sets standards, issues best practice guides and, together with ASX, has a 
key role in disseminating information to the market.
576
 The ASIC may seek criminal 
sanctions, civil or administrative action in terms of the relevant Acts and codes against 
defaulting companies.
577
 The ASIC, in situations of breach of any of the legislative 
provisions, can also enforce civil penalty provisions and may seek a disqualification order, a 
pecuniary penalty order
578
 or a compensation order.
579
 Recently, the courts have been 
awarding considerable damages against directors for breach of duties. Examples are the 
award of damages close to $97 million against the Chairman of the National Safety Council 
in Commercial Bank of Australia v Friedrich,
580
 the award of $81 million against the Chief 
Executive Officer of State Bank of South Australia in State Bank of South Australia v Marcus 
                                                                                                                                                        
Directors’ Duties in the Common Law World (2013)  in Paolini A Research Handbook on Directors’ Duties (Edward Elgar 
Publishing: Cheltenham 2014) 10-14). 
574 The Australian security and Investments Commission (ASIC) operates as the enforcement mechanism for breach of 
directors’ duties under the Australian civil penalty regime. As a result of the extensive powers it possesses, ASIC has in 
recent years instituted several litigation proceedings alleging breach of directors’ duties.574 Examples of cases where ASIC 
instituted legal proceedings for breach of director’s duty to exercise due care, skill and diligence are Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission v Healey, ASIC v Rich and ASIC v Macdonald. 
575 Contravention of a significant number of the provisions under the Corporations Act, together with the directors’ statutory 
duties (sections 181-183) and the insolvent trading provisions may result in liability under the civil penalty provisions of the 
Corporations Act (Part 9.4B of the Corporations Act). See also Welsh M “Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The 
Gap between Theory and Practice” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 908-933 available at 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/33_3_9.pdf (accessed on 9 January 2015). 
576 Sections 11 and 12A of the ASIC Act. The ASX works closely with the ASIC to identify matters that may require 
investigation. It is empowered to discipline defaulters through a warning letter, requesting for explanations, suspending 
trading rights (for serious breaches of trading rules and regulations), imposing a fine and recommending prosecution by 
ASIC (for serious cases) (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 
89-91). 
577 Sections 49 and 50 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act. If ASIC believes that an offence may 
have been committed, it can commence prosecution itself or refer the matter to the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) (Welsh M “Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap between Theory and Practice” (2009) 
908-933 and Crowley LK The Basics of Commonwealth Crime (Paper Presented to the News South Wales Bar Association 
on 13 March 2007) 17-18 available at http://www.criminalcle.net.au/attachments/Basics_of_Commonwealth_Crime.pdf 
(accessed on 19 April 2015). 
578  The ASIC has the power to seek orders for pecuniary penalties of up to A$200,000 for an individual and A$1 million for 
corporations (section 1311 and schedule 3 of the Corporations Act). See also Austin RP, Ford HAJ and Ramsay IM 
Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate Governance (Lexisnexis Butterworths, Sydney 2004) 271-276.  
579 A company may bring an action against its directors under the civil penalty provisions, but is restricted to a compensation 
order (Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 261). 
580 See para 6.2.2 above. 
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Clark
581
 and the imposition of civil penalty fines of A$30,000 and 5 year disqualification 
orders on the non-executive directors in ASIC v Macdonald (No 11).
582
 
 
The power of shareholders to remove directors from office is also an important governance 
device under Australian corporate law.
583
 The Corporations Act empowers shareholders of a 
public company to remove directors from office at any time, with or without cause.
584
  The 
legislation establishing public entities also provide for the removal of directors for 
misconduct and poor performance. As an example, the Australian Postal Communication Act 
provides for the removal of the board where the Minister is of the opinion that the 
performance of the board or a particular director has been unsatisfactory for a significant 
period of time.
585
 Similarly, the GBE Guidelines provide for the removal of a non-performing 
board or director.
586
 To achieve the same objective, the CAC Act and PGPA Act provide for 
penalties for failure to comply with the requirements in the Acts.
587
 
 
However, Australia has also tried to protect directors from criminal liability where they 
would have made decisions in good faith but the decisions turn out not to be the best for the 
company.
588
 To achieve this objective, the Federal Government introduced the Personal 
Liability for Corporate Fault Reform Act 180 of 2012 which is intended to address the 
                                                 
581 State Bank of South Australia v Marcus Clark (1996) 19 ACSR 606 at 646. See also ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 
where ASIC successfully took legal action against the directors and officers of HIH. The directors were found guilty of 
violating the statutory duty of care and diligence, duty to act in good faith and for proper purposes and duty not to abuse of 
position in terms of sections 180-182 of the Corporations act. The court imposed all forms of civil penalty liability, including 
the making of disqualification orders in accordance with section 206B of the Corporations Act. 
582 ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) NSWC 287. 
583 Du Plessis J and McConvill J “Removal of Company Directors in A Climate of Corporate Collapses” (2003) 31(4) 
Australian Business Law Review 251-264. 
584 Section 203D(1) of the Corporations Act. However, the Act prohibits the removal of a director by the board in the case of 
public companies since this has the potential to compromise director independence and corporate governance principles. See 
Scottish & Colonial Ltd v Australian Power & Gas Co Ltd & Ors (2007) NSWSC 1266 where the court found that director 
removal mechanisms contained in section 203D of the Corporations Act must be strictly adhered to notwithstanding what is 
written in the company’s constitution. See also Allied Mining & Processing & Anor v Boldbow Pty Ltd (2002) WASC 195.  
585 Section 79 of the Australian Postal Communication Act. Similarly, section 21 of the Defence Housing Australia Act 
provides for the termination of a director’s appointment for failing to comply with the provisions of the CAC Act without 
reasonable excuse and for being absent from 3 consecutive board meetings without prior approval from relevant authority.  
586 Para 3.15 of the GBE Guidelines and section 203D of the Corporations Act. 
587 Sections 9, 17, 36, and 42 of the CAC Act and sections 67-70 of the PGPA Act. 
588 The provision applies only in relation to a positive decision or business judgment of the board. The Corporations Act 
defines “business judgment” to mean any decision to take or not take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business 
operations of the corporation (section 180(3) Corporations Act). 
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differing standards of director’s fault and responsibility that exist under various statutes, in an 
attempt to promote greater certainty for directors by reducing the liability of directors in 
circumstances where the corporation is at fault or where the director would have diligently 
made a decision.
589
 
 
As another compliance and performance enforcement measure, it is a requirement that public 
entities’ financial statements should be audited annually and the audited financial statements 
should be published to enable the public to assess the entity’s performance.590 In most public 
entity cases, the audits are conducted by the Auditor- General in terms of the Auditors 
General Act 1997,
591
 Corporations Act and internationally accepted audit standards.
592
 
Australia has also established a number of bodies to enforce compliance with the corporate 
governance provisions, for example, Australian Crime Commission (ACC),
593
 ASX,
594
 
Attorney General’s Department595 and ANAO.596 Further to these regulatory bodies, certain 
                                                 
589 A director is deemed to have complied with the requirements of the duty of care and diligence if the director has made a 
business judgment in good faith for a proper purpose, does not have a conflicting interest, has adequately informed himself, 
and rationally believes that the decision is in the best interests of the corporation (section 180(2) of the Corporations Act). 
See also ASIC v Rich (2009) NSWSC 1229. 
590 Sections 307-310 of the Corporations Act, sections 43, 97-99 of the PGPA Act, paras 3.15-3.16 of the GBE Guidelines. 
591 Act 151 of 1997. This Act establishes an office of the Auditor General and sets its mandate. This Act also establishes the 
ANAO and provides for the appointment of an Independent Auditor to audit the Office. 
592 Paras 3-13-3.16 of the GBE Guidelines. Corporate collapses, such as Enron in the US and HIH and One.Tel in Australia, 
raised concerns about the role of auditors. In response to these concerns, the CLERP 9 Act 2004 introduced a range of 
reforms relating to the audit process in Australia (Ch 2M of the Corporations Act). Principle 4 of the ASX corporate 
governance principles also requires listed companies to have in place a structure of review and authorisation to ensure 
truthful and factual presentation of the company’s financial position.  According to Principle 4, the structure should include 
review of the accounts by an audit committee and a process to ensure that the company‘s external auditors are independent 
and competent. 
593 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is a statutory body established in terms of the Australian Crime Commission 
Act (ACC Act 2002 (No. 41 of 1984 as amended)) to improve the integrity of the public sector, combat corruption and 
investigate allegations of misconduct against public officers, among others. It took over from the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and has jurisdiction over all government departments, instrumentalities and boards as well as universities and 
local governments. Visit https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/ for more information. 
594 The ASX is responsible for supervision of trading activity and market participants, as well as investigation and 
enforcement of ASX Listing Rules under the Corporations Act. It imposes a wide range of disclosure requirements and it can 
take disciplinary action against a company that violates its Listing Rules (sections 2-4 of the ASX Enforcement Rulebook 
available at http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/rules/asx-enforcement-rulebook.htm (accessed on 15 December 2014)). 
Following alleged conflicts of interest in relation to ASX’s market supervisory role, in 2010, the Australian government 
transferred the ASX’s detection powers in relation to market abuse to ASIC (Hill JG The Architecture of Corporate 
Governance in Australia - Corporate Governance - National Report: Australia (2010) 55-56). 
595 The Attorney General’s Department is a department of the Government of Australia whose responsibility is to provide 
essential legal and other related expertise to the government in “the maintenance and improvement of Australia’s system of 
law and justice”. This department also plays an “active role in combating corruption through developing domestic policy on 
anti-corruption and engagement in a range of international anti-corruption forums”. Visit http://www.ag.gov.au/ for more 
information. 
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aspects of the governance of CAC bodies are also subject to supervision and investigation by 
organisations such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman,
597
 GBPFAU,
598
 and Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal,
599
 among others.
600
 Another body that has actively participated in the 
promotion of corporate governance is the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD). 
Although AICD does not have powers to enforce compliance, it has spearheaded 
developments and encouraged compliance with good corporate governance standards through 
research, disseminating information and conducting training sessions for directors and other 
stakeholders. 
 
All the above efforts to enforce compliance can only be effective if adequately supported by a 
reliable and efficient judicial system. Australia’s jurisprudence is based on the common law 
system developed in the United Kingdom.
601
 Its judicial system is complicated
602
 and 
comprises a variety of courts and tribunals at both the federal and state and territory levels.
603
 
The courts can be divided into superior and inferior courts. Superior Courts consist of the 
High Court
604
  and Supreme Court of each of the States and Territories
605
 and are the highest 
                                                                                                                                                        
596 One of ANAO’s functions is to encourage corporate governance through promoting public accountability, auditing 
annual financial statements and conducting performance audits in public entities (section 39 of the Auditor-General Act). 
597  The Ombudsman is an independent and impartial institution whose objective is to improve public administration through 
investigating and coming up with suggestions or recommendations to rectify complaints about the administrative actions and 
decisions of Australian Government agencies. See www.australia.gov.au/directories/australia/ombudsman for more details. 
598 The Unit oversees and ensures that Government Business Enterprises operate efficiently and adhere to best practices in 
governance principles outlined in the Government Business Enterprises Governance Arrangements and CAC Act. 
599 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) is an independent body established in terms of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal Act 1975. It is responsible for reviewing a broad range of administrative decisions made by Australian Government 
ministers and officials, authorities and other tribunals. See http://www.australia.gov.au/directories/australia/aat for more 
details. 
600 ANAO Corporate Governance in Commonwealth Authorities and Companies (Discussion Paper prepared by Australian 
National Audit Office 1999) 7 available at www.anao.gov.au (accessed on 3 February 2015). 
601 Akpet KO “The Australian Legal System: The Legal Profession and the Judiciary” (2011) 71-94. 
602 Given the complexity of Australia’s judicial system this research has not attempted to go into greater detail about the 
system as it is beyond the scope of the research. 
603 The country has eight legal systems; one federal system and eight state and territory legal systems. Each of the nine 
systems has its own parliament, courts and tribunals (Akpet KO “The Australian Legal System: The Legal Profession and 
the Judiciary” (2011) 71-94). See also Opeskin B “The State of the Judicature: A Statistical Profile of Australian Courts and 
Judges” (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 489-517 available at http://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr_35/slr35_3/Opeskin.pdf 
(accessed on 25 May 2015). 
604 The High Court of the Commonwealth of Australia was established by the Constitution of Australia. It is the highest court 
in Australia being at the “top of both the Commonwealth court and tribunal system, and the court and tribunal systems of all 
states and territories”. It is the final court of appeal (only on matters of law) and deals with matters relating to the 
Constitution (Visit www.hcourt.gov.au/ for more information). 
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courts in their section of the Australia court hierarchy.
606
 Examples of superior courts are the 
High Court of Australia, Family Court of Australia and Federal Court of Australia. Inferior 
courts have restricted powers and operate within the mandate granted to them by the specific 
legislation.
607
 Examples of inferior courts are the Magistrates Court and the District Courts. 
The Australian judiciary is independent of the other branches of government to the greatest 
extent possible.
608
 The main purpose for this is to ensure that the judiciary considers matters 
in a fair, transparent, impartial and equal manner.
609
 
 
The above analysis indicates that Zimbabwe and Australia have acknowledged that voluntary 
compliance has its limitations, hence they put other interventions in place to create the 
climate necessary to ensure adherence to the corporate governance guidelines.
610
 The 
interventions are in the form of statutes and regulatory/enforcement bodies like the Stock 
Exchange and Anti-Corruption bodies.
611
 Both countries have tried to develop their judicial 
systems so that they are in a position to effectively enforce compliance where necessary. In 
contrast to Zimbabwe where the primary means of enforcing breach of directors’ duties is 
through private litigation, Australia’s regulatory system relies on a public enforcement 
model.
612
 Also, Australia has more regulatory and enforcement bodies and has come up with 
more statutory instruments to enforce compliance than Zimbabwe.
613
 The Australian courts, 
unlike Zimbabwe’s, appear to have been more aggressive in trying to compel directors to 
                                                                                                                                                        
605 The Supreme Court of each of the States and Territories was established by the “constitution of the individual state or 
territory or the self-government act for the Australian Capital Territory or Northern Territory” (Symth R “The Business of 
the Australian State Supreme Courts over the Course of the 20th Century” (2010) 7(1) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 
141-163 available at http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Russell_Smyth/publication/229978529 (accessed at 27 April 
2015)). 
606 Akpet KO “The Australian Legal System: The Legal Profession and the Judiciary” (2011) 71-94. 
607 Ibid. 
608 Greenwood E “An Independent Judiciary?” (2012) VIII Cross-sections, the Bruce Hall Academic Journal 29-40 available 
at http://eview.anu.edu.au/cross-sections/vol8/pdf/ch03.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2015). 
609 Ibid.  
610 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 with regard to Zimbabwe’s enforcement framework. 
611 The Anti-Corruption bodies are the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and Australian Crime Commission. 
612 Hill JG Evolving Directors’ Duties in the Common Law World (2013) in Paolini A Research Handbook on Directors’ 
Duties (2014) 10-14. 
613 See para 6.2.7 above. 
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undertake their duties carefully and diligently.
614
 Nevertheless, considering the major 
differences in the two countries’ levels of economic and social developments, Zimbabwe 
should be applauded for the significant strides it has made to improve the effectiveness of 
boards of its public entities. 
 
6.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis in this chapter showed that Australian corporate law is of comparative value to 
Zimbabwean company law, because both legal systems are based on the English common 
law. Also, both countries’ frameworks consist of mandatory and self-regulatory attributes615 
which make almost similar provisions.
616
 Both countries have modelled their corporate 
governance frameworks around internationally recognised corporate governance instruments 
like OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG Guidelines and ICGN Guidelines.
 
The roles of bodies like the Institute of Directors, Stock Exchange Authorities and Auditor 
General in the promotion of good corporate governance are similar features in the two 
countries. 
 
However, differences occur in the scale at which the two countries have developed their 
corporate governance frameworks with Australia appearing to have started seriously focusing 
on promoting good corporate governance practices earlier than Zimbabwe.
617
 Unlike 
Zimbabwe which recently adopted a National Code, Australia has done much more in that it 
has undertaken extensive programs like the Bosch Report and Uhrig Review, adopted the ASX 
CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, developed guidelines like the 
GBE Guidelines and ANAO Better Practice Guides and produced a corporate governance 
                                                 
614 This is supported by the numerous recent cases the courts have handled (see paras 6.2.2 and 6.2.7 above).  
615 As indicated in Chapter 4, para 4.2 above, the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in Zimbabwe is 
determined by various statutes, ZSE Listings Requirements, common law and a self-regulation framework provided for in 
codes of corporate governance.   
616 Examples are the CGF and the GBE Guidelines which make similar provisions to promote good corporate governance 
practices in public entities. The two frameworks have borrowed significantly from the OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State Owned Enterprises. The similarity of the frameworks is confirmed in the discussions on specific issues 
above (paras 6.2.1-6.2.7). 
617 Zimbabwe should be commended for recently adopting its first National Code and for the initiatives undertaken in 
promoting good corporate governance in its public entities given its level of economic and social development. 
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specific Act (PGPA Act)
618
 relating to public entities, among other initiatives. In addition, 
Australia has more institutions which seek to promote good corporate governance in the 
country’s entities, for example, the Australian Investment Managers’ Association and 
Financial Services Association. 
 
Zimbabwe has also more to learn from some of the good aspects of Australia’s corporate 
governance standards to enhance its own systems. For example, currently, Zimbabwe has no 
specific guidelines on board appointment and remuneration and is still to adopt a Corporate 
Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework specific to its public entities. Zimbabwe 
can consider creating institutions like the Australian Nomination Panel and Remuneration 
Tribunal to improve its board appointment and remuneration processes. Zimbabwe also 
appears not to be as serious as Australia to achieve the gender equality agenda given the 
nature of initiatives it has put in place and the apparent lack of specific and time framed 
implementation targets.
619
 Zimbabwe should thus try to vigorously implement the measures it 
has put in place to promote gender equality and also learn from some of Australia’s 
initiatives.  
 
Although Australia and Zimbabwe have advocated for self-regulated corporate governance 
practices, the continued corporate collapses in both jurisdictions motivated the need to 
legislate for some aspects so that they can be legally enforceable. As a result, both 
jurisdictions have put in place enforcement mechanisms that include punishment of 
individual directors for misconduct in the form of fines, imprisonment or dismissal; removal 
of the whole board for poor performance in terms of relevant legislation and suspension or 
delisting of defaulting companies in terms of the Stock Exchange Listing Rules.
620
 Australia 
has, however, put in place more statutory instruments, comprehensive enforcement systems 
and regulatory bodies than Zimbabwe. 
 
Judging from the recent court decisions, Australia also appears to have a judicial system that 
is more vibrant and geared towards eliminating or at least minimising the potential for 
                                                 
618 Whilst similar in some respects to Zimbabwe’s PFMA, Australia’s PGPA makes board evaluations mandatory and covers 
the issues of corporate governance more extensively than the former does. 
619 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 above. 
620 See Chapter 4, para 4.27 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.7 above. 
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directors to abuse the managerial powers conferred upon them to the detriment of all relevant 
stakeholders. Despite the differences in levels of enforcement, I’m of the view that it would 
be unreasonable to expect Zimbabwe to match Australia’s enforcement mechanisms and level 
of compliance with good corporate governance standards given the significant differences in 
the two countries’ levels of economic and social development.621  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
621 See Chapter 7, paras 7.2.2.2-7.2.7.2 for the comparison of Australia’s level of compliance with good corporate 
governance standards to that of Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this study is to examine corporate governance in Zimbabwean public 
entities with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of boards of these entities and the 
initiatives that the government has put in place to improve corporate governance practices. 
First, the thesis examines the level of compliance with existing legal and institutional 
frameworks, regulatory requirements and voluntary corporate governance codes by four 
selected public entities. Secondly, the survey examines the challenges encountered by public 
entity boards in implementing good corporate governance standards. To achieve the 
objective, a literature analysis was carried out,
1
 interviews were conducted with and 
questionnaires circulated to participants holding current positions in the four selected public 
entities.
2
 The interviews and questionnaires were designed to obtain in-depth information and 
to elicit the participants’ perceptions of the status of corporate governance in the institutions 
they work for.
3
 The questions were thus chosen to focus participants’ answers to the 
researcher’s particular areas of interest.4  
 
7.2 RESULTS 
50 questionnaires were distributed to selected participants. Of the 50 questionnaires, 43 
responses (inclusive of interviews) were received of which all were usable in that they had 
                                                 
1 Chapters 3-6 above. Since most of the findings from literature analysis were articulated in previous chapters, this chapter 
tries to avoid unnecessary repetition and where appropriate reference is made to the relevant section that would have 
discussed the matter. 
2 See Appendix B and C for the actual questionnaires used in the survey. 
3 See Chapter 1, para 1.5 above on the main areas focused on. 
4 It is important to note that after interviewing the four company secretaries, the questionnaires had to be adjusted on the 
section on board evaluation when it became apparent that some of the questions posed were no longer relevant given the 
absence of evaluation of board performances systems in the four entities. 
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fully completed responses to questions. The response rate was therefore 86% and considered 
satisfactory.
5
 The participants included board members, chief executive officers, company 
secretaries, senior management and shareholder representatives of the public entities. The 
sample consisted of four board chairpersons (one woman and three men), eight board 
members (three women and five men), four chief executive officers (four men), four 
company secretaries (two women and two men), eighteen senior managers (six women and 
twelve men) and five shareholder representatives (two women and three men).
6
 Of the 43 
participants, none had less than 5 years of experience, 16 had between 5 and 10 years of 
experience whilst the rest (27) had over 10 years of experience. The ages of the participants 
ranged from 34 to 61 years. 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the results obtained from the literature examination,
7
 
interviews and questionnaires. With regard to the interviews and questionnaires, the 
discussions below are based on the participants’ opinions or perceptions. Each questionnaire 
was summarised focusing the participants’ responses on the particular areas covered by the 
research. At first the thesis discusses the participants’ views on corporate governance 
generally, then their views on the specific research areas namely; role, selection and 
appointment, composition, remuneration and evaluation of the board. Finally, based on 
research undertaken, South Africa and Australia’s positions on the specific research areas are 
discussed in comparison to Zimbabwe’s position. 
 
7.2.1 General Corporate Governance 
The majority (95%) of the participants articulated well the meaning of corporate governance
8
 
and had an appreciation of what the Corporate Governance Framework (CGF) for State 
Enterprises and Public Entities’ objectives are. All of the participants believed that the CGF 
                                                 
5 The response rate was considered acceptable given the fact that a response rate of approximately 60% has been found to be 
adequate to enable the researcher to make reasonable conclusions (Fincham JE “Response Rates and Responsiveness for 
Surveys, Standards and the Journal” (2008) 72(2) American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education 43-49 available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2384218/ (accessed on 28 February 2015)). 
6 Efforts were made to gender balance the sample, although in some cases the positions were occupied by men only, for 
instance, in the case of CEOs. 
7 Chapters 3-6 of this thesis. 
8 Of the 43 participants, 19 cited Cadbury’s definition of corporate governance that simply says that it is “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled”. 
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adequately covers the needs of public entities because it was drafted in compliance with 
internationally accepted corporate governance principles. However, they were of the view 
that the CGF had not greatly impacted on the performance of the board of their organisations 
because no sufficient effort had been made to fully comply with its provisions, starting from 
the responsible Minister to the board members and management.  
 
All four public entities did not have a corporate governance committee as part of their board 
committees at the time of conducting the interviews. However, all the entities had board 
charters to guide the board members’ conduct. On the assessment of their organisation’s 
corporate governance systems and level of compliance, 52% of the participants indicated that 
the systems and level of compliance were poor, 37% rated their organisation’s systems and 
level of compliance as fair whilst the rest thought their systems and level of compliance were 
good. 
 
7.2.2 Role of the Board 
Universally, it has been accepted that boards play a vital role in the successful governance of 
public entities.
9
 According to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises, the responsibilities of the board are to formulate, review and implement 
corporate strategy, set and monitor implementation of performance objectives, monitor the 
effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and recruit company executives, among 
others.
10
 
 
All the participants were able to articulate well the main responsibilities of the board although 
they differed in terms of which of the roles are more important than the other. One of the 
participants identified the role of the board as including “setting overall strategic plans, 
managing risk; monitoring the performance of the organisation, giving guidance to 
management and appointing or dismissing the CEO”. It has been found that it is the board’s 
critical duty to ensure that the organisation achieves its objectives through its effective 
guidance.
11
 In this study, the participants agreed that the board needs to take and accept the 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 for a discussion of the directors’ duties. 
10 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 47-50. 
11 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. 
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ultimate responsibility for the performance of the entity. As a result, the directors need to be 
knowledgeable about the operations of the entity and the applicable laws and regulations so 
as to be able to appropriately drive the company’s strategy, guide management and 
effectively contribute during discussions in board meetings.  
 
But, according to 44% of the participants, there seems to be a lack of commitment on the part 
of directors to make meaningful contributions to the boards to which they are elected because 
of the “misconception that corporate governance is the responsibility of management”. 
Another reason cited for poor commitment was the fact that directors “are thrown at the deep-
end without the necessary training” with regard to the responsibilities, obligations and 
fiduciary duties of their positions. The participants highlighted that there is a lack of a proper 
working framework that prescribes the way in which board members should carry out their 
duties.
12
 According to participants from all four entities, board members are normally just 
issued with incomprehensive appointment letters indicating that they have been appointed as 
board members and thereafter briefed by the Minister on what is expected of them.
13
 Thus, 
none of the entities has a written policy for formal briefing of directors by the appointing 
authority to ensure that they have a proper understanding of their role.   
 
Despite lack of formal policy or sufficient guidance by the Minister, of the twelve board 
members, nine indicated that they had been taken through an induction process which 
consisted of an induction workshop conducted by IoDZ
14
 and presentations by management 
on the operations of the entity.
15
 The other three board members indicated that they had not 
been subjected to formal induction programmes to familiarise with the company’s operations, 
                                                 
12 The framework that was said to be absent was that from the relevant ministry as participants from all four entities 
indicated that there was a board charter to guide the board’s operations and which also provided for formal briefing and 
professional development of directors. However, the main challenge was said to be lack of implementation of the provisions 
of the charters.  
13 Samples of appointment letters availed to the researcher simply stated that “I’m pleased to advise that His Excellency, the 
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe has approved your appointment to the Board of Directors of ……with effect 
from….for a period of three (3) years……… I implore upon you on the importance of entrepreneurial leadership guided by 
objectivity and result oriented performance. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and hope that your expertise and 
wealth of experience will stir …..to be the leading ….in the country”.  
14 It was reported that the induction programs offered by IoDZ include training on board responsibilities, the public entity’s 
relationship with government and relevant ministries as well as board procedures. 
15 The four company secretaries indicated that they were responsible for arranging for the board’s induction and 
familiarisation tours.  
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various levels of management they have to deal with and its business environment.
16
 They, 
therefore, had to learn on the job which tended to compromise the quality of their 
performance and effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the entity. Of the twelve board 
members, two board members ranked their general understanding of the business of the 
organisation as very good, three as good, five as fair and two as poor. The company 
secretaries, chief executive officers and some senior managers confirmed that the majority of 
their board members had a fair understanding of the operations of their entities. 
 
Over and above proper induction, it has generally been found that continuous training and 
development of directors is crucial in enabling the board to effectively undertake its 
responsibilities.
17
 The majority of the participants commended IoDZ for a good job in so far 
as promoting director’s training and development is concerned. A number of local and 
international institutions and foreign training facilitators were also said to provide training 
and development programs for directors in the hope that these will greatly add to the 
effectiveness of boards, inclusive of those from public entities. However, some participants 
highlighted “time constraints and lack of commitment” as the major limitations for directors 
to attend the training sessions which consequently compromises the quality of their 
performance and effectiveness.
18
  
 
The second concern raised was the lack of feedback from the appointing authority on whether 
or not the board was carrying out its responsibilities as expected. All participating board 
members indicated that there was no formal feedback on whether or not the shareholders’ 
expectations are met. This was also confirmed by all the chief executive officers and 
company secretaries who indicated that, although board minutes and quarterly reports were 
being submitted to the ministry, no feedback was received. In addition, participants in all 
entities indicated that there was no system in place to ensure that the board and the individual 
members are accountable with respect to their duties and responsibilities. According to one 
                                                 
16 According to participants from the entities, these three members joined an existing board that had already undergone 
induction and training hence the oversight. 
17 Principle 2.20 of the King III Report and Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned 
Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 10. See also Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory 
Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 102. 
18 It has been found that most directors shun formal training but prefer to do their learning on the job and through meetings 
with management and auditors, interactions with outside experts and memberships on other boards. However, on the job 
training has been considered insufficient in developing countries like Zimbabwe where skilled individuals are in short supply 
(Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 25-26). 
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participant, “the only formal feedbacks normally received by board members are dismissal 
letters which are then followed by press reports that the board has been fired for inefficiency 
and incompetence”. This view was supported by the majority of the participants. 
 
Concerning the board’s role in strategy formulation and implementation, 94% of the 
participants believed that the board played a significant role. Although this was not 
consistently adhered to, two entities were said to review the implementation of the entity’s 
strategy biannually whilst two conducted the reviews annually. A question was asked as to 
the time it took for the board to communicate to management the decisions that will have 
been taken at board and committee meetings. The respondents indicated that this was 
determined by the importance and urgency of the matter as well as the need to comply with 
statutory deadlines. In all four entities, management is normally represented by the chief 
executive officer and company secretary in board meetings and by the chief executive officer, 
company secretary and heads of key departments in committee meetings.
19
 This makes it 
“easier for the board to delegate authority to the respective heads of departments” that are 
then supervised by the chief executive officer. More so, it becomes easier to ascribe 
accountability to the appropriate board member, committee or manager if certain decisions 
are not actioned or implemented timeously. In all cases, the company secretaries were said to 
be responsible for ensuring that the board resolutions are implemented through following up 
with the relevant board members/committees and managers. 
 
With regard to the board’s role of policy formulation, participants from all four entities 
indicated that the board was responsible for formulating policies to guide the operations of 
their entities. In coming up with the policies, the boards were said to be guided by best 
practices and the existing legal framework. However, the “policies have to be submitted to 
the Minister for approval before implementation”. In some cases ministerial approval was 
said to take long to be granted, thus delaying the implementation of the policies. On the issue 
of whether or not the board and its committees are permitted to seek independent professional 
advice at the organisation’s expense, participants from all entities indicated that this was 
                                                 
19 The majority of the participants highlighted that inviting departmental heads provides the board with a firsthand 
opportunity to ask probing questions and monitor the performances of the senior management team. However, other board 
member participants displayed disappointment with senior managers who provide them with misleading information 
resulting in mistrust and lack of confidence in the information provided by specific managers. 
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possible provided that prior authority had been granted by the board in a proper meeting or by 
the board chairman, in consultation, with other board members, where necessary. 
 
The other critical role of the board is to, in consultation with the responsible Minister, appoint 
the chief executive officer who meets its requirements.
20
 Giving the board the opportunity to 
choose the chief executive officer enables it to choose a competent person who is able to 
effectively drive the entity under its direction.
21
 However, according to all the participating 
board members and other managers, the main challenge is the involvement of the responsible 
Minister in the appointment and removal of the chief executive officer which sometimes 
diminishes the board’s effectiveness especially where the chief executive officer has a strong 
and effective relationship with the Minister.
22
 The board’s power to give directives and 
supervise the chief executive officer may thus be compromised to such an extent that it is 
unable to provide effective governance and discharge its other duties successfully.
23
  
 
Furthermore, because of the involvement of the Minister in the appointment and removal of 
the chief executive officer, participants from all of the entities indicated that their entities, at 
some point, had not had any substantive chief executive officers for periods ranging from two 
to six years.
24
 This was said to be as a result of the fact that the Ministers could have been 
“too busy and did not give the matter the priority it deserves” or boards were too frequently 
changed before recruiting a chief executive officer. Respondents from one entity indicated 
that three successive boards had been prematurely dissolved at the stage of short listing 
potential candidates for the chief executive officer post resulting in the entity going for five 
years without a substantive chief executive officer. 
 
                                                 
20 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.2, Chapter 5, para 5.2.2 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.2 above. 
21 Ibid. 
22 For example, where a CEO seeks to influence the direction of the board, he may present the views of the Minister, as 
expressed in previous conversations, to exert pressure on the board to act in a certain way. This was confirmed by the Uhrig 
Review (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 41-42). 
23 Previous researchers have made similar findings as shown in Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. For example, Agrawal and 
Chadha found that a CEO’s influence on the board can reduce the board’s effectiveness in monitoring the performance of 
managers and detecting irregularities (Agrawal A and Chadha S “Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals” (2005) 
48(2) Journal of Law and Economics 371-406). 
24 GMB had an acting CEO from 2006 to 2008, ZMDC for the period 2010 to mid-2011, NRZ for the period August 2013 to 
August 2014 and MMCZ for the years 2010 to 2015. 
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It has also been globally acknowledged that it is very important that the board should be 
empowered and independent enough to undertake its functions.
25
 Responses from the 
majority of the participants (mostly board members) indicated that the board was not 
sufficiently empowered to perform its roles largely as a result of too much interference by the 
responsible Minister in the operations of the entity and lack of clear policy objectives.
26
 In 
most cases, the Minister was said not give clear policy direction and to interfere with the 
entity’s operations both through the influence of its board appointees and directly issuing 
directives to the chief executive officer,
27
 in the process usurping the powers of the board.
28
 
All the participating board members expressed serious concerns with the Minister dealing 
directly with the chief executive officer as they highlighted the fact that the chief executive 
officer and senior managers, because of the easy access to the Minister, “appear to be under 
the view that they are answerable to the Minister and not to the board”.29 The board members 
expressed strong reservations on the attendance and participation in the proceedings of board 
and committee meetings by some public servants.
30
 Their view was that this tended to 
compromise their “independence and objectivity in decision making”. 
 
In some cases the responsible Minister was reported to issue directives
31
 to the board without 
giving the later the opportunity to question the logic of implementing the directive or proffer 
                                                 
25 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above and Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets 
(2006) 23. 
26 Similar sentiments were expressed in an article entitled “Political Meddling Stifles Parastatals” that appeared in The 
Financial Gazette of 8-14 October 2015 18. This position has been found to be a common problem in most countries 
(Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in 
Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75).  
27 Research has established that, in most cases, these directives may circumvent prescribed systems of control to the 
detriment of the entity (Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24-25 and 
Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for Restructured Governance in 
Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75). 
28 For similar views, see Sifile O et al M “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – Executive Directors Gone to 
Sleep?” (2014) 78-86. 
29 The participants’ observation and frustrations with political interference in the day to day management of public entities 
has been supported by previous researchers. Wong, for example, observed that the “history of SOEs is replete with examples 
of disruptive political meddling” and “does little to ensure effective accountability” (Wong SCY “Improving Corporate 
Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach” (2004) 5-15). See also Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. 
30 Section 14 of the MMCZ and ZMDC Act provide that certain officers of the Public Service are “entitled to attend 
meetings and to take part in the proceedings of the Board or of a committee”. However, these officers should not vote on any 
question before the board or committee. 
31 Some of the Acts that created the public entities provide that the Minister may give to the entity “directions in writing of a 
general character relating to the exercise by it of its functions, duties and powers as appear to the Minister to be requisite in 
the national interest”. The entity is required to “with all due expedition, comply with any” such direction (section 43 of the 
Grain Marketing Act and section 25 of the MMCZ and ZMDC Acts and section 23 of the Railways Act). 
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alternative solutions.
32
 The board is thus not given adequate freedom to make important 
strategic decisions since a number of the issues that determine the success of the public 
entity’s operations are directed by the government. The participants further highlighted the 
challenge created by some statutory instruments that require that certain decisions or 
transactions should not be implemented without prior government approval through the 
responsible Minister.
33
 They argued that, for example, “there is little or no flexibility to adjust 
the budget in response to changing government directives or the needs of a dynamic business 
environment” considering the lengthy budget approval process by the ministry.34  
 
Contrary to the majority of the participants, three shareholders’ representatives and one 
manager were of the view that the Minister intervenes only when he considers it necessary to 
give direction and guide the board hence he cannot be said to be interfering. Overall 69% of 
the participants ranked the level of ministerial involvement in the performance of duties by 
the board as excessive, 21% as sufficient and 10% as inadequate. Those who said the level of 
involvement was inadequate argued that poor corporate governance in public entities was a 
result of lack of involvement and supervision of the board by the responsible Minister. On the 
contrary, the other participants argued that the responsible Minister was not playing an 
oversight role but was interfering with the day to day running of the entity. 
 
It has also been argued that some specific functions are performed better if they are 
performed by board committees comprising of members with specialised skills in the related 
field.
35
 The Zimbabwean corporate governance framework has likewise, prescribed the 
formation of various board committees to assist the board in effectively discharging its 
functions and responsibilities. The study revealed that all of the four public entities complied 
                                                 
32 It has been shown that such a state of affairs places boards in unsustainable situations, “torn between their obligation of 
loyalty to the public entity and the need to act on behalf” of the shareholders (Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards 
of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 10 and Ashe PA Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case 
Study of Five State Owned Enterprises (2012) 47). 
33 A number of issues have to be approved by the Minister before they can be implemented. For example, section 24 of the 
MMCZ and ZMDC Acts which provide that the board can appoint a General Manager (CEO) subject to approval from the 
Minister and section 47 of the Public Management Finance Act which makes it mandatory for public entities to submit their 
annual income and capital budgets to the parent Ministry for approval prior to implementation. 
34 Participants from three of the entities indicated that they had operated without approved budgets for periods close to two 
years (2013-2015). 
35 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, King III Report, GBE Guidelines, 
CAGG Guidelines, enabling legislation in various countries and the CGF recommend the establishment of various board 
committees that would largely support the board in effectively discharging its functions and responsibilities. 
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with the requirement to establish board committees. According to the entities’ annual reports 
and confirmation from the participants, all of the entities have remuneration, audit and 
finance committees plus other mandate specific committees.
36
 The participants also indicated 
that all the committees have comprehensive terms of reference and a clear life span.  
 
However, according to the majority of the participants, what appears to be a challenge is the 
poor composition of these committees as, in some instances, “the committees consist of 
members with irrelevant expertise”. For example, the participants indicated that on a number 
of occasions, of all the MMCZ board members, none had a financial background which made 
it difficult to properly constitute audit and finance committees.
37
 Participants from ZMDC 
also indicated that during 2011 the ZMDC board had no member with legal or human 
resources experience which compromised the effectiveness of the committees, especially the 
legal and remuneration committees. The absence of relevant expertise in committees makes it 
practically difficult to effectively carry out committee responsibilities. 
 
As to how best the board can be supported to effectively perform its role, the majority of the 
participants highlighted the need for the Minister not to interfere with the entity’s operations 
but to give only necessary guidance and supervision to the board. All participants agreed that 
it was crucial to give the board enough independence and powers to effectively discharge its 
responsibilities and for the Minister to intervene only when it is necessary to do so. They also 
suggested that there should be clear policy objectives to avoid the confusion caused by 
contradicting goals. There was also consensus that there are sufficient training and 
development programs in place for directors and all they need to do is to create time to attend 
the programs so as to enhance their knowledge and effectiveness. 
 
As seen from the participants’ observations above, in reality, the role of the board for public 
entities has not been as clear as portrayed in the various statutes, regulations and guidelines.
38
 
                                                 
36 MMCZ has five committees (Finance & Investments, Audit and Risk, Human Resources, Business Development and 
Marketing and Projects), ZMDC has four committees (Finance & Investments, Legal, Risk & Audit Committee, Human 
Resources and Technical), GMB has five committees (Finance and Risk Management, Audit and Internal Controls, Human 
Resources and Remuneration, Corporate Strategic and Projects) and NRZ has four committees (Audit,  Risk & Compliance, 
Finance & Budgeting, Technical, Operations & Marketing and Human Resources).   
37 The Comptroller and Auditor General’s Management Letter presented to MMCZ on 5 April 2014 confirmed the concerns 
by the participants that board committees were not properly constituted. 
38 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 for similar observations. 
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In addition, the board has not been fully empowered or sufficiently independent to discharge 
its duties as provided for in the corporate governance framework.
39
 The other challenge is the 
lack of familiarity with board functions and fiduciary responsibilities as well as absence of 
clear procedural rules to ensure that directors are empowered to make meaningful 
contributions to the functioning of the board.
 40
 Board committees have also not been 
properly composed in terms of relevant expertise and have thus failed to successfully assist 
the board in effectively discharging its duties.
41
 Another challenge that has fuelled the 
ineffectiveness of boards of the four public entities is the existence of conflicting policies and 
delays in approval of important strategic matters.
42
 
 
7.2.2.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
South Africa has, similar to Zimbabwe, adopted the approach that, given the importance that 
has been ascribed to the role of the board in the modern economy, it is necessary to empower 
boards of its public entities. The country developed a corporate governance framework that, 
if properly observed, should enable boards of public entities to effectively discharge their 
duties.
43
 South Africa has established a number of institutions to train and develop directors 
on board responsibilities, with the IoDSA playing the leading role.
44
 Further to the training 
and development of directors, the roles and responsibilities are clearly laid out in the board 
performance contracts
45
 and charters for ease of reference by the board members.
46
 The board 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Many state-owned entities board members in African countries, Zimbabwe included, have limited understanding of their 
roles, are outright incompetent and are usually open to manipulation by management, chairmen, or principal shareholders 
(Okeahalam CC and Akinboadek OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges 
(2003) 3).  
41 Previous researchers have made similar findings as shown in Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above. 
42 Ibid.  
43 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.1 above. 
44 See Chapter 5, paras 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above. In addition to the IoDSA, private consultants, large auditing and accounting 
firms, and higher education institutions (including business schools) offer training and development sessions for directors 
(Armstrong P Corporate Governance in South Africa – a Perspective from an Emerging Market (2004) 25. 
45 Unlike Zimbabwean statutes which do not specifically provide for performance contracts, South African public entity 
legislation provides for establishment of performance agreements between the Minister and the board (section 5 of the South 
African Civil Aviation Authority Act).  
46 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.2 above. The annual reports state that the directors’ duties were borrowed from the King III Report 
and the entities’ board charters (South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 45 available at 
http://www.caa.co.za/ and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 107 available at 
261 
 
charters for public entities provide for induction and training of board members which, if 
properly implemented, should eliminate the challenge of the existence of board members who 
are uninformed and incompetent.
47
  
 
Secondly, unlike Zimbabwe where committees lack the requisite skills, the committees in the 
majority of South African public entities are properly composed in terms of skills and 
experience.
48
 As an example, the Audit and Risk Committees for South African National 
Roads Agency Limited and South African Civil Aviation Authority included consist of 
people with finance and accounting experience which is best practice.
49
 Furthermore, the 
majority of board committees have clear terms of reference to guide their operations.
50
 
However, according to a research conducted by Thomas (2012), 20% of the public entities 
sampled did not have committees that were properly composed in terms of skills and 
experience.
51
  
 
A third comparative factor is that, like Zimbabwe, South African public entities recruit 
company secretaries whose roles and responsibilities are clearly stated in the board charters 
and individual contracts of employment.
52
 Fourthly, the board is empowered to seek for 
independent professional advice and services so as to enhance their independence such that 
they do not entirely depend on management for information and advice.
53
 All the above are 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.nra.co.za/ (accessed on 13 March 2015)). However, what could not be established from the annual reports are the 
commitment levels of the South African directors to participate in the training sessions. 
47 The South African Civil Aviation Authority Annual Report states that the Authority’s board is guided by a board charter 
which clearly details the duties and responsibilities of the board and provides for induction and professional development of 
directors (South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 45). 
48 This is confirmed by the entities’ annual reports. See the South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 
44-46 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 107.  
49 Ibid.  
50 South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 44-46 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 
2014 Annual Report 106-108. 
51 Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell 
Us?” (2012) 8(4) Social Responsibility Journal 448 – 470. 
52 The company secretary’s main responsibilities are to assist the board through advice and guidance as well as provision of 
secretarial services like maintaining statutory records and arranging for board and committee meetings (South African Civil 
Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 49 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 
105).  
53 South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 49 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 
2014 Annual Report 105. 
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clear indications of the efforts put by South African public entities to comply with good 
corporate governance practices as provided in the country’s statutes and guidelines.54 
 
Despite the commendable framework put in place to empower directors, South Africa, like 
Zimbabwe, has not been spared from a number of the common challenges.
55
 The South 
African government has been criticised for interfering with the affairs of the public entities.
56
 
This is because the government may, in certain circumstances, take over the responsibilities 
of the board by working directly with management without involving the board.
57
 This tends 
to compromise the board’s authority in the supervision of management. The other challenge 
is that the board is not empowered to conduct one of its critical functions in terms of good 
corporate governance practices, that of appointing the chief executive officer. This is because 
the chief executive officer is appointed by the shareholder Minister.
58
 This statutory 
requirement has been found to unavoidably affect the accountability for performance by the 
board as it has little or no actual influence over a chief executive officer who, for all intents 
and purposes, is accountable for managing the operations of the entity.
59
  
 
More so, complaints have been made by boards of public entities that although they are 
“subjected to reporting and accountability measures” they do not receive any feedback from 
the shareholder Minister.
60
 The absence of meaningful feedback makes the requirement for 
                                                 
54 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.2 above. 
55 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 for the common challenges. Public entities in South Africa have often been reported in the media 
for “poor performance in delivering on government guarantees; corporate governance breaches; routine unqualified audited 
financial statements; and ineffective boards and CEOs” (Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in 
the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) 
in South Africa (2014) 1-3. 
56 Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell 
Us?” (2012) 448 – 470. 
57 In a study conducted by Spencer Stuart some survey participants indicated that the biggest factor affecting the execution of 
board responsibilities in a state owned enterprise are the terms and conditions laid down by the Public Finance Management 
Act which restrict innovation and flexibility (Spencer Stuart Board Governance in South Africa (A Study to Review the 
State of Corporate Governance in South Africa conducted by Spencer Stuart in 2009) 6-9 available at 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/.../Board-Governance-in-South-Africa_01 (accessed on 21 February 2015)). 
58 South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 109 and section 11 of the South African Civil Aviation 
Authority Act. While the board may recommend candidates for the position of chief executive officer, it is ultimately the 
relevant Minister who makes the appointment decision. 
59 Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell 
Us?” (2012) 448 – 470. 
60 Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (2012) 34. 
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accounting, reporting and oversight of public entities of no significance.
61
 Although the board 
is mandated to come up with strategies and policies for the entity, no implementation can take 
place before ministerial approval which, in most cases, delays the implementation process to 
the detriment of the entity.
62
 The board is, therefore, incapacitated to fully discharge its duties 
due to other processes beyond its control, processes which may matter greatly in the 
achievement of the entity’s objectives. In addition, it has been shown that there is general 
lack of adherence to fiduciary duties by South African directors who are, in some cases, not 
knowledgeable enough about the affairs of the public entity.
63
 
 
Despite these challenges, when broadly assessing the corporate governance performance of 
South African public entities, it appears that, there is a significant level of compliance to the 
principles of good corporate governance. This is because, as shown above, the role of the 
board is laid out in performance agreements and board charters, board members are inducted 
and trained, proper committee structures have been put in place, communication with 
shareholders (in the form of audited financial statements and annual reports)
64
 has been 
established and the board has access to independent professional advice.
65
 Judging from this, 
South Africa appears to have performed better than Zimbabwe in empowering public entity 
boards through implementation of the systems that it has put in place. This is also confirmed 
by international organisations that have ranked South Africa better than Zimbabwe as far as 
upholding good corporate governance principles is concerned.
66
 Nonetheless, South Africa 
still has to put more effort towards addressing issues relating to board independence, director 
                                                 
61 Ibid. The challenges of the Minister usurping the powers of the board are therefore likely to occur in certain instances. 
62 Chapter 5, para 5.2.2 above. See also Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and 
Recruitment (2012) 34 and Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need for 
Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75. 
63 Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell 
Us?” (2012) 448 – 470. 
64 However, concerns have been raised about the quality of the accounting and auditing standards and the adequate 
disclosure of risk in the public entities’ financial statements and annual reports (Thomas A “Governance at South African 
State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell Us?” (2012) 448 – 470).  
65 South Africa appears to have performed better than Zimbabwe in empowering public entity boards through 
implementation of the systems that it has put in place. This is confirmed by international organisations that have ranked 
South Africa better than Zimbabwe as far as upholding good corporate governance principles is concerned (Schwab K The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2014-2015) 341 & 391 available at 
www3.weforum.org/.../WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2015). 
66 Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2014-2015) 341 
& 391 available at www3.weforum.org/.../WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf (accessed on 15 December 
2015). 
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development, timely approval of issues by responsible ministers and minimisation of political 
interference in board operations.  
 
7.2.2.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
Australia, similar to Zimbabwe, has acknowledged the fact that, for boards of public entities 
to be effective, there is need for role clarity, director education and full empowerment of the 
boards. To achieve this, Australia has, in compliance with international corporate governance 
standards, tried to promote board role clarity and board independence/empowerment through 
comprehensive corporate governance legislation and guidelines.
67
 First, the public entities 
provide appropriate induction and training to their board members to equip them to 
effectively undertake their duties.
68
 As a second measure, the role of the board has been 
clarified in the enabling statute, board charter and code of conduct.
69
 It has been found that 
Australia is one of the few countries where public entity boards are empowered to perform 
one of the key board functions, that of appointing the chief executive officer which gives 
them the powers to give directives and supervise him.
70
 Some public entities issue directors 
with detailed appointment letters which outline the board’s responsibilities.71  
 
                                                 
67 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.2 above.  
68 See Sugar Research and Development Corporation (SRDC) 2013-2014 Annual Report 28 and Grains Research and 
Development Corporation (GRDC) 2013-2014 Annual Report 83. The country’s Institute of Company Directors (AICD) has 
successfully provided induction and training sessions for directors and disseminated information on current international 
corporate governance developments. In addition to the AICD, other international organisations have also offered training and 
development courses to directors (Australian Government Australian Corporate Governance Training Compedium available 
at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/182/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=full.asp#AICD and ANAO Public Sector 
Governance (ANAO Better Practice Guide Volume 1 of 2003) 14 available at 
http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Better%20Practice%20Guides/Public%20Sector%20Governance.pdf (accessed on 12 
November 2015)). 
69 GRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 83 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 27. The Grains Research and Development 
Corporation (GRDC) is a statutory authority established under the Primary Industries Research and Development Act 1989 
(PIRD Act) to plan and invest in research, development and extension for the Australian grains industry. The GRDC is 
subject to accountability and reporting obligations set out in the CAC Act. Visit http://www.grdc.com.au/ for more 
information. 
70 Witherell WH Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 98. 
71 The annual reports for some public entities confirm that directors are issued with detailed appointment letters, properly 
inducted and educated on their responsibilities (Australian Postal Corporation (APC) 2014 Annual Report 44-47 available at 
http://auspost.com.au/annualreport2014/ (accessed on 12 February 2015). See also the annual report for the SRDC that is 
available at http://www.sugarresearch.com.au/ (accessed on 17 February 2015). The SRDC is an Australian statutory 
authority established in terms of the Sugar Research and Development Services Act 113 of 2013. The Corporation is 
responsible for investigating and evaluating the research and development requirements of the Australian sugar industry. 
Visit http://www.sugarresearch.com.au/ for more information. 
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Thirdly, the public entity board committees have, unlike in Zimbabwe, been composed of 
directors with the relevant skills and experience to enable the effective discharge of the 
boards’ responsibilities.72 In the fourth instance, Australian public entities have engaged 
competent company secretaries to assist the board in undertaking their mandate.
73
 Lastly, the 
boards are capacitated to seek for independent professional advice at the public entity’s 
expense, on matters arising in the course of their board and committee duties to enable them 
to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
74
 
 
Notwithstanding the vigorous efforts, Australia has experienced challenges, though at 
different scales from Zimbabwe, regarding shareholder or political interferences in board 
responsibilities or operations of public entities which compromise the effectiveness of the 
board in discharging its roles.
75
 In Australia, even in the most “independent” of CAC bodies, 
the effectiveness of the board is extensively constrained by the demands of government 
policy.
76
 Both the independence of the board and the dynamics of board decision-making are 
thus undermined by the unnecessary ministerial intrusion,
77
 conflicting objectives, excessive 
regulation and red tape.
78
 In addition, in Australia, the board’s purpose and the extent of the 
delegation of power to the board by the shareholder Minister is not very clear which 
                                                 
72 APC 2014 Annual Report 46 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 29-31. 
73 Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) 2013-2014 Annual Report 82 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual 
Report 28.  
74 SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 28 and GRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 83. 
75 Parret B Corporate Governance – A More Private Public Sector (Presentation paper prepared by Auditor-General for 
Australia, Australian National Audit Office 2007) 10-11 available at 
http://anao.gov.au/../../Documents/corporate_governance_a_more_private_public_sector1.pdf (accessed on 26 March 2015). 
76 Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 133-135. An example of a situation that compromises the 
effectiveness of the board is the involvement of the Minister in the appointment of the CEO. The fact that the CEO of the 
state owned enterprise is usually appointed by the shareholder Minister means that the effectiveness of the board in being 
able to sanction poorly performing management is significantly reduced. In some situations, the CEO has been asked to 
report directly to the Minister, bypassing the board altogether thus rendering the board ineffective (Corporate Governance in 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies (Discussion Paper by Australian National Audit Office, 1999) 19-20 available at 
http://www.anao.gov.au (accessed on 25 January 2015). 
77 Like in Zimbabwe, Australian public entities are faced with the challenges of political/government interference running of 
the operations of the entity as well as delays in approvals of certain strategic matters (Edwards M and Clough R Corporate 
Governance and Performance An Exploration of the Connection in a Public Sector Context (University of Canberra, 
Australia Issues Series Paper No. 1 of January 2005) 16-17 available at http://www.canberra.edu.au/corpgov-
aps/pub/IssuesPaperNo.1_GovernancePerformanceIssues.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015). 
78 Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 142. To confirm the extent of government intervention, in 
the research conducted by the World Economic Forum, Australia was ranked 96 out of 144 in so far as burden of 
government regulation is concerned (Schwab K and Sala-I-Martin X The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013 (World 
Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2012-2013) 95 available at www.konkurentnost.hr/lgs.axd?t=16&id=390 (accessed 
on 21 March 2015). 
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significantly reduces the ability of the board to effectively discharge its duties.
79
 On a similar 
note, the lack of experience by a majority of board members in governing enterprises of the 
size of many public entities and the likelihood of conflicts of interests have been found to be 
hindrances to effective performance by Australian public entity boards.
80
 
 
Another important point to note is that, although the Australian corporate governance 
framework provides for regular performance feedback from the relevant Minister,
81
 the 
feedback has not been consistently received.
82
 The absence of formal feedback was attributed 
to, among other things, “insufficient evaluation skills available within the public service” and 
lack of a standard approach to conduct regular performance evaluations and give appropriate 
feedback by ministries.
83
 As shown above, the absence of formal feedback on whether the 
shareholders’ expectations are met tends to compromise the effectiveness of boards as they 
may sometimes lack proper guidance.
84
 Like Zimbabwe, Australia, therefore also still has 
much to do with regard to implementation of the corporate governance standards that seek to 
promote public entity board role clarity and empower the boards to effectively undertake 
their mandate. 
 
7.2.3 Selection and Appointment of the Board 
It is a universally accepted principle that nomination of directors should be based on merit 
and conducted transparently, professionally and objectively.
85
 Potential candidates for board 
appointment should thus have relevant qualifications and expertise to competently discharge 
their duties and minimise the risk of being misled by management. Nevertheless, it has been 
established that, in practice, the manner by which public entity directors are selected and 
                                                 
79 Parret B Corporate Governance – A More Private Public Sector (2007) 11. 
80 Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 42-43. 
81 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.2 above. 
82 Mackay K The Australian Government’s Performance Framework (World Bank Evaluation Capacity Development 
Working Paper No. 25 of 2011) 28-31 available at http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/ecd (accessed on 25 March 2015).  
83 Ibid. This is common in most public entities internationally (Chapter 3, para 3.6.1) 
84 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.1 above, for similar observations. 
85 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.2 above. See also Principle 2.19 of the King III Report, para 5.1.6 of the South African Protocol 
on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector (RSA Department of Public Enterprises 2002) and section B of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. 
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appointed does not always follow a transparent and objective process.
86
 According to the 
participants, in reality it has been “difficult to find suitable board candidates” and to achieve 
the objective of selecting board members in a transparent and unbiased manner. The reasons 
cited for appointment of unsuitable candidates were the limited number of experienced and 
qualified individuals to serve as directors,
87
 poor director remuneration and the greater risk of 
being sued associated with directorship in public entities.
88
 
 
The majority (78%) of the participants agreed that the appointment of board members was 
poor and not transparent largely due to the fact that there are no specific guidelines for the 
identification and selection of directors. This has resulted in the responsible Minister and the 
President, who are mandated to appoint public entity boards, having “too wide latitude in the 
appointment of board members”.89 Other participants accused the Minister and the President 
of abusing their power to appoint and remove board members of public entities as a tool of 
political influence.
90
  Some participants indicated that this was prominent during the period of 
Government of National Unity
91
 where it was clear that board members were “appointed 
based on their political background and allegiance, tribalism and nepotism but not 
                                                 
86 Ibid. The newly appointed board chairman for Premier Service Medical Aid Society was reported to have said that the 
previous board was “ineffective and wracked by poor skills mix hence the rampant abuse of power by a few” (Daily News of 
12 February 2014 6 available at http://businessdaily.co.zw). 
87 As a result, multiple directorships are a common feature in Zimbabwe (Wushe T, Shenje J and Ndlovu D “Too Many 
Seats Too Little Talent: An Analysis of Optimum Number of Seats for Board of Directors in State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) in Zimbabwe” (2015) 6(2) Environmental Economics 109-116). Random statistics collected by The Herald in 
February 2014 indicated that one board member sat on 20 public and private companies’ boards, two sat on 6 boards, one on 
5 boards, three on 4 boards and 3 on 3 boards (The Herald of 22 February 2014 1). The shortage of qualified and 
experienced directors has resulted in some board members being appointed to too many boards rendering them ineffective in 
discharging their duties. In addition, it was said that in some cases inexperienced and unqualified people end up being 
appointed to boards of public entities. 
88 Participants from two of the entities reported that their entities had a history of suing directors based on malicious 
allegations. According to the majority of the participants, in a number of situations, the boards have tended to focus more on 
past events, concentrating on uncovering wrongs and malpractices committed by previous boards and management at the 
expense of achievement of futuristic strategic and more important issues. Zimbabwean newspapers were awash with news 
that several boards had been dissolved for incompetence, fiduciary shortcomings and unscrupulous dealings (See Newsday 
of 3 January 2014 and 6, 12 & 13 February 2014 available at https://www.newsday.co.zw, The Herald of 15 November 
2013, 12 December 2013, 6 & 12 February 2014 1 and 6 July 2015 1 and Daily News of 15 November 2013 7 and 12 
February 2014 2). All board members were thus painted with the same brush yet some might have been competent and 
professional.  
89 See Zhou G “Public Enterprise Sector Reforms in Zimbabwe: A Macro Analytical Approach” (2000) 27(ii) Zambezia 
Journal of Humanities of the University of Zimbabwe 195-219, for similar sentiments. 
90 This was also confirmed in Zhou G “Public Enterprise Sector Reforms in Zimbabwe: A Macro Analytical Approach” 
(2000) 195-219. 
91 The Government of National Unity refers to Zimbabwe’s coalition government that was formed on 13 February 2009 
among three political parties, namely President Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front,  
Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change and Arthur Mutambara’s MDC. The coalition government lasted 
for five years, 2009 to 2013. 
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competence and relevant experience”.92 In addition, the majority of the participants strongly 
described the process as lacking transparency and objectivity due to the fact that board 
positions are never advertised (although it is not a statutory requirement) and the appointment 
process is not publicised.  
 
The participants were concerned that, in some cases, directors who are “publicly known to be 
responsible for the collapse of some public entities have later been appointed to other 
directorships”.  As a result, 82% of the participating managers were of the view that most 
board members are not appointed with the right qualifications and for the relevant industry 
and professional experience, but based on other undisclosed reasons.
93
 They expressed the 
views that a lot still requires to be done with regard to the appointment criteria to board 
positions in public entities as the process was far from complying with the framework put in 
place by the policymakers and good corporate governance principles in general. All the 
participating board members were not aware of how they were selected save for the fact that 
they were approached and requested to be board members of the entities in question. 
However, all the participating board members and ministry representatives were of the view 
that it was an exaggeration and unfair to conclude that all public entity boards lacked the 
necessary skills as some board members had the relevant skills and experience.  
 
The participating board members indicated that they “actually possessed the required skills 
and professional experience” which they believed was the main consideration in their 
appointment. They had this to say; “we carry out our duties responsibly and diligently but the 
challenge is that our efforts may be too insignificant to improve the performance of the board 
and overall corporate governance systems and practices” in the public entities. Also, the 
participating board members and managers expressed concern on the appointment of public 
servants and senior ex-military officers
94
 as board members of public entities because they 
                                                 
92 For similar observations, see Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and the Need 
for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75 and Ashe PA 
Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: A Qualitative Case Study of Five State Owned Enterprises (2012) 47.  
93 This view was confirmed by Ruhanya P (an Academic and director with the Zimbabwe Institute of Directors) when he 
commented that “the running down of SEPs was largely hinged on the politics of patronage” where “top military personnel 
who do not have the expertise to manage the firms” were rewarded unjustly (Mambo E CEO Salaries Bleed Parastatals 
(Zimbabwe Independent of 11 October 2013) 1). 
94 According to the Zimbabwe Independent, some of the public entities in which ex-military personnel hold board positions 
“include the NRZ, GMB, Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, ZBC, Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe and 
Zimpapers” (Mambo E CEO Salaries Bleed Parastatals (Zimbabwe Independent of 11 October 2013) 1). 
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believed this had the “tendency of intensifying government interference in the functions of 
the board”. The public servants were said to focus more on “achievement of government’s 
interests at the expense of the public entity’s interests and good corporate governance”. The 
participants also noted that board members appointed to reward their political support usually 
refused to participate or vote on issues which they believed would unfavourably affect the 
government.
95
  
 
To compound the above challenges, 86% of the participants indicated that the appointment 
process did not allow for any smooth hand over take over processes as at times the whole 
board is dissolved without allowing for continuity and stability to leadership.
96
 The existing 
board members in two of the entities indicated that the absence of a hand over take over 
process “created challenges for the new boards as they had to overly rely on management to 
continue from where the previous boards would have left”. More so, a lot of time was 
unnecessarily lost with the new boards trying to understand the business of the entity before 
they could make sound and informed decisions. The participants were also concerned about 
the too frequent turnaround of boards in the public entities.
97
 Participants in two of the 
entities indicated that their organisations had been served with three different boards in a 
period of four years.
98
 During the same period the other entity had been led by one board 
which had three members retired and replaced by new ones. 
 
                                                 
95 In support of this view, other researchers have also argued that public entity boards may generally be concerned more 
about their chances of being re-elected to current board positions, which makes them inclined to focus on the kinds of 
governance decisions that please the government-owner sometimes at the expense of good corporate governance (Ludvigsen 
S State Ownership and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Norway and Sweden (2010) 22-23).  
96 The CGF (para 3.2.4-3.2.6) and the National Code (para 98) provide that proper balance should be maintained between 
continuity of board membership and the sourcing of new ideas through the appointment of new members. However, in 
certain situations the whole board is dissolved without considering the need for continuity, for example, the whole MMCZ 
and ZMDC boards were dissolved on 30 June 2011, 28 December 2012 and 10 December 2013 (Newsday 12 December 
2013 1 and The Herald of 3 January 2013 and 12 December 2013 1)). Similarly the whole of Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation of Zimbabwe’s board was dissolved on 14 November 2013 for incompetence and poor corporate governance 
(Newsday of 15 November 2013 1 and The Herald of 15 November 2013 1) and that of Air Zimbabwe was dissolved in 
March 2012 (See The Herald of 11 March 2012 3). Although the CGF (para 3.7.4) recommends that the tenure of the board 
should not be affected by the tenure of office of the responsible Minister, practice has shown that a new Minister always 
dissolves the existing board and comes up with a completely new one. The board dissolutions cited above came into effect 
when new Ministers came into office after national elections of 2013. 
97 There were regular press reports of boards’ dissolution to confirm this assertion (Manayiti O Ministry Dissolves Allied 
Timbers, Zimparks Boards (Newsday of 2 January 2014 2), Chakanyuka R Energy Minister Dissolves Parastatal Boards 
(Dailynews of 7 February 2014 1), Natpharm, MCAZ Boards Dissolved (The Herald of 14 February 2015 1) and Munyoro F 
Potraz Board Fired Over Graft (The Herald of 3 July 2015 1).  
98 The annual reports for MMCZ for the years 2011- 2013 show boards composed of different people in each year. 
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The Zimbabwean corporate governance framework limits the period to which a director can 
serve as a board member to three years and the number of directorships to two.
99
 However, in 
two of the entities, the appointed civil servants and some other board members were said to 
sit on more than two boards thus diluting their capacity to understand the business of the 
entities and devote sufficient time to them.
100
 According to the survey results, the term of 
office of three years has not been consistently observed as some boards have lasted for less 
than a year as in the case of MMCZ
101
 whilst others have served for more than seven years as 
in the case of three members on the GMB Board.
102
  
 
The survey also revealed that the main challenge in selecting appropriate board members for 
public entities is the inadequate number of seasoned and skilled professionals in 
Zimbabwe.
103
 This has resulted in the “few skilled and competent professionals serving and 
spreading their efforts on too many boards across industries” thus, eventually reducing their 
capacity to effectively contribute to these boards.
104
 Some participants also indicated that, in 
certain circumstances, some skilled persons refuse to be appointed to public entity boards 
because of the “excessive interference of the parent ministry in the operations of the public 
entities which renders the board ineffective” and also for fear of the reputational damage 
associated with being a public entity board member.
105
 On the question of what attracted 
                                                 
99 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.3 above. The main objective of so doing is to enable individual board members to devote sufficient 
time to the tasks assigned to them. 
100 Of the public servants holding multiple directorships one was said to be a board member in three other government 
related institutions and two sat on two other boards. From the participating board members, one had the highest number of 
directorships of four whilst the rest had a maximum of two. The participants’ observation that board members with multiple 
directorships tend to be less effective when it comes to participation in board issues was in line with previous research 
findings. Wong noted that the corporate governance framework within public entities was compromised by directors who did 
not spend enough time on board matters (Wong SCY “Improving Corporate Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach” 
(2004) 5-15). 
101 As an example, MMCZ had two completely different boards within a period of less than two years (2011 and 2012). 
102 Three directors have been board members since 25 July 2007 to date. For confirmation of the extended term of office for 
the GMB board members, see Muperi W Parly Grills GMB Board (Dailynews of 7 July 2015 3).  
103 For similar views, see Makwiranzou TH Operational Governance in Quasi Government Organisations in Zimbabwe: A 
Case Study of Telecommunications Sector 2005-2013 (2014) 96. 
104 Wushe et al made similar findings (Wushe T, Shenje J and Ndlovu D “Too Many Seats Too Little Talent: An Analysis of 
Optimum Number of Seats for Board of Directors in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Zimbabwe” (2015) 109-116). 
105 Reputational damage arises from the fact that, in some cases, boards of the entities in question are dissolved allegedly for 
incompetence and unethical dealings yet, amongst the board members, some would have been competent and professional in 
the discharge of their duties. Generally, directors would not want to be associated with poorly performing business entities or 
entities whose image has been tarnished because of business scandals (Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of 
Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 7). 
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board members to accept appointment to the board of a particular entity; three reasons were 
cited by the majority of the board members. The majority (55%) indicated that they had 
accepted board appointments as part of “national service” and for professional development; 
30% cited professional development whilst 15% indicated that they had been incentivised by 
the remuneration. 
 
7.2.3.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
Zimbabwe and South Africa have both advocated for board selection and appointment 
processes that are formal, transparent and based on merit.
106
 Both jurisdictions’ frameworks 
also seek to ensure that public entities are run by qualified and experienced board members 
who are able to devote sufficient time to the operations of the entities. However, both 
countries have experienced almost similar challenges in trying to implement what is provided 
for in their frameworks. The main challenge is that there is no generic legislation or 
standardised rules that govern the recruitment and appointment of the board of public entities 
in South Africa.
107
 The frameworks that have been put in place namely; the Protocol and the 
Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled 
Institutions, being voluntary, have not been strictly adhered to.
108
 
 
South Africa’s Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State 
Controlled Institutions was approved by Cabinet to deal with appointments of boards of 
public entities as well as specify the approval processes to be followed.
109
 But, the main 
concerns have been that the Handbook “represents a stand-alone practical document which is 
not in any way prescribed in terms of any formal framework, regulation or legislation”.110 
This means that the Handbook has not been effectively implemented and complied with due 
to the fact that it is not legally enforceable. In addition, the Protocol, which sets out an 
                                                 
106 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.3 and Chapter 5, para 5.2.3 above. 
107 Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (2012) 26-27. 
108 Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the Department 
of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 5 & 10. 
109 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.3 above. 
110 However, according to the Handbook, various policies and legislative frameworks and departments should ensure 
compliance with these policies and frameworks (Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State 
Controlled Institutions (2009)1). 
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appointment process that complies with good corporate governance standards and 
recommends the setting up of a formal Nominations Committee,
111
 is hardly followed 
because it is not obligatory.
112
 As a result, like in Zimbabwe, the nomination and appointment 
of board members in South Africa does not follow a stringent and formal system, tends not to 
be transparent and is politically biased.
113
 Moreover, when board members are being 
nominated, the skills, qualifications and experience of the contenders are rarely the main 
considerations.
114
  
 
The other challenge is that of a limited number of qualified and experienced people willing to 
be appointed to boards in both countries.
115
 According to a study on South Africa conducted 
by Stuart Spencer, despite the pool of experienced directors being already small, it is difficult 
to attract good quality board members for public entities for the reason that a number of 
experienced people are unwilling to be appointed on boards because of legislation that makes 
directors personally responsible for what is defined in the PFMA as “fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure”.116 Besides the concerns on the legislative requirements, there is a general 
limitation of suitable board candidates who have adequate experience in the management of 
public entities in both countries.
117
 This has caused South Africa to continue to experience 
                                                 
111 There is currently no Nominations Committee within the Department of Public Enterprises, or within any other executive 
authority/line ministry as set out in the Protocol (Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives 
and Recruitment (2012) 26). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Corrigan T Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-owned Enterprises: Perspectives on an Evolving System (African 
Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) Country Review Report (Policy Briefing 102) of September 2014) 3 available at 
http://www.saiia.org.za/.../583-corporate-governance (accessed on 29 March 2015). See also Spencer Stuart Board 
Governance in South Africa (2009) 6-9. 
114 In a study conducted by Spencer Stuart some board members were reported to have said that there is no transparency but  
“a more potent cocktail of political, social, environmental and financial imperatives in a state-owned enterprise” (Spencer 
Stuart Board Governance in South Africa (2009) 6-9). For Zimbabwe, this was confirmed by the participants. See also 
Robinett D The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging Markets (2006) 24-27, for similar comments. 
115 Like in Zimbabwe, it has been argued that in South Africa there is a relatively small pool of persons possessing the 
requisite business acumen and experience who are available to act as non-executive directors which has resulted in the few 
sitting on multiple boards (Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities 
Overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 
14).  But, the World Economic Forum ranked South Africa number 50 and 39 out of 144 countries on the country’s capacity 
to retain talent and capacity to attract talent, respectively, whist Zimbabwe was ranked number 120 and 102 on the same 
aspects (Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015 (2015) 347). 
116 Spencer Stuart Board Governance in South Africa (2009) 11. 
117 Okeahalam CC and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges 
(2003) 17 & 25. See also Ireri E Appointment of Board of Directors to State Owned Enterprises in Kenya: Towards A 
Stricter Regulatory Framework (2009) 67. 
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challenges of multiple directorships in boards of its public entities thus compromising board 
effectiveness.
118
 
 
Another similarity between Zimbabwe and South Africa is that they still encourage 
appointments of government representatives/officials in the boards of public entities.
119
 As a 
result, both countries experience the challenge caused by officials who end up seeking to 
protect the interest of their ministry and government at the expense of the entity’s 
performance and good corporate governance.
120
 As regards a director’s term of office, South 
Africa has not strictly adhered to the provisions of its statutes or guidelines as the director’s 
appointment is subject to withdrawal or renewal at the discretion of the shareholder 
Minister.
121
 But, unlike Zimbabwe, South Africa tries to maintain continuity and board 
stability by allowing boards to serve for reasonable terms and also keeping some members 
from the old board when coming up with a new board to enable smooth hand over take over 
processes.
122
 
 
7.2.3.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
Australia has taken greater strides than Zimbabwe in so far as improving its public entity 
board appointment process is concerned. First, Australia has actually been acknowledged as 
one of the countries which have come up with “structured and clearly skill-based nomination 
systems”, ranking it in a better position than Zimbabwe.123 The country considers the role of 
the board and that of the nomination committee in the appointment of the board more 
seriously than Zimbabwe where the board or committee is hardly consulted in the 
                                                 
118 For example, in 2012 a Transnet Board member was reported to sit on the boards and trustees of 63 other organisations 
(Kgosana C Gigaba Clamps Down on Parastatal Bosses (The Times of 14 March 2012) available at www.timeslive.co.za › 
Politics/2012/3/14). 
119 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.3 and Chapter 5, 5.2.3 above.  
120 This has been established to be a common problem with most public officials appointed as board members of public 
entities (Frederick W Enhancing the Role of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 18-19). 
121 Directors’ term of office can therefore be terminated before the stipulated timeframe (Gumede W South African State-
Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (2012) 26). 
122 The annual reports for some of its public entities indicate that the board members have served for reasonable periods and 
there are no incidences of completely new boards being put in place (South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 
Annual Report 45 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 104). 
123 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.3 above and Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises 
in Developing Countries (2008) 8.  
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appointment process.
124
 Nevertheless, it has been shown that only a few Australian public 
entities follow a systematic process of identifying board skill gaps before informing the 
responsible minister of the necessary requirements.
125
 Secondly, Australia, by virtue of being 
a developed country, has a wider pool of directors to choose from which gives the selecting 
authorities more opportunities to find appropriately qualified and skilled directors.
126
 As a 
result, Australia has succeeded in discouraging numerous directorships hence has not 
experienced the challenge of multiple directorships as much as Zimbabwe.
127
  
 
Australia has also tried to widen the pool from which to identify and select potential directors 
by encouraging supplementary processes such as public advertising or the use of executive 
search processes which have not yet been introduced in Zimbabwe where directors are mostly 
head hunted.
128
 Australia, unlike Zimbabwe,
129
 has further implemented a policy that 
                                                 
124 More often than not, the responsible Minister just selects and recommends possible candidates to the President without 
consulting the board. In any event, most of the time there won’t be any board to consult as boards are dissolved before 
another one is put in place. For example, in January 2009 the MMCZ board was dissolved and in June of the same year 
another board was formed. In June 2011 the board was completely dissolved and another one only appointed in September 
2011 and the later board was dissolved in December 2012 to be replaced by one that went into office in February 2013. The 
board appointed in December 2012 was dissolved in December 2013 (MMCZ 2011 Annual Report, The Herald of 3 January 
2013 and Newsday of 12 December 2013). This just confirms the excessive rate at which boards of public entities are 
changed in Zimbabwe. 
125 In some cases, even if a formal process was used the overriding role played by the minister made the process worthless 
(Meredith E et al Public Sector Governance in Australia (2012) 206-207). 
126 According to the research by Uhrig, the government has been able to attract a variety of skilled and professional people in 
its public entities boards. However, it is important to note that, although Australia may be better than Zimbabwe, it also has, 
to some extent, a limited pool from which potential directors may be drawn because government is competing with the 
private sector for suitable candidates (Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders (2003) 43-44).   
127 According to a study conducted by Competitive Dynamics for the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), 
Australia has low prevalence of numerous directorships. The study indicated that eighty-one per cent of top 100 companies' 
directors held only one directorship, while thirteen per cent held two and four per cent held three (AICD Too many 
Directorships? (AICD 2005) available at http://www.companydirectors.com.au/../Media+Releases/2005 (accessed on 15 
October 2014)). See also Siladi B The Role of Non-Executive Directors in Corporate Governance: An Evaluation 
Unpublished Thesis (Swinburne University of Technology 2006) 104. 
128 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.3 above. Although Australia has tried to use a more professional approach by using the services 
of external consultants and head hunters and a Nomination Committee in the directors’ nomination process, the domination 
by personal connections in the nomination process may not be ruled out (Siladi B The Role of Non-Executive Directors in 
Corporate Governance: An Evaluation (2006) 101-102). 
129 To confirm that in Zimbabwe the government is represented on the board by civil servants from the relevant ministry or 
other part of the government, the newly appointed board for ZMDC’s subsidiary, Mining Promotion Corporation, is headed 
by the Secretary for Mines and Mining Development as the Board Chairman and the Minister’s Personal Assistant was 
appointed a board member of ZMDC (Newsday of 1 April 2014 5 and The Herald of 1 April 2014 1). More so, the Secretary 
for Mines and Mining Development was appointed the Acting Board Chairman for MMCZ with effect from 1 January 2014 
to 31 December 2014 (Chinyangare A Mines Minister Fires Three Boards (Business Around the Clock (BH24) of 12 
December 2013) available at http://www.bh24.co.zw/mines-minister-fires-three-boards/ and Zimbabwe’s Mines Minister 
Fires Boards of Directors of Three State-Owned Enterprises (Nams News Network (NNN) of 12 December 2013) available 
at http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/v3/read.php?id=MjUyNzU5 (accessed on 15 January 2015).  
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prohibits the appointment of public servants to the boards of public entities, except in 
exceptional circumstances.
130
 Australia has, therefore, tried to avoid challenges created by 
government officials who, when appointed to boards, seek to defend the shareholder’s 
position at the expense of the entity’s growth and success. There also appears to be more 
board stability in Australia than in Zimbabwe where boards hardly complete their terms of 
office.
131
 Despite the major achievements, Australia has not been able to completely 
eliminate political interference in the board appointment processes.
132
 The interference, like 
in Zimbabwe, has adversely affected the effectiveness of public entity boards in Australia as 
some board members appointed for their political patronage may not be competent enough to 
undertake their fiduciary duties.
133
 
 
7.2.4 Composition of the Board 
A balanced board in terms of skills mix, personalities, independence and diversity is 
necessary in building a team that will effectively contribute to issues and challenge 
viewpoints to ensure decisions are made in the interest of the organisation.
134
 Results 
obtained from the survey indicated that compliance with board structures as prescribed by the 
Zimbabwean corporate governance instruments and other internationally recognised 
corporate governance codes is a serious challenge for public entities in Zimbabwe. Of 
                                                 
130 In Australia the great majority of public entity board members are independent and excludes government or political 
board members (see Chapter 6, para 6.2.3 above). The Uhrig Review discouraged any representational appointments to 
boards because they “can fail to produce independent and objective views”. Representational boards are likely to be 
primarily concerned with the interests of those they represent, rather than the success of the entity they are responsible for 
governing (Urig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 43).  
131 In Australia, the government tries to ensure that boards of public entities complete their terms of office except in 
exceptional circumstances of poor performance or gross misconduct (McLellan J G All above Board: Great Governance for 
the Government Sector 2nd ed. (Australian Institute of Company Directors 2011) 78). Visit 
http://auspost.com.au/annualreport2014/board-and-leadership-team.html for information on periods served by board 
members of Australian Postal Corporation which appear reasonable. 
132 In a public entities directors’ survey conducted by Cameron, questions were raised about the selection process and the 
capabilities, skills and experience of some chosen directors and two thirds of the directors surveyed thought that the process 
for appointing board members was “…too politically influenced…” (Cameron R Governance of SOEs: Is the Current 
Design of the SOE Model a Recipe for Failure? (A Presentation to the Centre of Accounting Governance and Taxation 
Research Conference in November 2008) 21 available at https://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/centres-and-
institutes/cagtr/pdf/Rob_Cameron_291108.pdf (accessed on 6 March 2015). 
133 Ibid. 
134 The various corporate governance Codes, for example, the King III Report, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
UK Corporate Governance Code and the Manual recommend that boards should comprise a balance of executive and non-
executive directors. Furthermore, the board should be properly mixed in terms of diversity, qualifications and experience to 
be able to make effective strategic decisions and objectively judge management’s performance (see Chapter 2, para 2.6.3 
above). 
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particular concern is the way in which board members are elected which is not based on merit 
as indicated above.
135
 Consequently, boards created are not properly composed as required by 
good corporate governance standards. 
  
In all four entities, the participants indicated that there were no approved minimum 
qualifications for directorship. The survey indicated that some board members neither 
possessed relevant qualifications nor appropriate industry knowledge as prescribed in the 
legislation establishing the public entities. According to one participant, “the authorities are 
not conducting any due diligence and background checks when appointing some of these so-
called board members at our public institutions”. This was said to compromise the efficiency 
of the board. The survey results also revealed that the maximum board size is ten (including 
the chief executive officer) for ZMDC, GMB and MMCZ and eight for NRZ, the maximum 
years of tenure are three years but subject to renewal, there is no age limit for directors and 
no stipulated years of experience in specific areas. Although the maximum number of board 
membership each director may hold is one according to the CGF and two according to the 
draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework,
136
 it appeared this was 
not seriously implemented.  One of the participating board members was a member on four 
boards, two sat on three boards, the majority had two directorships whilst only two had a 
single directorship. 
 
Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of gender equality, there is an evident low 
women representation on the boards in all the four entities as confirmed by the entities’ 
annual reports and participants.
137
 Out of nine non-executive board members in MMCZ and 
ZMDC respectively, only two were women with indications that ZMDC had one female 
director during the years 2010-2012. GMB and NRZ had also one female board member each 
during the same period. Statistics obtained from the office of the former Ministry of State 
Enterprises and Parastatals for the years 2011 and 2012 illustrate the male dominance in 
                                                 
135 Para 7.2.2 above. 
136 The participants highlighted that the CGF and Framework recommend different things which in itself may create 
challenges of which recommendation should be followed. 
137 Previous research has found that the gender balance objective has been difficult to achieve as most boards have been 
dominated by men (Wushe T, Shenje J and Ndlovu D “Too Many Seats Too Little Talent: An Analysis of Optimum Number 
of Seats for Board of Directors in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Zimbabwe” (2015) 109-116). For example the MMCZ 
annual reports for 2009 – 2011 indicate that there were only two women out of nine board members. Similarly the 2009 and 
2010 GMB annual reports show that there was only one woman out of nine board members. 
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boards.
138
 Of the 86 public entities, the majority had a maximum of two women board 
members (with some not having a single woman on their board), 5 had three women and 2 
had four women.
139
 Although Zimbabwe provided for the establishment of a Gender 
Commission in its Constitution of 2013
140
 members of the Commission were only appointed 
in June 2015.
141
 As at end of October 2015, the Commission was still to be allocated a budget 
to enable it to start operating.
142
 More so, judging by the efforts made so far, the country still 
has more work to do to comply with the provisions of international agreements on gender 
equality that it has acceded to.
143
 
 
The research results revealed that the public entities complied with this requirement. All the 
entities had the maximum prescribed number of directors in most cases except in two 
incidents in 2012 where MMCZ had six directors (which is the minimum prescribed number) 
and ZMDC had seven directors.
144
 Of the nine board members in GMB and ZMDC, 
respectively, two were said to be (former or current) senior government officials whereas 
MMCZ had only one government official and NRZ had two government officials in its board. 
The appropriate board skills mix principle was not observed on a number of times as 
evidenced by the fact that MMCZ had no legal and finance skills in the boards in existence 
during the years 2011 and 2013. ZMDC also lacked legal skills in the board that presided 
during the period 2012 to 2013. During the period January 2014 to December 2014, MMCZ 
had one board member who acted as the board chairman, i.e. the Permanent Secretary of the 
                                                 
138 Statistical Report obtained from Ministry of State Enterprises and Parastatals.  
139 Ibid. 
140 Section 12 of the Constitution. 
141 The Gender Commission Bill was gazetted on 25th July 2014 (Daily News of 28 July 2014, The Zimbabwean of 29 July 
2014 available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe-news/72764/zimbabwe-gender-commission-bill.html) and 
The Herald of 30 June 2015 1).  
142 No Budget for Gender Commission (The Herald of 26 October 2015 4). 
143 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 above. See also Chabaya O, Rembe S and Wadesango N “The Persistence of Gender Inequality 
in Zimbabwe: Factors that Impede the Advancement of Women into Leadership Positions in Primary Schools” (2009) 29 
South African Journal of Education 235-251. 
144 This is in cases where the entities had boards in place because it was reported that there are situations when some entities 
had no boards at all, for example, MMCZ during the period June 2011 to November 2011 and December 2013 to December 
2015. 
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shareholder ministry.
145
 However, the participants indicated that, these were exceptional 
circumstances as in the majority of cases the responsible authorities try to have an appropriate 
skills mix in the board, which skills include finance, accounting, legal and relevant industry 
experience.                                                                    
 
With regard to the recommendation that boards should comprise a balance of executive and 
non-executive directors,
146
 the survey established that the boards of all the four entities 
comply with this requirement. They have a majority bias towards non-executive directors, 
since only the chief executive officer who is directly involved in the day-to-day running of 
the companies, serves on the boards. However, according to the participants, the majority of 
the non-executive directors “cannot be considered to be truly independent since they are 
representatives of the shareholders” of the public entities and are, in most cases, former or 
current senior government officials appointed to influence decisions taken at board level in 
the interest of the government.  
 
7.2.4.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
South Africa has tried to encourage the creation of properly composed boards that have 
diverse skills, good management qualities and competencies to effectively achieve public 
entities’ mandate as well as enforce good corporate governance.147 However, similar to 
Zimbabwe’s experience above, South Africa has not been spared from the challenge of board 
members appointed for their political clout and other reasons instead of relevant skills and 
experience.
148
 This has resulted in the creation of boards that are sometimes not properly 
composed in terms of skills mix, experience and other critical qualities.
149
 South Africa has, 
to a large extent, tried to comply with its statutes and international recommendations which 
                                                 
145 Chinyangare A Mines Minister Fires Three Boards (Business Around the Clock (BH24) of 12 December 2013 and 
Zimbabwe's Mines Minister Fires Boards of Directors of Three State-Owned Enterprises (Nams News Network (NNN) of 12 
December 2013. See also MMCZ 2013 Annual Report 7. 
146 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.3 above.  
147 This is confirmed by the framework that South Africa has developed as shown in Chapter 5, para 5.2.4 above. 
148 Mkhwanazi D B The Critical Evaluation of Board of Directors Composition and Their Effectiveness Unpublished Thesis 
(University of Natal 2002) 22. 
149 The other contributing factor is that of insufficient board members with the relevant skills and experience as indicated in 
para 7.2.3 above. 
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provide for the appointment of the majority non-executive directors as a good corporate 
governance practice.
150
 All public entities, for example, Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd and South 
African Civil Aviation Authority, have non-executive directors as the majority in their 
boards.
151
 South Africa has also limited the number of directors that make up public entity 
boards in the statutes establishing the entities and has succeeded in maintaining the standards 
set.
152
  
 
With regard to gender equality, South Africa has made greater advances in addressing the 
inequalities within its society particularly between women and men, although the percentage 
of working women in senior management positions is still unacceptably low and 
“boardrooms are still male-dominated”.153 The 2013 Grant Thornton International Business 
Report (IBR) also pointed towards the lack of gender equality in South African boards.
154
 It 
found that only 15 per cent of South African women were represented on boards compared to 
26 per cent in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) counterparts.
155
 However, although 
South Africa may not yet have reached acceptable levels, it has significantly performed better 
than Zimbabwe.
156
 According to the World Economic Forum 2014 report on gender gap, 
                                                 
150 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.4 above. 
151 Eskom has only two executive directors (the CEO and Finance Director) whilst the rest (12) are independent non-
executive directors (Eskom 2014 Integrated Report 66-67 available at http://integratedreport.eskom.co.za/pdf/full-
integrated.pdf). South African Civil Aviation Authority had only one executive director (the CEO) whilst the rest (7) were 
independent non-executive directors (South African Civil Aviation Authority Annual Report 2013-2014 9 & 45). 
152 The South African National Roads Agency Limited’s boards for the years 2013 and 2014 maintained the number of board 
members to a maximum of eight as prescribed in section 12 of the South African National Roads Agency Limited Act (The 
South African National Roads Agency Limited 2013-2014 Annual Report 9). See also the 2013 and 2014 annual reports for 
South African Civil Aviation Authority.  
153 Maharaj Z Gender Inequality and the Economy: Empowering Women in the New South Africa (Keynote speech at 
Professional Women’s League of KwaZulu Natal in August 2009) available at http://womensnet.org.za/news/speech.htm 
(accessed on 3 February 2015). See also UNDP Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2014 Millennium Development Goals Report on South Africa available at 
http://www.za.undp.org/./south_africa/././mdgoverview/overview/mdg3.html (accessed on 9 February 2015). 
154 The report is available at http://www.grantthornton.ie/Publications/International-Business-Report-(IBR)-2013 (accessed 
on 3 February 2015). However, in assessing diversity, the public sector was found to perform better than the private sector as 
the majority of public entities have good representation of both black and female directors (Research on Governance and 
State-Owned Enterprises conducted by Centre for Governance in Africa and Hans Seidel Foundation 2012) 16 available at 
http://www.convivium4leaders.co.za/../Rating%20SOEs%20FinalReport2012.pdf (accessed on 17 March 2015). 
155 Ibid. But, according to a study conducted by Arries, South African public entities had an average female representation of 
49% on their boards (Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen 
by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 22. 
156 According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 2013 Report, 
South Africa has “reached most gender equality targets, if not exceeded them” (UNDP MDG Report available at 
http://www.za.undp.org/content/south_africa/ mdg3.html) (accessed on 12 March 2015)). As an example, Eskom Holdings 
SOC Ltd had a percentage of 57% women representation in its board as at 31 March 2014 (Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2014 
Annual Report 66-67). 
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South Africa was ranked 65 out of 142 countries with a female to male ratio of 0:45 whilst 
Zimbabwe was ranked 96 out of 142 with a female to male ratio of 0:26.
157
  
 
7.2.4.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
The standards and principles set in Australia as regards board composition are similar to 
those recommended by the Zimbabwean framework.
158
 But, Zimbabwe is limited in terms of 
the number of directors to choose from such that it has not been able to come up with 
appropriately composed boards and to be as strict as Australia in defining board 
independence.
159
  
 
Comparable to Zimbabwe, the majority of the board members of public entities in Australia 
are non-executive, with the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer being the only 
executive director.
160
 It has been shown that in Australia most, if not all, board members are 
independent and come from the private sector, even though they are appointed by the 
shareholder Minister.
161
 Moreover, the country defines independence more strictly both from 
the management and from business relationships in that the private sector experts are not 
supposed to have any business relation or be in competing business with the entity.
162
 
According to the annual reports of some of the public entities, all the non-executive directors 
were appointed for their relevant skills and experience which makes Australia score better 
than Zimbabwe in this regard.
163
 Following the Australian government’s policy position that 
government officials should not be appointed as board members in public entities, except in 
exceptional conditions, most of Australia’s entities do not have government officials as part 
                                                 
157 The quoted rankings are for women employed as legislators or senior officers/managers. The Global Gender Gap Report 
2014 is available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014 (accessed on 15 February 2015). 
158 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.4 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.4 above. 
159 Ncube F and Maunganidze L “Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in Zimbabwean State Owned 
Enterprises: A Case of Institutionalized Predation” (2014) 4(6) Management 131-140. As indicated above, it has been 
difficult for Zimbabwe to achieve board continuity and stability given the rampant changes in boards of its public entities. 
See also para 6.2.4 for the comparative analysis between Australia and Zimbabwe. 
160 See the APC 2014 Annual Report 17 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 35. 
161 OECD Comparative Report on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005) 87-89. See also para 2.7 of the 
GBE Guidelines. 
162 Ibid.  
163 See the APC 2014 Annual Report 16-17 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 33-35. 
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of their boards.
164
 With regard to the board size, like in Zimbabwe, the size of Australian 
public entities boards is stipulated in the establishing Acts and ranges from a minimum of six 
and a maximum of nine.
165
 Australia has managed to comply with the statutory 
requirements.
166
  
 
In comparison to Zimbabwe, Australia has done significantly better in terms of promoting 
gender equality in its board directorships although it still has to do more to meet its set 
targets.
167
 According to the World Economic Forum report on gender gap, Australia was 
ranked 40 out of 142 countries with a female to male ratio of 0:57 whilst Zimbabwe was 
ranked 96 out of 142 with a female to male ratio of 0:26.
168
 According to AICD, women 
accounted for 19.8% of ASX200 directorships as at 28 February 2015, up from 19.3% at the 
end of 2014 and with 34 boards having no women at all.
169
 As far as Australian Government 
board appointments are concerned, women held 41.7% of board directorships as at 30 June 
2013, an increase from 38.4% in 2012.
170
 Thus, unlike Zimbabwe, Australia is progressively 
working towards achieving its set targets concerning gender equality. It can therefore, be 
concluded that Australia, contrary to Zimbabwe, has significantly tried to comply with its 
corporate governance framework with regard to proper board composition although there are 
still gaps to be filled. 
                                                 
164 Ibid. The profile descriptions of the board members in the annual reports indicate that they are not government officials 
(APC 2014 Annual Report 16-17 and SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 33-35). 
165 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.4 above. 
166 SRDC has 7 directors and GRDC has 9 directors, excluding the CEO (SRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 35 and GRDC 
2013-2014 Annual Report 80-82).  
167 For example, APC had two female members out of eight board members in 2014, a percentage of 25% instead of the 40% 
target as per the GBE Guidelines (para 2.8 of GBE Guidelines and APC 2014 Annual Report, 45). Likewise, the 2013-2014 
Annual Report for SRDC shows that the entity had a women representation of 14%. See para 5.2.4 for the efforts Australia 
has made to promote gender equality. 
168 The Global Gender Gap Report 2014 104. However, according to Professor Du Plessis, “Australia is very much a male-
dominated society, as far as business and politics are concerned”. Several prominent organisations and institutions in 
Australia have come up with “wonderful initiatives and well-intended programs” to promote gender equality on boards, “but 
so far, they have not resulted in any significant improvement in the gender balance on boards of listed companies. On ASX 
200 boards, only 18.2 per cent of board members are women and only 3.5 per cent of CEOs are women” (Du Plessis J 
Getting More Women on Board (Deakin University (Australia) Research Communications 2014) 
http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/stories/2014/09/29/getting-more-women-on-board (accessed on 5 May 2015)).  
169 AICD Statistics - Appointments to S&P/ASX 200 Boards (AICD Statistics of March 2015) available at 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director-Issues/board-Diversity/Statistics 
(accessed on 13 March 2015). Curtis M Schmid C and Struber M also confirm the improvement in gender diversity in their 
paper “Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance” (Credit Suisse Research Institute Paper of August 2012) 18-19 
available at https://www.credit-suisse.com/newsletter/doc/gender_diversity.pdf (accessed on 17 March 2015)). 
170 Ibid.  
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7.2.5 Remuneration of the Board 
Good corporate governance requires that the level of remuneration for members of the board 
should be sufficient to attract and retain the quality and calibre of individuals needed to run 
the organisation successfully.
171
 It has also been considered essential that directors’ 
remuneration should be performance related and set in a formal and transparent manner, 
preferably through an appropriately composed remuneration committee.
172
 
 
According to half of the participants, although the framework provides that directors should 
be adequately remunerated, the directors in their entities are not adequately remunerated. The 
participating board members were of the view that they are “grossly underpaid” considering 
the increase in legal responsibilities directors are expected to carry out, the length of time 
required for preparation and attendance of meetings as well as the reputational risks 
associated with directorship in public entities. The participants from three of the loss making 
public entities (GMB, NRZ and ZMDC) cited financial constraints as one of the reasons for 
failure to pay remuneration commensurate with the required board expertise and 
responsibilities involved. Contrary to the above views, seventeen of the participants believed 
that the board members were being sufficiently rewarded. One participant commented “$400 
as sitting allowance for one meeting plus monthly fees of $900 is appropriate remuneration in 
a struggling economy like Zimbabwe”. On the other hand, the rest of the participants 
indicated that they believed that board members were overpaid considering the time they 
devote to the entities with some members coming to the meetings unprepared because they 
would not have read the board packs.  
 
The participants also expressed the view that the above challenges are compounded by the 
absence of a standard remuneration framework such that each public entity determines its 
own board remuneration thus creating distortions in the market.
173
 In addition, the directors’ 
                                                 
171 See Chapter3, para 3.6.4 above. 
172 Ibid. 
173 The participants highlighted the fact that there was no commonly agreed definition of what constitutes fair remuneration. 
In an effort to address the disparities, Zimbabwe has come up with a draft Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework to govern the operations of state owned enterprises and local authorities with regard to remuneration and 
corporate governance practices. 
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remuneration was said not be linked to corporate or individual directors’ performance.174 As a 
result, the non-performance of an individual director or the public entity is not a restraining 
factor for directors to be accorded their remuneration. The directors may, therefore, lack the 
motivation to perform in the interests of the shareholders which could adversely impact on 
the performance of the public entities. The participants whose view was that the board 
remuneration is inadequate also highlighted that poor remuneration resulted in the disgruntled 
board members “opting to place more of their commitment in other better paying activities” 
and put less effort in the business of the public entities.
175
  
 
The participating managers indicated that, in some cases, the boards resorted to approving 
their fees without ministerial involvement in contradiction to the provisions of the law and 
corporate governance principles.
176
  Also, the participants indicated that boards were holding 
unnecessary meetings as a means of increasing the board fees, for example, in one entity, 
instead of holding quarterly meetings as statutorily provided for, the board resolved to hold 
monthly meetings. One participant commented that “the rate at which some of our boards 
hold meetings leaves one wondering whether they consider the fact that there is need to 
create sufficient time to action board resolutions before holding another meeting”. Some 
other participants also reported that they had received letters from the parent ministry seeking 
justification for holding more than statutorily provided for board and committee meetings.
177
 
The managers and ministry representatives added that greed and corrupt tendencies by board 
                                                 
174 This is mostly as a result of the absence of performance contracts and performance measurement systems as indicated in 
para 7.2.3 above. See also Matowanyika K, Hosho N, Mabvure TJ and Dandira M “Are Directors Remunerated for 
Corporate Performance?” (2013) 4(15) Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 21-27 and Mutanda D “The Impact of 
the Zimbabwean Crisis on Parastatals” (2014) 1-14, for similar sentiments. 
175 This was said to be shown by the poor attendance at board or committee meetings and other events where the board 
members would have been invited to attend on behalf of the entity. Wushe et al similarly found that “independent directors 
had a high absenteeism rate in terms of attending crucial board meetings per year for the state owned enterprises” (Wushe T, 
Shenje J and Ndlovu D “Too Many Seats Too Little Talent: An Analysis of Optimum Number of Seats for Board of 
Directors in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Zimbabwe” (2015) 109-116). However, a few of the participants were of the 
view that the level of a director’s commitment and dedication should not necessarily be determined by remuneration only as 
there are other long term non-monetary rewards associated with being a director. 
176 The Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services indicated that the hefty salaries paid to Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) board and senior managers since 2012 were unlawful because they were unprocedurally 
negotiated, adopted and implemented without Ministerial knowledge and approval (The Zimbabwe Mail of 30 January 2014 
2). Another example is that of Premier Medical Aid Society (PSMAS) where the board approved exorbitant board fees ($120 
000 per quarter) and senior managers salaries (as high as $230 000 per month) without the knowledge and approval of the 
parent ministry (The Herald of 23 January 2014 3). The scandalous situation was reported to have been fuelled by weak 
monitoring mechanisms by the parent ministries. For similar views, see Rusvingo SL “The Salarygate Scandal in the 
Zimbabwe Parastatals Sector: Another Darkside of the Nation (2013 – 2014)” (2014) 14(1) Global Journal of Management 
and Business Research: Administration and Management 18-29. 
177 According to the participants, the particular board held 10 board meetings (instead of 4 as per the Act) and 8 meetings per 
each committee (instead of 4) during the year 2012. 
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members also affected the entities’ board remuneration system.178 According to one 
participant, the other challenge is that “some people who are appointed as board members 
have no other source of income so they tend to want to maximise on board fees hence the 
reason they would call for unnecessary meetings or engage in unethical activities as a means 
of raising income”.179   
 
On the functions of the remuneration committee, it was established that, although all the four 
public entities have remuneration committees, the committees have “greater say with regard 
to management salaries and benefits but minimal contribution in the setting of board 
remuneration”. The majority of the participants indicated that the remuneration of the board 
is set by the Minister with “very little, if any, input from the board”.180 They highlighted that 
the remuneration committee makes recommendations to the board which deliberates on the 
recommendations and subsequently forwards the recommendations to the Minister. However, 
in their view, the remuneration package eventually approved by the Minister does not appear 
to have taken into account the remuneration committee’s recommendations and is neither 
adequate to motivate the board nor linked to performance. 
 
With regard to disclosure of directors’ remuneration, all the participants indicated that 
directors’ remuneration is aggregately presented in the financial statements and no 
breakdown is given of individual director’s remuneration.181 According to the majority of the 
participants, aggregate disclosure made it difficult for stakeholders to assess the level of 
individual directors’ remuneration and could, in some instances, be deliberate to avoid 
transparency and public scrutiny. The above issues point to the fact that Zimbabwean public 
entities have not effectively implemented the existing remuneration guidelines hence poor 
                                                 
178 To support this assertion, during the period November 2013 and February 2014, Zimbabwe was engulfed with news of 
company directors earning exorbitant and unauthorised salaries albeit on the back of struggling company operations. 
Examples of three such organisations that made headlines are ZBC, PSMAS and City of Harare. See Zimbabwe National 
Chamber of Commerce Newsletter of 6 February 2014 1 and Newsday of 10 February 2014 5. See also Rusvingo S L “The 
Rot in the State–Owned Enterprises in Zimbabwe: A Cause for Great Concern” (2014)” (2014) 14(7) Global Journal of 
Human-Social Science 38-43. 
179 This position was confirmed by Wushe et al who found that directors who are nearing retirement age or have limited 
sources of income “may be interested much in the compensation rather than performance” (Wushe T, Shenje J and Ndlovu D 
“Too Many Seats Too Little Talent: An Analysis of Optimum Number of Seats for Board of Directors in State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in Zimbabwe” (2015) 109-116). According to the quoted participant, whose view was supported by eight 
other participants, the appointing authorities should not appoint directors who have no stable source of income so as to 
minimise such challenges.  
180 See Chapter 3, para 3.2.5 above, for similar concerns. 
181 See page 47 of the MMCZ 2013 Annual Report and page 47 of the ZMDC 2012 Annual Report. 
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board remuneration remains a major concern in discussions regarding the effectiveness of 
boards.  
 
7.2.5.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
South Africa and Zimbabwe have come up with similar provisions with regard to the need to 
motivate directors to effectively discharge their duties through performance related, fair and 
adequate remuneration.
182
 However, directors in both countries are still of the view that they 
are not sufficiently rewarded for their skills and experience and for the risks and liabilities 
associated with being a director.
183
 This is shown by the limited number of people willing to 
be directors in public entities and the lack of commitment by some people who will have 
been appointed as directors.
184
  
 
Contrary to Zimbabwe which does not have any remuneration guidelines specific to public 
entities, South Africa has remuneration guidelines specifically targeted to directors engaged 
by public entities.
185
 The South African National Treasury, in compliance with the State-
owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines, publishes an annual directive which sets 
maximum remuneration and fees limits for non-executive board members of public 
entities.
186
 However, the challenge appears to be that the remuneration guidelines are not 
being fully complied with, judging from some of the annual reports for certain public 
entities.
187
 For example, the remuneration guidelines provide for the establishment of a 
remuneration committee to assist in the determination of board remuneration but this is not 
                                                 
182 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 and Chapter 5, para 5.2.5 above. 
183 This has been confirmed by the Zimbabwe research participants and Spencer Stuart Board Governance in South Africa 
(2009) 11. 
184 The research by Spencer Stuart revealed that “There are many potential board members who would rather paddle their 
own canoes than serve on the boards...” (Spencer Stuart Board Governance in South Africa (2009) 11). 
185 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.5 above and Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned 
Entities Overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa 
(2014) 15. 
186 Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the Department 
of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 15. 
187 See South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 48 and South African National Roads Agency 
Limited 2013-2014 Annual Report 171. 
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happening on the ground.
188
 The committee plays no significant role in the setting of board 
remuneration because the remuneration is determined and fixed by the National Treasury and 
the shareholder Minister, presumably based on the remuneration guidelines.
189
  
 
Another factor that distinguishes the two countries is that board remuneration in South 
Africa, unlike that of Zimbabwe, is not arbitrarily fixed but based on performance.
190
 
Nonetheless, concerns have been raised that there has not been a synchronised and 
consolidated approach to board remuneration for public entities in South Africa which “is 
further compounded by the mixed ownership model for SOEs with entities reporting to 
different sector ministries” resulting in inconsistencies and inequalities within the entities.191 
Also, despite the existence of remuneration guidelines, the remuneration of South African 
public entity boards is still considered low in comparison to their private sector counterparts 
and also in consideration of the enormous responsibilities.
192
  
 
As regards the disclosure of directors’ remuneration, South African public entities have done 
greatly better than Zimbabwean entities in that, instead of aggregate presentation, they are 
disclosing individual directors’ fees in the annual reports, as a result enhancing 
transparency.
193
  
 
 
                                                 
188 Ibid. See also Arries C Comparative Study on Specific Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the 
Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 15. 
189 See South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 47-48 and South African National Roads Agency 
Limited 2013-2014 Annual Report 170-173. 
190 As indicated in Chapter 5, para 5.2.5 above, the guidelines suggest that remuneration for directors should be linked to the 
state owned enterprise size, determined by the asset base and revenue. See also Arries C Comparative Study on Specific 
Governance Elements in the State-Owned Entities Overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and the 
Department of Transport (DOT) in South Africa (2014) 26-28. 
191 Phiyega R Remuneration Observations SOES and Public Office Bearers (South African Reward Association (SARA) 
Presentation) 11 available at http://www.sara.co.za/sara/../../Riah%20Phiyega.pdf) (accessed on 22 March 2015). 
192 Crafford D SOE Remuneration and Wage Gap Analysis (South African Presidential SOE Review Committee Paper of 
March 2012) 17 & 38 available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_3/ (accessed on 27 
May 2015). See also Spencer Stuart Board Governance in South Africa (2009) 11-12 and Frederick W Enhancing the Role 
of the Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (2011) 26-27. 
193 South African Civil Aviation Authority 2014 Annual Report 104 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 
Annual 2013-2014 Report 171. 
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7.2.5.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
In Australia, as in Zimbabwe, the board is not involved in setting its own remuneration and 
the remuneration committee has no significant role to play in the process.
194
 But, Australia 
has performed significantly better than Zimbabwe as far as the determination of board 
remuneration is concerned. This is because the remuneration paid to board members is 
determined by a Remuneration Tribunal which is an independent body that objectively 
determines the remuneration after taking into account a number of critical factors.
195
 This 
initiative by Australia has enabled it to achieve transparency, objectivity and uniformity as 
well as to set remuneration levels that are as more realistic as possible.
196
 However, 
Australia’s board remuneration, like Zimbabwe’s, is still to approach acceptable levels in 
comparison with the private sector, the responsibilities involved and greater risk of directors 
being held legally liable.
197
  
 
Like Zimbabwe, the financial statements or annual reports for most Australian public entities 
have not fully adopted the principle of disclosing individual directors’ remuneration but just 
indicate the total board remuneration.
198
 Presentation of board remuneration in an aggregate 
manner diminishes transparency and makes public scrutiny difficult.
199
 
 
 
                                                 
194 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.5. See also OECD Board of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of National 
Practices (2012) 71 and GRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 129. 
195 OECD Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises A Survey of OECD Countries: A Survey of OECD Countries 
(2005) 154. The Remuneration Tribunal should take into account “the workload and work value of the office, fees in the 
private sector, wage indices, non-cash benefits provided and other economic indices and rates set for other bodies” (para 
2.14 of the GBE Guidelines). 
196 Ibid.  
197 A survey by Ernst & Young and the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) indicated that 63 % of 
respondents believed that they were underpaid (Australian Institute of Company Directors October 2003). Another public 
entities director survey also revealed that “….[SOE] Directors believe they are under-compensated for their roles and 
responsibilities, both absolutely and relative to private sector benchmarks…This adversely impacts the availability of 
capable Directors…”. (Cameron R Governance of SOEs: Is the current design of the SOE Model a Recipe for Failure? (A 
Presentation to the Centre of Accounting Governance and Taxation Research Conference in November 2008) 22-23 
available at https://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/centres-and-institutes/cagtr/pdf/Rob_Cameron_291108.pdf (accessed on 6 
February 2015)). See also Siladi B The Role of Non-Executive Directors in Corporate Governance: An Evaluation (2006) 
102-103. 
198 See APC 2013-2014 Annual Report 10 and GRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 129.  
199 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.4 above. 
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7.2.6 Evaluation of Board Performance 
Good corporate governance requires that there be accountability and measurement of 
performance in the management of companies.
200
 The issue of whether board evaluation 
actually leads to improved board performance was put to all the participants as a direct 
question and they unanimously agreed that board evaluation is an essential ingredient in 
corporate governance that can motivate and also compel board members to effectively 
undertake their responsibilities.  
 
According to the majority of the participants, Zimbabwean public entities have encountered 
numerous challenges in conducting evaluations of board performances. First, the initial step 
of appointing public entity directors was said to defeat the whole objective of coming up with 
performance contracts to improve the effectiveness of boards. This is because some of the 
directors who are expected to meet the targets agreed upon with the government “lack the 
capacity to perform efficiently, as they are appointed on the basis of their close political or 
other relationships with public officials rather than on merit”.201 The so appointed directors 
enjoy political protection and it might thus be difficult to evaluate their performance and 
remove them from office even when they do not meet the targets set under performance 
contracts.
202
 
 
Secondly, all participants indicated that the CGF and other key instruments had not impacted 
significantly in their entities as there was no implementation of the recommendations with 
regard to written job descriptions or performance contracts for all the four boards.
203
 They 
added that, in practice, there were no established processes for setting performance objectives 
and indicators as well as reviewing performance against the targets, for the board as a whole 
                                                 
200 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.5 above on the benefits of board evaluations. 
201 This position was also confirmed in Mwaura K “The Failure of Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises and 
the Need for Restructured Governance in Fully and Partially Privatized Enterprises: The Case of Kenya” (2007) 34-75. 
202 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.5, for similar sentiments. 
203 All three public entities do not have performance contracts and formal evaluation of board performance procedures as 
required by the CGF.  
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and for individual directors.
204
 Where an attempt to set performance objectives and indicators 
has been made, like in the case of GMB, the performance contracts were said to be “unclear 
and to lack sufficient detail”.205 The participants further added that the parent ministries 
lacked the capacity and sufficient commitment to effectively monitor the operations of the 
boards “making the whole exercise a worthless process”.  
 
To further complicate matters, the majority of the participants highlighted the fact that the 
government has no objective and standardised board performance evaluation tool in place 
which makes it difficult to conduct effective performance assessments.
206
 They highlighted 
the fact that there had been no significant effort to implement the recently introduced Results 
Based Management system.
207
 As a result, there are no formal board performance evaluations 
making it difficult to hold directors accountable for poor performance. This, according to 
eleven of the participants, also presents challenges in assessing the board’s needs for specific 
skills and knowledge and for individual directors to further develop themselves since there is 
no basis on which to recommend improvements. On the other hand, the participating board 
members indicated that they are not adequately equipped to perform their duties and evaluate 
their performance “due to the absence of sufficient guidance from the parent ministry”.  
 
Nevertheless, the majority of the participants expressed great concern at the way boards are 
normally dismissed allegedly based on incompetence despite the absence of comprehensive 
laid down procedures to enable the shareholder Minister to give feedback on performance. 
The participants highlighted the fact that in some cases the dismissal of boards is announced 
in the press by the Minister before the individual board members are formally notified of the 
dismissal. They also cited this as one of the factors that discourage a number of people from 
                                                 
204 Matowanyika et al made similar findings (Matowanyika K, Hosho N, Mabvure TJ and Dandira M “Are Directors 
Remunerated for Corporate Performance?” (2013) 21-27). 
205 PwC and IoDSA State-Owned Enterprises: Governance Responsibility and Accountability (Public Sector Working 
Group: Position Paper 3 of 2011 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) & Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA)) 
available at www.iodsa.co.za  (accessed on 28 February 2015)). 
206 The majority of the participants attributed the causes of some of the inefficiences and corruption in the public entities to 
poor monitoring by the parent ministry and absence of criteria for measurement of board performance.  
207 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.6 above. The participants indicated that “whilst there has been substantial appreciation of the 
RBM program in general, there is still need to institute change management initiatives that will help transform the mindset” 
of everyone concerned so that they begin to “understand and appreciate the importance of implementing the programme for 
the purpose of managing for results and improving service delivery to the public”. The other challenge noted was that of 
resource constraints which hamper training initiatives to educate all key players so that they become conversant with the 
concept before its full implementation. See also Madhekeni A “Implementing Results-Based Management Systems in 
Zimbabwe: Context and Implications for the Public Sector” (2012) 122-129, for similar observations. 
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accepting appointments to boards of public entities because of the reputational damage 
associated with being unjustly published for incompetence in the newspapers. 
 
The third challenge, according to the majority of the participants, is too much intrusion by the 
parent ministry in operational issues in the form of directives and approvals as highlighted 
above.
208
 The various approvals that have to be undertaken by the Minister delay the boards 
from implementing strategic plans on a timely basis. In addition, the participants also 
expressed concern at government directives that require their entities to provide goods and 
services at unprofitable prices or to undertake certain activities that are not commercially 
viable.
209
 The major risk with this kind of arrangement was said to be that boards end up 
focusing on accomplishing directives of the parent ministry at the expense of performance 
related issues.
210
 Accordingly, measuring the board’s performance and effectiveness becomes 
a challenge as the board is not in control of most of the issues that are crucial for the success 
of the entity.
211
  
 
The fourth challenge highlighted by the participants was the numerous changes in boards 
which result in too many uncompleted projects and significantly compromises the board’s 
performance.
212
 They argued that boards are sometimes prematurely dismissed without 
proper justification. They gave an example of the rampant changes in boards which occurred 
when new Ministers came into office in 2013 as a clear indication of this fact.
213
  Also, the 
managers of MMCZ and ZMDC indicated that their entities have sometimes gone for long 
                                                 
208 Para 7.2.1 and Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 above. 
209 Examples are GMB and NRZ where it was indicated that sometimes the entities are directed to sell grain and charge 
fares, respectively, at subsidised prices which are less than the cost or to even donate the grain or render services for free. 
See also Ashipala S M An Analysis of Corporate Governance within the Framework of State Owned Enterprises Governance 
Act in Namibia with Specific Focus on Namwater, Nampower And Transnamib (2012) 3. 
210 This is a common phenomena in public entities (Indreswari M Corporate Governance in the Indonesian State Owned 
Enterprises (2006) 121 and Chapter 3, para 3.6.5 above). 
211 Ibid.  
212 The boards are changed when new Ministers come into office without considering the need for continuity. MMCZ had 3 
different boards in a space of three years from 2010 to 2013 which resulted in the Corporation going without a substantive 
general manager for more than five years since the boards were fired before completing the recruitment process. Similarly, 
ZMDC had three different boards during the same period. This is a common trend in most developing countries (see 
Vagliasindi M The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries (2008) 3-4). 
213 The country’s newspapers for the period November 2013 to February 2014 (when a new government came into place) 
reported vast dissolutions of boards, for example five boards under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural 
Development were all dissolved on 11 February 2014 (The Zimbabwe Mail of 12 February 2014 2 and Newsday of 12 
February 2014 1). In the same vein, the Energy and Power Development Minister dissolved the boards of eight public 
entities under the supervision of his ministry (Newsday of 5 February 2014 1 and The Herald of 6 February 2014 1). 
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periods without boards which negatively impacts on the effectiveness of the boards and 
efficiency of the entities.
214
 The premature dismissal and complete absence of a board makes 
it difficult for “a new board to pick up from scratch and still effectively discharge its duties”.  
 
As a final point, all the participating shareholder representatives indicated that the boards do 
not provide the parent ministry with sufficient information about the public entities’ 
operations and financial position of the public entities.
215
 Although the four public entities 
produce annual reports, ZMDC, NRZ and GMB were not compliant with the PFMA 
requirements as they were not up to date with the publishing of their annual reports.
216
 The 
participants thus argued that such practice makes the annual reports irrelevant for current 
decision making. In further violation of the PFMA, all four public entities were reported not 
to be holding Annual General Meetings which are considered as important channels of 
informing shareholders on company performance. The majority of the participants agreed that 
these challenges make it complicated to evaluate and conclude whether or not a board has 
effectively performed its duties. Therefore, according to the participants, the framework that 
has been put in place to ensure that boards are properly evaluated has not been implemented 
and has not assisted the boards to effectively discharge their duties. 
 
7.2.6.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
In South Africa, there is currently no legislative requirement to carry out evaluation of board 
performances.
217
 The Protocol and the King III Report that provide for evaluation of board 
performances are not legally binding instruments. As a result, a significant number of the 
South African public entities have not been conducting board performance evaluations but 
                                                 
214 ZMDC had no board for close to one year during the period 2009 and 2010 (The Financial Gazette of 30 August 2012 3). 
Similarly MMCZ had no board for a period of seven months during the year 2011 and a one man board for the period 1 
January 2014 to 31 December 2015 (MMCZ 2014 Annual Report 4). GMB had no board for part of 2006 and 2007 for a 
period of nine months (GMB 2007 Annual Report). 
215 Best corporate governance practice requires that public entities should report annually to inform the public of their 
activities and performance. Similarly the establishing Acts, PFMA, CGF and National Code require public entities to 
produce annual reports. But, the annual reports have not yet complied with some aspects of international best practice, for 
example, providing an individualised breakdown of directors’ remuneration (see MMCZ 2013 Annual Report and GMB 2012 
Annual Report). 
216 At the time of interviewing the participants, GMB, NRZ and ZMDC had last published their annual reports in 2012. 
217 Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (2012) 42-43. 
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started doing so recently.
218
 Thomas found that 40% of the public entities surveyed were not 
conducting board performance appraisals in 2012.
219
   
 
According to research conducted by Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), in South Africa, 
“there is weak accountability for poor performance, including ineffective monitoring and 
evaluation”.220 The research also established that performance contracts for boards of public 
entities are often poorly drafted and not effectively or consistently monitored resulting in 
weak evaluation frameworks.
221
 Thus, performance evaluation has been made difficult by the 
fact that there is uncertainty as to what should be measured and how it should be measured.
222
 
In addition, the BUSA research found that lack of accountability for poor performance is 
sometimes worsened by political interference in the operations of boards, protection of 
incompetent and underperforming directors and executives, lack of independent boards and 
imposition of too many conflicting political, social and economic objectives.
223
 The delays in 
approvals of urgent strategic issues by the government were also found to be a challenge that 
adversely affects the board’s effectiveness and hence its objective evaluation.224 
 
                                                 
218 According to their annual reports, board evaluations commenced in 2013 in South African Civil Aviation Authority  
whereas in South African National Roads Agency Limited evaluations commenced in 2014 (South African Civil Aviation 
Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 44 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 105). 
219 Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell 
Us?” (2012) 448 – 470. However, unlike Zimbabwe which is still to implement the provisions of its CGF with regard to 
board performance contracts, a significant number of South Africa’s public entities boards have signed performance 
contracts with their shareholder Ministers (South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 44 and South 
African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 110). 
220 BUSA The Role of State Owned Entities in South Africa (A Submission Prepared By Business Unity South Africa to the 
Presidential Review Committee on State Owned Entities in September 2011) available at 
www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=190834 (Accessed on 8 February 2015) 22-23. 
221 According to the BUSA report, there is no clarity in the governance framework between long-term mandates, strategic 
plans, indicators, targets and related incentives. In the absence of clarity on the purpose of a public entity and the board’s 
mandate, it has become difficult to formulate a clear operating mandate, draft a clear strategic plan and, in turn, effective 
performance contracts. 
222 Mkhwanazi D B The Critical Evaluation of Board of Directors Composition and Their Effectiveness (2002) 28. 
223 Ibid. In practice, public entities are often compelled to pursue multiple, changing and often conflicting objectives (e.g. job 
creation, training, social goods versus cost-effective service delivery). In some instances (e.g. Eskom prior to the supply 
crisis in 2008), public entities have been used as instruments of macro-economic stabilisation policy, adhering to price 
controls and investment targets, without due regard for their long term performance or sustainability (BUSA The Role of 
State Owned Entities in South Africa (2011) 22-23). 
224 Gumede W South African State-Owned Enterprises: Boards, Executives and Recruitment (2012) 9-12. 
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In contrast to Zimbabwe, the majority of South African public entities have been able to 
publish their annual reports within the confines of the PFMA.
225
 The annual reports are 
detailed enough to enable stakeholders to make sound opinions about the performance of the 
boards, for example, they indicate the roles and responsibilities of the board, qualifications 
and experience of directors and number of meetings attended by individual board members, 
among others.
226
 More so, the South African public entities, unlike in Zimbabwe, hold annual 
general meetings as per statutory requirements.
227
 South Africa appears to be employing 
commendable efforts to enforce board evaluations contrary to Zimbabwe which is still to 
exhibit commitment to the implementation of board evaluations in its public entities.
228
 
 
7.2.6.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
Australia, unlike Zimbabwe, has not left the issue of board evaluations exclusively to 
voluntary compliance as provided in its instruments like the GBE Guidelines and ASX CGC 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, but has gone a step further and 
legislated for it.
229
 Public entities are, therefore, expected to conduct board evaluations in 
terms of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (PGPA) Act. Judging from 
the published annual reports for some of Australia’s public entities, the Australian entities 
have started implementing board evaluations at a greater scale than Zimbabwe.
230
 Australia 
has tried to minimise the appointment of incompetent and inexperienced directors and that of 
public servants in a better way than Zimbabwe by providing for an objective and transparent 
                                                 
225 The majority of public entities are up to date with the publication of their annual reports. For example, the South African 
Civil Aviation Authority, Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. and South African National Roads Agency Limited have already 
published their 2014 annual reports in compliance with the statutes. 
226 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2014 Annual Report 66-71, South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 
44-49 and South African National Roads Agency Limited 2014 Annual Report 104-109. 
227 Ibid.  
228 The annual reports for the selected entities exhibit that South African public entities have realised the value of board 
evaluations in enhancing board effectiveness. As an example, Eskom reported that an independent evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of the board, individual directors and the company secretary had been conducted as per its 
practice whereas South African National Roads Agency Limited reported that it held its first board evaluation in 2014 
(Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2014 Annual Report 68 and South African Civil Aviation Authority 2013-2014 Annual Report 
109). 
229 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.6 above and sections 37-40 of the PGPA Act. 
230 The APC reported that it undertakes board evaluations with the assistance of an external consultant in every two years 
(APC 2013-2014 Annual Report 45). The GRDC reported that its board periodically commissions an external review of its 
performance (GRDC 2013-2014 Annual Report 84). See also ASRC 2013-2014 Annual Report 33.  
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way of appointing directors.
231
 The annual reports for public entities in Australia are 
published timeously and are more informative than those of Zimbabwean entities.
232
 The 
public entities hold annual general meetings which further assist stakeholders to assess and 
comment on the performance of the board and the entity at large.
233
 
 
From the above, Australia appears to have done significantly more than Zimbabwe in trying 
to promote the evaluation of public entity boards’ performance in a standardised manner. To 
confirm that Australia’s framework has been effective, the survey conducted by KPMG in 
2004 concluded that there was a significant change in board behaviour as companies were 
progressively conducting “comprehensive performance evaluations of the board, committees 
and individual directors” with the assistance of external facilitators.234 However, concern was 
expressed that boards were becoming over-involved with compliance issues due to the 
increased reporting obligations at the expense of real performance required to achieve the 
objectives of the entities.
235
 In addition, the review by Uhrig revealed that, despite the 
measures put in place, several factors continued to cloud the assessment of the effectiveness 
of boards and these include issues about clarity of purpose, the extent of the delegation of 
power to the board by the relevant authorities and the gap in skills and experience of the 
directors.
236
 
 
7.2.7 Enforcement of Corporate Governance Compliance  
The continued corporate collapses as a result of poor corporate governance practices have 
caused a number of jurisdictions to acknowledge that it is important to create a balance 
                                                 
231 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.6 above. 
232 The annual reports indicate the roles and responsibilities of the board, qualifications and experience of directors as well as 
number of meetings attended by individual board members, among others (ASRC 2013-2014 Annual Report 32-36, GRDC 
2013-2014 Annual Report 84-85 and APC 2013-2014 Annual Report 44-52). 
233 Ibid.  
234 Siladi B The Role of Non-Executive Directors in Corporate Governance: An Evaluation (2006) 22. Furthermore, a 
research conducted by The Australian Council of Superannuation Investors confirmed that although the ASX Principles do 
not recommend any particular frequency for board evaluations, 70% of a sample of 30 companies listed on the ASX 
conducted evaluations annually (Clarke T and Klettner A The State of Play on Board Evaluation in Corporate Australia and 
Abroad (2010) 23).   
235 Ibid. 
236 Uhrig J Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (2003) 43-44. 
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between voluntary and mandatory mechanisms to achieve significant transformation in 
corporate governance practices.
237
 As a result, Zimbabwe has come up with a legislative and 
regulatory framework to instill discipline and enforce compliance with good corporate 
governance practices.
238
 The statutory instruments provide for disciplinary action in the form 
of fines, imprisonment and dismissal for failure by boards to observe the terms and 
conditions of their appointment.
239
 The challenge, however, is that, like in many other 
African countries, the capacity to support the implementation of good corporate governance 
principles in Zimbabwe is undermined by the existence of poor enforcement mechanisms and 
weak monitoring and regulatory organisations.
240
 The lack of enforcement of existing 
legislative and regulatory measures has thus significantly contributed to poor corporate 
governance practices in the public entities.
241
 A number of issues were raised by the 
participants with regard to level of enforcement of compliance with good corporate 
governance. 
 
There were mixed reactions on the issue of whether corporate governance should be 
mandatory or voluntary.
242
 28% of the participants preferred that corporate governance 
should be mandatory given the continued occurrences of corporate collapses as a result of 
                                                 
237 See Chapter 3, para 3.6.6 above. In Zimbabwe the collapse of a number of financial institutions (e.g. Genesis Investment 
Bank Ltd in June 2012 and Royal Bank in July 2012) and the poor performance of public entities (e.g. National Railways of 
Zimbabwe, GMB, Air Zimbabwe, ZMDC and ZUPCO) are clear examples of the continued practice of poor corporate 
governance despite the existence of a corporate governance framework. See First Report of The Portfolio Committee on 
Transport and Infrastructural Development on the Operations of National Railways of Zimbabwe Presented to Parliament in 
March 2012, available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/../article/54/...NRZ_March_2012.pdf (accessed on 17 February 2015). 
See also Moyo G The State of Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe’s State Enterprises: Can the Situation be Rescued? 
(2012). 
238 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 above. However, it is important to note that some of the legislation Zimbabwe has relied on, for 
example the Companies Act, is outdated and several calls have been made to amend it to bring it in line with best 
international practices and standards (Botha T Amend Companies Act (Daily News of 21 November 2012 and The Zimbabwe 
Mail of 16 June 2014)).  
239 Ibid. 
240 Mambondiani L, Zhang Y and Arun T Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: Evidence from Zimbabwe (2013) 
8-10. This is supported by Botha who found that, in many African countries, the capacity to support the implementation of 
good corporate governance is undermined by the existence of weak monitoring and watchdog organisations (Okeahalam CC 
and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges (2003) 23).  
241 Johnson et al have argued that whilst the majority of countries have developed guidelines, standards, and codes of 
corporate governance, the enforcement of the measures put in place has not been given sufficient attention to hold public 
entities accountable for complying with the corporate governance provisions of these guidelines, codes and standards 
(Johnson CC, Beiman I and Thompson K Balance Scorecard for State Owned Enterprises: Driving Performance and 
Corporate Governance (Asian Development Bank 2007) available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Balanced-
Scorecard-for-SOEs.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2015)).   
242 Zimbabwe has relied on a self regulation environment in its approach to corporate governance as shown in Chapter 4, 
para 4.1 above. 
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poor corporate governance practices.
243
 51% of the participants were of the view that there is 
need to balance between mandatory and voluntary corporate governance provisions so as to 
encourage compliance given the fact that if corporate governance is left exclusively to 
voluntary compliance some managers and boards may not feel obliged to comply. These 
participants argued that although self-regulation would be desirable, the continued corporate 
governance failures seem to point to the fact that there are some aspects of directors’ 
responsibilities that require certain legislative and regulatory controls. The rest (21%) 
preferred that compliance with good corporate governance should be voluntary since it is 
mostly about ethical behaviour which is difficult to force someone to observe.
244
 The last 
group believed that directors and managers need to be educated more on the importance of 
corporate governance so that they fully appreciate the need to comply without having to be 
compelled to do so.  
 
Participants were asked whether or not they believed that the current corporate governance 
framework was sufficient to instill good corporate governance practices in public entities. In 
response, the majority of the participants (60%) believed that it was conducive and sufficient 
to enhance the effectiveness of public entities boards but what was lacking was the 
commitment by the relevant authorities to implement and enforce compliance with the 
framework in place.
245
 The remaining (40%) participants felt that more enforcement 
mechanisms needed to be created to achieve full compliance. Overall, the participants agreed 
that the existing procedures, policies and regulations are based on international corporate 
governance standards and, if implemented properly, should serve as a strategic road map for 
public entities. The second challenge highlighted was that only a few public entities comply 
with the corporate governance principles as enshrined in the instruments but the rest comply 
only with the letter and not the spirit of the principles.
246
 This has the tendency of 
                                                 
243 These participants cited the voluntary nature of corporate governance as one of the contributing factors to directors’ 
reluctance to comply with recommended principles. 
244 This view is supported by Mallin when he says that at “the heart of many corporate governance issues lies the question of 
ethics” (Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 
227). 
245 A similar view was expressed in Chavunduka MD and Sikwila NM “Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: The 
ZIMCODE and State Owned Enterprises Connection” (2015) III(11) International Journal of Economics, Commerce and 
Management 651-661 and Sifile O et al “Corporate Board Failure in Zimbabwe: Have Non – Executive Directors Gone to 
Sleep?” (2014) 78-86. 
246 This is a common challenge in many countries (see Chapter 3, para 3.6.6 above and Anand AI “An Analysis of Enabling 
vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post Sarbanes-Oxley” (2006) 229-252). 
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diminishing the benefits of good corporate governance as corporate governance is much more 
than just ticking boxes. 
 
A third concern raised by the majority of the participants was that, government ministries 
responsible for actively monitoring public entities and the boards in particular, and other 
mechanisms such as independent regulators,
247
 do not adequately fulfil their oversight role.
248
 
Many were said to be generally inefficient and subject to external influence by politicians and 
other external factors like less supportive legislative or regulatory frameworks and inadequate 
resources.
249
 On the other hand, the Ministry of State Enterprises and Parastatals which, in 
consultation with the responsible Ministers, was responsible for monitoring compliance with 
corporate governance principles by public entities was said not to be effective in discharging 
its mandate due to lack of adequate resources (human and capital) and the absence of a 
standardised board performance evaluation system. The participants wondered how boards 
continue to be dissolved or dismissed allegedly based on misconduct and incompetence when 
there is no performance evaluation carried out. One participant believed that the only “logical 
reason was that the boards were fired for refusing or failing to comply with directives they 
believed were dubious, unethical or some other such reason that may be contrary to public 
policy”.  
 
The participants indicated that, although the PFMA provides for the auditing of public 
entities’ financial statements, there are challenges in fully implementing the provisions. This 
is because the bulk of public entities (e.g. GMB and ZMDC) do not timeously produce 
financial statements which means that the auditors may experience challenges in conducting 
the audits. In addition, it was shown that the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(OCAG) which is mandated to audit the majority of the public entities is inadequately 
resourced in terms of finances and staff members who are few in terms of numbers and 
                                                 
247 The participants cited the line ministries, Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Anti-Corruption Commission 
and the judicial system as the main enforcers of compliance with good corporate governance. 
248 Okeahalam and Akinboade found that the monitoring organisations may not be legally empowered to ensure that certain 
principles of good corporate governance such as transparency and accountability are effectively implemented or enforced 
(Okeahalam CC and Akinboade OA A Review of Corporate Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges (2003) 
23). See also Okpara JO “Corporate Governance in a Developing Economy: Barriers, Issues, And Implications for Firms” 
(2011) 11 (2) Corporate Governance 184–199. 
249 According to Cooper, these challenges are prevalent in the majority, if not all, of the developing countries (Cooper M S 
Corporate Governance In Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges & Impact on Credit (Paper presented at the 
Congress to celebrate the fortieth annual session of UNCITRAL Vienna, July 2007) 3-4 available at 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Cooper_S_rev.pdf (accessed on 6 January 2015)). 
298 
 
expertise.
250
 In addition, the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG)’s audit findings are 
hardly seriously considered and acted upon even if they highlight pertinent issues and major 
irregularities.
251
 This is mostly because the legislative framework
252
 does not give the OCAG 
“sufficient independence and any authoritative powers to coerce ministers, departments and 
other public agencies to observe and comply with the Treasury Instructions”253 and corporate 
governance standards as well as to enforce implementation of its audit findings.
254
 Also, 
according to the participants, in other cases there is cover up on OCAG’s findings and 
recommendations by some associated senior public officials, obstructing the course of justice 
in the process. This, therefore, makes the auditors an ineffective enforcement tool of the 
government. 
 
The fourth contributing factor to the poor enforcement of compliance with good corporate 
governance cited by the participants is the high rate of corruption in Zimbabwe.
255
 The main 
argument was that corruption has the effect that corporate governance-related laws and 
regulations may not be enforced (or may be enforced selectively) and the reliability of the 
judicial system may be compromised. Therefore, directors who are incompetent, ineffective 
in discharging their duties or “guilty of any form of misconduct may go unpunished”. The 
participants expressed concern that there are no consequences for ineffective boards as “in 
                                                 
250 See Zhou G and Zinyama T “Auditing Government Institutions in Zimbabwe Frameworks, Processes and Practices” 
(2012) 2(2) International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 218-237, for similar sentiments. 
251 The participants’ assertions were confirmed by a number of press reports and researchers (Langa V Audit Reports: A Sad 
Cycle of Inaction (The Standard of 5 July 2015 3), Gumbo L Government Urged to Act on Audit Reports (The Herald of 29 
June 2015 1), Zinyama T “Efficiency and Effectiveness in Public Sector Auditing: An Evaluation of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General’s Performance in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2012” (2013) 3(7) International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Science 267-282 and Zhou G and Zinyama T “Auditing Government Institutions in Zimbabwe Frameworks, 
Processes and Practices” (2012) 218-237). 
252 Some of the relevant statutes are the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Public Finance Management Act and Audit Office 
Act (Chapter 22:18). 
253 For example, recent reports of the OCAG have shown that ministries, departments and public entities have delayed 
submitting and in other instances failed totally to produce certain returns and statements required for audit. This “impacted 
negatively on the ability of the Audit Office in producing the annual reports as well as meeting the statutory deadlines for 
tabling of such reports in Parliament” (Zhou G and Zinyama T “Auditing Government Institutions in Zimbabwe 
Frameworks, Processes and Practices” (2012) 218-237). 
254 For similar sentiments, see Zinyama T “Efficiency and Effectiveness in Public Sector Auditing: An Evaluation of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s Performance in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2012” (2013) 267-282. 
255 To show the high level of corruption, the Transparency International 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked 
Zimbabwe 156 out of 175 countries. The report is available at www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed on 18 March 
2015). Furthermore, it has been reported that “mismanagement, corruption and fraud in state owned firms have become 
corrosive, grossly undermining the country’s economy” (Makoshori S Parastatals Bleed Broke Govt (The Financial Gazette 
of 11-17 June 2015) 7). 
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instances where the board has performed so poorly that the entity goes bankrupt, the 
government has bailed out the entity by injecting money” and even reassigned the board 
members in question to other public entity boards.
256
  
 
Above half (63%) of the participants expressed the view that Zimbabwe’s Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ZACC), established to combat corruption, has not been as effective as it should 
be in investigating and curbing corrupt activities by board members.
257
 This, according to the 
participants, is mostly because the legislative framework in place does not sufficiently 
empower the Commission to execute its duties independently and to enforce compliance.
258
 
The other reason cited was that the Commission is underfunded, making it difficult to achieve 
its intended goals and objectives.
259
 Some participants indicated that where criminal charges 
are being preferred and the matters are referred to the police, the police do not urgently and 
effectively handle the matter.
260
 In some situations, the police were said to be bribed resulting 
“in matters being irregularly struck off the register or no action being pursued on the matter at 
all”.261 In some cases it was reported that, where corruption is involved, court files disappear 
                                                 
256 This observation was supported by a number of press reports. Examples of some of the entities assisted by the 
government to recover are GMB, Air Zimbabwe and National Railways of Zimbabwe (Mugari S Govt Doles Out Money It 
Doesn’t Have (Zimbabwe Independent of 6 October 2006 3) and Mafirakureva M Govt Props up AirZim (NewsDay of 23 
October 2013). See also G Zhou “From Interventionism To Market-Based Management Approaches: The Zimbabwean 
Experience” (2001), XXVIII (ii) Zambezia 229-261 and Mutanda D “The Impact of The Zimbabwean Crisis on Parastatals” 
(2014) 1-14. 
257 For similar comments, see Moyo S Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society 
in Combating Corruption Unpublished Thesis (University of Central Lancashire 2014) 221-242. Some commentators 
reported that the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) is a “toothless bulldog and lacks independence from 
political interferences”. Of 147 cases reported to ZACC in 2006, only 4 were completed (Newsday of 4 March 2014 and 
Financial Gazette of 22 September 2012). Transparency International Zimbabwe has called for the overhaul of the 
Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission following concerns that it is ineffective at dealing with corruption (Mail & 
Guardian of 7 March 2014 available at http://mg.co.za/article/2014-03-07-zim-corruption-watchdog-toothless). 
258 This challenge was confirmed in Moyo S Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil 
Society in Combating Corruption (2014) 241. The Commission can only exercise its powers concurrently with those of the 
police and in the event of any conflict arising in the exercise of their powers, the Attorney-General is empowered to 
intervene and direct the parties to act as he considers fit (section 13 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 13 of 2004). 
259 See also Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The case of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation” (2014) 1-8. 
260 For similar views, see Hlatywayo L and Mukono A “Corruption in Zimbabwe, the Causes” (2014) 2 (9) International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Studies 266-271. See also Shana G The State of Corruption in Zimbabwe (Paper presented 
at the Mass Public Opinion Institute Seminar in Harare in 2006) 5-8 available at 
http://www.mpoi.net/...Public+Seminar+Speeches-The+State+of+Corruption+in+Zimbabwe.pdf (accessed on 8 March 
2015). 
261 Ibid. This is supported by the poor ranking (122 out of 144 countries) Zimbabwe obtained with regard reliability of police 
services (Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2014-201) 
391 available at http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015) (accessed on 3 June 2015). A report 
by the Anti-Corruption Trust (ACT) of Southern Africa also indicated that Zimbabwean local police were the most corrupt 
in the region (Newsday of 6 December 2012). The Anti-Corruption Trust report “Zimbabwe: Corruption Cases” is available 
at https://actsouthernafrica.wordpress.com/ (accessed on 17 March 2015). 
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unexplainably, matters take unnecessarily too long to be heard and judgements are reserved 
indefinitely or where they are given they raise questions as to their reasonableness.  
 
Lastly, it is universally accepted that at the foundation of good governance “is a predictable, 
equitable, effective, and efficient legal and judicial system”.262 Consequently, a deficit in the 
Rule of Law directly affects good corporate governance. Zimbabwe’s legal and judicial 
system has not been spared the criticism that it is unreliable, unpredictable and ineffective, 
mostly because the law as written and the law as enforced in the courts can differ 
considerably.
263
 According to Moyo, “corruption has thrived in Zimbabwe partly because the 
state was unable to develop and sustain independent law enforcement and judicial institutions 
that are germane to the maintenance of the rule of law”.264  
 
From investors’ and other interested stakeholders’ viewpoint, the main problem has been the 
time that it takes to investigate and prosecute cases of corporate mismanagement.
265
 
According to the participants, the very few directors who have been punished for 
mismanaging companies and paying themselves exorbitant remuneration which resulted in 
corporate collapses have not been subjected to punishments commensurate with the gravity of 
the offences committed.
266
 The poor enforcement and implementation mechanisms thus 
undermine the usefulness of legal provisions and “reduce the confidence of everyone that 
relies on the legal system”.267  
 
                                                 
262 Cooper MS Corporate Governance In Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges & Impact on Credit (2007) 3. 
263 Hlatywayo L and Mukono A “Corruption in Zimbabwe, the Causes” (2014) 266-271 and Moyo S Corruption in 
Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society in Combating Corruption (2014) 35-40. See also 
Cahn N Corporate Governance Divergence and Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from out Here in the Fields (Paper presented 
at the Comparative Corporate Governance Symposium in 2004) available at 
justice.law.stetson.edu/lawrev/abstracts/PDF/33-3Cahn.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
264 Moyo S Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society in Combating Corruption 
(2014) 308. This viewpoint was echoed by Zenda C in his article titled “Judiciary Weak on Enforcing Rule of Law” (The 
Financial Gazette of 10-16 March 2015 6-7). 
265 Ibid. The country was ranked poorly (105 out of 144 countries) as far as investors’ interests protection is concerned 
(Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2014-2015) 391. 
266 For similar observations, see Moyo S Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil 
Society in Combating Corruption (2014) 35-40 for similar sentiments. 
267 Ibid. See also La Porta R et al “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” (2002) 1147-1170. 
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In addition, efforts to prosecute directors for mismanagement of parastatals were said to have 
proved fruitless. For example, in the case of S v Chikumba
268
 where directors were alleged to 
have committed acts of misconduct involving criminal abuse of duty, fraud and corruption, 
the accused directors ended up being freed because the state could not prove its case to the 
satisfaction of the courts.
269
 In the majority of cases, it was reported that the matters do not 
even reach the courts because the prosecutors would have disqualified the cases for lack of 
substance. In addition to the above, Zimbabwe’s judicial system was said to be inundated 
with backlogs and to be often unable to timeously conclude matters because of inadequate 
physical infrastructure, poor terms and conditions of service for judicial personnel, 
malfunctioning judicial systems and obsolete laws.
270
 More so, the judicial system was 
reported to lack sufficient independence and transparency.
271
 The participants also cited high 
litigation costs as another prohibitive factor to shareholders and other interested parties who 
may wish to institute legal action against incompetent directors.
272
 
 
7.2.7.1 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of South Africa  
South Africa, like Zimbabwe, has encountered challenges in the enforcement of compliance 
with good corporate governance standards thus still has much work to do to be fully 
corporate governance compliant.
273
 South Africa’s enforcement mechanisms have generally 
                                                 
268 S v Chikumba CA 344/15 (2015) ZWHHC 724. This case involved Air Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd, a public entity responsible 
for providing national air services. 
269 However, in one civil case (Savanhu V Hwange Colliery Co SC 473/13), the court ruled in favour of the public entity. In 
this case a former non-executive chairman of the plaintiff company was refusing to return a motor vehicle allocated to him 
during his term of office arguing that his predecessors had been allowed to purchase their vehicles after leaving the 
company. The court dismissed his appeal and ruled that he was not entitled to keep or purchase the vehicle hence should 
return the vehicle to the company. 
270 Hodzi O Reforming the Criminal Justice System in Zimbabwe: Lessons from Kenya (Study published in March 2011) 
113-14 & 21-22 available at http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/legal/hodzi_reforming_criminal_justice_110315.pdf (accessed 
on 27 May 2015). This scenario has been found to be a common feature in most developing countries (Cooper M S 
Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges & Impact on Credit (2007) 3).  
271 These observations were confirmed by Chiduza L “Towards the Protection of Human Rights: Do the New Zimbabwean 
Constitutional Provisions on Judicial Independence Suffice?” (2014) 17(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 368-412 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2014/17.html (accessed on 27 May 2015). The country was rated at 
position 120 out of 144 countries in the 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Report on judicial independence which confirms the 
poor state of the system (Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 (2015) 391). 
272 Ibid. 
273 Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (2006) 222-223 and Horn R F The 
Legal Regulation of Corporate Governance with Reference to International Trends (2005) 49-60. The corporate scandals 
involving the Fidentia Group and LeisureNet indicate that, despite the existence of King Report and other regulatory 
measures, problems are still evident in terms of implementing the legislation and regulations adequately.  
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been labeled as weak and unreliable given the high increase in unethical behaviour by 
directors and corporate collapses.
274
  
 
Although weak enforcement of rules and regulations has been sighted as a major problem in 
discussions concerning South Africa, the main reason for the negative perception is not so 
much a general lack of enforcement, as might be the case in Zimbabwe, but erratic 
enforcement in that in some areas it is of a high standard, but in others it is almost absent.
275
 
An assessment of the current levels of corporate governance compliance in South Africa 
showed that the responsible ministries have not fulfilled their oversight role of ensuring that 
the public entities comply with best good governance practices.
276
 One of the reasons cited as 
exacerbating the ineffectiveness of government oversight role in public entities is the 
existence of too many institutions that carry out this role resulting in numerous and disjointed 
oversight practices.
277
 Also, because these institutions play these roles simultaneously, their 
ability to do so effectively is “limited as the resources are spread and stretched and straddle 
these many roles”.278 On the other hand, institutions that have been tasked to check on 
compliance of public entities, like the Auditor General, have not been as effective as expected 
because they have encountered challenges namely; insufficient independence, lack of 
enforcement powers and inadequate operational resources to undertake their duties.
279
  
 
                                                 
274 Ibid. It has been argued that boards tend to comply with the requirements without necessarily buying into the spirit of 
good corporate governance. According to King, even with the “comply or explain” regime, directors just tick the boxes to 
avoid having to go through the cumbersome process of explaining non-compliance (King ME The Corporate Citizen: 
Governance for All Entities (Penguin Books 2006) 12. 
275 Armstrong et al Corporate Governance: South Africa, a Pioneer in Africa (2005) 26-28. 
 
276 Thomas argues that, while the state-owned enterprises appear to observe external governance demands, compliance to 
internal, self regulated governance appears to be lacking (Thomas A “Governance at South African State-Owned 
Enterprises: What Do Annual Reports and the Print Media Tell Us?” (2012) 448 – 470). According to Falkena and others, 
the rate at which institutional change has taken place in South Africa has been so fast that the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities at times had challenges in keeping pace with appropriate regulatory changes (Falkena H et al Financial 
Regulation in South Africa (SA Financial Sector Forum 2001) available at 
http://www.finforum.co.za/publications/fregall.pdf (accessed on 12 January 2015).  
277 PRC Shareholder Oversight and Governance of SOEs (Paper prepared by Presidential SOE Review Committee (PRC) on 
22 March 2012) 5-6 available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/../vol._3/governance_and_ownership/...SOEs.doc. 
(accessed on 20 March 2015). 
278 Ibid. 
279 The 2010 Public Service Commission report noted that departments persistently received qualified audits in annual audits 
conducted by the Auditor-General, with some departments getting such qualified audits at least four years in a row, without 
any disciplinary steps by the Executive Authorities (The report entitled ‘State of the Public Service Report 2010’ is available 
at http://www.psc.gov.za/../2010/State.of.the.Public.Service.Report.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2015).  
303 
 
Comparable to Zimbabwe, the too insignificant number of directors who have been 
prosecuted for poorly managing organisations and the length of time that it takes to 
investigate and prosecute cases of corporate mismanagement have been areas of concern in 
South Africa.
280
 The existence of enforcement and implementation gaps is believed to 
weaken the usefulness of lawful provisions and to lessen the confidence of local and foreign 
investors in the legal system as a whole.
281
 The other concern in South Africa is not of non-
compliance as such, but rather that a number of government officers are not capable or are 
reluctant to penalise those directors who purposely neglect their fiduciary duties.
282
  
 
As an example, the South African Public Service Commission reported a 48% compliance 
rate among senior managers in the public service in 2008 and recommended that non-
complying members be charged with misconduct but this was not implemented.
283
 Also, 
resembling Zimbabwe, the South African judicial system is clogged with backlogs and is 
often unable to timeously finalise court cases mainly because of lack of financial resources to 
address inadequate physical infrastructure, malfunctioning judicial systems and poor 
employment conditions for judicial personnel, among others.
284
 But, South Africa’s judiciary 
has been considered more independent and efficient than that of Zimbabwe.
285
 
 
In addition, while the legislation in place is stronger and more updated (e.g. the Companies 
Act) when compared to Zimbabwe, some of the reasons for the fragmented nature of South 
                                                 
280 Armstrong P, Segal N and Davis B Corporate Governance: South Africa, a Pioneer in Africa (2005) 26-28 and Davies D 
et al Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 185-191. According to the Department of Trade 
Industry’s general notice, the most noteworthy weakness in the law before the new Companies Act was that South African 
company law did not offer efficient methods for the enforcement of directors’ duties prescribed under the 1973 Companies 
Act. This resulted in directors and senior management of large companies being “effectively immune from legal control, 
except perhaps in regard to the more outrageous criminal offences”. The general notice titled “South African Company Law 
for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform” is available at www.gov.za/documents/ (accessed on 23 March 
2015). 
281 La Porta R et al “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” (2002) 1147-1170. 
282 Schulz-Herzenberg C Why Ethics Regulations Continue to Fail SA (Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2009) available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/why-ethics-regulations-continue-to-fail-sa-2009-09-02, (accessed on January 2015)).  
283 Ibid. 
284 Hendricks E Towards Good Corporate Governance in South Africa: Private Enforcement versus Public Enforcement 
(2010) 14. See also Afolabi AA “Examining Corporate Governance Practices in Nigerian and South African Firms” (2015) 
10-29. 
285 South Africa was ranked 24 and 16 out of 144 countries yet Zimbabwe was ranked 120 and 93 out of 144 countries on 
judicial independence and efficiency of the legal system respectively (Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 
2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, Switzerland 2014-2015) 341 & 391). 
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Africa’s regulatory system are the high costs that effective regulation entails and the need for 
government to meet other crucial national and international obligations.
286
 Though not at 
Zimbabwe’s levels, another contributing factor to the continued ineffectiveness of public 
entity boards in promoting good corporate governance is the high rate of corruption in South 
Africa.
287
 According to the annual Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
released in July 2013, of the 740 South Africans interviewed, 36 percent had paid a bribe to a 
policeman and 30 percent had paid bribes to officials in the judicial system.
288
 To make 
matters worse, the South African Anti-Corruption Commission has not been as effective in 
undertaking its mandate as required of it because of a number of challenges.
289
 The 
challenges arise from factors relating to independence, investigational capacity, “extent of 
prosecutorial power; effectiveness of international collaborative efforts; efficiency of the 
judicial process; the observance of the rule of law; and respect for the rights of suspects”.290   
 
Although Zimbabwe and South Africa have put in place similar corporate governance 
frameworks, the level of implementation of the frameworks is different in the two countries. 
South Africa appears to have made greater strides than Zimbabwe in implementing good 
corporate governance standards because its corporate governance reforms have significantly 
improved the country’s standard of corporate governance to the extent of placing it in the top 
rank of emerging market economies, and in some cases even at par with some of the more 
developed markets.
291
 The high level of compliance with good corporate governance 
                                                 
286 Mallin CA Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (2006) 222. See also Armstrong P 
Corporate Governance in South Africa – A Perspective from an Emerging Market (2004) 23.  
287 To show the high level of corruption in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the Transparency International 2014 Corruption 
Perceptions Index gave Zimbabwe a score of 156 out of 175 and South Africa a score 67 out of 175. The Index is available 
at www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed on 18 February 2015). 
288 The report is available at http://www.transparency.org/../publication/global_corruption_barometer_2013 (accessed on 15 
March 2015). 
289 Fraser-Moleketi G J and Boone R Country Corruption Assessment Report - South Africa (Department of Public Service 
and Administration and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report of April 2003) 4-6 available at 
www.westerncape.gov.za/text/.../4/sacorruptionassessmentreport2003.pdf (accessed on 12 January 2015). 
290 Ibid. See also Economic Commission for Africa Assessing the Efficiency and Impact of National Anti-Corruption 
Institutions in Africa (Study conducted by Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in December 2010) 46 available at 
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/anti-corruprion_document.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2015). In this 
regard, independence centres on matters to do with the appointment and removal procedures, tenure, mode of funding and 
independent powers of prosecution. 
291 Armstrong P, Segal N and Davis B Corporate Governance: South Africa, a Pioneer in Africa (2005) 14-15. South 
African listed companies are at present ranked by “foreign institutional investors as among the best governed in the world’s 
emerging economies in terms of genuinely practicing good corporate governance” (“Introduction and Background” to the 
King III Report).  
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practices by a significant number of South African companies has resulted in an increase in 
the number of companies shifting their stock exchange listings to foreign bourses, mostly 
London and New York.
292
  
 
To confirm the efforts put by South African public entities in observing good corporate 
governance, Eskom won, for the second year running in 2013, a corporate governance award 
granted by Nkonki Incorporated (a South African audit firm) for integrated reporting by state-
owned companies whilst Transnet Limited and Denel SOC Limited took second and third 
place respectively.
293
 According to Armstrong, South Africa has put so much emphasis on 
corporate governance within the public entities to the extent of pressurising the private sector, 
to some extent, to match the set standards.
294
 South Africa has also been ranked higher than 
Zimbabwe internationally on the strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficiency of its 
legal framework, corporate boards’ efficacy and ethical behavior of firms.295 This really 
provides evidence to the fact that corporate governance practices in South Africa seem to be 
better than those in Zimbabwe.
296
 
 
7.2.7.2 Comparative Analysis of the Findings to those of Australia  
Australia has been more aggressive than Zimbabwe in so far as the implementation and 
enforcement of the corporate governance standards is concerned.
297
 Unlike in Zimbabwe, in 
                                                 
292 Armstrong P Corporate Governance in South Africa – a Perspective from an Emerging Market (2004) 23. 
293 These three entities were also said to rank among the largest of their kind globally (Eskom Wins Corporate Governance 
Award (News.24.com of 19 June 2013) available at http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Industrial/Eskom-wins-corporate-
governance-award-20130619 (accessed on 25 January 2015)).  
294 Armstrong P Corporate Governance in South Africa – a Perspective from an Emerging Market (2004) 6, 26. 
295 According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, South Africa was ranked number number 1 out 
of 144 countries on the strength of auditing and reporting standards, 15 out of 144 countries with regard to efficiency of its 
legal framework, 3 out of 144 countries on efficacy of corporate boards and 35 out of 144 on ethical behaviour of firms 
whilst Zimbabwe was ranked 38 out of 144, 93 out of 144, 88 out of 144 and 106 out of 144 respectively. Efficacy has been 
assessed by the extent to which survey respondents considered that investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions (Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015 (World Economic Forum Geneva, 
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296 However, despite the poor ranking, it is important to note that some of Zimbabwe’s public entities have tried to comply 
with a significant number of corporate principles, where the board was capacitated to do so, and performed profitably to the 
extent of declaring dividends to the government (MMCZ 2010-2013 annual reports). 
297 The number of reviews done by Australia, for example the Bosch Report, Uhrig Review and Ahead of the Game that came 
up with extensive recommendations for the betterment of corporate governance in public entities, are an indication of its 
aggressiveness. The Ahead of the Game: Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government Administration (AGRAGA 
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Australia collapses of high profile entities have frequently resulted in the creation of 
commissions of inquiry tasked to come up with reform recommendations aimed at improving 
enforcement of corporate and securities laws.
298
 Its regulators and enforcing agents have been 
more forceful, independent and resourced than those in Zimbabwe.
299
 For example, ASIC, 
following a spate of several corporate collapses from 2000, has successfully enforced 
compliance with good corporate governance practices as the Australian corporate regulator, 
with several actions instituted against directors.
300
  
 
ASIC’s success rate in actions against directors in the cases of HIH Insurance Ltd, Harris 
Scarfe, One.Tel and Macdonald & Others, among others, sent the right signal to directors on 
the consequences of not complying with good corporate governance and improved investor 
confidence in the Australian market.
301
 However, ASIC’s major problem has not been that of 
failure to prosecute cases per se, but the complications of fulfilling the high evidentiary 
burdens of proof in criminal cases and the high “costs of protracted court proceedings against 
high profile individuals and corporations”.302 Thus, despite ASIC’s success in high profile 
prosecutions, there have been concerns about the overall efficacy of the enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                        
2010) is available at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/aga_reform/aga_reform_blueprint/ (accessed on 18 January 
2015). 
298 In 1990, in an effort to improve corporate accountability of directors, auditors and directors, a Working Group was 
formed under the auspices of the former Australian National Companies and Securities Commission (now ASIC). The group 
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2001, the Australian government set up a commissioning of an inquiry to investigate on auditor independence and the 
commission produced the Ramsay (2001) Report, ‘Independence of Australian Company Auditors: Review of Current 
Australian Requirements and Proposals for Reform’ (Sarre R “Responding to Corporate Collapses: Is There a Role for 
Corporate Social Responsibility?” (2002) 7(1) Deakin Law Review 1-9 available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/DeakinLawRw/2002/1.html (accessed on 13 May 2015). Another example is the HIH 
Royal Commission that reported, in 2003, on Australia’s largest insurance corporate collapse (Tomasic R “The Challenge of 
Corporate Law Enforcement: Future Directions for Corporations Law in Australia” (2006) 10(1) University of Western 
Sydney Law Review 1-9 available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWSLawRw/2006/1.html (accessed on 29 March 
2015)). 
299 OECD Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 111. Australia’s 
regulatory environment has also been rated as one of the world’s most transparent, efficient and open to foreign investors 
(US Department of State 2014 Investment Climate Statement - Australia (US Department of State - Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs 2014) available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/226594.htm (accessed on 29 March 2015)). 
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failures are simply a result of competitiveness and economic factors (Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of 
Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 182-184). 
300 Du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A and Bagaric M Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2010) 182-184. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Tomasic R “The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement: Future Directions for Corporations Law in Australia” (2006) 
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measures of corporate criminal law.
303
 As a result, civil and administrative proceedings have 
frequently been favoured and have often been more successful, particularly when trivial 
breaches have been under consideration.
304
 
 
Another advantage Australia has over Zimbabwe is that it has an effective auditing system 
led by the office of the Auditor General. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), 
unlike Zimbabwe’s OCAG, experiences less challenges in enforcing compliance with its 
audit findings and implementation of its recommendations by audited public entities. This is 
because the public entities are required to provide regular reports on action taken on matters 
raised by the Auditor General in ANAO audit reports and the ANAO is also sufficiently 
resourced to conduct its own follow-up audits to monitor the implementation of its 
recommendations.
305
 To assist the ANAO, a committee (Joint Committee of Public Accounts 
and Audit (JCPAA)) holds quarterly public hearings on selected audit reports and any 
JCPAA inquiry conducted as a result of these reports.
306
 The JCPAA thus assists the ANAO 
and the government generally in ensuring that audit findings are acted upon with the urgency 
they deserve. 
 
Zimbabwe has no committee similar to Australia’s JCPAA and does not have such public 
hearings. The more important thing is that Australia appears to take more seriously the 
ANAO’s audit findings unlike in Zimbabwe where the parliamentary committees appear not 
to effectively follow through audit findings from OCAG.
307
 In addition, the ASX, 
Government Business and Private Financing Advice Unit (GBPFAU) and the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman have also effectively carried out their oversight role of 
overseeing and ensuring that public entities operate efficiently and adhere to best corporate 
                                                 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Barrett P Auditing in a Changing Governance Environment (Paper on Parliament No. 39 of December 2002) available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/~/~/link.aspx?_id (accessed on 29 March 2015). 
306 Ibid. 
307 To show Australia’s commitment to addressing issues arising from audits, it was ranked number 14 out of 148 countries 
with regard to strength of auditing and reporting standards whilst Zimbabwe was ranked 39 out of 148 on the same aspect 
(Schwab K The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 (2014) 111 & 395). The ranking Zimbabwe got shows that it has 
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governance practices.
308
 As indicated above, Zimbabwe’s regulatory and enforcement bodies 
are not capacitated to the extent of Australia’s levels hence they may not be as effective.309  
 
Although Australia has not performed so well against its developed counterparts,
310
 in 
comparison to Zimbabwe, Australia’s judicial system appears to be more independent, 
reliable and efficient.
311
 This is because in a study conducted by the World Economic Forum, 
Australia was ranked 30 and 16 out of 148 countries with regard to judicial independence and 
efficiency of its legal system, respectively, whilst Zimbabwe was ranked 78 and 83 out of 
148 countries on the same aspects.
312
 In addition, Australia has managed to maintain a 
comprehensive system of laws and regulations designed to counter corruption which has 
resulted in it being perceived internationally as having low levels of corruption and thus also 
not experiencing as high corruption levels as Zimbabwe.
313
 In 2014, Australia ranked 11 out 
of 175 countries whereas Zimbabwe was rated 156 out of 175 countries.
314
 Australia was also 
said to have managed to control corruption at the rate of 96% in 2013 whereas Zimbabwe 
only managed to achieve a rate of 2%.
315
 But, presumably at a lesser scale than Zimbabwe, 
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mechanisms in developed countries are stronger than those of developing and transition countries (Berglöf E and Claessens 
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consistently ranked as one of the least corrupt nations in the world in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index. Research has established that the Australian government’s procurement system is generally transparent and well 
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Australia also has challenges of court cases backlogs,
316
 malfunctioning judicial systems and 
uncompetitive employment conditions for personnel involved in the judicial system.
317
 
 
The above is a clear indication that Australia’ enforcement mechanisms are way better than 
Zimbabwe’s mechanisms. This assertion is confirmed by the high ranking profile that 
Australia has created globally in so far as good corporate governance is concerned. 
According to the World Economic Forum report of 2008-2009,
318
 Australia’s corporate 
governance framework ranked highly internationally and has constantly been amongst the top 
three countries for the efficacy of its corporate boards.
319
 Furthermore, in 2014, Australia was 
ranked 19 out of 148 for ethical behaviour of firms and 51 out of 148 for transparency of 
government policymaking.
320
 In comparison, Zimbabwe was ranked 83 out of 148 for ethical 
behaviour of firms and 88 out of 148 for transparency of government policymaking. 
However, considering the differences in the levels of development of the two countries, 
Zimbabwe’s efforts to enforce compliance with good corporate governance standards is 
commendable though they are still to reach expected levels. 
 
7.3 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
Case studies were conducted specifically on four public entities (MMCZ, ZMDC, NRZ and 
GMB) which were selected on a random basis. Survey results from literature analysis, 
completed questionnaires and interviews were analysed and discussed. The collected data 
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provided a range of personal opinions based on the participants’ experiences on a number of 
issues. Overall, the participants agreed that public entities were performing below 
expectations hence continued to be a drain to the fiscus. The participants supported the view 
that boards have a significant role to play in the good governance and success of public 
entities. However, the research results indicate a number of concerns that the participants 
have with the board’s role, appointment, composition, remuneration and evaluation.  
 
While Zimbabwe has an apparently adequate legislative and regulatory framework to enable 
the practice of good corporate governance, the challenge in creating a fully working corporate 
governance environment still lies in the implementation of these guidelines and legislative 
provisions and enforcement of the corporate governance principles. This is primarily due to 
lack of will power, institutional capacity constraints and the slow recovery in the country’s 
socio-political and economic fortunes. The country’s public entities have not been spared 
from these challenges as they have performed poorly due to a number of factors, one of 
which is the ineffective discharge of duties by boards. The poor board performance has been 
attributed to obscure roles of boards, multiple and contracting objectives, subjective board 
appointment processes, limited director expertise, poor composition of boards, too much 
ministerial involvement in operational issues, inadequate director remuneration, absence of 
proper board performance measurement tools and poor enforcement mechanisms.
321
 
 
The research also established that Zimbabwe, South Africa and Australia share common 
features in terms of the frameworks they have put in place to promote good corporate 
governance in public entities. All three countries have continued to experience high-profile 
corporate collapses despite the existence of corporate governance codes, stringent statutes, 
rigorous Listings Requirements and government regulation.
322
 The common challenges 
experienced by the countries  in respect of public entity boards include, among others, lack of 
board role clarity, insufficient experienced and dedicated human resources especially in the 
running of public entities, poorly composed boards, the undue meddling in the execution of 
board duties by the responsible ministries which incapacitates the board to objectively 
                                                 
321 See paras 7.2.1-7.2.7 above. 
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exercise its judgment and come up with sound strategies and decisions, poor regulatory 
oversight by the responsible authorities and poor enforcement mechanisms.
323
  
 
Regardless of the similarities, the results of the survey show that South Africa and Australia 
have significantly performed better than Zimbabwe as regards the development of corporate 
governance codes and guidelines, implementation of good corporate governance principles 
and enforcement of compliance. Australia and South Africa have therefore, been 
internationally ranked higher than Zimbabwe in so far as promotion and observance of good 
corporate governance standards are concerned.
324
 
 
The next, final, chapter consists of an overall summary of the research, concluding remarks 
and makes recommendations based on the above findings. 
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324 See paras 7.2.2.1-7.2.7.2 above, for examples of international rankings which prove that Zimbabwe has been ranked 
lowly in comparison to South Africa and Australia. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The increase in corporate collapses and amplified attention on transparency and 
accountability in corporate accounting and reporting has led Zimbabwe, like many other 
countries, to put in place corporate governance guidelines and regulations. However, 
questions have been raised on the effectiveness of these guidelines and regulations in actually 
assisting the corporate governance issues in general and with particular reference to public 
entities. With regard to public entities, the main concern has been whether or not the 
guidelines and regulations have assisted the boards of public entities to effectively discharge 
their duties. 
 
Given the important contribution of public entities to the economic and social development of 
all countries, it has been universally accepted that the entities require good corporate 
governance if they are to effectively contribute to these goals. A number of factors have been 
found to significantly contribute to the achievement of good corporate governance in public 
entities.
325
 Of these many factors, the present study focused on the board of directors and the 
role they play in the successful achievement of organisational goals and promotion of good 
corporate governance in public entities. In particular, the research focused on the role of the 
board, its selection and appointment, composition, remuneration and evaluation. The main 
objective of this research was to establish whether or not boards of public entities have been 
able to effectively discharge their duties and how supportive the existing Zimbabwean 
corporate governance framework has been in enabling the board to carry out its mandate. 
 
                                                 
325 Some of the factors include management responsibilities, rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, relations 
with stakeholders, risk management and internal controls (see paras 4-5 of the South African Protocol, Part 2-5 of the 
Australian GBE Guidelines, sections 2-6 of the Zimbabwe CGF and the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-owned Enterprises (2005) 12-17). 
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The extensive spectrum of instruments that have been put in place to improve board 
effectiveness in Zimbabwe is clear evidence that the country has unquestionably recognised 
the crucial role boards of public entities play in the promotion of good corporate governance 
and achievement of the entities’ objectives. The country maintains a plausibly good legal and 
institutional infrastructure for corporate governance consisting of statutes, a wide-ranging set 
of corporate governance codes and regulations as well as regulatory agencies and private 
sector bodies committed to improving corporate governance.
326
  
 
This chapter summarises the research findings based on the literature analysis and views and 
experiences of directors, chief executive officers, company secretaries, senior managers and 
shareholder representatives chosen from four public entities namely; GMB, MMCZ, NRZ 
and ZMDC. Conclusions are drawn on the basis of the research results. Recommendations on 
how best corporate governance and the effectiveness of boards in public entities can be 
improved are made. The chapter concludes by making suggestions for further research. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In order to answer the research questions above,
327
 the study entailed the following:  
 
Chapter 1 was an introductory chapter which gave the background as to why the study was 
considered necessary and what it sought to achieve.
328
 First, the study was motivated by the 
allegations that poor corporate governance resulting from the ineffectiveness of public entity 
boards was one of the major causes of inefficiencies in these entities. Secondly, the absence 
of meaningful research on the effectiveness of the framework put in place by Zimbabwe to 
enable boards of public entities to successfully discharge their responsibilities inspired the 
research.
329
 The third aim was to, based on findings, recommend to the policymakers and 
other interested parties, how best they can get public entities to effectively discharge their 
                                                 
326 See Chapter 4, para 4.2.7 of Chapter 4 above. 
327 Chapter 1, para 1.2 above. 
328 Ibid. 
329 The research’s main objective was to determine whether the Zimbabwe corporate governance instruments, namely; the 
Manual, CGF, National Code, enabling Acts, Companies Act and PFMA provide appropriate and adequate mechanisms to 
improve the effectiveness of boards and ensure that good corporate governance is practised within public entities. 
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obligations of promoting social and economic development without unnecessarily burdening 
the taxpayers. This chapter, therefore, outlined the research questions, significance of the 
study, scope of the research and overview of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance legal and 
regulatory framework.
330
 It also briefly highlighted the researcher’s assumptions and 
limitations of the research.
331
   
 
Chapter 2 discussed the research methodology employed in the study. The research involved 
literature analysis
332
 as well as interviewing participants and circulating questionnaires. The 
participants were randomly selected from board members, chief executive officers, company 
secretaries, senior management and shareholder representatives of four selected public 
entities namely; MMCZ, ZMDC, NRZ and GMB. The participants were considered 
appropriate because of their positions, experience and sound understanding of corporate 
governance and their significant involvement in the operations of the entities. The thesis set 
out to investigate the perceptions of the selected participants and the questionnaires were 
designed to find answers to pertinent questions targeted at achieving the research objective.  
 
This investigation also sought to measure the level of progress made in improving the 
corporate governance practices in the public entities since Zimbabwe introduced the different 
guidelines and regulatory framework. It was also the aim of this study to identify the 
challenges encountered in establishing boards that are effective and able to achieve 
organisational goals as well as to establish the challenges experienced by the boards in 
undertaking their obligations. In particular, the research sought to find out how corporate 
governance is implemented and the challenges faced by boards based on previous research 
and from the experience and perspectives of the chosen participants whose views were 
considered representative of the majority of the public entities. The study proposed that the 
effectiveness of boards of public entities has to be improved extensively if these entities are 
to efficiently achieve their objective of socio-economic development. 
 
                                                 
330 Chapter 1, paras 1.3-1.5 above. 
331 Chapter 1, paras 1.6-1.7 above. 
332 A literature analysis was carried out on the nature and determinants of board effectiveness (see Chapter 3, paras 3.6.1-
3.6.6 above). 
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In chapter 3, an analysis of literature was conducted. The chapter began by defining corporate 
governance and its importance.
333
 In summary, corporate governance was defined to mean, 
systems by which companies are directed and controlled, with major prominence being 
placed on transparency, independence, fairness and accountability. Corporate governance was 
considered essential in, inter alia, attracting investment both locally and internationally, 
improving organisational performance and improving the overall management of the entity or 
country. The chapter gave an overview of international corporate governance developments 
that are spearheaded by worldwide organisations that include the World Bank, OECD, 
CACG, UN and ICGN, among others.
334
 It also showed that a significant number of 
countries, for example, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Malawi and Australia, have 
developed specific codes and guidelines to promote good corporate governance in their 
respective countries.
335
 
 
The analysis showed that public entities in all countries were formed to drive socio-economic 
development through the provision of social goods such as electricity, education, health and 
water as well as to create jobs, among other things.
336
 But, a significant number of public 
entities have not been able to effectively provide these goods and services but have instead 
continued to be a burden to governments, requiring subsidies in some cases and operating at 
huge losses. The poor performance of the public entities was attributed to many factors, 
among which, poor corporate governance and board ineffectiveness featured most.
337
 Five 
aspects were considered vital for an effective board namely; role, selection and appointment, 
composition, remuneration and evaluation. These aspects were examined to establish their 
impact on the effectiveness of the board.  
 
With regard to the role of the board, the analysis showed that the board’s main roles are to 
monitor management, to provide advice and links to external resources and to set overall 
corporate strategy.
338
 It was found that the boards have not effectively discharged their roles 
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mostly as a result of lack of clarity on the roles due to intricate regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks, multiple and conflicting objectives, highly controlled and bureaucratic decision 
making systems, weak formulation and implementation of strategies and excessive 
shareholder interference.
339
 Concerning board selection and appointment, the review revealed 
that good corporate governance requires that boards should be transparently and objectively 
appointed for their relevant skills, experience and other personal attributes.
340
 However, it 
was found that, in most countries, the selection and appointment process is not transparent 
and objective due to the absence of specific guidelines to guide the process, political 
interference and lack of sufficient numbers of skilled and experienced persons to be 
appointed to the boards.
341
  
 
The chapter also showed that it is good practice, when it comes to board composition, to 
establish boards that are properly composed in terms of, inter alia, independence, skills and 
experience, size, age, race and gender.
342
 But, the literature interrogated showed that there are 
challenges in meeting the requirements due to the limited number of professional and 
experienced people from which to select appropriately qualified directors and due to political 
interference in the appointment of boards.
343
 As far as board remuneration is concerned, it 
was shown that, in terms of good corporate governance standards, the remuneration should be 
linked to performance and should be adequate to draw and retain properly qualified and 
dedicated individuals capable of running the organisation effectively.
344
 It was, however, 
found that difficulties have been encountered to match public entities’ board remuneration to 
that of the private sector and to the responsibilities and liability risks associated with being a 
public entity board member. The main reason for the poor remuneration were found to be 
financial constraints, absence of remuneration guidelines that take into account market 
developments and failure to link the remuneration to board or individual board member 
performance.
345
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The research results also showed that, due to the increased focus on the need for board 
accountability and effectiveness, it has been globally acknowledged that the performance of 
the board has to be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis.
346
 The performance 
evaluation is necessary to enable the responsible authorities and other interested stakeholders 
to assess whether the board is effectively undertaking its obligations. It also assists boards to 
identify their strengths and weaknesses so as to address these issues accordingly. But, 
implementing board evaluations has been shown to have its share of challenges namely; lack 
of formal and standardised performance indicators and board evaluation systems, lack of 
capacity to conduct performance assessments by the responsible authorities, existence of 
numerous and contradictory objectives to be achieved by the same entity, failure by the 
public entities to timely and accurately disclose critical information essential for decision 
making by the relevant authorities and excessive involvement of the parent ministries in the 
operations of the public entities.
347
 
 
As a result of the continued increase in poor corporate governance practices and their 
devastating consequences, many countries have found it essential to complement self-
regulation with mandatory mechanisms so as to encourage organisations to comply with good 
corporate governance principles.
348
 Although some countries have combined voluntary and 
compulsory mechanisms, others have actually adopted a more prescriptive approach like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act which makes compliance with good corporate governance principles 
mandatory.
349
 Relating to the evaluation of the enforcement mechanisms, the literature 
analysed indicated that efforts to enforce compliance have encountered challenges such as 
inadequate courts, judiciary and public enforcement institutions and weak enforcement of 
rules and regulations especially in developing and transitional countries.
350
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Chapter 4 discussed Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework. The Institute of Directors 
of Zimbabwe has been in the forefront of promoting good corporate governance in 
Zimbabwe. On the whole, the country’s corporate governance is determined by a legislative 
framework consisting of the Constitution, various Acts of Parliament, common law and the 
ZSE Listings Requirements and a voluntary system that consists of the Manual, National 
Code and CGF.
351
 In coming up with its own framework, the country has also significantly 
borrowed from other codes on corporate governance, for example, the King Reports, 
Combined Code, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and CAGG Guidelines. To 
enhance compliance with good corporate governance standards, the country also enacted a 
number of laws and institutions to enforce compliance.
352
  
 
Pertaining to the role of the board, the Zimbabwean framework requires that there should be 
clarity through, for example, the statutes establishing public entities, individual appointment 
letters, board charters, comprehensive performance agreements as well as through proper 
induction and training. It is also required that the board should be equipped and independent 
enough to implement the entity’s strategies, have easy access to information on the entity and 
to the services of external professional consultants, be assisted by a competent board 
secretary and properly constituted board committees. As far as the board appointment process 
is concerned, the framework seeks to achieve transparency and objectivity in the selection 
and appointment process so that only appropriately qualified and skilled persons are 
appointed as board members.
353
 In addition, the framework limits the term of office of 
directors to promote new and sound perspectives into discussions and decision making and 
limits the number of directorships one can hold to enable directors to devote sufficient time to 
the business of the entities they are appointed to lead.  
 
With regard to board composition, the Zimbabwean framework targets to achieve properly 
diversified boards in terms of a suitable combination of skills, knowledge and experience, 
independence, size, nationality, age, race and gender, among others.
354
 These factors, if 
properly balanced, are considered important in enhancing board effectiveness which may lead 
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to improvements in the performance of public entities. The framework also aims to achieve 
levels of remuneration that are performance-related and sufficient to attract, motivate and 
retain appropriately qualified people who are capable of effectively achieving the entities’ 
mandates.
355
 To assist the process of setting up and administering remuneration policies that 
comply with good corporate governance, the framework provides for the establishment of a 
remuneration committee and requires that board remuneration should be linked to the 
performance of the board and the individual director as well as to prevailing market 
conditions.
356
  
 
Concerning board performance evaluation, the framework aims to encourage assessment of 
the board’s performance regularly so that any performance and board skills gaps may be 
addressed promptly before they get out of hand.
357
 Some of the measures instituted to enable 
the evaluation of board performance include the requirements to produce comprehensive 
performance agreements, various informative reports, annual audited financial accounts and 
reports and carrying out of regular evaluations of board performances.
358
 Lastly, the 
enforcement mechanisms put in place target to increase the rate of compliance with good 
corporate governance by boards and the public entities so that they can efficiently promote 
economic and social development.
359
 The enforcement mechanisms include penalties such as 
fines, imprisonment and dismissal for noncompliance. The institutions created to enhance 
compliance consist of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, judiciary, Comptroller and Auditor 
General, Anti-Corruption Commission and Corporate Governance and Delivery Agency, 
among others.
360
 
 
However, very minimal evaluation of the successes of these interventions has been done in 
Zimbabwe. This was the reason why the present study was carried out to examine whether 
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these interventions are yielding positive results and to identify the factors mostly contributing 
to the achievement or non-achievement thereof. 
 
In chapter 5, the Zimbabwean corporate governance legal and regulatory mechanisms were 
compared and contrasted with those of South Africa with a view to assess Zimbabwe’s 
standing relative to other regional African countries. The comparative analysis with South 
Africa’s framework revealed that Zimbabwe has kept up to date with regional and 
international developments, the changing business environment and competes favourably 
with some developing countries.
361
 The analysis also confirmed that the two countries have 
emulated the United Kingdom corporate governance framework which comprises of legal 
sources and a system of non-binding codes of best practice.
362
 They have also extensively 
borrowed from other international corporate governance codes like the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance and CAGG Guidelines.  
 
The legal sources for both countries are similar and include the Constitution, Acts of 
Parliament, Stock Exchange Listings Requirements and common law. Similarly, both 
countries have voluntary codes namely the Manual, National Code and CGF for Zimbabwe 
and the King Report and Protocol for South Africa. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa differ in that whilst South Africa considered corporate governance issues much earlier 
and introduced a national code in 1994, Zimbabwe only adopted its National Code in 2015, 
eleven years later. In addition, South Africa, unlike Zimbabwe, has developed additional 
guidelines for specific items pertaining to public entities, for example, the State-owned 
Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines and Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to 
Boards of State and State Controlled Institutions.   
 
In summary, Zimbabwe and South Africa’s corporate governance frameworks seek to ensure 
that, first, the role of the board is clear and detailed formally and the boards are fully 
empowered to perform their duties with minimum government intrusion.
363
 As a second 
measure, the frameworks require that the boards should be appointed in a transparent and 
                                                 
361 Chapter 5, para 5.2.1 above. 
362 Ibid. 
363 The summary of Chapter 4 above states how this is anticipated to be achieved. To avoid too much repetition the 
summaries for chapter 5 and 6 are not giving as much detail as the summary for Chapter 4 given the similarities in the 
mechanisms and the objectives for both countries. Emphasis is only given where there are significant differences.  
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objective manner so that properly qualified and experienced persons are appointed as board 
members.
364
 To this end, a Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and 
State Controlled Institutions was published in South Africa to enhance the board appointment 
process whereas Zimbabwe does not have such a guiding document.
365
 Thirdly, the 
frameworks provide for mechanisms that should result in creation of boards that are 
appropriately composed in terms of independence and diversity. To demonstrate the 
importance it places towards gender equality, South Africa has published a Women 
Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill which Zimbabwe is still to do. However, both 
countries have established Gender Commissions in terms of their Constitutions. Also, to 
motivate directors to effectively discharge their duties, both countries provide for fair, 
adequate and performance related remuneration. In the fifth instance they require that the 
board’s performance be evaluated regularly and that appropriate action be taken if there is 
poor performance.  
 
Although South Africa and Zimbabwe have chosen to maintain a voluntary approach to 
corporate governance, they have relied on their legislative framework and Listing 
Requirements to enforce corporate governance compliance.
366
 Both countries have also 
created regulatory bodies tasked to ensure that public entities and their boards comply with 
corporate governance requirements as well as other laws and regulations.
367
 Examples of 
such bodies are the Auditor General, Anti-Corruption Commission and the judicial system. It 
is important to note that although they do not have enforcement powers, the Institute of 
Directors in both countries have contributed greatly to the promotion of good corporate 
governance. But, South Africa has outperformed Zimbabwe in that it has created more 
supervisory and regulatory institutions to enforce compliance.  
 
Chapter 6 makes a comparative analysis of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance framework to 
that of Australia with a view to assess Zimbabwe’s position internationally. The analysis 
revealed that Zimbabwe has kept up to date with international developments and competes 
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positively with some developed countries.
368
 The analysis also confirmed that the two 
countries share a significant number of issues in common generally preferring voluntary 
compliance with corporate governance principles to compulsory enforcement by statutory 
and regulatory agents. In both countries, the Institute of Directors have spearheaded efforts to 
promote good corporate governance through disseminating information on international 
corporate governance developments and providing technical training on directorship and 
board effectiveness. In addition, Australia and Zimbabwe have both formulated their 
frameworks guided by globally recognised corporate governance instruments like OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, CAGG Guidelines and ICGN Guidelines.  
 
As far as the self-regulatory framework is concerned, both countries have published codes, 
among which there are guidelines particularly meant to guide public entities namely, GBE 
Guidelines, the ASX CGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and 
ANAO Better Practice Guides for Australia and the CGF, Manual and National Code for 
Zimbabwe.
369
 Nonetheless, Australia has done more than Zimbabwe with regard to this 
aspect judging by the wide-ranging programs it has undertaken like the Bosch Report and 
Uhrig Review as well as the number of institutions that seek to promote good corporate 
governance in the country, for example, the AIMA and IFSA. As far as the legal framework 
is concerned, both countries are guided by the Acts of Parliament, Stock Exchange Listings 
Requirements and common law. But, Australia has gone to the extent of coming up with a 
corporate governance specific Act (PGPA Act) relating to public entities which Zimbabwe 
has not done.
370
  
 
Generally, the frameworks for both Zimbabwe and Australia are designed to ensure that the 
effectiveness of the public entities boards is enhanced. This is achieved through empowering 
boards to discharge their duties depth with minimum government interference and clearly 
laying out their roles, transparent and objective appointment of directors, formation of 
properly composed boards, regular assessment of the performance of boards and adequately 
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remunerating the board members to motivate them to exert their best efforts.
371
 All the same, 
Zimbabwe still has to do more and create institutions like the Australian Nomination Panel 
and Remuneration Tribunal to improve its board appointment and remuneration processes. 
Zimbabwe also still to establish a framework to promote gender equality that is equivalent to 
that of Australia. Australia has further performed better than Zimbabwe by coming up with a 
standard way of evaluating boards of public entities in the form of a Director’s Checklist and 
legislating for board evaluations to enhance compliance. With regard to enforcement of 
compliance, although Australia has more regulatory and enforcement mechanisms than 
Zimbabwe, both countries maintain a combination of self-regulatory codes and legal 
instruments.
372
 
 
In Chapter 7, the results obtained from the literature analysis, interviews and questionnaires 
are presented and analysed.
373
 Generally, the research results show that the participants fully 
appreciate what corporate governance is, the level of corporate governance compliance in the 
public entities and the challenges encountered by boards in effectively discharging their 
duties.
374
 The research focused on the board’s role, selection and appointment, composition, 
remuneration and evaluation as well as compliance enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The role of the board was articulated in Zimbabwe’s instruments as to set overall strategic 
plans, manage risk, monitor the performance of the organisation and give guidance to 
management.
375
 Despite the acknowledgement of the board’s role, the research established 
that a number of challenges had been encountered by the boards to effectively undertake 
these responsibilities. These challenges include lack of commitment by poorly inducted and 
trained directors, absence of a proper working framework, limited board independence, lack 
of performance feedback from the appointing authority, too much interference by the 
responsible Minister in the operations of the entity, lack of clear policy objectives, poorly 
composed board committees and delayed government approvals which delay implementation 
                                                 
371 Chapter 6, paras 6.2.2-6.2.6 above. As indicated before, given the similarities in the mechanisms and the objectives for 
Zimbabwe and Australia this chapter’s summary focuses mostly on areas of differences. 
372 Chapter 4, para 4.2.7  and Chapter 6, para 6.2.7 above. 
373 Chapter 7, paras 7.2.2-7.2.7 above. 
374 Chapter 7, para 7.2.2 above. 
375 Ibid. 
324 
 
of projects.
376
 The research found that the mechanisms put in place by Zimbabwe to enable 
boards to effectively perform their roles were similar in many respects to those put in place 
by South Africa and Australia. The three countries also experienced similar challenges but at 
different magnitudes with Australia experiencing the least challenges, followed by South 
Africa and finally Zimbabwe.
377
  
 
It was found that good corporate governance requires that the nomination of directors should 
be based on merit and conducted in a transparent, professional and objective manner.
378
  In 
addition, the potential board members should be properly qualified and experienced, possess 
relevant expertise and be capable of devoting sufficient time to the tasks assigned to them. 
But, a number of challenges were experienced in trying to fully comply with these good 
corporate governance standards.
379
 The main challenge was found to be the absence of 
specific guidelines for the identification and selection of directors which resulted in boards 
appointed based on favouritism and political allegiance. The other challenges were the 
limited number of experienced and qualified individuals to serve as directors resulting in 
multiple directorships, poor director remuneration to attract qualified directors, appointments 
of public servants as board members which fuel government interference in the functions of 
the board and the frequent turnaround of boards without proper hand over take over 
processes. 
 
In the comparative analysis between South Africa and Zimbabwe, the study established that 
South Africa has developed the Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State 
and State Controlled Institutions so as to enable the appointment of boards in a transparent 
and objective manner which Zimbabwe has not done. The research further revealed that 
South Africa has performed better in terms of avoiding numerous board turnarounds and 
promoting board continuity as shown by the stability of boards of some of the entities. 
However, South Africa still experiences similar challenges to those of Zimbabwe although in 
some instances at lesser rates.
380
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Compared to Australia, Zimbabwe still has a number of issues to attend to match the level of 
compliance exhibited in Australia.
381
 Australia has come up with a transparent and structured 
way of selecting directors which includes public advertising or the use of executive search 
processes. Also, Australia has moved towards legislating for board appointments, for 
example, the National Broadcasting Legislation Amendment Act which formalises a merit-
based and independent board appointment process to be conducted through an Independent 
Nomination Panel. The country also has a wider pool of directors to select from which has 
enabled it to minimise on numerous directorships. On the other hand, despite the major 
achievements, it was found that Australia, like Zimbabwe, still encounters some challenges of 
political interference in the board appointment processes. 
 
On board composition,
382
 it was found that it is good corporate governance practice to create 
properly diversified boards in terms of skills mix, personalities, independence, and other 
demographic aspects such as gender, age and race. This enables the board to effectively 
discharge its roles especially if the directors are able to appropriately combine their expertise 
and viewpoints in the interests of the public entity. The research has shown that Zimbabwe 
has successfully managed to create boards with a majority of non-executive directors and to 
separate the role of the board chairman from that of the chief executive officer. Nevertheless 
the country has experienced challenges such as appointment of unqualified and non-
experienced board members, poor women representation on the boards and poorly composed 
boards in terms of skills mix. 
 
When Zimbabwe’s situation was generally compared to that of South Africa, it was found 
that although South Africa may not yet have reached acceptable levels, it has significantly 
performed better than Zimbabwe in terms of promoting gender equality in its boards. But, 
South Africa has also experienced the same challenges as those experienced by Zimbabwe 
especially that of a limited number of potential directors and of failing to fully complying 
with best practice in terms of board composition.  
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Like Australia, Zimbabwe has managed to create boards with a majority of non-executive 
directors and to separate the role of the board chairman from that of the chief executive 
officer. Zimbabwe has similarly tried to promote gender equality although it is still to match 
the standards set and achievements made by Australia. Given the existence of a larger pool of 
directors, Australia has been able to compose more balanced boards in terms of skills mix 
than Zimbabwe as well to limit the appointment of government officials to exceptional 
situations whereas Zimbabwe still appoints these officials to boards of its entities. In this 
regard, although the comparison showed that Australia has performed better, Zimbabwe has 
performed relatively well considering that the former is a developed country. 
 
In respect of board remuneration,
383
 the framework that Zimbabwe has put in place requires 
that the level of remuneration for members of the board should be performance related and 
enough to attract and retain properly qualified and experienced individuals required to run the 
organisation effectively. Despite the acknowledgement, the country has failed to fully 
implement its framework such that it has been unable to link board remuneration to 
performance and to adequately remunerate the directors. This has mainly been caused by the 
absence of a standard remuneration framework that takes into account the directors’ skills, 
responsibilities, performance and the prevailing market conditions. The challenges have been 
compounded by financial constraints experienced by the public entities as shown in the case 
of GMB, NRZ and ZMDC. The poor remuneration has resulted in lack of commitment from 
the directors, poor performance of their duties and engagement in unethical activities as a 
means of raising income. Furthermore, contrary to good practice, the remuneration committee 
has no significant role in the determination of board remuneration as the shareholder Minister 
is responsible for fixing remuneration for public entities.    
    
In the comparison carried out between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the research results 
showed that both countries have put in place similar frameworks to fairly remunerate board 
members.
384
 But, the two countries have not fully achieved the objective of ensuring that 
board members are adequately rewarded in recognition of their expertise, responsibilities and 
performance. Despite the similarities, South Africa has achieved greater strides than 
Zimbabwe in that it has developed the State-owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines 
                                                 
383 Chapter 7, para 7.2.5 above. 
384 Ibid. 
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specifically to guide the determination of board remuneration in public entities. More so, 
South Africa has tried to link the board remuneration to company performance which may be 
a motivational tool to the board members to ensure that the public entities operate 
successfully.  
 
A comparison of Zimbabwe’s position to that of Australia was also conducted.385 The results 
showed that the two countries have more or less similar frameworks that seek to ensure that 
boards are sufficiently rewarded for their skills and performance. However, Australia has 
outperformed Zimbabwe in that it has set up a Remuneration Tribunal which is an 
independent body that objectively determines the board’s remuneration in public entities. In 
determining the remuneration the Tribunal takes into account factors such as “workload and 
work value of the office, fees in the private sector, wage indices, non-cash benefits provided 
and other economic indices and rates set for other bodies”.386 Although Australia has not yet 
reached the acceptable levels of board remuneration, with the assistance of the Remuneration 
Tribunal, it has significantly performed better than Zimbabwe in terms of fairly remunerating 
directors of public entities.   
 
With regard to board evaluation, Zimbabwe acknowledges that board evaluation is a vital tool 
in motivating and also compelling board members to effectively undertake their 
responsibilities.
387
 The country has thus come up with a voluntary framework aimed at 
promoting board evaluations. However, according to the research results, Zimbabwean public 
entities have encountered several challenges in conducting evaluations of board 
performances.
388
 The challenges include appointment of unqualified directors, 
incomprehensive and unclear performance contracts, lack of appropriate and standardised 
performance measurement tools, lack of capacity and sufficient commitment by the 
responsible authorities to effectively monitor the operations of the boards, too much 
interference by the parent ministry in operational issues and too frequent changes in 
                                                 
385 Chapter 7, para 7.2.5 above. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Chapter 4, para 4.2.5 and Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
388 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
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boards.
389
 This has made it difficult to hold directors accountable for poor performance and to 
assess the board’s needs for specific skills and knowledge.  
 
Zimbabwe’s board evaluation framework was compared to that of South Africa and the 
results showed that both countries have created voluntary mechanisms to encourage board 
evaluations.
390
 The difference lies in that public entities in South Africa have moved towards 
implementing board evaluation initiatives at a much larger scale than Zimbabwe as shown by 
some of the public entities’ annual reports and survey results of studies conducted on this 
aspect.
391
 However, South Africa has also encountered similar challenges to those 
experienced by Zimbabwe especially on the issues of poorly crafted performance contracts, 
ineffective monitoring and evaluation by shareholder ministries and political interference in 
the operations of boards.
392
  
 
In comparison to Australia, the research results showed that Zimbabwe’s framework matches 
that of Australia save for the fact that Australia has made board evaluations obligatory in 
terms of its PGPA Act.
393
 Australia has, therefore, seen more of its public entities performing 
board evaluations resulting in considerable changes in board behaviour.
394
 Despite the 
significant success rate, Australia has experienced challenges of lack of clarity of board 
purpose, over involvement in the entities’ operation by the relevant authorities and boards 
becoming bogged down with compliance issues at the expense of performance.
395
 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 evaluates the enforcement mechanisms of Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Australia. The results showed that Zimbabwe has established sufficient voluntary and 
prescriptive mechanisms to enforce compliance with good corporate governance standards.
396
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390 Chapter 5, para 5.2.5 above. 
391 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
392 Ibid.  
393 Chapter 6, para 6.2.5 above. 
394 Chapter 7, para 7.2.5 above. 
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Though, the achievement of full compliance has been undermined by the existence of poor 
enforcement mechanisms, weak monitoring and regulatory organisations and absence of a 
standardised board performance evaluation system to enhance the effectiveness of boards of 
the public entities.
397
 The other challenges included lack of adequate enforcement powers by 
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and lack of appropriate follow ups on external 
audit observations, high level of corruption in the country and absence of a proper framework 
to capacitate and empower the Anti-Corruption Commission to execute its duties competently 
and independently as well as to enforce compliance.
398
 To further complicate the enforcement 
process is the presence of an unreliable, unpredictable and ineffective judicial system and the 
prohibitive high costs of instituting legal action. 
 
In comparison to Zimbabwe, it was found that South Africa’s enforcement is similar to that 
of Zimbabwe in a number of aspects.
399
 The South African mechanisms have also generally 
been labelled as weak and unreliable given the increase in unethical behaviour by directors 
and corporate collapses.
400
 The main causes of South Africa’s challenges were found to be 
poor performance of oversight roles and disjointed oversight practices by relevant authorities 
as a result of the existence of too many institutions that carry out this role and the absence of 
ample resources to undertake the roles.
401
 In addition, enforcement bodies like the Auditor 
General and Anti-Corruption Commission have not been empowered with sufficient 
independence, enforcement powers and adequate operational resources to effectively 
undertake their enforcement roles. Lastly, like Zimbabwe, South Africa’s enforcement drive 
has been adversely affected by high corruption levels and unreliable and ineffective judicial 
systems.  
 
A comparative analysis of Zimbabwe’s enforcement level to that of Australia showed that 
Australia has been more aggressive than Zimbabwe in so far as the implementation and 
                                                 
397 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Chapter 7, para 7.2.7 above. Despite the similarities, South Africa has been ranked better than Zimbabwe internationally 
in so far as enforcement of and compliance with good corporate governance standards is concerned. 
400 Ibid. 
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enforcement of the corporate governance standards is concerned.
402
 Australia’s enforcement 
agents have been more equipped and independent than those of Zimbabwe.
403
 As an example, 
ASIC, as the Australian corporate regulator, has successfully instituted numerous actions 
against directors and enforced compliance with good corporate governance practices. As 
well, the country’s office of the Auditor General has been sufficiently empowered to 
implement an effective auditing system with the assistance of the JCPAA which conducts 
quarterly public hearings on selected audit reports. Another important difference is that 
Australia, unlike Zimbabwe, has lower levels of corruption and its judicial system appears to 
be more reliable and efficient basing on the higher ranking given to Australia globally.
404
 
 
8.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This research was motivated by the poor performance of public entities in Zimbabwe which 
has resulted in them being a heavy burden on taxpayers. The study sought to establish how 
effective public entity boards have been in performing their duties in the existing corporate 
governance framework.  
 
The following conclusions are made based on the analysis of literature and the results from 
the interviews conducted and questionnaires circulated. Despite the existence of a 
comprehensive corporate governance framework, Zimbabwe’s public entities have not been 
spared from the challenges that have been universally experienced by public entities in other 
countries.
405
 In essence, the research findings revealed that efforts to enhance the 
effectiveness of boards of public entities and promote good corporate governance within the 
entities are adversely affected by a number of issues. First, in practice, boards are not fully 
empowered to perform their responsibilities due to multiple and conflicting organisational 
objectives, excessive interference by the government, lack of autonomous powers by the 
board, lack of director training and development and absence of a proper working framework 
to guide the boards. As a result, directors lack the powers and commitment that is required to 
make meaningful and constructive contributions to the running of the business. 
                                                 
402 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
405 See Chapter 3, para 3.6 above, for general challenges. 
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Secondly, the legal and regulatory framework governing the appointment of board members 
has loopholes that have adversely impacted on the effectiveness of boards. Board members 
are appointed for the wrong reasons and therefore lack the necessary skills and expertise to 
effectively direct the respective entities towards achieving their goals. The main challenge is 
that the framework in place defines the person responsible for appointing the boards (“the 
Responsible Minister in consultation with the President”) but there are no clear guidelines on 
academic and professional qualifications and the framework does not specify the process that 
has to be followed.  
 
The criteria used in the appointment and dismissal of directors of public entities have 
therefore not been disclosed to the public. This gives the appointing authorities the 
opportunity to flout the rules and regulations by appointing board members for their political 
allegiance and other improper reasons which in turn deprive the public entities of appropriate 
autonomy. Another challenge is the limited number of persons with adequate and relevant 
skills in the management of public entities which has resulted in multiple directorships that 
incapacitate directors to exert their best efforts. The framework guiding the appointment of 
public entities boards has therefore not significantly assisted the boards to effectively carry 
out their responsibilities.  
 
In the third instance, due to the irregular appointment of directors, achieving board diversity 
appears not to be always possible in Zimbabwe especially with regard to relevant expertise 
and gender. In some cases, the people who are appointed as directors are usually not well 
versed with the complexities of the public entity and the industry in which it operates as well 
as the applicable laws and regulations. The absence of expertise and relevant skills makes it 
difficult for public entity boards to effectively discharge their duties. Also gender equality has 
not been given the prominence it deserves in the selection and appointment of board 
members. Fourthly, judging from the research results, the directors’ remuneration is not yet 
commensurate with the level of responsibility and potential reputational risks associated with 
being a board member in public entities. As a result, the pool from which to choose directors 
is small because not many people are willing to be directors of public entities as they would 
rather concentrate on more rewarding businesses. The remuneration framework has thus not 
been implemented in such a way that it is able to motivate board members to effectively 
discharge their duties. 
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The fifth challenge is that there is neither implementation of performance contracts nor is 
there a systematic way of evaluating board performance. The absence of appropriate 
performance measurement tools to regularly assess the board’s performance has significantly 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of boards and the poor performance of public entities. 
Given the fact that the responsible authorities are not regularly monitoring and evaluating the 
boards’ performance, the boards may not have the motivation to effectively discharge their 
mandate especially if they believe that the shareholders are not interested in the outcome of 
their actions be it failures or achievements. The absence of monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of the board compromises its efficiency.
406
 It can therefore be concluded that 
although Zimbabwe has created a framework to promote public entity board effectiveness, 
there has not been sufficient effort to put in place an appropriate implementation framework 
with regard to board performance evaluation.  
 
It has been universally acknowledged that regulation and legislation is not enough without 
proper enforcement.
407
 An evaluation of the findings on Zimbabwe’s enforcement 
mechanism shows that the country has failed to effectively enforce corporate governance 
compliance in its public entities. The country has not put sufficient measures to ensure that 
the framework it has put in place achieves the desired results. For example, the 
implementation of performance contracts on their own has not yielded meaningful results in 
Zimbabwe because the contracts are not properly designed, the government has not shown 
much commitment in enforcing the contracts and the boards have not been given adequate 
autonomy to achieve the performance targets. More so, the research results point to the fact 
that Zimbabwe’s relevant authorities have done very little towards empowering the 
enforcement agents in terms of investigative skills, independence, resources and the legal 
powers to enforce compliance.  
 
                                                 
406 According to Swanson and Wolde-Semait, performance monitoring “provides useful economic and financial information 
to policymakers and analysts alike, acts as a tool for measuring the strengths and weaknesses of enterprises, and serves as a 
guide in decision-making for resource allocation and for the design of reform programs”. Monitoring the performance of 
public entities is also an essential tool of measuring the effectiveness of the boards, rewarding good performance and 
punishing poor performers as well as reinforcing reform programs (Swanson D and Wolde-Semait T Africa’s Public 
Enterprise Sector and Evidence of Reforms (World Bank Technical Paper Number 95, Washington, D.C 1989) 2). 
407 Chapter 3, para 3.6.6 above. 
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Another major challenge that appears to have weakened the enforcement mechanisms 
developed by the country to enhance board effectiveness is the high rate of corruption in 
Zimbabwe. The relevant authorities have not exhibited much political will to eliminate 
corruption as they have mostly concentrated on the symptoms and not root causes of 
corruption. As a result, the government needs to establish ways of eliminating corruption, 
create an adequate legal and judicial framework and be committed and more consistent in the 
implementation of good corporate governance standards and enforcement of compliance.  
 
8.3.1 Concluding Remarks 
It is clear from the above that Zimbabwe has put in place a credible corporate governance 
framework to improve the effectiveness of boards and encourage public entities to fulfil the 
goals of efficient and affordable service provision. But, the framework has not fully assisted 
the boards to effectively carry out their mandate. The recent highly publicised corporate 
governance scandals by boards of public entities, as highlighted above,
408
 indicate a 
disconnection between the country’s corporate governance framework and actual practices. 
The main area Zimbabwe needs to focus on is the implementation and enforcement of the 
corporate governance standards as establishing a good framework on paper without 
implementation will not help the country much.  
 
Overall, the results of the study show that, regardless of Zimbabwe’s commendable efforts to 
promote good corporate governance in its public entities, it has not been in a position to 
match the standards of South Africa and Australia in so far as development of corporate 
governance guidelines and regulations, implementation of good corporate governance 
principles and enforcement of compliance are concerned. The country, therefore, has to put 
more effort to improve the standard of corporate governance in its entities and may learn 
from other developing countries like South Africa and developed countries similar to 
Australia. This is more so with regard to the quality of enforcement especially in empowering 
the directors of public entities, transparently and objectively appointing directors, creating 
appropriately composed boards, adequately remunerating the board members and conducting 
effective board performance evaluations.  
 
                                                 
408 Chapter 7, paras 7.22-7.25 above. 
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Therefore, what the research results show is that boards of public entities have not 
considerably benefited from the existing corporate governance framework due to absence of 
total commitment from all relevant stakeholders to observe the standards set and also due to a 
multiple and conflicting objectives, economic challenges, poor enforcement mechanisms and 
unethical practices, among others.    
 
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS  
The research highlights a number of crucial aspects of non-conformance to best practice by 
Zimbabwe’s public entities. Based on the above research findings, this section lays down 
some recommendations that could enhance the effectiveness of the boards of Zimbabwean 
public entities and alleviate some of the problems being encountered by the entities. These 
recommendations may be useful to the Zimbabwean government officials, leaders and public 
entity directors to improve the corporate governance framework in public entities. 
Policymakers, leaders and public entity directors from other regional and developing 
countries may also benefit from these recommendations.  
 
8.4.1 Empowerment of Boards 
Whilst it is acknowledged that some form of government intervention is necessary for the 
successful achievement of the objectives of public entities, it is universally accepted that the 
intervention based on public policy, political or national interest should not clash with 
commercial interests to the extent of compromising the efficient performance of the entities. 
It is therefore recommended that, to improve the effectiveness of the boards, the government 
should minimise its interference in the operations of the public entities and restrict its 
intervention only to strategic and essential issues. Essentially, the role of the government 
should be to develop the policy framework, set the long term mandates and develop 
performance contracts with specified economic, financial and performance requirements. 
Thereafter, the board and management should be afforded the opportunity to exercise their 
own independent judgment in the management of the public entity and to function in a 
professional manner. 
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However, this is only achievable when government is fully committed to a system of 
autonomous control by boards and when the state and board have a clear and common 
understanding of their roles, in an environment of frequent communication and trust. 
Zimbabwe can learn from Australia’s centralised system (monitoring and advisory unit)409 
which has assisted the later in minimising interference by the responsible ministries in the 
operations of public entities. An independent public entity monitoring and advisory unit is 
essential in enabling government to provide arm’s length management and oversight of 
public entities. 
 
To achieve board role clarity and efficiency, it is important that the government should 
implement performance agreements which are free from ambiguities and conflicting 
objectives. It is also recommended that standard performance agreements should be 
developed to achieve uniformity in the public sector. However, the standard performance 
agreements should take into account the specific features of the entities and communicate 
clear priorities and objectives, based on which citizens and political leaders can evaluate the 
performance of the boards and management. The government, through the relevant parent 
ministry, should play an oversight role by systematically monitoring and reporting on the 
public entity’s performance against the set objectives, hence promoting transparency and 
accountability.  
 
It is further recommended that, to minimise excessive government interference, all relevant 
stakeholders (e.g. policymakers and shareholder representatives) should be subjected to 
training on corporate governance and be regularly updated on latest developments.
410
 Also, 
where civil servants are appointed to boards of public entities training is vital to educate them 
on the importance of not allowing their role in the public service to compromise their 
independent judgment with respect to the public entity. Similarly, the boards have to be 
trained on how to balance government or national interests with the interests of the public 
entities as well on good corporate governance in general. But, it is important to note that 
training may not be sufficient as a solution on its own hence the need for the trained people to 
                                                 
409 Chapter 6, para 6.2.2 above. 
410 Whilst training may not be enough to promote good corporate governance practices, it is a critical step in educating and 
equipping the relevant stakeholders with the benefits of observing good corporate governance standards. 
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implement what they would have been trained to do and also for follow up mechanisms to 
establish whether the training is achieving the desired results.   
 
8.4.2 Establishment of Transparent and Structured Board Nomination Systems 
The best way of restricting governmental or political interference in the nomination of public 
entity boards and increasing their independence and professionalism is to put in place 
structured and clearly skill-based nomination systems, making sure that the ultimate selection 
criterion is transparent and based on competency and proven professionalism. Zimbabwe can 
consider learning from Australia’s structured and skill-based nomination system and South 
Africa’s Handbook for the Appointment of Persons to Boards of State and State Controlled 
Institutions which specifically deal with appointments of boards of public entities as well as 
specify the approval procedures to be followed.
411
  
 
It is also recommended that the policy makers should create an independent tribunal (e.g. 
parliamentary committee or committee comprised of qualified experts) that is charged with 
the responsibility of selecting and appointing board members based on a transparent and 
objective criteria approved by the government. The tribunal should be responsible for 
development of the selection criteria, identification of the needs of the public entity, creating 
a database of potential nonexecutive board candidates, assessing and vetting potential 
candidates, monitoring boards’ composition for appropriateness and making suitable 
recommendations to the designated office.  
 
To further enhance transparency, appointments should be advertised and a shortlist compiled 
by the independent or impartial panel even if the final decision on appointment still lies with 
the relevant parent minister, President of the country or any other designated office. In 
addition, to preserve the independence and job security of board members, it is recommended 
that the board should not be dismissed by the parent minister without the parliamentary 
committee’s consideration of the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. Appropriate 
policy and statutory changes on public entity board appointments may be required if this is to 
be achieved. This will avoid circumstances where boards are unjustifiably dismissed 
                                                 
411 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.3 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.3 above. 
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especially whenever a new minister is appointed as has been the case in Zimbabwe.
412
 It will 
also limit the influence and abuse of power over the boards by the respective ministers. 
 
However, it is important to note that although a structured nomination system may 
depoliticise the nomination process, no technique is full proof and all can be subverted by 
individuals who may be determined to impose their candidate on the board. It is, therefore, of 
paramount importance that the government should genuinely be supportive of the objective of 
appointing appropriately qualified and experienced individuals as board members of public 
entities. The government can also consider seeking the services of professional bodies like 
accounting and legal institutions to assist in the nomination of persons to be appointed as 
directors to the boards of public entities. The advantage of using professional organisations is 
that they have access to a wider pool of potential directors with more diverse backgrounds, an 
important characteristic of boards. Zimbabwe may borrow from Australia’s framework which 
provides for a similar process wherein supplementary processes such as public advertising or 
the use of executive search processes are used.
413
  
 
In undertaking board appointments, it is further recommended that, in addition to relevant 
qualifications and expertise, the persons to be appointed as board members should be of good 
financial standing. This is to ensure that the appointees do not end up seeking to benefit from 
the entity as if they were employees and engaging in unethical activities for financial gain as 
is the current state in the public entities. Prospective board members should be asked to 
declare assets before appointment. The country should also robustly implement the provisions 
that discourage multiple board memberships so that board members can have sufficient time 
to effectively discharge their duties. With regard to promotion of gender equality, it is 
recommended that Zimbabwe should borrow from South Africa and Australia which have 
developed specific legislation and created institutions targeted towards achieving gender 
equality in boards of public entities.
414
 The country should also put sufficient measures to 
ensure that public entities comply with the promotion of a gender equality framework that it 
would have put in place. 
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8.4.3 Induction and Development of Directors 
From the research findings, it would appear that it is the quality of the individual directors 
that play a significant role in the effectiveness of public entity boards. Yet, despite the 
importance of their role as directors, there seems to be a general lack of adequate attention to 
the proper induction and development of these directors to make them competent to the tasks. 
It is therefore, recommended that more effort should be directed towards professionally 
developing individuals that are engaged as directors through comprehensive formal induction 
and training so that they become competent to act as such. It is also imperative that adequate 
resources should be channeled towards training facilities and programs for corporate 
directors. In addition, all potential directors should be enlightened on the necessity for 
training and continual development as well as encouraged to attend the induction and training 
sessions so that they are capacitated to effectively discharge their duties. This would also 
ensure that the country has a reasonable pool of appropriately qualified and independent 
directors especially in cases where directors are required to have specialist knowledge such as 
those who serve on the audit committee of a board. 
 
8.4.4 Improvement of Board Remuneration 
Recruiting qualified non-executive board members requires more than just offering a nominal 
fee but adequate compensation that matches the skills, expertise and the responsibilities of the 
directors. Board remuneration should therefore be sufficient to attract and retain high quality 
skill, experience and expertise as well as loyalty and commitment to the public entity. To 
enable public entities to adequately remunerate their directors, it is recommended that board 
remuneration should be set and reviewed by, preferably, an independent remuneration 
committee similar to the Australian Remuneration Tribunal.
415
 The  Committee should be 
tasked to come up with a standard remuneration framework which takes into account, inter 
alia, market developments, the entity’s financial status, required skills and expertise, entity’s 
objectives and strategic importance, director’s responsibilities, international best practices 
and director’s performance and contribution to the performance and success of the entity. The 
proposed committee and framework should be approved by Parliament before 
implementation and should be subjected to regular review to take into account current 
                                                 
415 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.5 above. 
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developments. Zimbabwe can also learn from South Africa’s State-owned Enterprises 
Remuneration Guidelines and adjust it to suit its own specific requirements.
416
 
 
8.4.5 Introduction of Systematic Board Evaluation Tools 
The research indicated that Zimbabwe has not seriously implemented board evaluations for 
its public entities. Implementing a strong and successful board and director evaluation system 
is one important way to ensure that a board can avert organisational failure as well as 
evaluate the existing mix of competences and skills and specify new profiling for new board 
positions. Board performance should not just focus on achievements in terms of profits and 
dividends contributed to Treasury but on the provision of high quality goods and services, 
employment creation and general economic and social development. It is therefore 
recommended that public entities should introduce robust regular board evaluations and 
feedback systems as a matter of urgency. 
 
First, the board, with the assistance of a competent company secretary, can undertake internal 
board and individual director’s performance evaluations. Thereafter, there should be an 
introduction of an independent or third-party review mechanism of board performance which 
functions independently to advise and make recommendations to the relevant ministries, 
parliamentary committee or the presidency. The evaluation criteria should focus on important 
issues for the specific public entity and should be linked to the kinds of decisions and 
processes necessary for the effective performance of the entity. To be effective the evaluation 
should be performed at board and individual director levels, be benchmarked to international 
standards and linked to the criteria for appointing directors. 
 
In the second instance, the government should clarify the respective roles of parent ministries 
and other relevant regulators through formal means. This would ensure that the key 
participants have distinct areas of responsibility, which are aligned with their objectives and 
mandates and enhance the effective monitoring of the public entities. Clear performance 
expectations should be set in a shareholder’s agreement and performance assessments for the 
board members should be formalised in individual performance agreements and linked to the 
shareholder’s agreement. For successful results, the members of parliament and parent 
                                                 
416 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.5 above. 
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ministries should be continuously trained and capacitated to monitor the entities’ 
performance with respect to the shareholder’s agreement. 
 
It is also recommended that public entities’ mandates, performance contracts and 
performance achievements or failures should be publicly available to enable the public to 
hold the public entities accountable for delivery. The public entities’ annual reports should 
also provide as much information as possible on the board’s performance levels. Disclosure 
has been found to be one of the key mechanisms for regulation and monitoring hence its 
enforcement should greatly assist in achieving compliance with good corporate 
governance.
417
 But, measures should be put in place to guarantee that directors do not 
manipulate publicised information in order to show positive performance of public entities 
and, accordingly, avoid removal from their offices. An example of such measures is creating 
a system whereby independent verification of the information by a third party is conducted 
before the information is publicised. 
 
The research also showed that boards of public entities are too frequently changed which 
compromises the effectiveness of the boards. It is recommended that boards should be 
allowed to serve for reasonable periods (preferably the periods stipulated in the enabling 
Acts) and not be frequently changed as is the case now. The government should come up 
with a guiding framework linked to the appointment framework that protects directors from 
malicious dismissals and guarantees security of tenure even if there is a change in 
government or minister. If boards serve for reasonable periods they are able to demonstrate 
their capabilities and accomplish set targets. Where the circumstances demand that the boards 
be changed, it is recommended that some of the board members from the old board be 
retained for continuity purposes.  
 
8.4.6 Improvement of Enforcement Mechanisms  
The corporate governance framework put in place by Zimbabwe can only be effective if 
properly implemented and enforced. Having considered the enforcement challenges 
                                                 
417 In this regard, it would be ideal if a system is put in place to encourage formal and regular interaction between public 
entities and their stakeholders. The board should oversee the establishment of mechanisms and processes that support 
stakeholder interactions on the performance and strategic issues facing the public entity. This will assist the board to obtain 
diverse ideas from the stakeholders and to improve cooperation between the parties. 
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experienced by the country,
418
 a number of recommendations may be useful. First, it is 
recommended that the regulatory bodies tasked with the monitoring of public entities, e.g. 
parent ministries, should be equipped with appropriate financial and competent human 
resources to ensure that the monitoring system is effective. As a second measure, it is 
important that the audit observations that are presented by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General on the performance of the public entities should be seriously pursued and actioned.
419
 
It is thus, recommended that Zimbabwe should create a committee similar to the Australian 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit which will be responsible for ensuring that the 
audit observations are attended to and for following up on the implementation of the same.
420
  
 
Thirdly, given the vast developments in the business world, it is imperative for Zimbabwe’s 
outdated company law to be reviewed and revised in line with changing business needs and 
circumstances and to keep pace with international developments. The Companies Acts in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa could be of comparative value.
421
 It is also recommended 
that the country should consider developing prescriptive law specific to some corporate 
governance issues like the Australian PGPA Act
422
 and enhance the enforcement of the 
existing laws to improve the levels of corporate governance compliance. For example, there 
should be legal provisions that subject members of public entity boards to liability for 
neglectful decisions. In the fourth instance, it is recommended that Zimbabwe should put 
vigorous efforts towards the elimination of corruption which has significantly compromised 
the country’s enforcement system. To this end, it is proposed that institutions like the Anti-
Corruption Commission should be vested with sufficient independence, investigational 
capacity and authoritative powers to enforce compliance. The institutions should also be 
adequately resourced in terms of financial and human resources. 
 
                                                 
418 Chapter 7, para 7.2.6 above. 
419 This recommendation is based on the fact that the majority of public entities are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General and the research findings (Chapter 7, para 7.2.7 above) are that, in most cases, the audit findings are not considered 
seriously, not acted upon with the urgency they deserve or followed up to check whether they have been adequately 
addressed. 
420 See Chapter 6, para 6.2.7 above. 
421 To align their company legislation with international developments, the United Kingdom promulgated a new Companies 
Acts in 2006 and South Africa published a new Companies Act in 2008. 
422 See Chapter 6, paras 6.2.1.6 and 6.2.7 above. 
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Similarly, the country should adopt appropriate measures to strengthen the rule of law and 
transform the judiciary into a transparent, independent, legitimate and impartial institution. 
The judicial system should therefore be reinforced with autonomous powers as well as 
adequately resourced in terms of skilled human and financial resources so that they are able 
to effectively enforce compliance with good corporate governance standards.
423
 Furthermore, 
punitive measures should be transparently and consistently imposed on those who violate 
corporate governance regulations irrespective of the social or official status of the person 
involved. To assist the transformation process, the political leadership should obey the 
decisions of the judiciary and minimise political interference. It is also recommended that 
consideration should be given to enactment of legislation that prohibits politicians and 
officials, for example, ministers and members of parliament from giving directives or 
interfering in the operations of public entities otherwise they should be subjected to potential 
personal legal liability for the entities’ failures. 
 
However, it is important to note that stringent requirements may fail to achieve full corporate 
governance compliance as research has shown that there is more to corporate governance 
than just laws and regulations; directors have to be committed to practice good corporate 
governance.
424
 It is therefore imperative to educate and encourage the boards and 
management of public entities to voluntarily implement good corporate governance out of 
conviction and not because of fear of punishment as too harsh and inappropriate sanctions 
may not only be unnecessary, but outright counterproductive.
425
 This is because directors 
who believe in corporate governance do not require rules like the Sarbanes-Oxley to conduct 
themselves diligently and professionally as they consider fulfilment of regulations as a 
minimum criterion for performance and go far beyond just meeting the requirements on a 
checklist. Considering this, it is recommended that policymakers and other relevant 
                                                 
423 Whilst adequately resourcing and equipping all its judicial system and regulatory authorities might not be possible in the 
immediate future because of the need to address other social and economic obligations, gradual attention to addressing the 
current challenges should see the country significantly improving the quality of its enforcement to match international 
standards. 
424 Even though regulatory systems and enforcement schemes may encourage directors to follow the law, there are limits to 
which they can do so as ultimately the decision to act responsibly must come from within the individuals as no law or 
regulations are adequate to guide directors’ behavior (Vaughn M et al Corporate Governance in South Africa: A Bellwether 
for the Continent? (2006) 504-512). See also Zvavahera P “Corporate Governance and Ethical Behaviour: The case of the 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation” (2014) 1-8. 
425 But, it is important to bear in mind that, in certain circumstances, incentives may not be enough on their own but need to 
be complemented by legal sanctions to achieve the desired improvements in compliance with good corporate standards 
especially if one considers the poor state of corporate governance in the country’s public entities. 
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stakeholders should consider coming up with non-legal incentives rather than negative 
consequences in case of violation of the provisions of the codes of corporate governance. The 
individual directors thus have to be incentivised to be committed to practice good corporate 
governance.  
 
The incentives can take the form of awards for best implementers of good corporate 
governance standards and incentive contracts for board members. Zimbabwe can learn from 
South Africa and Australia’s systems where annual corporate governance awards are granted 
to the best public entities in terms of complying with good corporate governance standards.
426
 
The corporate governance reports and explanations of the entities could be evaluated, praised 
and even rewarded by the financial press, supervisory agencies, shareholder associations and 
possibly by external auditors. Also, public entities should be encouraged to list on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and even other international stock exchanges as by so doing they 
will be compelled to comply with certain minimum corporate governance standards as 
required by the respective Listing Rules.  
 
Furthermore, whistle blowing as well as naming and shaming defaulters could be used to 
motivate compliance. Zimbabwe could consider developing a framework similar to South 
Africa’s Companies Act and the JSE Listing Requirements which provide for the publication 
of delinquent directors’ details.427 The fear of reputational damage associated with bad 
publicity may be deterrent in that directors are less likely to risk financial harm or to 
compromise their reputations by engaging in unethical and unprofessional conduct. Lastly, 
public entities should be encouraged to establish a corporate governance board committee 
whose main responsibility should be to ensure that the board complies with good corporate 
governance standards at all times. The company secretary will have a vital role to play in this 
regard.  
 
8.4.7 Privatisation of Some Public Entities 
It is recommended that the country selects from its many public entities those entities that can 
be converted into private entities. Privatisation is advantageous because it improves 
                                                 
426 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.7 and Chapter 6, para 6.2.7 above. 
427 See Chapter 5, para 5.2.3 above. 
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efficiency and profitability, increases competition, prevents political interference, prevents 
the bureaucracy that is associated with public entities and eliminates corruption because 
managers of private companies are more accountable to shareholders. In addition, private 
companies are able to more easily raise investment capital than public entities because the 
government’s budget has to be spread over several areas of the economy.  
 
However, in selecting the entities for privatisation it is critical for the responsible authorities 
to take into account the nature of goods or services in question. This is because there are 
some social obligations such as water supply, healthcare, education and public transport 
which the government may still need to regulate for the good of the general public.
428
 It is 
also important to note that the issue of privatisation of public entities as an alternative to 
address some of the established challenges can only yield fruitful results if properly managed 
and if the relevant authorities are committed to empowering boards and respecting their 
independence. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that, despite the existence of a credible corporate governance 
framework, public entity boards have not been able to effectively discharge their duties due 
to several constraints.
429
 To enjoy the benefits of its corporate governance framework, 
Zimbabwe should focus more on improving the quality of enforcement of the existing 
guidelines, laws and regulations. The country should also strive to eliminate corruption, 
minimise political interference in the public entities’ affairs and strengthen its regulatory and 
judicial systems. 
 
 
                                                 
428 It is imperative to consider that private companies may provide inferior goods or services since they are driven by the 
profit making objectives rather than public interest in the delivery of essential services. The public may also not be 
guaranteed of the benefits of privatisation because there is limited government oversight or control over private companies. 
The other disadvantages to consider are the potential loss of dividends to the government, abuse of monopoly power by the 
private entities, investing in short term profits at the expense of long term projects. For more information on the pros and 
cons of privatisation, see Kousadikar A and Singh T K “Advantages and Disadvantages of Privatisation in India” (2013) 3(1) 
International Journal of Advanced System and Social Engineering Research 18-22 available at 
http://bipublication.com/files/ijaser-v3i1-2013-04.pdf  (accessed on 29 June 2015) and Kalejaiye PO, Adebayo K and Lawal 
O “Deregulation and Privatization in Nigeria: The Advantages and Disadvantages So Far” (2013) 7(25) African Journal of 
Business Management 2403-2409. 
429 The constraints include excessive government interference, a lack of structured and transparent board appointment 
processes, improperly constituted boards, poor board remuneration, absence of effective board evaluation tools and poor 
enforcement mechanisms (see Chapter 7 above). 
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8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH  
The present study alerts government and all other stakeholders to areas of corporate 
governance practices in Zimbabwean public entities that warrant attention. The study 
contributes to the scarce academic literature on public sector corporate governance in Africa 
in general, and in Zimbabwe’s public sector in particular. It is therefore hoped that this 
research can assist other researchers to further investigate other complexities faced by public 
entities’ boards in effectively discharging their duties. The research can also assist policy 
makers to develop laws and regulations which will improve the performance of the entities as 
well as the directors and their advisers to develop and maintain effective boards. 
 
A number of areas are suggested for further research. The research can be extended to assess 
the contribution and effectiveness of other crucial stakeholders (e.g. management, employees, 
investors and politicians) whose conduct is key in promoting good corporate governance and 
in enabling public entities to achieve national economic and social goals. Further research can 
examine the perceptions of various stakeholders on the rate of compliance with good 
corporate governance in Zimbabwe. Another possible area of research would be establishing 
the impact of political intervention in the operations of the board and the public entities. 
Finally, future research can also be targeted at examining the relationships between the chair 
and the rest of the board and management to establish the effect of the relationships on the 
success or failure of public entities. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Nomusa Jane Moyo. I am a student at the University of South Africa undertaking 
a Doctoral degree. I am conducting a research study entitled “Corporate Governance - A 
Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors in Public Entities in 
Zimbabwe.”  
 
The purpose of the research study is to critically analyse the effectiveness of boards of 
Zimbabwean public entities (State-owned Enterprises) in discharging their duties and to 
identify the major constraints faced by the directors in effectively performing their mandates 
within the existing corporate governance framework. In addition, the research seeks to 
establish the extent to which the legislatures and policy makers in Zimbabwe have intervened 
to enhance the effectiveness of public entities’ boards of directors and promote good 
corporate governance. Finally, the research also recommends how best the boards may be 
assisted so that they are able to perform their duties diligently and promote good corporate 
governance. The results of the study may assist in improving the effectiveness of boards of 
public entities and promoting good corporate governance in the entities 
 
This is an invitation to participate in a research study conducted by the researcher. Your 
cooperation is sought to complete the questionnaire to gather information on the research 
study. Your participation will involve completing a questionnaire or answering questions in a 
face to face interview which should not exceed 1 hour of your time. The survey requests your 
honest responses to questions on current corporate governance practises in your public entity 
and your opinion on the effectiveness of the practices in promoting board effectiveness and 
good corporate governance in general. The interview and questionnaire focus on 5 main 
aspects of public entity boards namely, role of board, appointment of boards/directors, 
composition of the board, remuneration of the board and evaluation of the board’s 
performance.  
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Please note that your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate 
or to withdraw from the study at any time, you can do so without penalty or loss of benefit to 
yourself. The results of the research study may be published but your identity will remain 
confidential and your name will not be disclosed to any outside party. In this research, there 
are no foreseeable risks to you. Furthermore, no information gained from this survey will be 
identified with the name of the organisation and the results will be presented in aggregate in 
the research report 
 
I thank you in advance for your support with this study. 
 
In confirmation of your agreement to participate in this study please sign and return the 
attached consent form. 
 
 
N J Moyo 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
The researcher has thoroughly explained the parameters of the research study and all of my 
questions and concerns have been addressed. All parts of the research study are clear to me.  
 
I, _____________________________________________(print name in full) hereby consent 
to participate in the study.  
 
I understand that: 
 Participation is voluntary  
 That I may refuse to participate in any aspect of the study 
 I may request to be withdrawn from the study and any time without consequences 
 No information that may identify me will be included in the research report, and my 
responses and participation will remain confidential 
 There are no direct risks or benefits involved in my participation 
 
 
 
Signed                         ________________________ 
 
 
Date                            __________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC ENTITY DIRECTORS 
 
This questionnaire is part of an academic research in pursuance of a Doctor of Laws Degree (LLD) on 
“Corporate Governance: Effectiveness of Boards in Zimbabwe Public Entities.” It is prepared 
only for the purpose of gathering information to ascertain the effectiveness of boards of public 
entities/parastatals in Zimbabwe. Respondents are requested to provide honest answers to the 
questions below. The data furnished and the identity of the respondents will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
 
SECTION A – PERSONAL INFORMATION 
1. Gender 
Male                                                                                Female 
 
2. Years of relevant experience 
Less than 5 years                                                       Between 5 and 10 years 
Over 10 years 
 
 
SECTION B – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. What is your understanding of corporate governance? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................  
2. In your view, does a company’s performance improve by adopting good corporate governance 
practices? 
Yes                                                                                      No 
 
3. Do you think that corporate governance should be made mandatory or voluntary in Zimbabwe’s 
public entities? Please explain your answer 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 
4. Does your board comply with Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and 
Parastatals introduced in Zimbabwe in 2010? 
Yes                                                                                   No 
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5. Did the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals impact on the 
performance of the board in your organisation? Please state reasons for your answer 
................................................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................................................. 
6. Is the current legal and regulatory framework conducive and sufficient to enhance the 
effectiveness of your board in promoting good corporate governance? Please explain 
.............................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................... 
7. How would you rate your organisation’s corporate governance systems and level of compliance? 
Poor                                                   Fair                                             Good 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
 
SECTION C – ROLE OF THE BOARD 
1. Does your organisation’s board of directors have a charter to guide its operations? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................ 
2. Does your organisation have a written policy for induction and professional development of 
directors to ensure that they have a proper understanding of their role and the organisation’s 
operations and business? 
        Yes                                                                                 No 
 
3. Were you, as a board member, given clear guidance on what is expected of you and do you get 
regular feedback on whether you are meeting expectations? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................... 
4. Does the board have a role in strategy formulation and implementation? 
       Yes                                                                             No 
 
Please explain your answer 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................. 
5. How often does your board meet to review the implementation of the strategy? 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
 
6. How soon are decisions taken at board meetings communicated to the concerned departments for 
implementation? 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
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7. Does the board establish and monitor policies directed at ensuring that the Corporation complies 
with the law and conforms to the highest standards of good corporate governance? 
        Yes                                                                                  No 
 
If so please briefly explain the process involved. 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
8. What system has been put in place to ensure that the board and the individual members are 
accountable with respect to their duties and responsibilities? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
9. In your view, is the board adequately empowered to undertake its functions? 
      Yes                                                                           No 
          
10. How do you rate the level of government/ministry involvement in the performance of duties by 
the board? 
       Excessive                                    Sufficient                                   Inadequate     
 
       Please justify your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
11. How would you rate your general understanding of the business of the organisation? 
Very Good                                      Good                                              Poor 
 
12. How many board committees does your board have? Please name them 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
13. Are all committees appropriately comprised in terms of experience and qualifications? Please 
explain your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
14. Do board committees have clear terms of reference setting out their scope of work, role and 
responsibilities to enable them to perform their functions properly?  
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
15. How would you rate the effectiveness of your board committees? 
        Very Good                                            Good                                     Poor 
 
16. Does your organisation have a competent corporate secretary? 
       Yes                                                                                 No      
 
17. How, in your view, can your board best be supported to effectively perform its role? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................... 
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SECTION D: BOARD SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT  
1. Does the Corporation have a transparent procedure for the appointment and retirement of 
directors? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
2. Who was responsible for appointing you to the board? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
3. What criterion was used to select and appoint you? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
4. What attracted you to board service at this organisation in the first place and what keeps you 
interested as a director? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
5. For how long have you served as a board member in the organisation? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
6. In how many other organisations do you serve as a board member? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
7. In your opinion, does Zimbabwe have sufficient numbers of skilled and experienced directors to 
meet the needs of its public entities? Please state reasons for your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
SECTION E: COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 
1. What are the specific mandatory requirements for the compositions of members of your board of 
directors in terms of: 
minimum qualifications,        ...................................................................                                                                                        
 board size,                             ................................................................... 
maximum years of tenure,      ................................................................... 
maximum age of directors,     ...................................................................  
minimum or maximum years of experience in specific areas,   ............................................ 
maximum number of board membership each director may hold   ............................................ 
 
2. How may directors constitute your present board and what are their professional backgrounds? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
3. How many of the directors are government officials?  
..................................................................................................................................................... 
4. How many of the directors are women?  
..................................................................................................................................................... 
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5. Does your board have the right blend of skills, expertise and personalities, and the appropriate 
degree of diversity, to enable it effectively discharge its duties? 
Please justify your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
SECTION F: BOARD REMUNERATION 
1. Does your board have a Remuneration Committee? 
       Yes                                                                            No 
 
2. Who is responsible for the final approval of your remuneration as the board members?  
Board                                                 CEO                            Responsible Minister 
 
3. is directors’ remuneration linked to corporate and individual performance?  
Yes                                                                                   No 
 
4. What is the composition of your board’s remuneration (for example, sitting allowances, fuel, etc)? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
5. What do you think about the financial compensation for non-executive directors in your 
organisation?  
Probably overpaid                         Adequate                                   Inadequate 
 
6. What systems would you recommend as a way of rewarding directors to motivate them to 
effectively discharge their duties? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................. 
SECTION G: EVALUATION OF BOARD PERFORMANCE 
1. Are directors able to seek independent professional advice at the organisation’s expense? 
Yes                                                                    No 
 
2. Does the board have adequate access to key staff and information to enable it to discharge its 
monitoring and oversight role effectively? Please explain your answer 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
3. What processes are in place for setting objectives and reviewing performance against those 
objectives, for the board as a whole and for individual directors? 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
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4.  
 
How do you rate the Board’s performance in the following key areas? 
Score  
From 5 
(excellent) 
to 1 (poor) 
(a) Setting strategy and objectives  
(b) Monitoring implementation of agreed plans  
(c) Monitoring performance  
(d) Financial control  
(e) Taking key decisions  
(f) Managing risk  
(g) compliance with the law and corporate governance  
(h) Appraising the Chief Executive/Director  
(i) Maintaining a productive relationship with senior management  
 
5. How do you rate the performance of your board as a whole? 
Very good                                             Good                                       Poor     
 
6. How often does your board review progress against its performance appraisal action plan? 
................................................................................................................................................ 
 
7. Who is responsible for evaluating board performance? 
Independent Consultant appointed by Shareholders 
The Individual directors (self-evaluation) 
Board Chairperson and nominations committee 
The Parent Ministry 
Other (specify) 
................................................................................................................................................ 
8. Is the board evaluated as a group or as individual directors? 
 Individual                                                                         Group       
 
9. What tools are used to evaluate board performance?  
Financial performance tools 
Non-financial performance tools                                                                    
Performance Management Scheme e.g. Balanced Scorecard 
Other (specify) 
.................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
10. In your opinion, how effective is the performance evaluation system in assessing directors’ and 
board performance? Please support your answer 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................. 
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11. What are the main challenges encountered in evaluating board performance? 
Lack of evaluation tools 
Reluctance by the board to conduct evaluations 
Weak supervision by the parent Ministry                               
Other (specify) 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
12. Do you think that, as a board member you are adequately equipped to evaluate your performance? 
Please support your answer 
................................................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................................................ 
13. Are you as directors held accountable for your performance and if so what penal provisions are 
there to punish poor performance? 
................................................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................................................ 
 
14. Did the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals impact on the 
evaluation of board performance in your organisation? Please support your answer 
................................................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................................................ 
15. Is Evaluation of Board Performance regarded as essential in your organisation? Please give 
reasons for you answer 
................................................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................................................ 
16. How do your rate shareholder participation in assessing the performance of the board and holding 
them accountable for non-performance of the organisation? Please explain  
       Very Good                                               Good                                            Poor 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................  
 
1. How do you rate your own personal performance in the following areas? 
Score  
From  5 
(excellent) 
to 1 (poor) 
(a) Attendance at Board meetings  
(b) Attendance at Committee meetings (where applicable)  
(c) Understanding the organisation’s objectives and strategy   
(d)       Understanding the role of a Board member  
(e) Working cohesively with your Board colleagues  
(f) Probing issues or proposals that are not clear to you  
g) Using your experience and skills to enhance Board decisions  
(h) Working productively with senior managers  
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17. How does the effectiveness of this organisation’s board compare to that of other boards on which 
you serve? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................ 
 
SECTION H– ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
1. Do you think that corporate governance should be made mandatory or voluntary in Zimbabwe’s 
public entities? Please state reasons for your answer 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
2. In your view, is the current legal and regulatory framework conducive and sufficient to enhance 
the effectiveness of public entities boards in promoting good corporate governance? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
3. Which organisations or authorities are responsible for enforcing corporate governance complaince 
in public entities? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
4. How do you rate the effectiveness of the corporate governance enforcement mechanisms? 
Very good                                               Good                                           Poor        
 
5. If you believe the enforcement mechanisms are poor, please list the factors you believe contribute 
to the poor enforcement? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
6. How do you rate the overall performance of Zimbabwe’s judicial system? 
Very good                                            Good                                            Poor        
 
7. If you believe the judicial system is poor, please list the factors you believe contribute to the 
ineffectiveness judicial system? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
8. In your view, are the penal provisions for misconduct and poor performance being effectively 
implemented? 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................... 
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SECTION I– OVERALL COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS 
What other comments or recommendations (if any) would you make to assist in improving the 
effectiveness of board of directors in promoting good corporate governance in your organisation? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
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APPENDIX C 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENIOR MANAGERS & OTHERS 
 
This questionnaire is part of an academic research in pursuance of a Doctor of Laws Degree (LLD) on 
“Corporate Governance: Effectiveness of Boards in Zimbabwe Public Entities.” It is prepared 
only for the purpose of gathering information to ascertain the effectiveness of boards of public 
entities/parastatals in Zimbabwe. Respondents are requested to provide honest answers to the 
questions below. The data furnished and the identity of the respondents will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
 
SECTION A – PERSONAL INFORMATION 
3. Gender  
Male                                                                          Female         
 
4. Position held in the Organisation 
CEO                                                                      Corporate Secretary         
Senior Management                                               Other 
 
5. Years of relevant experience 
Less than 5 years                                          Between 5 and 10 years 
Over 10 years 
 
 
SECTION B – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
8. What is your understanding of corporate governance? 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
9. Does your organisation comply with Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and 
Parastatals introduced in Zimbabwe in 2010? 
Yes                                                                                                No                 
 
10. Did the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals impact on the 
performance of the board in your organisation? Please explain your answer 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
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11. Do you believe the Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals adequately covers the needs 
of State-owned Enterprises and Parastatals? Please give reasons for your answer. 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................. 
12. Does your organisation have a corporate governance committee? 
Yes                                                                                No 
 
13. How would you rate your organisation’s corporate governance systems and level of compliance? 
Poor                                                      Fair                                        Good 
 
 
SECTION C – ROLE OF THE BOARD 
18. Does your organisation have a written policy for formal briefing and professional development of 
directors to ensure that they have a proper understanding of their role and the organisation’s 
operations and business? 
Yes                                                                                         No 
 
19. Does your organisation’s board of directors have a charter to guide its operations? 
Yes                                                                                          No 
 
20. Does the board have a role in strategy formulation and implementation? 
        Yes                                                                                         No 
Please explain your answer 
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................. 
21. How often does your organisation’s board meet to review the implementation of the strategy? 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
22. How soon are decisions taken at board meetings communicated to the concerned departments for 
implementation? 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
23.  What system has been put in place to ensure that the board and the individual members are 
accountable with respect to their duties and responsibilities? 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
       ...................................................................................................................................................... 
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24. Does the board establish and monitor policies directed at ensuring that the Corporation complies 
with the law and conforms to the highest standards of good corporate governance? 
 Yes                                                                                                        No 
 
 
If so please briefly explain the process involved. 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
25. Are directors able to seek independent professional advice at the organisation’s expense? 
Yes                                                                                      No 
          
26. Is the board adequately empowered to undertake its functions? 
Yes                                                                                       No 
 
27. How do you rate the level of government/ministry involvement in the performance of duties by 
the board? 
       Excessive                                       Sufficient                          Inadequate     
 
Please justify your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
28. How many board committees does your organisation have? Please name the committees. 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
29. Are all existing committees appropriately composed in terms of experience and qualifications? 
Please explain your answer 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
30. Do board committees have clear terms of reference setting out their scope of work, role and 
responsibilities to enable them to perform their functions properly?  
       Yes                                                                                  No      
 
31. How would you rate the effectiveness of your board committees? 
        Very Good                                        Good                                      Poor 
 
32. Does your organisation have a competent company secretary? 
       Yes                                                                                                  No      
 
33. How, in your view, can the board best be supported to effectively perform its role? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................................ 
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SECTION D: BOARD SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT  
1. Who is responsible for appointing your organisation’s board and what criteria are used? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
2. Would you say board members selection and appointments are done transparently?  
Please explain your answer 
.............................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................... 
3. Do you believe that the ownership structure of your organisation has got an effect on the 
appointment, composition and performance of the boards? Please state reasons 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
4. In your opinion, does Zimbabwe have sufficient numbers of skilled and experienced directors to 
meet the needs of its public entities? 
        Yes                                                                                       No 
If no, what effect do you think this shortage has had on the board appointment process in your 
organisation? 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. In the past 6 years what has been the tenure of the boards in your organisation? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
6. In your view, what practices or structures should be put in place to help to promote transparency 
and  suitable board members selection and appointment in public entities? 
.............................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................... 
 
SECTION E: COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 
6. What are the specific mandatory requirements for the compositions of members of your board of 
directors in terms of: 
minimum qualifications,        ...................................................................                                                                                        
board size,                               ................................................................... 
maximum years of tenure,      ................................................................... 
maximum age of directors,     ................................................................... 
minimum or maximum years of experience in specific areas,      ............................................ 
maximum number of board membership each director may hold   .......................................... 
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7. How many directors constitute your present board and what are their professional backgrounds? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
8. How many of the directors are government officials?  
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
9. How many of the directors are women?  
..................................................................................................................................................... 
10. Does your organisation’s board have the right blend of skills, expertise and personalities, and the 
appropriate degree of diversity, to enable it to face today’s and tomorrow’s challenges 
successfully? 
Please justify your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
11. Do you think board composition has an effect on the performance of your organisation? Please 
explain your reasoning 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
 
SECTION F: BOARD REMUNERATION 
1. Does your organisation have a Remuneration Committee? 
        Yes                                                                           No 
 
2. Who is responsible for the final approval of the board members’ remuneration in your 
organisation?  
Board                                             CEO                                          Responsible Minister 
 
3. is directors’ remuneration linked to corporate and individual performance?  
Yes                                                                                      No 
 
4.  What do you think about the financial compensation for non-executive directors in your 
organisation?  
Probably overpaid                                 Adequate                             Inadequate  
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SECTION G: EVALUATION OF BOARD PERFORMANCE 
1. What processes are in place for setting objectives and reviewing performance against those 
objectives, for the board as a whole and for individual directors? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
.....................................................................................................................................................        
2. Who is involved in the evaluation of your organisation’s board? 
Independent Consultant appointed by Shareholders 
The Individual directors (self-evaluation) 
Board Chairperson and nominations committee 
The Parent Ministry 
Other (specify) 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
6. How often are board performance appraisals conducted? 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
7. Is the board evaluated as a group, committee or as individual directors? 
        Individual                                 Committee                                              Group       
 
8. What are the main challenges encountered in evaluating board performance? 
Lack of evaluation tools 
Reluctance by the board to conduct evaluations 
Weak supervision by the parent Ministry                               
Other (specify) 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
9. Do you think that the board members are adequately equipped to evaluate their performance? 
Please support your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
10. Are directors held accountable for their performance and if so, what penal provisions are there to 
punish poor performance? 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
11. Did the Corporate Governance Framework for State Enterprises and Parastatals impact on the 
evaluation of board performance in your organisation? Please state reasons for your answer 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
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12.  
 
How do you rate the Board’s performance in the following key areas? 
Score  
From 1 
(poor) to 
 5 
(excellent) 
(a) Setting strategy and objectives  
(b) Monitoring implementation of agreed plans  
(c) Monitoring performance  
(d) Financial control  
(e) Taking key decisions  
(f) Managing risk  
(g) compliance with the law and corporate governance  
(h) Appraising the Chief Executive/Director  
(i) Maintaining a productive relationship with senior management  
 
13. How do you rate the overall performance of your board? 
Very good                                              Good                                         Poor        
 
14. Does your organisation hold Annual General Meetings?  
Yes                                                                                 No 
 
 
SECTION H– ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
9. Do you think that corporate governance should be made mandatory or voluntary in Zimbabwe’s 
public entities? Please state reasons for your answer 
................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
10. In your view, is the current legal and regulatory framework conducive and sufficient to enhance 
the effectiveness of public entities boards in promoting good corporate governance? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
11. Which organisations or authorities are responsible for enforcing corporate governance complaince 
in public entities? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
12. How do you rate the effectiveness of the corporate governance enforcement mechanisms? 
Very good                                               Good                                        Poor        
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13. If you believe the enforcement mechanisms are poor, please list the factors you believe contribute 
to the poor enforcement? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
14. How do you rate the overall performance of Zimbabwe’s judicial system? 
Very good                                             Good                                             Poor        
 
15. If you believe the judicial system is poor, please list the factors you believe contribute to the 
ineffectiveness judicial system? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
16. In your view, are the penal provisions for misconduct and poor performance being effectively 
implemented? 
................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
SECTION I– OVERALL COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS 
What other comments or recommendations (if any) would you make to assist in improving the 
effectiveness of board of directors in promoting good corporate governance in your organisation? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and cooperation 
   
